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  <channel rdf:about="http://pinboard.in">
    <title>Pinboard (mraginsky)</title>
    <link>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/public/</link>
    <description>recent bookmarks from mraginsky</description>
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      <rdf:Seq>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2514107123"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.nature.com/articles/nn0701_693"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://link.springer.com/journal/13423/volumes-and-issues/22-6"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00588/full"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/routledge-lectures/clark-routledge"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/095150899105927"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016159621665"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519310003772"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ompref.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~isb9112/dept/phil341/histconn.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://proxy.lib.duke.edu/content/w424t64184p3023j/?p=4ddabb5967f84422a30a97f3ca79156a&amp;pi=3"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jocn.2009.21131"/>
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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2514107123">
    <title>Neural correlates of perceptual decision-making in the primary somatosensory cortex | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2026-05-10T00:51:01+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2514107123</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The brain is thought to produce decisions by gradual accumulation of sensory evidence through a hierarchically organized feedforward cascade of neuronal activities that transforms early stimulus representations in the primary somatosensory cortex (S1) to a perceptual decision processed in premotor areas. Recently, this prevailing view has been challenged by observation of choice-correlated neural activity as early in the hierarchy as S1. Here, to reconcile these seemingly controversial observations, we employ ethological whisker-guided navigation of mice in a tactile virtual reality paradigm combined with dense electrophysiological recordings in whisker-related wS1. Leaving only a pair of C2 whiskers for mice to navigate with, we effectively designed an information bottleneck for sensory input to decision-making. We show that neural activity during sensory evidence accumulation exhibits dramatic collapse of the high-dimensional spiking activity to just a single latent variable followed by a slower and almost synchronous ramping up across the whole cortical column. We show that this variable is consistent with models of gradual accumulation of noisy sensory evidence to a decision bound. These observations indicate that S1 may directly participate in a categorical coding of all-or-none decision variable via cortico-cortical feedback loops through which sensory information reverberates to be transformed into perception and action.]]></description>
<dc:subject>papers to-read neuroscience decision-making perception</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:5060bdd7f851/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/nn0701_693">
    <title>Does the brain model Newton's laws? | Nature Neuroscience</title>
    <dc:date>2025-08-24T17:32:24+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/nn0701_693</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[How does the nervous system synchronize movements to catch a falling ball? According to one theory, only sensory information is used to estimate time-to-contact (TTC) with an approaching object1,2; alternatively, implicit knowledge about physics may come into play3,4. Here we show that astronauts initiated catching movements earlier in 0 g than in 1 g, which demonstrates that the brain uses an internal model of gravity to supplement sensory information when estimating TTC.]]></description>
<dc:subject>papers to-read neuroscience perception world-models internal-models</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:fab52cefa5d0/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:world-models"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:internal-models"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/journal/13423/volumes-and-issues/22-6">
    <title>Psychonomic Bulletin &amp; Review | Volume 22, issue 6</title>
    <dc:date>2022-08-05T01:43:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/journal/13423/volumes-and-issues/22-6</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[This issue contains "The interface theory of perception" by Hoffman, Singh, and Prakash, as well as response papers and the authors' rejoinder.]]></description>
<dc:subject>papers to-read cognition perception philosophy epistemology psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:1b9122a0b152/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:papers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:to-read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:psychology"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00588/full">
    <title>Frontiers | An Enactive-Ecological Approach to Information and Uncertainty</title>
    <dc:date>2022-08-03T18:20:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00588/full</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as a minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is that information for action can be construed as covariant information, and that learning to perceive covariant information is a matter of minimizing uncertainty through skilled performance. We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve intended goals in that environment. We conclude by reviewing empirical findings that support our view by showing how direct learning, seen as an instance of ecological rationality at work, is how mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity.]]></description>
<dc:subject>papers to-read information-theory cognition enactivism perception</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:97f48f251ba0/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:to-read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:information-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:enactivism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/routledge-lectures/clark-routledge">
    <title>Messy Minds: Embodiment, Action, and Explanation in 21st Century Cognitive Science</title>
    <dc:date>2022-08-02T16:33:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/routledge-lectures/clark-routledge</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[slides by Andy Clark]]></description>
<dc:subject>philosophy ai embodiment epistemology perception</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:926d8d175c35/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:ai"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:embodiment"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/095150899105927">
    <title>Qualia, Space, and Control: Philosophical Psychology: Vol 12, No 1</title>
    <dc:date>2022-08-02T16:22:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/095150899105927</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space.]]></description>
<dc:subject>papers to-read philosophy perception cognitive-science</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:c0fddd641a36/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:papers"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:cognitive-science"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016159621665">
