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    <title>Pinboard (elizrael)</title>
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    <description>recent bookmarks from elizrael</description>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://tcf.org/content/report/turkish-future-egypts-muslim-brotherhood/"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2018/09/05/how-assad-won-the-syrian-civil-war-before-it-began/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/11/19/unhappy-return-what-iraqi-islamic-party-gave-up-to-gain-power-pub-77747"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/mercenaries-assassination-us-yemen-uae-spear-golan-dahlan"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-sectarian-violence-middle-east/573580/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/books/review/david-d-kirkpatrick-into-the-hands-of-the-soldiers.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-national-chaos-local-order"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.themaydan.com/2018/05/roundtable-political-islam-arab-uprisings/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/sunday-review/obama-egypt-coup-trump.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/197949"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/32073.html"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.wired.com/story/jared-kushner-leak-full-audio/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.hudson.org/research/13787-the-rise-of-the-violent-muslim-brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pomeps.org/2017/04/27/the-islamist-voter-base-during-the-arab-spring-more-ideology-than-protest/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/03/how-egypts-generals-used-street-protests-to-stage-a-coup/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/al-jazeera-qatar-saudi-arabia-muslim-brotherhood/531471/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.syriauntold.com/en/2017/05/no-new-parties-in-liberated-idlib/"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pomeps.org/2017/01/23/the-role-of-traditional-and-new-media-in-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhoods-internal-power-struggle/"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/66585"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://pomeps.org/2016/06/03/from-co-optation-to-crackdown-gulf-states-reactions-to-the-rise-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-during-the-arab-spring/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/17/how-emigration-to-the-gulf-is-influencing-egyptian-voters/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/no-end-sight"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/64609"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://pomeps.org/2016/02/26/the-islamist-identity-crisis-how-mainstream-islamism-lost-control-of-its-own-narrative/"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://syriadirect.org/news/victory-army-commander-on-restructuring-infighting-led-to-%E2%80%98breakdown-of-our-operational-effectiveness%E2%80%99/"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/04/five-years-after-arab-uprisings-security-trumps-reforms-in-jordan/"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/08/rethinking-political-islam"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://al3ahdnewspaper.com/%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Face-off-between-Hamas-Cairo-448739"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-02-04/egypts-new-radicalism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://fikraforum.org/?p=8565#.VreWAVh94U0"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/20160116/the-uncle-the-life-and-death-of-isils-man-in-southern-syria#full"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/discussing-recent-poll-results-from-the-middle-east"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-01-17/brotherhood-breaks-down"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/12/07-why-israel-outlawed-northern-branch-islamic-movement-rubin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://merip.org/mero/mero123015"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://abujamajem.wordpress.com/2015/12/16/jabhat-al-nusrah-leader-on-splits-in-egyptian-brotherhood-and-thats-what-jihadists-are-waiting-for-2/#more-242"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-12/opposition-wants-a-say-in-choosing-syrian-leaders"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/11/03-us-egypt-relationship-hamid#.VjpXjv1uUqQ.twitter"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.hudson.org/research/11530-the-brotherhood-divided"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/people-get-wrong-political-islam/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/05/22-kuwait-secular-groups-political-parties"/>
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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://www.syriaintransition.com/en/home/archive/issue-30/islamists-versus-islamists">
    <title>Islamists versus Islamists - Syria in Transition</title>
    <dc:date>2025-12-21T06:28:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.syriaintransition.com/en/home/archive/issue-30/islamists-versus-islamists</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Sources indicate that during summer Sharaa tasked Zaidan to persuade the Brotherhood leadership that the Islamic project had already materialised through HTS, and that dissolving the organisation would allow its members to participate in state institutions without potential complications arising from formal Brotherhood affiliation. 

