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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://web.archive.org/web/20210518013051/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html">
    <title>In China, Apple Compromises on Censorship and Surveillance - The New York Times</title>
    <dc:date>2024-01-30T01:47:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://web.archive.org/web/20210518013051/https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Internal Apple documents reviewed by The New York Times, interviews with 17 current and former Apple employees and four security experts, and new filings made in a court case in the United States last week provide rare insight into the compromises Mr. Cook has made to do business in China. They offer an extensive inside look — many aspects of which have never been reported before — at how Apple has given in to escalating demands from the Chinese authorities.

Two decades ago, as Apple’s operations chief, Mr. Cook spearheaded the company’s entrance into China, a move that helped make Apple the most valuable company in the world and made him the heir apparent to Steve Jobs. Apple now assembles nearly all of its products and earns a fifth of its revenue in the China region. But just as Mr. Cook figured out how to make China work for Apple, China is making Apple work for the Chinese government.

Mr. Cook often talks about Apple’s commitment to civil liberties and privacy. But to stay on the right side of Chinese regulators, his company has put the data of its Chinese customers at risk and has aided government censorship in the Chinese version of its App Store. After Chinese employees complained, it even dropped the “Designed by Apple in California” slogan from the backs of iPhones.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy humanrights apple</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:f43ee8c7e78e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:humanrights"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:apple"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://github.com/IAmStoxe/wirehole">
    <title>IAmStoxe/wirehole: WireHole is a combination of WireGuard, Pi-hole, and Unbound in a docker-compose project with the intent of enabling users to quickly and easily create a personally managed full or split-tunnel WireGuard VPN with ad blocking capabilitie</title>
    <dc:date>2023-10-29T13:53:15+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://github.com/IAmStoxe/wirehole</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[WireHole is a combination of WireGuard, Pi-hole, and Unbound in a docker-compose project with the intent of enabling users to quickly and easily create a personally managed full or split-tunnel WireGuard VPN with ad blocking capabilities thanks to Pi-hole, and DNS caching, additional privacy options, and upstream providers via Unbound.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy tools networking vpn docker synology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:d633bc3d69ca/</dc:identifier>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://backlinko.com/ad-blockers-users">
    <title>Ad Blockers Usage and Demographic Statistics in 2023</title>
    <dc:date>2023-09-20T20:32:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://backlinko.com/ad-blockers-users</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Based on data from AudienceProject, ad blockers in the US are predominantly used by men. 49% of male respondents in the US reported the use of ad blockers. Interestingly, the disparity between male and female users is far more pronounced in the US than it is globally. Just 33% of US women use ad blockers.  By age group, ad blockers in the US are most popular with internet users aged 15-25. Meanwhile, the lowest usage of ad blockers is seen among the 36-45 age group, with 38% of respondents in this demographic using blocking software.  Here’s a table showing the US ad blocker penetration rate by age group (as of 2020):]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy analytics marketing</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:5ed84f0145f1/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/08/youtube-may-face-billions-in-fines-if-ftc-confirms-child-privacy-violations/">
    <title>YouTube may face billions in fines if FTC confirms child privacy violations | Ars Technica</title>
    <dc:date>2023-08-25T02:43:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/08/youtube-may-face-billions-in-fines-if-ftc-confirms-child-privacy-violations/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Both groups ran ad campaigns to test if YouTube was really blocking all personalized ads from appearing in children's channels, as YouTube said it was. Both found that "Google and YouTube permit and report on behavioral ad targeting on 'made-for-kids' videos, even though neither should be possible under COPPA."

Google spokesperson Michael Aciman told The New York Times that these reports "point to a fundamental misunderstanding of how advertising works on made-for-kids content."

"We do not allow ads personalization on made-for-kids content, and we do not allow advertisers to target children with ads across any of our products,” Aciman told The Times.

But in their letter, child advocates told FTC Chair Lina Khan that they have "serious questions" about whether Google is being honest about ad targeting. After running targeted ad campaigns, Fairplay reported that YouTube placed its behavioral ads on children's channels 1,446 times. If YouTube was operating in compliance with COPPA as it claimed, Fairplay said that these campaigns would have resulted in zero ad placements.]]></description>
<dc:subject>google advertising privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:e064baee3b0e/</dc:identifier>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/07/instead-of-obtaining-a-warrant-the-nsa-would-like-to-keep-buying-your-data/">
    <title>Instead of obtaining a warrant, the NSA would like to keep buying your data | Ars Technica</title>
    <dc:date>2023-07-29T15:42:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/07/instead-of-obtaining-a-warrant-the-nsa-would-like-to-keep-buying-your-data/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[officials at the National Security Agency (NSA) have approached lawmakers charged with its oversight about opposing an amendment that would prevent it from paying companies for location data instead of obtaining a warrant in court.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:95de8dd1663a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6325034/#">
    <title>Property and human genetic information - PMC</title>
    <dc:date>2023-07-22T15:16:24+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6325034/#</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Another cluster of philosophical conceptions of property (exemplified, among others, by Kant and Nozick) focuses on self-ownership, the idea that all individuals have complete and full rights over their bodies, minds, and talents, and that infringing on these limits is morally reprehensible. Such a conception may be closer to the intuition that since we own our bodies, we also own the GI. However, geneticist will probably protest: Genes as such—understood as the human genome—are not something that can be claimed by individuals. If anything, they are common property. Here, it may be counter-replied that our specific genetic make-up makes us who we are, and cannot be subsumed under the general heading of ‘the human genome’ (even if your specific house belongs to the general class ‘houses’, it is your house and not something held in common). But here it may still be said, drawing on the Lockean intuition, that you have not done anything to acquire your genome. It is ultimately a rather random mix of just four nucleotide bases that we all have in common.3

Still, this “my specific genome” line of thought probably is the closest we get to something which aligns with the intuition “I own my body hence I own the GI”. However, and assuming that the original sample was obtained in a legitimate manner, it is hard to see that bodily self-ownership automatically extends to GI: Surely, your heart belongs to you. But if a health scientist monitors your heartbeat—derives information from your heart—do you then by extension own that information? After all, the information does derive from something we believe trivially belongs to you, namely your heart. Furthermore, the concept of self-ownership and the idea that all individuals have complete and full rights over minds and talents arguably also extends to the ‘fruits of the mind’. Hence, this theory seamlessly allows for “I own the results of my creative efforts” arguments which may in effect compete with the “I own my body hence I own my GI” narrative.4

As can be seen, both the Lockean model and the theories of self-ownership do provide arguments both for and against private ownership of GI, but are clearly (and for obvious reasons) not formulated with GI in mind. Nevertheless, we find application of these theoretical considerations to GI in the field of law. The next step, then, is to explore how the general theories regarding property and ownership have informed the law(s) vis-à-vis GI.]]></description>
<dc:subject>health law privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:47f59d541a61/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:health"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://github.com/awesome-selfhosted/awesome-selfhosted#archiving-and-digital-preservation-dp">
    <title>GitHub - awesome-selfhosted/awesome-selfhosted: A list of Free Software network services and web applications which can be hosted on your own servers</title>
    <dc:date>2023-03-12T16:58:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://github.com/awesome-selfhosted/awesome-selfhosted#archiving-and-digital-preservation-dp</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Self-hosting is the practice of hosting and managing applications on your own server(s) instead of consuming from SaaSS providers.

This is a list of Free Software network services and web applications which can be hosted on your own server(s). Non-Free software is listed on the Non-Free page.]]></description>
<dc:subject>tools server apps privacy projects</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:f40862eea019/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.photoprism.app/">
    <title>Browse Your Life in Pictures – PhotoPrism</title>
    <dc:date>2023-03-12T16:15:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.photoprism.app/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[PhotoPrism® is an AI-Powered Photos App for the Decentralized Web. It makes use of the latest technologies to tag and find pictures automatically without getting in your way. You can run it at home, on a private server, or in the cloud.]]></description>
<dc:subject>photos tools apps privacy projects</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:a75f8863ca71/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LKp2gikIkD8">
    <title>Weird Kids' Videos and Gaming the Algorithm - YouTube</title>
    <dc:date>2022-12-19T19:40:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LKp2gikIkD8</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Clickbait Title: Video Criticism YouTube Exploitation Meta Commentary Pregnant Algorithm Educational Spam Fidget Spinner Buried Alive For Kids

Very late in the process of making this I decided to change the name, largely because the moment I made the original title "YouTube and the Business of Exploiting Children" public in a promotional Tweet I realized that there was an entire constellation of related issues that I wanted to talk about. From channels that exist to get kids hooked on gambling to parents subjecting their children to abusive conditions as "pranks", there's a lot of shady stuff going on. In that context, weird spam and unsettling videos about poop didn't rank high enough to warrant burning a title that good.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy ai machinelearning google business</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:a816a98ec1d6/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ai"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:machinelearning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:business"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.theverge.com/2022/9/20/23356434/youtube-dislike-not-interested-buttons-bad-recommendations-mozilla-report">
    <title>YouTube’s ‘dislike’ and ‘not interested’ buttons barely work, study finds - The Verge</title>
    <dc:date>2022-12-13T14:12:09+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.theverge.com/2022/9/20/23356434/youtube-dislike-not-interested-buttons-bad-recommendations-mozilla-report</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[A Mozilla report found feedback buttons didn’t stop the majority of similar recommendations

Even when users tell YouTube they aren’t interested in certain types of videos, similar recommendations keep coming, a new study by Mozilla found.

Using video recommendations data from more than 20,000 YouTube users, Mozilla researchers found that buttons like “not interested,” “dislike,” “stop recommending channel,” and “remove from watch history” are largely ineffective at preventing similar content from being recommended. Even at their best, these buttons still allow through more than half the recommendations similar to what a user said they weren’t interested in, the report found. At their worst, the buttons barely made a dent in blocking similar videos.]]></description>
<dc:subject>google privacy ux</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:7b84d190e980/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ux"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-declined-to-implement-16-web-apis-in-safari-due-to-privacy-concerns/">
    <title>Apple declined to implement 16 Web APIs in Safari due to privacy concerns | ZDNet</title>
    <dc:date>2022-02-04T15:39:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-declined-to-implement-16-web-apis-in-safari-due-to-privacy-concerns/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Apple said this week that it declined to implement 16 new web technologies (Web APIs) in Safari because they posed a threat to user privacy by opening new avenues for user fingerprinting.