    <title>Selective Representing and World-Making | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2022-08-02T16:21:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016159621665</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[In this paper, we discuss the thesis of selective representing –- the idea that the contents of the mental representations had by organisms are highly constrained by the biological niches within which the organisms evolved. While such a thesis has been defended by several authors elsewhere, our primary concern here is to take up the issue of the compatibility of selective representing and realism. In this paper we hope to show three things. First, that the notion of selective representing is fully consistent with the realist idea of a mind-independent world. Second, that not only are these two consistent, but that the latter (the realist conception of a mind-independent world) provides the most powerful perspective from which to motivate and understand the differing perceptual and cognitive profiles themselves. And third, that the (genuine and important) sense in which organism and environment may together constitute an integrated system of scientific interest poses no additional threat to the realist conception.]]></description>
<dc:subject>papers have-read epistemology perception realism cognitive-science via:cshalizi</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:0c99a63cb0bf/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:have-read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:realism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:cognitive-science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:via:cshalizi"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
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<item rdf:about="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519310003772">
    <title>Natural selection and veridical perceptions 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.020 : Journal of Theoretical Biology | ScienceDirect.com</title>
    <dc:date>2012-01-24T18:27:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519310003772</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Does natural selection favor veridical perceptions, those that more accurately depict the objective environment? Students of perception often claim that it does. But this claim, though influential, has not been adequately tested. Here we formalize the claim and a few alternatives. To test them, we introduce “interface games,” a class of evolutionary games in which perceptual strategies compete. We explore, in closed-form solutions and Monte Carlo simulations, some simpler games that assume frequency-dependent selection and complete mixing in infinite populations. We find that veridical perceptions can be driven to extinction by non-veridical strategies that are tuned to utility rather than objective reality. This suggests that natural selection need not favor veridical perceptions, and that the effects of selection on sensory perception deserve further study.]]></description>
<dc:subject>papers to-read perception evolution game-theory re:active_feature_selection_project</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:622ace52765c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:papers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:to-read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:re:active_feature_selection_project"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ompref.html">
    <title>Observer Mechanics: A Formal Theory of Perception (Bennett, Hoffman, Prakash)</title>
    <dc:date>2011-01-01T19:49:25+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/ompref.html</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Observer Mechanics is an inquiry into the subject of perception. It suggests an approach to the study of perception that attempts to be both rigorous and general. A central thesis of Observer Mechanics is that every perceptual capacity (e.g., stereovision, auditory localization, sentence parsing, haptic recognition, and so on) can be described as an instance of a single formal structure: viz., an "observer.""
]]></description>
<dc:subject>books to-read complexity computation perception dynamical-systems probability multiagent-systems cognitive-science cybernetics</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:9139cac25623/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:books"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:to-read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:complexity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:computation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:dynamical-systems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:probability"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:multiagent-systems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:cognitive-science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:cybernetics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~isb9112/dept/phil341/histconn.html">
    <title>&quot;A Revisionist History of Connectionism&quot;</title>
    <dc:date>2010-07-31T16:47:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/~isb9112/dept/phil341/histconn.html</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[A great quote from M. Minsky: "It would seem that Perceptrons has much the same role as The Necronomicon -- that is, often cited but never read."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>history_of_cybernetics AI cognitive-science machine-learning perception connectionism neuroscience essays</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:72d51df8f155/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:history_of_cybernetics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:AI"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:cognitive-science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:machine-learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:connectionism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:essays"/>
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<item rdf:about="http://proxy.lib.duke.edu/content/w424t64184p3023j/?p=4ddabb5967f84422a30a97f3ca79156a&amp;pi=3">
    <title>The Informed Neuron: Issues in the Use of Information Theory in the Behavioral Sciences</title>
    <dc:date>2010-03-03T03:51:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://proxy.lib.duke.edu/content/w424t64184p3023j/?p=4ddabb5967f84422a30a97f3ca79156a&amp;pi=3</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Abstract: "The concept of information is virtually ubiquitous in contemporary cognitive science. ... Fred Dretske''s extensive philosophical defense of a theory of informational content (semantic information) based upon the Shannon-Weaver formal theory of information is subjected to critical scrutiny. A major difficulty is identified in Dretske''s equivocations in the use of the concept of a signal bearing informational content. Gibson''s alternative conception of information (construed as analog by Dretske), while avoiding many of the problems located in the conventional use of signal, raises different but equally serious questions. It is proposed that, taken literally, the human CNS does not extract or process information at all; rather, whatever information is construed as locatable in the CNS is information only for an observer-theorist and only for certain purposes."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>papers to-read information-theory neuroscience cognition psychology perception</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:384f56b7f100/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:papers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:to-read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:information-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jocn.2009.21131">
    <title>Neural Evidence of Statistical Learning: Efficient Detection of Visual Regularities Without Awareness</title>
    <dc:date>2009-08-24T00:47:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jocn.2009.21131</link>
    <dc:creator>mraginsky</dc:creator><dc:subject>papers to-read statistical-learning neuroscience perception vision via:cshalizi</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/b:56142e32a07f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:papers"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:statistical-learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:vision"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:mraginsky/t:via:cshalizi"/>
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