The article certainly appeared to signal the end of dialogue. Informed sources in Damascus suggested to Syria in Transition that the authorities were prepared to treat the Brotherhood as they did Hizb ut-Tahrir in Idlib: cease all political activity or face imprisonment.]]></description>
<dc:subject>HTSRegime al-Jolani Muslim_Brotherhood elections Parliament Islamists</dc:subject>
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<item rdf:about="https://abuaardvark.substack.com/p/more-identity-less-class?s=w">
    <title>More Identity, Less Class</title>
    <dc:date>2022-12-20T22:01:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://abuaardvark.substack.com/p/more-identity-less-class?s=w</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[He shows how Sadat’s efforts to neuter the Nasserist and Communist Left in response to immediate political exigency over the long term resulted in the profound weakness of leftist parties which might have otherwise challenged both the Brotherhood and the late Mubarak regime. He is particularly acute in analyzing the shift by many of those Leftists instead into an anti-Islamism which implicitly supported the regime]]></description>
<dc:subject>leftists Muslim_Brotherhood history Egypt books</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:090809978129/</dc:identifier>
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    <title>Lebanon: New Strategic Base for Hamas</title>
    <dc:date>2022-10-20T01:38:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/88184?amp%3Butm_medium=rss</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>AssadRegime Muslim_Brotherhood Mar15 Hizbollah Lebanon Hamas</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:a22b70126961/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/assads-secular-sectarianism/">
    <title>Assad's secular sectarianism | openDemocracy, 2014</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-27T07:23:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/assads-secular-sectarianism/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[This sectarian shift can be appreciated in the testimony of the Syrian poet Faraj Bayrakdar, at the time a central committee member of the underground Communist Action Party, who was imprisoned several times by the Assad regime:

“The first time I was imprisoned, in 1978, there were no sectarian insults. When I was arrested again, in 1987, sectarian insults against prisoners were the norm.”]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood Mar15 Syria secularism sectarianism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.syria.tv/%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9">
    <title>فيلق الشام.. التحولات وشبكة العلاقات والحالة الفريدة في العسكرة</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-21T19:51:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.syria.tv/%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>NLF FSA history Mar15 Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
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<item rdf:about="https://tcf.org/content/report/turkish-future-egypts-muslim-brotherhood/">
    <title>The Turkish Future of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood - TCF, Aug 17, 2020</title>
    <dc:date>2020-09-27T06:49:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://tcf.org/content/report/turkish-future-egypts-muslim-brotherhood/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Egypt’s 2013 military coup and crackdown left the Muslim Brotherhood adrift, perhaps more so than it ever had been in its ninety-two-year history.
Nevertheless, the organization has been able to survive, in large part because thousands of members—especially its youth—fled the country, many to Turkey.
But now, the Muslim Brotherhood is undergoing new strains. The organization’s diaspora has encountered new ways of thinking—about life, politics, and religion. Meanwhile, the aging Brotherhood leadership is proving reluctant to adapt.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood Turkey AKP authoritarian_regime ideology liberalism</dc:subject>
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<item rdf:about="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/03/06/book-review-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-syria-by-dara-conduit/">
    <title>Book Review – ‘The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria’ by Dara Conduit</title>
    <dc:date>2020-03-07T10:16:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/03/06/book-review-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-syria-by-dara-conduit/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>books Muslim_Brotherhood Mar15 Syria</dc:subject>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2018/09/05/how-assad-won-the-syrian-civil-war-before-it-began/">
    <title>How Assad Won the Syrian Civil War Before It Began – Political Violence at a Glance, Sep 2018</title>
    <dc:date>2019-01-03T20:55:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2018/09/05/how-assad-won-the-syrian-civil-war-before-it-began/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[victory?

Most analysts emphasize how Assad benefited from extensive international support from Russia and Iran, as well as non-state militias like Hezbollah. They also credit Assad’s deft deployment of a divide-and-rule strategy, in which he sought modus vivendis with some opponents—ISIS and Kurdish rebel groups carving out autonomous spaces far from Damascus—while unleashing the full weight of his military strength on moderate Western-backed rebel factions. Yet the most important factor in Assad’s victory was neither his international support nor his wartime strategies; rather, Assad triumphed because Syria’s armed domestic opposition was hopelessly fragmented from the beginning to the closing stages of the conflict.

By early 2013, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had compiled an index of 1,000 independent armed groups operating in Syria. These eventually coalesced into five or six major coalitions, but even then Syria’s rebel movement was the most fragmented in a dataset I constructed by a significant margin. Indeed, the Syrian rebel movement is likely the most fragmented in history.