Technologies that Apple declined to include in Safari because of user fingerprinting concerns include:

Web Bluetooth - Allows websites to connect to nearby Bluetooth LE devices.
Web MIDI API - Allows websites to enumerate, manipulate and access MIDI devices.
Magnetometer API - Allows websites to access data about the local magnetic field around a user, as detected by the device's primary magnetometer sensor.
Web NFC API - Allows websites to communicate with NFC tags through a device's NFC reader.
Device Memory API - Allows websites to receive the approximate amount of device memory in gigabytes.
Network Information API - Provides information about the connection a device is using to communicate with the network and provides a means for scripts to be notified if the connection type changes
Battery Status API - Allows websites to receive information about the battery status of the hosting device.
Web Bluetooth Scanning - Allows websites to scan for nearby Bluetooth LE devices.
Ambient Light Sensor - Lets websites get the current light level or illuminance of the ambient light around the hosting device via the device's native sensors.
HDCP Policy Check extension for EME - Allows websites to check for HDCP policies, used in media streaming/playback.
Proximity Sensor - Allows websites to retrieve data about the distance between a device and an object, as measured by a proximity sensor.
WebHID - Allows websites to retrieve information about locally connected Human Interface Device (HID) devices.
Serial API - Allows websites to write and read data from serial interfaces, used by devices such as microcontrollers, 3D printers, and othes.
Web USB - Lets websites communicate with devices via USB (Universal Serial Bus).
Geolocation Sensor (background geolocation) - A more modern version of the older Geolocation API that lets websites access geolocation data.
User Idle Detection - Lets website know when a user is idle.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy apple security safari html5 standards</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:075cc10259b6/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:apple"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:safari"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:html5"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:standards"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.theverge.com/2021/12/9/22820381/tile-life360-location-tracking-data-privacy">
    <title>Life360 sells its family location tracking data — now it owns Tile - The Verge</title>
    <dc:date>2021-12-10T17:29:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.theverge.com/2021/12/9/22820381/tile-life360-location-tracking-data-privacy</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The Verge also spoke to Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) staff technologist Bennett Cyphers, who pointed out that very few apps disclose what companies they’re actually sharing data with because they’re not legally required to do so. It’s not only that the apps aren’t telling users where their data is going, and the companies that pass the data on refuse to tell their customers how it was obtained. As he put it, “Especially the ones [data brokers] that deal in location data, they consider the apps that they collect data from to be trade secrets, and they won’t reveal that to anyone, in response to anything.”

Based on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests on situations where the government has obtained location data from a broker, in every case the EFF has seen, the government has no idea where the data is coming from. “Secrecy is these companies bread and butter, they cannot exist out in the sunlight. They depend on people not understanding where things are coming from, where they’re going, where they’re actually getting their data,” says Cypher about the information brokers.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy technology business</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:fc2c1110deb8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:technology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:business"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/re-identification-of-anonymized-data/GLTR-04-2017/">
    <title>Georgetown Law Technology Review</title>
    <dc:date>2021-12-08T20:18:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/re-identification-of-anonymized-data/GLTR-04-2017/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[owever, today’s techniques of re-identification can nullify scrubbing and compromise privacy. The examples of Governor Weld, Netflix, AOL, and NYC taxi illustrate how data scrubbed of direct personal identifiers can still be readily re-identified if it is combined with another set that also contains data about the same individuals.

Once a dataset is released to the public it can never be strengthened, only ‘weakened’ by future information that may be released that could lead to that information being re-identified.32 Re-identification can also be achieved by anyone from government entities, to data brokers, to blackmailers, and is nearly impossible to trace. Once a comprehensive database of previously ‘anonymized’ data is created, it can readily be de-identified. One data broker, InfoUSA, alone claims to have data on 235 million US consumers and uses 29 billion records from over 100 sources to update its database of raw data every year. 33

The re-identification of anonymized data has far reaching privacy implications. For example, this information can be used to bypass password recovery mechanisms for email and bank accounts.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:0dffa223b53f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.theregister.com/2021/10/22/google_facebook_antitrust_complaint/">
    <title>Google 'colluded' with Facebook to bypass Apple privacy • The Register</title>
    <dc:date>2021-10-25T23:54:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.theregister.com/2021/10/22/google_facebook_antitrust_complaint/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Several years ago, to deal with the competitive threat of header bidding – a way for multiple ad exchanges to get a fair shot at winning an automated auction for ad space – Google allegedly hatched a plan called "Jedi" to ensure that its ad exchange always won.

And in 2017, after Facebook announced plans to support header bidding, Google, it's claimed, struck a deal with Facebook – dubbed "Jedi Blue" – in which the two internet behemoths would "work together to identify users using Apple products," and set up "quotas for how often Facebook would win publishers’ auctions."

]]></description>
<dc:subject>google facebook business technology advertising privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:5a40a3cfa227/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:facebook"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:business"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:technology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://about.ads.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/post/september-2021/how-zero-party-data-is-changing-trust-and-relevance-in-advertising">
    <title>Zero-party data: Trust &amp; relevance in ads - Microsoft Advertising</title>
    <dc:date>2021-10-24T17:29:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://about.ads.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/post/september-2021/how-zero-party-data-is-changing-trust-and-relevance-in-advertising</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Zero-party data is a type of consented data beyond standard information, such as someone’s email address or phone number, that you may gather to deliver a service or experience. It could include product interests, personal context, and preferences, and it is exchanged for value and helps brands better understand an individual. People voluntarily share it in exchange for some explicit value, such as tailored communications or a more personalized experience for the customer. It is grounded in transparency and control and is how brands improve relevancy and the value exchange they offer.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>ads data privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:4ca255b72647/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ads"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:data"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://robertheaton.com/2014/01/20/cookieless-user-tracking-for-douchebags/">
    <title>Cookieless user tracking for douchebags | Robert Heaton</title>
    <dc:date>2021-09-07T12:22:25+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://robertheaton.com/2014/01/20/cookieless-user-tracking-for-douchebags/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[HTTP caching is great. If I am using the same image on every page of my site, why send all that data to a client every time they load a new page? HTTP caching instead allows a client to store the resources it receives from a server. When requesting a resource it has seen and stored before, the client says “here is some information about the version of this resource that I already have stored - should I just use this one?” The server can then say “yep, that’s still valid, just use that” and return a blank 304 or “no, there’s a new version, here it is” and return 200 and the updated resource.

Alarm bells should now be going off in your head. ]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:1a1cfd62c5c9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/s/technology/2021/08/29/stop-facebook-tracking/?pwapi_token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWJpZCI6IjM5MjQ4OTAyIiwicmVhc29uIjoiZ2lmdCIsIm5iZiI6MTYzMDM1MzE0MCwiaXNzIjoic3Vic2NyaXB0aW9ucyIsImV4cCI6MTYzMTU2Mjc0MCwiaWF0IjoxNjMwMzUzMTQwLCJqdGkiOiI4OWM4MDBhYS00MzBmLTRhMGEtYWI5MC0wM2YyYjQwYzQ1NjkiLCJ1cmwiOiJodHRwczovL3d3dy53YXNoaW5ndG9ucG9zdC5jb20vdGVjaG5vbG9neS8yMDIxLzA4LzI5L3N0b3AtZmFjZWJvb2stdHJhY2tpbmcvIn0.twDV3TSOedsZb8OZTGgCl2_JUisClHGEetcKEAe6BeI">
    <title>How to stop Facebook tracking - The Washington Post</title>
    <dc:date>2021-08-31T12:14:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/s/technology/2021/08/29/stop-facebook-tracking/?pwapi_token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWJpZCI6IjM5MjQ4OTAyIiwicmVhc29uIjoiZ2lmdCIsIm5iZiI6MTYzMDM1MzE0MCwiaXNzIjoic3Vic2NyaXB0aW9ucyIsImV4cCI6MTYzMTU2Mjc0MCwiaWF0IjoxNjMwMzUzMTQwLCJqdGkiOiI4OWM4MDBhYS00MzBmLTRhMGEtYWI5MC0wM2YyYjQwYzQ1NjkiLCJ1cmwiOiJodHRwczovL3d3dy53YXNoaW5ndG9ucG9zdC5jb20vdGVjaG5vbG9neS8yMDIxLzA4LzI5L3N0b3AtZmFjZWJvb2stdHJhY2tpbmcvIn0.twDV3TSOedsZb8OZTGgCl2_JUisClHGEetcKEAe6BeI</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><dc:subject>facebook howto privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:0a2f80f85559/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:facebook"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:howto"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/01/europes-top-court-says-active-consent-is-needed-for-tracking-cookies/">
    <title>Europe’s top court says active consent is needed for tracking cookies | TechCrunch</title>
    <dc:date>2021-05-31T15:42:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/01/europes-top-court-says-active-consent-is-needed-for-tracking-cookies/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[So, to sum up, pre-checked consent boxes (or cookie banners that tell you a cookie has already been dropped and pointlessly invite you to click ‘ok’) aren’t valid under EU law. 

Furthermore cookie consent can’t be bundled with another purpose (in the Planet49 case the promotional lottery) — at least if that fuzzy signal is being used to stand for consent.

There’s also an interesting new requirement which looks set to shrink the ability of service operators to obfuscate how persistently they’re tracking Internet users.

For consent to cookies to be legally valid the court now says the user must be provided with some specific information on the tracking, namely: How long the cookie will operate, and who their data will be shared with. So, er, awkward…]]></description>
<dc:subject>law privacy gdpr ux</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:369df466ec34/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:gdpr"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ux"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1397032784703655938.html">
    <title>Thread by @RobertGReeve on Thread Reader App – Thread Reader App</title>
    <dc:date>2021-05-30T04:24:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1397032784703655938.html</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Here's where it gets truly nuts, though.

If my phone is regularly in the same GPS location as another phone, they take note of that. They start reconstructing the web of people I'm in regular contact with.
The advertisers can cross-reference my interests and browsing history and purchase history to those around me. It starts showing ME different ads based on the people AROUND me.

Family. Friends. Coworkers.
It will serve me ads for things I DON'T WANT, but it knows someone I'm in regular contact with might want.

To subliminally get me to start a conversation about, I don't know, fucking toothpaste.

It never needed to listen to me for this. It's just comparing aggregated metadata.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Facebook advertising google privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:4e3c3118f071/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:Facebook"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://signal.org/blog/the-instagram-ads-you-will-never-see/">
    <title>Signal &gt;&gt; Blog &gt;&gt; The Instagram ads Facebook won't show you</title>
    <dc:date>2021-05-05T00:02:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://signal.org/blog/the-instagram-ads-you-will-never-see/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Access denied

We created a multi-variant targeted ad designed to show you the personal data that Facebook collects about you and sells access to. The ad would simply display some of the information collected about the viewer which the advertising platform uses. Facebook was not into that idea.

Ad account disabled. This ad account, its ads and some of its advertising assets are disabled. You can't use it to run ads.

Facebook is more than willing to sell visibility into people’s lives, unless it’s to tell people about how their data is being used. Being transparent about how ads use people’s data is apparently enough to get banned; in Facebook’s world, the only acceptable usage is to hide what you’re doing from your audience.

So, here are some examples of the targeted ads that you’ll never see on Instagram. Yours would have been so you.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:96a6d3af74e1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/move-over-ccpa-the-california-privacy-rights-act-gets-the-spotlight-now">
    <title>Move Over, CCPA: The California Privacy Rights Act Gets the Spotlight Now</title>
    <dc:date>2021-03-04T15:41:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/move-over-ccpa-the-california-privacy-rights-act-gets-the-spotlight-now</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The California Privacy Rights Act, a ballot initiative approved by California voters, expands the state’s consumer privacy law and creates an omnibus privacy regulation in the state. Baker Botts attorneys detail the additional consumer rights afforded by the act and new privacy obligations for businesses.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law ccpa gdpr</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:6bb0531026fc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ccpa"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:gdpr"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://onezero.medium.com/clubhouse-is-suggesting-users-invite-their-drug-dealers-and-therapists-a8161b3062fc">
    <title>Clubhouse Is Suggesting Users Invite Their Drug Dealers and Therapists | by Will Oremus | Feb, 2021 | OneZero</title>
    <dc:date>2021-02-26T15:36:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://onezero.medium.com/clubhouse-is-suggesting-users-invite-their-drug-dealers-and-therapists-a8161b3062fc</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[When you join the fast-growing, invite-only social media app Clubhouse — lucky you! — one of the first things the app will ask you to do is grant it access to your iPhone’s contacts. A finger icon points to the “OK” button, which is also in a bolder font and more enticing than the adjacent “Don’t Allow” option. You don’t have to do it, but if you don’t, you lose the ability to invite anyone else to Clubhouse.
Once you’ve agreed to upload your phone’s address book, Clubhouse uses it to recommend people to follow who are already on the app, which is common practice for social apps these days. But it soon becomes apparent that Clubhouse also takes it a few steps further, in ways that are both creative and a little creepy.
When I granted the app access to my contacts, within hours it was nudging me to invite my former pediatrician, barber, and a health worker who once cared for my dying father to join Clubhouse — and sending me push notifications every time someone from my contacts signed up so I could welcome them via private chat and “walk them in.”]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy socialmedia socialnetworking</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:5962340b6680/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:socialmedia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:socialnetworking"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.wsj.com/articles/behavioral-ad-targeting-not-paying-off-for-publishers-study-suggests-11559167195">
    <title>Behavioral Ad Targeting Not Paying Off for Publishers, Study Suggests - WSJ</title>
    <dc:date>2021-02-01T23:24:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.wsj.com/articles/behavioral-ad-targeting-not-paying-off-for-publishers-study-suggests-11559167195</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Behavioral Ad Targeting Not Paying Off for Publishers, Study Suggests
Finding could affect where publishers line up in brewing privacy battles
By  Keach Hagey
May 29, 2019 5:59 pm ET


Are creepy advertisements really necessary to support the free web?

A new academic study suggests they aren’t.

Behavioral advertising, which involves collecting data about readers’ online behavior and using it to serve them specially tailored ads, often through bits of code called cookies, has become the dominant force in digital advertising in recent years.

But in one of the first empirical studies of the impacts of behaviorally targeted advertising on online publishers’ revenue, researchers at the University of Minnesota, University of California, Irvine, and Carnegie Mellon University suggest publishers only get about 4% more revenue for an ad impression that has a cookie enabled than for one that doesn’t. The study tracked millions of ad transactions at a large U.S. media company over the course of one week.

That modest gain for publishers stands in contrast to the vastly larger sums advertisers are willing to pay for behaviorally targeted ads. A 2009 study by Howard Beales, a professor at George Washington University School of Business and a former director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission, found advertisers are willing to pay 2.68 times more for a behaviorally targeted ad than one that wasn’t.

Much of the premium likely is being eaten up by the so-called “ad tech tax,” the middlemen’s fees that eat up 60 cents of every dollar spent on programmatic ads, according to marketing intelligence firm Warc.

The online ad ecosystem is complex and opaque, said Alessandro Acquisti, a professor of information technology and public policy at Carnegie Mellon’s Heinz College, who conducted the study along with Veronica Marotta and Vibhanshu Abhishek. It is “hard to understand how much value each participant in the ecosystem is adding to the process, and whether the fees different intermediaries receive are commensurate to their value added,” he said.

Publishers’ inability to benefit much from behavioral targeting could have implications for policy as lawmakers in Washington, D.C., debate the shape of national privacy legislation. The ad industry is pushing for new federal rules, partly to head off the risk of a state-by-state patchwork of privacy laws, following the passage of California’s own privacy regulations.

“It is a huge finding in terms of the policy debate,” said Ashkan Soltani, one of the authors of the California Consumer Privacy Act who formerly served as the chief technologist for the FTC. (Mr. Soltani also served as a technical adviser to The Wall Street Journal’s 2012 series on privacy, “What They Know.”)

“All of these externalities with regard to the ad economy—the harm to privacy, the expansion of government surveillance, the ability to microtarget and drive divisive content—were often justified to industry because of this ‘huge’ value to publishers,” Mr. Soltani said.

The shift toward behavioral targeting has come along with two other trends: the emergence of the Google- Facebook duopoly, which in 2018 accounted for 58% of U.S. digital ad spending, according to eMarketer Inc.; and the stalling of digital display ad revenue growth for many digital publishers.

A 2015 report by marketing and e-commerce research firm Econsultancy found that 40% of digital publishers’ display ad revenue was stagnant or shrinking. Over the past year, many of the largest digital publishers have been forced to cut staff and explore consolidation as growth has stalled.

Michael Zimbalist, the chief strategy and innovation officer at Philadelphia Media Network LLC who previously spent a decade working in digital advertising at New York Times Co. , argues the value of behavioral advertising to publishers was always misrepresented.

“Behavioral targeting has been completely overhyped in its value for publishers from the day it was first invented,” he said.


Write to Keach Hagey at keach.hagey@wsj.com]]></description>
<dc:subject>psychology marketing advertising analytics privacy facebook</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:3ff649155b31/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:marketing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analytics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:facebook"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/technology/personaltech/fingerprinting-track-devices-what-to-do.html">
    <title>‘Fingerprinting’ to Track Us Online Is on the Rise. Here’s What to Do. - The New York Times</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-25T15:50:35+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/technology/personaltech/fingerprinting-track-devices-what-to-do.html</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[And so it is with the rise of so-called fingerprinting, which security researchers are calling a next-generation tracking technology.

What is it exactly? Fingerprinting involves looking at the many characteristics of your mobile device or computer, like the screen resolution, operating system and model, and triangulating this information to pinpoint and follow you as you browse the web and use apps. Once enough device characteristics are known, the theory goes, the data can be assembled into a profile that helps identify you the way a fingerprint would.

“Get enough of those attributes together and it creates essentially a bar code,” said Peter Dolanjski, a product lead for Mozilla’s Firefox web browser, who is studying fingerprinting. “That bar code is absolutely uniquely identifiable.”
And here’s the bad news: The technique happens invisibly in the background in apps and websites. That makes it tougher to detect and combat than its predecessor, the web cookie, which was a tracker stored on our devices. The solutions to blocking fingerprinting are also limited.

Security researchers discovered fingerprinting as a tracking method about seven years ago, but it was rarely discussed until recently. Only about 3.5 percent of the most popular websites use it today for tracking, but that’s up from about 1.6 percent in 2016, according to Mozilla. And an unknown number of mobile apps also use fingerprinting.

All of this is not a reason to panic, but it is a reason to be concerned. As fingerprinting becomes more popular, here’s what you need to know about it and what we can do.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy advertising</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:8bce03ea665e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:advertising"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.analyticsmania.com/post/introduction-to-google-tag-manager-server-side-tagging/">
    <title>Introduction to Google Tag Manager Server-side Tagging - Analytics Mania</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-22T17:57:35+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.analyticsmania.com/post/introduction-to-google-tag-manager-server-side-tagging/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[When the public beta was launched on August 12, 2020, the audience split into several groups. Some people were cheering and shouting “THIS IS HUUUUGE” while others were a little confused asking “I not sure I understand this. Is it good for marketers?”. And this is totally understandable. The topic is not an easy one to grasp. Especially, if you are coming from a non-technical background.

That’s why the goal of this blog post is not to give you the “ultimate definitive” guide into how to work with Google Tag Manager server-side tagging. Instead, I wanted to provide an introduction for beginners (in the server-side) and those who have no idea why this might be useful at all.

So if you are looking for something like “GTM server-side tagging for beginners” or “Google Tag Manager server-side tagging tutorial for beginners”, you’ve come to the right place. However, keep in mind that in this context, the word “beginner” refers to someone who does not know what server-side is. However, you still need to have a good understanding of how website tracking with GTM works in general.

If your clients ask whether they need to adopt server-side tagging, hopefully, you will be able to answer that question after reading my guide and/or watching the video.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>googletagmanager google webdev performance privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:facdb43248ac/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:googletagmanager"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webdev"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:performance"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.simoahava.com/analytics/server-side-tagging-google-tag-manager/#circumvent-content-blocking">
    <title>Server-side Tagging In Google Tag Manager | Simo Ahava's blog</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-22T17:20:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.simoahava.com/analytics/server-side-tagging-google-tag-manager/#circumvent-content-blocking</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Google Tag Manager has now released Server-side tagging into public beta. In this lengthy article, we’ll take a look at what Server-side tagging is, how it should (and should not) be used, and what its implications are on the broader digital analytics community.
 