What explains this dubious achievement? My research points to a set of social and political policies employed by the Assad regime to control Syrian society in the thirty years prior to the Arab Spring uprising. After the Assad regime crushed a rebellion by Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamists in 1982, it sought to demobilize both its religious and secular opponents by dismantling the Muslim Brotherhood, coopting potential opponents, infiltrating and splintering opposition groups, and sponsoring small Salafi militant networks.

In short, Syrian state policy atomized civil society in the decades prior to 2011. When Syrians rose in rebellion for a second time in 2011, they did so from scattered pockets of opposition, not from a single cross-cutting social base like the Muslim Brotherhood. This, in turn, led to today’s intensely fragmented civil war.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Mar15 Syria authoritarian_regime repression Muslim_Brotherhood Salafis civil_society</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:750a30340a85/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Syria"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:authoritarian_regime"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Salafis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:civil_society"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war">
    <title>Yemen on the brink: how the UAE is profiting from the chaos of civil war | Ghaith Abdul-Ahad | News | The Guardian, Dec 21, 2018</title>
    <dc:date>2018-12-24T01:28:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/21/yemen-uae-united-arab-emirates-profiting-from-chaos-of-civil-war</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The Emiratis appear to be the only alliance members with a clear strategy. They are using private armies that they have created, trained and funded in a bid to crush both jihadi militancy and Islamist political parties such as al-Islah. Across the southern coast – where the UAE is allied with the separatist Southern Movement, which is opposed to both the Houthis and the Hadi government – the Emiratis have built a series of military camps and bases, and established what is essentially a parallel state, with its own security services who are not accountable to the Yemeni government. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have revealed the existence of a network of secret prisons operated by the UAE and its proxy forces, who are accused of disappearing and torturing al-Islah members, anti-Houthi fighters from rival factions, and even activists and critics of the Saudi-UAE coalition. Yemeni ministers have taken to referring to the Emiratis as an “occupation force”.

With the Emiratis as their backers, the people of Aden believed their city would become the next Dubai, with electricity, water and jobs. The enthusiastic governor, a former general who had returned from London to help rebuild the city, told me companies would pour into the city; Aden would resume its former glory; its port, which had been stagnating before the war, would reclaim its status; and embassies would reopen. In the months after the Houthis’ departure in 2015, the Emiratis were celebrated as liberators, their flags sold on market stalls, and pictures of the rulers adorned street corners and weapons.

In the streets, the reality was different. “Liberated Aden” resembled other cities devastated by the civil wars that followed the Arab spring, with rusting, burned tanks and armoured vehicles perched on hills, overlooking a city of scarred streets and gutted buildings, toppled on top of one another like crumpled concrete wafers, and impoverished people left homeless and turned into refugee squatters in their own city. The defeated Houthi militia was replaced by dozens of others in a city without water, electricity or a sewage system. The war became the main employer, and the streets filled with fighters riding in the back of pickup trucks mounted with heavy machine guns. Commanders from the disparate, disunited resistance groups were demanding their share of the spoils from a broken and impoverished city.

The most powerful of those commanders, men like Ayman Askar, secured control of the ports, factories and any institution that generated an income, imposing their protection racket. The smaller commanders contented themselves with looting public and private property, especially if the latter belonged to northern owners.

In the summer I met with a human rights lawyer who works with Yemeni ministry of justice, compiling lists of detainees and collecting testimonies from them and their families. “After the battle for Aden we expected the Emiratis to form one army from the resistance – instead, they created a dozen forces and they are detaining anyone who opposes them,” she told me. “Pursuing al-Qaida became a pretext – anyone they don’t approve of is detained, and almost everyone detained is tortured, often hung from ceiling, many are sexually abused. The sad thing is that now southerners are torturing southerners with the blessing of the Emiratis – while the government of Yemen stands helpless and watches.”