[…]

KEY CONCERNS

Moving tracking away from the device to behind the veil of the server doesn’t come without its concerns.
The paradigm shift that we can envision with GTM’s Server-side tagging isn’t just one of improving data collection; it’s also one of obfuscating it.
CIRCUMVENT CONTENT BLOCKING

One of the first knee-jerk reactions many probably have to Server-side tagging has to do with content blocking and browser tracking protections in general.
A typical approach for privacy-friendly browsers is to restrict or downright block communications between the browser and known trackers. The list of known trackers is usually based on a blocklist such as Disconnect.Me, but it could also be algorithmic and on-device, such as with Intelligent Tracking Prevention.
Indeed, an endpoint like google-analytics.com could well be targeted by the heuristics used in content blockers, but my-server-side.domain.com probably isn’t.
 Direct hit to GA is blocked, but hit proxied via the Server container isn't.
Direct hit to GA is blocked, but hit proxied via the Server container isn't.
Can you use Server-side tagging to circumvent content blockers? Absolutely. Should you? Definitely not; at least if that’s your primary reason.
However, this does raise an interesting paradox.
It’s not your fault that content blockers do not target your domains.
You are not obliged to exhaustively test if all the actual endpoints are blocked by the browser. That would be a huge waste of resources and counter-productive to what Server-side tagging first and foremost does: reduce client load.
Once server-side proxies become the norm (with a popular tool like Google Tag Manager likely to spearhead the transition), content blockers will adapt their heuristics to not just look at domains but also the information that is being sent.
The right course of action is to be transparent at what data is being collected on your site, placing behind consent that which is required by law, and giving opt-out mechanisms for the rest.
And if it just so happens that your endpoint gets blocked by content blockers or its URL string is stripped of all useful information, don’t try to “fix” this.
Always err on the side of maximum privacy.
Always assume that the user knows exactly what they are doing when they choose to block your data collection. Don’t defy their wishes.
OPAQUE DATA COLLECTION

When there’s a data leak or a security breach in a company, the party uncovering this is often not related to the company at all.
The web is full of companies and individuals who exhaustively audit the HTTP traffic in and out of websites, and their work has been instrumental in uncovering things like Magecart attacks and domain takeovers.
Cookie leaks, cross-site scripting injections, CSP workarounds, and all manner of nasty JavaScript hacks can typically be audited directly in the browser, because the vendor scripts are running right there under the watchful eyes of the auditors.
When you move to Server-side tagging, you are reducing the amount of third-party JavaScript running on the site, which is good. It’s a great step to mitigating the issues listed above.
However, you are also removing all traces of what is actually done with the data bundled in the requests. Auditors will have a hard time deciphering just what the event stream to your endpoint actually does, and whether you are compromising the user’s right to privacy and security behind the veil of the server, where client-side tools can’t reach it.
This means that you must document carefully what type of data is being collected and processed on your site. You are already obliged to do so under legal frameworks like GDPR and CCPA/CPRAA, which require you to be upfront and transparent about data collection, storage, and processing.
Always err on the side of maximum privacy.
You should take preemptive and proactive measures to do transparency and compliance right in order to avoid litigation and potential brand damage when you get caught in the act.
In short, Server-side tagging means running a Google Tag Manager container in a server-side environment (at the time of writing, the only available environment is the Google Cloud Platform, though I’m certain more options will become available in good time).
Many of the benefits and concerns are tackled in their respective chapters. Even so, I want to emphasize that Server-side tagging has the potential to overturn the current dynamic of data collection and governance for an organization. You own and have full control over the server-side environment. You have access to tools and methods to thoroughly vet and validate the traffic between network sources and your advertising and analytics endpoints.
You can run a fully functional digital analytics and marketing setup without loading any third-party code in the user’s browser or device. With appropriate monitoring in place, you can say goodbye to PII and credential leaks, cross-site tracking traps, and bloated third-party JavaScript encumbering the client.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy webdev google googletagmanager marketing tracking</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:dd20c68321f3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webdev"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:googletagmanager"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:marketing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:tracking"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://cryptome.org/0003/tor-spy.htm">
    <title>TOR Made for USG Open Source Spying Says Maker</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-10T20:27:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://cryptome.org/0003/tor-spy.htm</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2011 16:57:39 -0400
From: Michael Reed <reed[at]inet.org>
To: tor-talk[at]lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Iran cracks down on web dissident technology

On 03/22/2011 12:08 PM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 22, 2011 at 11:23 AM, Joe Btfsplk<joebtfsplk[at]gmx.com>  wrote:
>> Why would any govt create something their enemies can easily use against
>> them, then continue funding it once they know it helps the enemy, if a govt
>> has absolutely no control over it?  It's that simple.  It would seem a very
>> bad idea.  Stop looking at it from a conspiracy standpoint&  consider it as
>> a common sense question.
> Because it helps the government as well. An anonymity network that
> only the US government uses is fairly useless. One that everyone uses
> is much more useful, and if your enemies use it as well that's very
> good, because then they can't cut off access without undoing their own
> work.

BINGO, we have a winner!  The original *QUESTION* posed that led to the 
invention of Onion Routing was, "Can we build a system that allows for 
bi-directional communications over the Internet where the source and 
destination cannot be determined by a mid-point?"  The *PURPOSE* was for 
DoD / Intelligence usage (open source intelligence gathering, covering 
of forward deployed assets, whatever).  Not helping dissidents in 
repressive countries.  Not assisting criminals in covering their 
electronic tracks.  Not helping bit-torrent users avoid MPAA/RIAA 
prosecution.  Not giving a 10 year old a way to bypass an anti-porn 
filter.  Of course, we knew those would be other unavoidable uses for 
the technology, but that was immaterial to the problem at hand we were 
trying to solve (and if those uses were going to give us more cover 
traffic to better hide what we wanted to use the network for, all the 
better...I once told a flag officer that much to his chagrin).  I should 
know, I was the recipient of that question from David, and Paul was 
brought into the mix a few days later after I had sketched out a basic 
(flawed) design for the original Onion Routing.

The short answer to your question of "Why would the government do this?" 
is because it is in the best interests of some parts of the government 
to have this capability...  Now enough of the conspiracy theories...

-Michael
_______________________________________________
tor-talk mailing list
tor-talk[at]lists.torproject.org]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy security history military crypto</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:7b6e92f01505/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:history"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:military"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:crypto"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://restoreprivacy.com/google-alternatives/">
    <title>Alternatives to Google Products (Complete List for 2020)</title>
    <dc:date>2020-10-26T15:55:37+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://restoreprivacy.com/google-alternatives/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Google analytics alternative

For website admins, there are many reasons to use an alternative to Google analytics. Aside from privacy concerns, there are also faster and more user-friendly alternatives that also respect your visitors’ privacy.

Clicky is a great alternative to Google Analytics that truncates and anonymizes visitor IP addresses by default. It is lightweight, user-friendly, and fully compliant with GDPR regulations, while also being certified by Privacy Shield.
Matomo (formerly Piwik) is an open-source analytics platform that respects the privacy of visitors by anonymizing and truncating visitor IP addresses (if enabled by the website admin). It is also certified to respect user privacy.
Fathom Analytics is an open source alternative to Google Analytics that’s available on Github here. It’s minimal, fast, and lightweight.
Get Insights – Another privacy-focused analytics platform, with a full analytics suite. The front-end client is open source and available here.
AT Internet is a France-based analytics provider that is fully GDPR compliant, with all data stored on French servers, and a good track record going back to 1996.
Many websites host Google Analytics because they run Google Adsense campaigns. Without Google Analytics, tracking performance of these campaigns would be difficult. Nonetheless, there are still better options for privacy.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy analytics google</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:6a9903a51146/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analytics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://trustarc.com/blog/2019/10/03/eu-high-court-confirms-pre-ticked-boxes-are-insufficient-for-cookie-consent/">
    <title>EU High Court Confirms Pre-Ticked Boxes Are Insufficient for Cookie Consent - TrustArc</title>
    <dc:date>2020-10-19T14:15:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://trustarc.com/blog/2019/10/03/eu-high-court-confirms-pre-ticked-boxes-are-insufficient-for-cookie-consent/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[On October 1st, in the much anticipated Planet49 case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) affirmed an earlier opinion set forth by the Advocate-General that utilizing pre-ticked boxes to obtain consent for website cookies does not represent valid consent because it does not show affirmative, unambiguous action on the part of the data subject.  The Court decided this with reference to the GDPR, the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR’s predecessor, the Data Protection Directive, which was in force at the time of the matter at issue.
[…]

Other takeaways from the case include the ECJ confirming that the ePrivacy Directive’s consent requirements with respect to the storing or accessing of “information” apply irrespective of whether the information involved amounts to “personal data” as defined by the GDPR, and the finding that for consent to be valid, website operators must transparently indicate the life span of each cookie and whether any third parties will have access to them.  

Questions left unanswered by the decision include a formal opinion on the legality of so-called “cookie walls” that require consent to third party cookies as a pre-condition to general access to a website, and an opinion as to whether a data subject can be required to consent to the processing of personal data for advertising purposes in order to participate in the promotional lottery.  The latter question, which the ECJ was not asked to rule on, could by extension have implications for online ad-funded content.

This case serves as a reminder that for consent to cookies to be valid in the EU, the data subject’s consent at issue must be active, rather than passive; unambiguous and not implied, as would be the case by requiring individuals to be aware enough to un-tick a pre-ticked box; and specific, rather than bundled with other terms.  For a summary of the case, see here.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law consent dms bestpractices webdev ux</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:ed1b7707066b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:consent"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:dms"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:bestpractices"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webdev"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ux"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/05/just-turning-your-phone-on-qualifies-as-searching-it-court-rules/">
    <title>Just turning your phone on qualifies as searching it, court rules | Ars Technica</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-22T12:52:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/05/just-turning-your-phone-on-qualifies-as-searching-it-court-rules/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[the judge determined that the police looking at the phone at the time of the arrest and the FBI looking at it again after the fact are two separate issues. Police are allowed to conduct searches without search warrant under special circumstances, Coughenour wrote, and looking at the phone's lock screen may have been permissible as it "took place either incident to a lawful arrest or as part of the police's efforts to inventory the personal effects" of the person arrested. Coughenour was unable to determine how, specifically, the police acted, and he ordered clarification to see if their search of the phone fell within those boundaries.

But where the police actions were unclear, the FBI's were both crystal clear and counter to the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, Coughenour ruled. "Here, the FBI physically intruded on Mr. Sam's personal effect when the FBI powered on his phone to take a picture of the phone's lock screen." That qualifies as a "search" under the terms of the Fourth Amendment, he found, and since the FBI did not have a warrant for that search, it was unconstitutional.

Attorneys for the government argued that Sam should have had no expectation of privacy on his lock screen—that is, after all, what everyone who isn't you is meant to see when they try to access the phone. Instead of determining whether the lock screen is private or not, though, Coughenour found that it doesn't matter. "When the Government gains evidence by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area—as the FBI did here—it is 'unnecessary to consider' whether the government also violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy," he wrote.

Basically, he ruled, the FBI pushing the button on the phone to activate the lock screen qualified as a search, regardless of the lock screen's nature.]]></description>
<dc:subject>justice privacy law policy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:4ea01dadef35/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:justice"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://gist.github.com/shadybones/71617252fd8814d1b9f9a6114030f63a">
    <title>Partial integration between the TrustArc Consent Manager API and Google Tag Manager. This code allows for GTM event-based tag firing solution. · GitHub</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-11T20:16:24+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://gist.github.com/shadybones/71617252fd8814d1b9f9a6114030f63a</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Partial integration between the TrustArc Consent Manager API and Google Tag Manager. This code allows for GTM event-based tag firing solution.]]></description>
<dc:subject>googletagmanager privacy tools webdev</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:22c44f072bdc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:googletagmanager"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:tools"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webdev"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://matomo.org/blog/2018/04/how-to-make-matomo-gdpr-compliant-in-12-steps/">
    <title>How to make Matomo GDPR compliant in 12 steps</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-02T18:13:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://matomo.org/blog/2018/04/how-to-make-matomo-gdpr-compliant-in-12-steps/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We will list below the 12 steps recommended by the UK privacy commissioner in order to be GDPR compliant and what you need to do for each step.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy gdpr tools analytics compliance</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:9d4cf7718c76/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:gdpr"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:tools"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analytics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:compliance"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://matomo.org/gdpr/">
    <title>Be Compliant With Secure GDPR Analytics - Respect User-Privacy</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-02T18:12:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://matomo.org/gdpr/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[How is Matomo Analytics GDPR compliant?
How can we ensure GDPR compliance:

Data anonymization
GDPR Manager
Users can opt-out of all tracking
First-party cookies by default
People can view the data collected
Capabilities to delete visitor data when requested
The data is not used for any other purposes (compared to Google Analytics)
IP anonymization
Visitor log and profiles can be disabled
In addition, if you’re complying with France’s National Data Protection Commission (CNIL) rules then you’ll also need to:

Delete personal data after 25 months
Have IP anonymiser enabled
Offer Opt-out
Disable Visits log and Visitor profile
Agree not to export the RAW data to other systems like CRM or data warehouse without consent

Personal data or personally identifiable information (PII) and GDPR
If you decide to process personal data, then it must be processed in accordance with the principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency. It should be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and not be processed if they don’t suit those purposes. 

Here are a few steps to start with:

Step one: learn what personal data or PII is
Step two: learn about data anonymization
Step three: learn about GDPR and cookie compliance
Step four: Make your Matomo GDPR compliant in 12 steps ]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy gdpr tools analytics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:be592fa722ef/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:gdpr"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:tools"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analytics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.magiclasso.co/insights/hey-google/">
    <title>“Hey Google, stop tracking me” – Magic Lasso Adblock</title>
    <dc:date>2020-04-09T22:56:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.magiclasso.co/insights/hey-google/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[As an open-source project, it’s possible to view the source code for the Chrome web browser. Insightful contributors to the code have recently discovered an insidious third way that Google tracks you across the web.

Each and every install of Chrome, since version 54, have generated a unique ID. Depending upon which settings you configure, the unique ID may be longer or shorter.

Irrespective, when used in combination with other configuration features, Google now generates and retains a unique ID in each Chrome installation. The ID represents your particular Chrome install, and as soon as you log into any Google account, is likely also linked directly to your individual Google profile.

The evil next step is that this unique ID is then sent (in the “x-client-data” field of a Chrome web request) to Google every time the browser accesses a Google web property. This ID is not sent to any non-Google web requests; thereby restricting the tracking capability to Google itself.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>advertising chrome privacy google</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:f4fa733793fd/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:chrome"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.engadget.com/2020/01/13/websites-not-following-eu-gdpr-rules-study/?guccounter=1">
    <title>Most websites don't follow European cookie consent laws, study shows | Engadget</title>
    <dc:date>2020-01-13T16:54:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.engadget.com/2020/01/13/websites-not-following-eu-gdpr-rules-study/?guccounter=1</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Websites that operate in Europe are supposed to follow GDPR rules that let consumers to opt out of cookie-type tracking. However, most are making it "substantially more difficult" to reject all tracking than to accept it, according to a new study called Dark Patterns after the GDPR, by researchers from MIT, UCL and Aarhus University. In fact, only 11.8 percent of the 10,000 websites they checked "meet the minimal requirements that we set based on European law," the team wrote.

Websites are using a variety of means to bend EU rules and make it harder for consumers to opt out of tracking. They have been abetted by so-called consent management platforms (CMPs) like QuantCast, Cookiebot and TrustArc. Those companies make the pop-up windows for cookie consent that are supposed to appear when a site is accessed in the EU.

The most common way websites are reportedly bypassing EU laws is via implicit consent, used by around 32.5 percent of studied sites. That system presumes the user consents to cookies simply by visiting or scrolling a website or failing to respond to a pop-up consent window. "Popular CMP implementation wizards still allow their clients to choose implied consent ... within the geographical scope of the EU," according to the paper. "This raises significant questions over adherence with the concept of data protection by design in the GDPR."]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law news gdpr ccpa ux bestpractices</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:814d16043a62/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:news"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:gdpr"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ccpa"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ux"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:bestpractices"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.02479">
    <title>Dark Patterns after the GDPR: Scraping Consent Pop-ups and Demonstrating their Influence</title>
    <dc:date>2020-01-13T16:53:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.02479</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[New consent management platforms (CMPs) have been introduced to the web to conform with the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, particularly its requirements for consent when companies collect and process users' personal data. This work analyses how the most prevalent CMP designs affect people's consent choices. We scraped the designs of the five most popular CMPs on the top 10,000 websites in the UK (n=680). We found that dark patterns and implied consent are ubiquitous; only 11.8% meet the minimal requirements that we set based on European law. Second, we conducted a field experiment with 40 participants to investigate how the eight most common designs affect consent choices. We found that notification style (banner or barrier) has no effect; removing the opt-out button from the first page increases consent by 22--23 percentage points; and providing more granular controls on the first page decreases consent by 8--20 percentage points. This study provides an empirical basis for the necessary regulatory action to enforce the GDPR, in particular the possibility of focusing on the centralised, third-party CMP services as an effective way to increase compliance.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law gdpr ccpa policy research ux webdesign</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:b4903cb9392e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:gdpr"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ccpa"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:research"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ux"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webdesign"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/17/what-does-your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-chevy-find-out/?wpisrc=nl_most&amp;wpmm=1">
    <title>Driving surveillance: What does your car know about you? We hacked a 2017 Chevy to find out. - The Washington Post</title>
    <dc:date>2019-12-17T17:39:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/17/what-does-your-car-know-about-you-we-hacked-chevy-find-out/?wpisrc=nl_most&amp;wpmm=1</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We’re at a turning point for driving surveillance: In the 2020 model year, most new cars sold in the United States will come with built-in Internet connections, including 100 percent of Fords, GMs and BMWs and all but one model Toyota and Volkswagen. (This independent cellular service is often included free or sold as an add-on.) Cars are becoming smartphones on wheels, sending and receiving data from apps, insurance firms and pretty much wherever their makers want. Some brands even reserve the right to use the data to track you down if you don’t pay your bills.
When I buy a car, I assume the data I produce is owned by me — or at least is controlled by me. Many automakers do not. They act like how and where we drive, also known as telematics, isn’t personal information.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy cars</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:f3140452347e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:cars"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/31/think-youre-anonymous-online-third-popular-websites-are-fingerprinting-you/?arc404=true">
    <title>What is fingerprinting? The online tracking you can’t avoid. - The Washington Post</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-31T20:25:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/31/think-youre-anonymous-online-third-popular-websites-are-fingerprinting-you/?arc404=true</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Fingerprinting has been around for more than a decade but considered mostly a theoretical threat for you and me. Not anymore. I asked Patrick Jackson, chief technology officer of privacy software company Disconnect, to test for signs of fingerprinting on the 500 most popular websites used by Americans. He revealed what these sites hide in their code and do on our computers that we don’t get to see on our screens.

I’m naming names. Of the 183 likely fingerprinters Jackson identified between Sept. 30 and Oct. 8, I asked 30 of the most well-known to explain their behavior. (See below for a list.) Some claimed it was industry-standard to fingerprint. Many said they didn’t realize it was happening or never collected our data themselves, because they had let ad and data partners operate parts of their websites. After hearing from me, six sites said they would remove fingerprinting code, including four run by the U.S. government.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy news data analysis</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:7277f126732e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:news"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:data"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analysis"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://dilbert.com/strip/2018-05-08">
    <title>Press Release About Hack - Dilbert Comic Strip on 2018-05-08 | Dilbert by Scott Adams</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-29T20:41:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://dilbert.com/strip/2018-05-08</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Hackers got our customer data. Write a press release saying we are sorry and it will never happen again.
Is any of that true?
Part of it is.
Which part?
Hackers got our customer data.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy ethics comics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:0e308615a52b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ethics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:comics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://dilbert.com/strip/2011-02-15">
    <title>Dilbert Comic Strip on 2011-02-15 | Dilbert by Scott Adams</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-29T20:36:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://dilbert.com/strip/2011-02-15</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[How hard would it be to program a website to collect browser history from our visitors?]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy ethics business comics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:f5e8da7dcf0f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ethics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:business"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:comics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://github.com/StreisandEffect/streisand">
    <title>GitHub - StreisandEffect/streisand: Streisand sets up a new server running your choice of WireGuard, OpenConnect, OpenSSH, OpenVPN, Shadowsocks, sslh, Stunnel, or a Tor bridge. It also generates custom instructions for all of these services. At the end of</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-27T01:10:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://github.com/StreisandEffect/streisand</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Streisand sets up a new server running your choice of WireGuard, OpenConnect, OpenSSH, OpenVPN, Shadowsocks, sslh, Stunnel, or a Tor bridge. It also generates custom instructions for all of these services. At the end of the run you are given an HTML file with instructions that can be shared with friends, family members, and fellow activists. ]]></description>
<dc:subject>networking security privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:932621fb4be0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:networking"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/for-sale-your-private-browsing-history/">
    <title>For sale: Your private browsing history | Ars Technica</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-04T18:06:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/for-sale-your-private-browsing-history/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The rules issued by the FCC last year would have required home Internet and mobile broadband providers to get consumers' opt-in consent before selling or sharing Web browsing history, app usage history, and other private information with advertisers and other companies. But lawmakers used their authority under the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to pass a joint resolution ensuring that the rules "shall have no force or effect" and that the FCC cannot issue similar regulations in the future.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy policy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:b1882eabb4ce/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.businessinsider.com/credit-cards-sell-purchase-data-to-advertisers-2013-4">
    <title>Yes, Your Credit Card Company Is Selling Your Purchase Data To Online Advertisers - Business Insider</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-04T17:57:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.businessinsider.com/credit-cards-sell-purchase-data-to-advertisers-2013-4</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Depending on how you feel about online shopping, this either old news or a huge betrayal of consumer trust: Mastercard and American Express are selling your data to online advertisers who then use it to target you with ads.
As Ad Age notes, they're not shouting very loud about it for fear of a backlash.

Here's what we learned today from reporter Kate Kaye:

Mastercard began doing this two and a half years ago.
It sells data by zip code, offering areas that are more likely to make certain types of purchases, like shoes, for instance. Online advertisers can then bid on online users from those areas, and target them with ads for shoes.
The data is anonymous and aggregated. They can't identify you, in other words. All they know is that there are x-thousand shoe-buyers in a given zip code, online, at any one time.
Amex sells its data as a series of models.
EBay also sells its data for ad targeting.
Best quote in the article: "Anybody that's got data right now is in the business of trying to make money off of it," said Forrester Principal Analyst Sucharita Mulpuru-Kodali. "Why not take advantage of it, especially if you can do it under the radar?"
]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy finance</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:f6b36b66f5ac/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:finance"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://adage.com/article/dataworks/mastercard-amex-feed-data-marketers/240800">
    <title>Mastercard, AmEx Quietly Feed Data to Advertisers | AdAge</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-04T17:56:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://adage.com/article/dataworks/mastercard-amex-feed-data-marketers/240800</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Credit-card firms are selling their credit-card transaction data for digital advertising and other marketing efforts, but they're not exactly broadcasting the fact for fear of consumer backlash.

Mastercard Advisors launched its Information Services division around two-and-a-half years ago and in recent months has been approaching media-agency trading desks with an enticing offer: data representing 80 billion consumer purchases.


American Express has also turned its transaction data into a revenue stream through its Business Insights consulting division which has aimed direct mail and online offers to card holders on behalf of advertisers for years, though on an aggregate level. More recently, AmEx has modeled audience segments for use in online ad targeting.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy finance</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:d59b580d4060/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:finance"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2018/07/22/mastercard-amex-and-envestnet-profit-from-400m-business-of-selling-transaction-data/#7c5e97497722">
    <title>Mastercard, AmEx And Envestnet Profit From $400M Business Of Selling Transaction Data</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-04T17:52:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2018/07/22/mastercard-amex-and-envestnet-profit-from-400m-business-of-selling-transaction-data/#7c5e97497722</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[I've been around the block, but I was still shocked this month to learn that credit card companies and others sell your real-time credit card transactions to hedge funds -- which they also sell to advertising networks. Hedge funds use such data to place stock bets on the rise and fall of companies whose products you're charging up a storm to buy.

I first became aware of this when MapD, a San Francisco-based "Extreme Analytics™ platform provider," told me that one of its major customers groups is hedge funds.  Said MapD's CEO in a July 2018 interview,

We have hedge fund and investment banking clients that use MapD to analyze stock ticker data and credit card transactions -- they analyze 10% to 30% of all transactions in real-time to see which companies are enjoying upticks in purchases. Our product lets them refresh their analysis every 30 minutes instead of daily.

Today In: Money
Like many things in finance -- think private equity (a term designed to hide the huge pile of debt larded onto a sliver of equity) -- this practice of buying and analyzing such data, dubbed 'alternative data' -- is an anodyne sounding phrase that to me masks some pretty nasty behavior.

It's a large, growing business which makes me wonder when I agreed to let credit card companies sell my transaction data and whether that data really excludes personally-identifying information as the companies claim.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy finance</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:bcb66966ed75/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:finance"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.clarip.com/data-privacy/ccpa-extraterritoriality/">
    <title>www.clarip.com</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-03T16:17:18+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.clarip.com/data-privacy/ccpa-extraterritoriality/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) protects California residents and applies to organizations that are doing business in California. The International Association of Privacy Professionals estimates that 500,000 organizations based around the United States are going to need to achieve CCPA compliance due in part to its extraterritorial application.

Does the new California privacy law apply to your organization even though you are not located in CA?

The current answer is yes if you are doing business in California. CCPA does not currently require organizations to have a physical presence in California in order to be covered by the state’s new privacy law, which goes into effect in 2020. It merely requires that they are doing business in the state and meet one of the three threshold requirements ($25 million in annual revenue; data collection on 50,000; or 50% of revenue from data sales).

The only limit placed in the law on territoriality (besides the consumer’s residency) is that it does not apply to consumer information if the commercial conduct takes place wholly outside of California. In other words, the information is collected while the consumer is outside of California, no part occurred in California, and no personal information collected while the consumer is in California.
[…]

The California Attorney General has been given authority to issue regulations governing the new California privacy law following public consultation. These regulations may ultimately impact how the law is enforced on businesses located outside of California and without a physical presence there. In the interim, if your organization does not have a mature privacy program that could quickly scale up compliance obligations, it is best to begin planning for its effects]]></description>
<dc:subject>business policy analysis law privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:d46451ea1039/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:business"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cnet.com/news/californias-new-data-privacy-law-the-toughest-in-the-us/">
    <title>California's new data privacy law the toughest in the US - CNET</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-03T16:15:15+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cnet.com/news/californias-new-data-privacy-law-the-toughest-in-the-us/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Not quite the GDPR

The rights in the new law are similar to some sections of the European Union's new privacy law, the General Data Privacy Regulation, or GDPR, minus some important provisions. For one thing, it doesn't enact a set deadline for notifying consumers of a data breach, which the GDPR does.

What's more, the GDPR creates the possibility of enormous fines -- potentially exceeding 40 million euros ($46.26 million) -- for companies found in violation, and calls for a dedicated authority to enforce the law in each EU member state. The law passed in California does neither of those things.

Damages paid to consumers top out at $750 per person in each instance where the law is violated, and the highest penalty per violation that can be levied against companies is $7,500.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>law privacy policy analysis</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:4a8b2a6ba43a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analysis"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.carpedatumlaw.com/2019/02/california-consumer-privacy-act-2018-businesses-need-know-now/">
    <title>The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018: What Businesses Need to Know Now | Carpe Datum Law</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-03T16:08:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.carpedatumlaw.com/2019/02/california-consumer-privacy-act-2018-businesses-need-know-now/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[In addition to taking certain steps to be in compliance and reinforcing consumer rights regarding the privacy of personal information businesses must:

Perform a data inventory in order to identify informational flow. Following completion, the business will need to identify issues impacting compliance and develop controls or countermeasures to address them.
Provide California consumers with two or more methods for submitting their requests for information—including, at a minimum, a toll free telephone number.
On its online privacy policy or policies (if in existence) or otherwise on its website, disclose a description of a consumer’s rights pursuant to this law regarding the collection, use, and sale of personal information and one or more designated methods for submitting requests, and provide a list of the categories of personal information it has collected, disclosed for a business purpose, or sold in the preceding 12 months by reference to specific categories of personal information in the law—or if the business has not done so, to disclose that fact. Information so posted must be updated at least once every 12 months.
On its website home page, provide a link to a web page titled ‘Do Not Sell My Personal Information’ in order to allow a customer (or their agent) to opt out on the sale of their personal information to a third party. In addition to this link, the business is required to include a description of a consumer’s rights, along with a separate link to the above titled ‘Do Not Sell My Personal Information’ page in its online privacy policy or policies (if in existence) as well as any California-specific description of consumers’ privacy rights.
Implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the personal information]]></description>
<dc:subject>law privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:7a03ec6c813c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/01/2019-insights/california-privacy-law">
    <title>California Privacy Law: What Companies Should Do to Prepare in 2019 | Insights | Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &amp; Flom LLP</title>
    <dc:date>2019-09-17T20:37:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/01/2019-insights/california-privacy-law</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Who Is Covered?

In general, the CCPA applies to entities conducting business in California that either directly or indirectly control the collection of personal information of residents in that state and meet one or more of the following criteria:

have annual gross revenues in excess of $25 million, adjusted for inflation;
derive 50 percent or more of their annual revenues from selling consumers’ personal information; or
annually buy, receive for a commercial purpose, sell or share the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, households or devices.

[…]

Will GDPR Compliance Also Satisfy the CCPA?

While some overlap exists between the CCPA and the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (see "European Data Protection and Cybersecurity in 2019"), they differ in certain key aspects:

* The CCPA’s definition of personal information is more extensive than that in the GDPR;
* The CCPA is expected to provide broader rights to request data deletion and includes different exceptions to this requirement;
* The CCPA is expected to provide more power for consumers to access personal information and does not provide all of the exceptions available under the GDPR; and
* The CCPA includes more stringent restrictions on sharing personal information for commercial purposes than does the GDPR.

While companies that have become GDPR-compliant may have an approach to data protection that will be useful in adapting to the CCPA’s requirements, GDPR compliance cannot be seen as dispositive for CCPA purposes.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law analysis</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:f9ca1db45424/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analysis"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375">
    <title>Bill Text - AB-375 Privacy: personal information: businesses.</title>
    <dc:date>2019-09-17T20:34:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[An act to add Title 1.81.5 (commencing with Section 1798.100) to Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code, relating to privacy.

[ Approved by Governor  June 28, 2018. Filed with Secretary of State  June 28, 2018. ]

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 375, Chau. Privacy: personal information: businesses.

The California Constitution grants a right of privacy. Existing law provides for the confidentiality of personal information in various contexts and requires a business or person that suffers a breach of security of computerized data that includes personal information, as defined, to disclose that breach, as specified.
This bill would enact the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. Beginning January 1, 2020, the bill would grant a consumer a right to request a business to disclose the categories and specific pieces of personal information that it collects about the consumer, the categories of sources from which that information is collected, the business purposes for collecting or selling the information, and the categories of 3rd parties with which the information is shared. The bill would require a business to make disclosures about the information and the purposes for which it is used. The bill would grant a consumer the right to request deletion of personal information and would require the business to delete upon receipt of a verified request, as specified. The bill would grant a consumer a right to request that a business that sells the consumer’s personal information, or discloses it for a business purpose, disclose the categories of information that it collects and categories of information and the identity of 3rd parties to which the information was sold or disclosed. The bill would require a business to provide this information in response to a verifiable consumer request. The bill would authorize a consumer to opt out of the sale of personal information by a business and would prohibit the business from discriminating against the consumer for exercising this right, including by charging the consumer who opts out a different price or providing the consumer a different quality of goods or services, except if the difference is reasonably related to value provided by the consumer’s data. The bill would authorize businesses to offer financial incentives for collection of personal information. The bill would prohibit a business from selling the personal information of a consumer under 16 years of age, unless affirmatively authorized, as specified, to be referred to as the right to opt in. The bill would prescribe requirements for receiving, processing, and satisfying these requests from consumers. The bill would prescribe various definitions for its purposes and would define “personal information” with reference to a broad list of characteristics and behaviors, personal and commercial, as well as inferences drawn from this information. The bill would prohibit the provisions described above from restricting the ability of the business to comply with federal, state, or local laws, among other things.
The bill would provide for its enforcement by the Attorney General, as specified, and would provide a private right of action in connection with certain unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure of a consumer’s nonencrypted or nonredacted personal information, as defined. The bill would prescribe a method for distribution of proceeds of Attorney General actions. The bill would create the Consumer Privacy Fund in the General Fund with the moneys in the fund, upon appropriation by the Legislature, to be applied to support the purposes of the bill and its enforcement. The bill would provide for the deposit of penalty money into the fund. The bill would require the Attorney General to solicit public participation for the purpose of adopting regulations, as specified. The bill would authorize a business, service provider, or 3rd party to seek the Attorney General’s opinion on how to comply with its provisions. The bill would void a waiver of a consumer’s rights under its provisions. The bill would condition its operation on the withdrawal of a specified initiative from the ballot.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law reference</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:fb9d3514f554/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:reference"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375">
    <title>Today's Law As Amended</title>
    <dc:date>2019-09-17T20:32:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[SECTION 1. This measure shall be known and may be cited as “The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.”
SEC. 2. The Legislature finds and declares that:
(a) In 1972, California voters amended the California Constitution to include the right of privacy among the “inalienable” rights of all people. The amendment established a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian. Fundamental to this right of privacy is the ability of individuals to control the use, including the sale, of their personal information.

[…]

(i) Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature to further Californians’ right to privacy by giving consumers an effective way to control their personal information, by ensuring the following rights:
(1) The right of Californians to know what personal information is being collected about them.
(2) The right of Californians to know whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to whom.
(3) The right of Californians to say no to the sale of personal information.
(4) The right of Californians to access their personal information.
(5) The right of Californians to equal service and price, even if they exercise their privacy rights.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law reference</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:74b7113e3215/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:reference"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.datanami.com/2018/07/06/californias-new-data-privacy-law-takes-effect-in-2020/">
    <title>California's New Data Privacy Law Takes Effect in 2020</title>
    <dc:date>2019-09-17T20:19:40+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.datanami.com/2018/07/06/californias-new-data-privacy-law-takes-effect-in-2020/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[According to the California Consumer Privacy Act website, the new law (which was called AB 375) gives residents of California the most comprehensive consumer privacy rights in the entire country. Specifically, the new law gives residents:

* The right to know all data collected by a business on you;
* The right to say no to the sale of your information;
* The right to delete your data;
* The right to be informed of what categories of data will be collected about you prior to its collection, and to be informed of any changes to this collection;
* Mandated opt-in before sale of children’s information (under the age of 16);
* The right to know the categories of third parties with whom your data is shared;
* The right to know the categories of sources of information from whom your data was acquired;
* The right to know the business or commercial purpose of collecting your information;
* Enforcement by the Attorney General of the State of California;
* The private right of action when companies breach your data, to make sure these companies keep your information safe.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy law reference</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:282b152df6d0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:reference"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.analyticsmania.com/post/gdpr-cookie-consent-notification-with-google-tag-manager/">
    <title>How To Implement GDPR Cookie Consent Notification with Google Tag Manager - Analytics Mania</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-20T19:41:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.analyticsmania.com/post/gdpr-cookie-consent-notification-with-google-tag-manager/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[So before you get the actual consent, all the tracking should be put on hold. In this guide, I’ll show you what solution did I choose and how I implemented GDPR cookie consent notification on analyticsmania.com + you’ll get a GTM Recipe.

…

In a nutshell: According to GDPR, firing all tracking codes right after a visitor landed on your page is not permitted anymore (since May 25th, 2018). You should first ask for a permission to track and only then fire your marketing tags.

In this blog post, I’ve explained how to implement a GDRP cookie notification consent with Google Tag Manager and how to update your current marketing tags accordingly.

Cookie consent notification is just a tool for getting a consent, it’s not capable of managing your tracking tags because every website and every GTM container is unique, therefore there is no universal solution. As a result, you will have to manually update all your tracking tags with additional firing rules.

OneTrust GDPR cookie consent notification solution was a tool of my choice (you saw it on this blog, already) and in this guide, I’ve explained how to configure it.

It has its pros and cons but with some experience, you can do pretty flexible implementations. Obviously, new users will have no previous knowledge, that’s why my guide should be useful to them as I share my blunders and ways to avoid them. Plus, my GDPR Cookie Consent GTM Recipe should save you lots of time.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy googletagmanager tracking howto guide reference ux dms</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:86f020c8422f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:googletagmanager"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:tracking"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:howto"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:guide"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:reference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ux"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:dms"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mb88za/amazon-requires-police-to-shill-surveillance-cameras-in-secret-agreement">
    <title>Amazon Requires Police to Shill Surveillance Cameras in Secret Agreement - VICE</title>
    <dc:date>2019-07-25T20:40:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mb88za/amazon-requires-police-to-shill-surveillance-cameras-in-secret-agreement</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Police already have access to publicly-funded street cameras and investigative tools that help them track down almost any criminal suspect. But Ring cameras are proliferating in the private sphere, with close to zero oversight. Amazon is convincing people to self-surveil through aggressive, fear-based marketing, aided by de facto police endorsements and free Ring camera giveaways. Consumers are opting into surveillance. And police are more than eager to capitalize on this wealth of surveillance data.

The result of Ring-police partnerships is a self-perpetuating surveillance network: More people download Neighbors, more people get Ring, surveillance footage proliferates, and police can request whatever they want.

Chris Gilliard, a professor of English at Macomb Community College who studies digital redlining and discriminatory practices enabled by data mining, said in a phone call that this surveillance network can heighten fear of crime and put people’s lives at risk.

“When really powerful companies, or police for that matter, are incentivized to find crime, they’re going to find it no matter what,” Gilliard said. “It’ll ultimately shift the definition of what is a crime and lead to over-policing in some ways. Frankly, [it’s] the broken windows style that tends to harm marginalized communities more.”

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy justice police policy politics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:683d553d89a2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:justice"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:police"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:politics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://jochasinga.github.io/subhuman/">
    <title>subhuman | Chrome extension that exposes pixel trackers in your email and retaliate 🤓</title>
    <dc:date>2019-07-23T22:05:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://jochasinga.github.io/subhuman/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[This is a Chrome extension app that tracks and exposes in-browser tracking pixels or pixel tags common deployed by marketing emails known as read receipts.

It gives you simple options to:

Block all images
Expose the pixel tracker
Send DOS-like repetive requests to the source.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy tools</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:6ac7006d7c4d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:tools"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://guardianapp.com/">
    <title>Guardian Firewall</title>
    <dc:date>2019-07-20T11:42:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://guardianapp.com/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[<blockquote>
The first real firewall for iOS.
Take back control of your digital life and privacy.
</blockquote>]]></description>
<dc:subject>security ios privacy tools</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:4bd1cb14b3d3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ios"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:tools"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://idlewords.com/2019/06/the_new_wilderness.htm">
    <title>The New Wilderness (Idle Words)</title>
    <dc:date>2019-06-14T23:11:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://idlewords.com/2019/06/the_new_wilderness.htm</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[<blockquote>
Our discourse around privacy needs to expand to address foundational questions about the role of automation: To what extent is living in a surveillance-saturated world compatible with pluralism and democracy? What are the consequences of raising a generation of children whose every action feeds into a corporate database? What does it mean to be manipulated from an early age by machine learning algorithms that adaptively learn to shape our behavior?

That is not the conversation Facebook or Google want us to have. Their totalizing vision is of a world with no ambient privacy and strong data protections, dominated by the few companies that can manage to hoard information at a planetary scale. They correctly see the new round of privacy laws as a weapon to deploy against smaller rivals, further consolidating their control over the algorithmic panopticon.
</blockquote>]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy policy google facebook business liberty</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:3e17c71eb8e7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:facebook"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:business"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:liberty"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-internet-knows-you-better-than-your-spouse-does/">
    <title>The Internet Knows You Better Than Your Spouse Does</title>
    <dc:date>2019-03-15T13:19:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-internet-knows-you-better-than-your-spouse-does/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[<blockquote>
Then the investigators had the program examine the likes of other Facebook users. If the software had as few as 10 for analysis, it was able to evaluate that person about as well as a co-worker did. Given 70 likes, the algorithm was about as accurate as a friend. With 300, it was more successful than the person’s spouse. Even more astonishing to the researchers, feeding likes into their program enabled them to predict whether someone suffered from depression or took drugs and even to infer what the individual studied in school
</blockquote>]]></description>
<dc:subject>psychology data science socialmedia surveillance privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:7f76e0dec25d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:data"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:socialmedia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:surveillance"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://medium.com/@robleathern/carriers-are-making-more-from-mobile-ads-than-publishers-are-d5d3c0827b39">
    <title>Carriers are Making More From Mobile Ads than Publishers Are</title>
    <dc:date>2018-09-12T01:18:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://medium.com/@robleathern/carriers-are-making-more-from-mobile-ads-than-publishers-are-d5d3c0827b39</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Consumers pay 16.6x more in data costs than top 50 news sites are making in ad revenue

The New York Times published an excellent piece called “The Cost of Mobile Ads on 50 News Websites” that explains how iOS 9 content blockers significantly reduce the size of news website page loads across the top sites they looked at, since “more than half of all data came from ads and other content filtered by ad blockers”.

I did some quick calculations to figure out:
What is the required data use for content+ads from these sites costing a typical US user (who pays for a data plan from a major mobile phone carrier), and,
How much ad revenue is that news website making on the average user?]]></description>
<dc:subject>mobile performance privacy advertising</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:44a0c42f679b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:mobile"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:performance"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:advertising"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.ghostery.com/lp/trackertax/">
    <title>The Tracker Tax - Ghostery</title>
    <dc:date>2018-09-05T13:55:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.ghostery.com/lp/trackertax/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Without blocking trackers, only 17% of all the pages in the study loaded within 5 seconds. All other pages loaded much more slowly: it took more than 10 seconds to load nearly 60% of the pages, more than 30 seconds for 18% of the pages, and nearly 5% of the pages took over a minute to load.

The study also shows that on average, websites take more than twice as long to load when trackers are not blocked (19.3 seconds), compared to when the Ghostery browser extension is used to block all trackers (8.6 seconds). This means you spend an extra 10 seconds per load weighed down by trackers – which can add up quickly given how many different pages we visit online.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy UX performance research webdesign</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:7788eab0ab01/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:UX"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:performance"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:research"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webdesign"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://blog.mozilla.org/futurereleases/2018/08/30/changing-our-approach-to-anti-tracking/">
    <title>Changing Our Approach to Anti-tracking - Future Releases</title>
    <dc:date>2018-09-05T13:53:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://blog.mozilla.org/futurereleases/2018/08/30/changing-our-approach-to-anti-tracking/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Tracking slows down the web. In a study by Ghostery, 55.4% of the total time required to load an average website was spent loading third party trackers. For users on slower networks the effect can be even worse.

Long page load times are detrimental to every user’s experience on the web. For that reason, we’ve added a new feature in Firefox Nightly that blocks trackers that slow down page loads. We will be testing this feature using a shield study in September.  If we find that our approach performs well, we will start blocking slow-loading trackers by default in Firefox 63.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy firefox performance ux webdesign</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:8b0e84b25460/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:firefox"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:performance"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ux"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webdesign"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://thewalrus.ca/how-we-made-ai-as-racist-and-sexist-as-humans/">
    <title>How We Made AI As Racist and Sexist As Humans</title>
    <dc:date>2018-05-24T00:33:59+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://thewalrus.ca/how-we-made-ai-as-racist-and-sexist-as-humans/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[In 2016, researchers from Boston University and Microsoft Research fed an algorithm a data set of more than 3 million English words from Google News texts, focused on the ones that were most frequently used, and then prompted it to fill in the blanks. “Man,” they asked, “is to computer programmer as woman is to—what?” The machine shuffled through those words and came back with homemaker.

These statistical correlations are known as latent bias: it’s why an artificial-intelligence institute’s image collection was 68 percent more likely to associate the word cooking with photos of women, and it explains the trouble Google Translate has with languages that use gender-neutral pronouns. A Turkish sentence won’t specify if the doctor is male or female, but the English translation assumes that, if there’s a doctor in the house, he must be a man. This presumption extends to the ads that follow us around the internet. In 2015, researchers found that men were six times more likely than women to be shown Google advertisements for jobs with salaries upwards of $200,000.

[...]
Accordingly, groups that have been the target of systemic discrimination by institutions that include police forces and courts don’t fare any better when judgment is handed over to a machine. “The argument that you can produce an AI tool that’s fair and objective is a problem, because you can’t reduce the context in which crime happens to a yes-or-no binary,” says Kelly Hannah-Moffat, a professor at the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies at the University of Toronto. “We know that race is related to stop-and-frisk policies, carding, and heavier police checking, so if you’re looking at contact with the police or prior arrest rates, you’re looking at a variable that is already biased.” Once that variable is included in the machine-learning system, bias becomes embedded into the algorithmic assessment.
Two years ago, the US investigative news organization ProPublica scrutinized a widely used program known as COMPAS that determines the risk of recidivism in defendants. The reporters collected the scores for more than 7,000 people arrested in a Florida county, then evaluated how many of them had committed crimes in the following two years—the same benchmark used by COMPAS. The algorithm, they discovered, was deeply flawed: the scores were twice as likely to incorrectly flag black defendants for a high risk of recidivism. White defendants who had been labelled low risk, conversely, were nearly twice as likely to be charged with future crimes]]></description>
<dc:subject>ai sociology justice policy artificialintelligence machinelearning culture privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:7e7f45338bb3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ai"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:justice"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:artificialintelligence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:machinelearning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:culture"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://medium.freecodecamp.org/tor-signal-and-beyond-a-law-abiding-citizens-guide-to-privacy-1a593f2104c3">
    <title>How to encrypt your entire life in less than an hour</title>
    <dc:date>2018-05-18T14:55:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://medium.freecodecamp.org/tor-signal-and-beyond-a-law-abiding-citizens-guide-to-privacy-1a593f2104c3</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Well, law-abiding citizens do have reason to fear. They do have reasons to secure their devices, their files, and their communications with loved ones.
“If one would give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest man, I would find something in them to have him hanged.” — Cardinal Richelieu in 1641
In this article, I will show you how you can protect yourself by leveraging state-of-the-art encryption. In a single sitting, you can make great strides toward securing your privacy.
Common sense security for everyone
To be clear, everything I recommend here is 100% free and 100% legal. If you bother locking your doors at night, you should bother using encryption.]]></description>
<dc:subject>security bestpractices encryption privacy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:1f6be3101080/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:bestpractices"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:encryption"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/fbi-could-have-gotten-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone-leadership-didnt-say">
    <title>The FBI Could Have Gotten Into the San Bernardino Shooter’s iPhone, But Leadership Didn’t Say That | Electronic Frontier Foundation</title>
    <dc:date>2018-04-05T12:06:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/fbi-could-have-gotten-san-bernardino-shooters-iphone-leadership-didnt-say</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) last week released a new report that supports what EFF has long suspected: that the FBI’s legal fight with Apple in 2016 to create backdoor access to a San Bernardino shooter’s iPhone was more focused on creating legal precedent than it was on accessing the one specific device.

The report, called a “special inquiry,” details the FBI’s failure to be completely forthright with Congress, the courts, and the American public. While the OIG report concludes that neither former FBI Director James Comey, nor the FBI officials who submitted sworn statements in court had “testified inaccurately or made false statements” during the roughly month-long saga, it illustrates just how close they came to lying under oath. ]]></description>
<dc:subject>law privacy politics policy news apple iphone</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:3bd589fec025/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:politics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:policy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:news"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:apple"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:iphone"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/2763052?hl=en">
    <title>IP Anonymization in Analytics - Analytics Help</title>
    <dc:date>2018-03-05T14:41:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://support.google.com/analytics/answer/2763052?hl=en</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The IP anonymization feature in Analytics sets the last octet of IPv4 user IP addresses and the last 80 bits of IPv6 addresses to zeros in memory shortly after being sent to the Analytics Collection Network. The full IP address is never written to disk in this case.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy google analytics reference howto</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:2d3f086ea891/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:analytics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:reference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:howto"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2018/02/gdpr-for-web-developers/">
    <title>How GDPR Will Change The Way You Develop — Smashing Magazine</title>
    <dc:date>2018-03-02T20:32:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2018/02/gdpr-for-web-developers/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We’ve shown you how GDPR requires you to be more thoughtful about the sites and services you build, more transparent about the ways you collect and use data, more considerate of your users, and more thorough in your development and documentation processes. If you were expecting scary legal mumbo-jumbo, we won’t apologize. GDPR is only a complicated legal burden if you want it to be. The European privacy overhaul is really about adopting common-sense safeguards for data protection and privacy as fundamental parts of your development workflow on the code and process levels.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy security law webdev ux</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:b8150e21a4fa/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webdev"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:ux"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/reporter-google-successfully-pressured-me-to-take-down-critical-story/">
    <title>Reporter: Google successfully pressured me to take down critical story | Ars Technica</title>
    <dc:date>2017-09-01T16:47:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/reporter-google-successfully-pressured-me-to-take-down-critical-story/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The incident occurred in 2011. Hill was a cub reporter at Forbes, where she covered technology and privacy. At the time, Google was actively promoting Google Plus and was sending representatives to media organizations to encourage them to add "+1" buttons to their sites. Hill was pulled into one of these meetings, where the Google representative suggested that Forbes would be penalized in Google search results if it didn't add +1 buttons to the site.

Hill thought that seemed like a big story, so she contacted Google's PR shop for confirmation. Google essentially confirmed the story, and so Hill ran with it under the headline: "Stick Google Plus Buttons On Your Pages, Or Your Search Traffic Suffers."

Hill described what happened next:]]></description>
<dc:subject>google news politics privacy culture</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:30abae628e66/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:google"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:news"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:politics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:culture"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://find-wifi.mylnikov.org/">
    <title>Find Wi-Fi | Mylnikov GEO</title>
    <dc:date>2017-08-23T20:30:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://find-wifi.mylnikov.org/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[This website gives opportunity to find all the Wi-Fis on the world.]]></description>
<dc:subject>tools reference security privacy networking</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:2ad9be02d9b1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:tools"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:reference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:networking"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://webkit.org/blog/7675/intelligent-tracking-prevention/">
    <title>Intelligent Tracking Prevention | WebKit</title>
    <dc:date>2017-07-07T18:06:01+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://webkit.org/blog/7675/intelligent-tracking-prevention/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Out of the various statistics collected, three vectors turned out to have strong signal for classification based on current tracking practices: subresource under number of unique domains, sub frame under number of unique domains, and number of unique domains redirected to. All data collection and classification happens on-device.

Actions Taken After Classification
Let’s say Intelligent Tracking Prevention classifies example.com as having the ability to track the user cross-site. What happens from that point?

If the user has not interacted with example.com in the last 30 days, example.com website data and cookies are immediately purged and continue to be purged if new data is added.

However, if the user interacts with example.com as the top domain, often referred to as a first-party domain, Intelligent Tracking Prevention considers it a signal that the user is interested in the website and temporarily adjusts its behavior as depicted in this timeline:

Intelligent Tracking Prevention Timeline
If the user interacted with example.com the last 24 hours, its cookies will be available when example.com is a third-party. This allows for “Sign in with my X account on Y” login scenarios.

This means users only have long-term persistent cookies and website data from the sites they actually interact with and tracking data is removed proactively as they browse the web.]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy security browsers apple safari webkit</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:3e1def79c5ad/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:browsers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:apple"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:safari"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:webkit"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://brooksreview.net/2017/04/ghostery-is-acquired-by-cliqz/">
    <title>Ghostery is Acquired by Cliqz! – The Brooks Review</title>
    <dc:date>2017-06-22T21:41:39+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://brooksreview.net/2017/04/ghostery-is-acquired-by-cliqz/</link>
    <dc:creator>rmohns</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[GHOSTERY IS ACQUIRED BY CLIQZ!→

Yeah, I’d uninstall Ghostery as quickly as you can. FWIW, 1Blocker (iOS, Mac) is your best option. Second, I think we can all agree on a new internet rule: if the company name ends with an exclamation mark, run away.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>privacy security advertising browsers safari</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/b:941c1ffb732d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:privacy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:security"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:browsers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:rmohns/t:safari"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>