The increasingly visible pursuit of these geopolitical imperatives has not necessarily impressed their ostensible allies in Yemen. In Aden this summer, criticism of the UAE was spreading, especially among the poor, who had thought the presence of their very rich neighbours would make their lives better. Instead, the electricity supply had got worse, preventable diseases were spreading, and the collapse of the Yemeni riyal was making them even poorer.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>UAE Muslim_Brotherhood militia Looting corruption lawlessness ForeignFighters torture kidnapping</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:9a8d2828304e/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:kidnapping"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/11/19/unhappy-return-what-iraqi-islamic-party-gave-up-to-gain-power-pub-77747">
    <title>An Unhappy Return: What the Iraqi Islamic Party Gave Up to Gain Power - Carnegie Middle East Center - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</title>
    <dc:date>2018-11-19T18:49:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/11/19/unhappy-return-what-iraqi-islamic-party-gave-up-to-gain-power-pub-77747</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Nevertheless, the IIP will most likely survive its waning popularity and the consequent loss of government positions because the party has an important advantage over its rivals. Contrary to most of its Sunni counterparts, who depend on buying loyalty, the IIP is a hierarchical organization with a solid organizational core united by a common ideology. Although the IIP has had its fair share of internal rivalries, its ideological cohesion and consultative mechanisms for resolving internal disputes have kept the party together thus far.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Iraq Muslim_Brotherhood history sunni</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:2c8744b7f028/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Iraq"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:history"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:sunni"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/mercenaries-assassination-us-yemen-uae-spear-golan-dahlan">
    <title>Exclusive : American Mercenaries Went To Yemen To Carry Out Targeted Killings</title>
    <dc:date>2018-11-03T23:54:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/aramroston/mercenaries-assassination-us-yemen-uae-spear-golan-dahlan</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>Assassination USA Yemen UAE murder Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:a357704f09d3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Assassination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:USA"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Yemen"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:UAE"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:murder"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-sectarian-violence-middle-east/573580/">
    <title>The End of Sectarian Violence in the Middle East - The Atlantic</title>
    <dc:date>2018-10-23T19:56:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-sectarian-violence-middle-east/573580/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>sectarianism Iraq elections Muslim_Brotherhood Iran Saudi-Arabia</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:fa21d276e9c4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:sectarianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Iraq"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:elections"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Iran"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Saudi-Arabia"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/books/review/david-d-kirkpatrick-into-the-hands-of-the-soldiers.html">
    <title>The Failure of Egypt’s Revolution - The New York Times, Aug 7, 2018</title>
    <dc:date>2018-08-11T21:43:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/books/review/david-d-kirkpatrick-into-the-hands-of-the-soldiers.html</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Kirkpatrick suggests that if the activists had lived with Morsi’s illiberal but weak rule until he could be voted out, democracy might have had a chance. Their mistake, he says, was “they trusted Sisi.” They chose the greater of two evils. But he doesn’t fully explore the risks of sticking with Morsi. Nor does he analyze how a revolution works, how power can be seized and lost so easily. The closest he comes is a remark that political power is like “fairy-tale magic” that only works if you believe in it. That observation is actually well-rooted in political theory: Revolutions happen when enough people stop blindly accepting that it’s futile to resist the current regime.

The activists’ ability to organize street demonstrations, I would argue, was the kind of “magic” that — for limited periods — could make a revolution (or a coup) possible. However, they never really understood its limits. I remember liberals in 2013 brushing off the threat from Sisi: If he tried to seize power, they’d just make another revolution. They didn’t grasp that you get only so many chances at revolution. A week of civil disorder is thrilling; three years are exhausting. Alliances broken are hard to rebuild. If you throw out too many elected governments, even bad ones, you’ll throw out democracy with them.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt Jan25 Muslim_Brotherhood military junta coup</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:f98e600ed41d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Jan25"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:military"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:junta"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:coup"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-national-chaos-local-order">
    <title>Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order | Chatham House, Dec 2017</title>
    <dc:date>2018-08-06T03:33:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/yemen-national-chaos-local-order</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Yemen has become a ‘chaos state’ – a nominal entity that exists largely as lines on a map and as a concept in newspaper reports and policymaker briefings.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Yemen militia AQ civil_war Houthi warlords UAE Muslim_Brotherhood Saudi-Arabia</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:cbd8b1200187/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Yemen"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:militia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:AQ"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:civil_war"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Houthi"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:warlords"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Saudi-Arabia"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.themaydan.com/2018/05/roundtable-political-islam-arab-uprisings/">
    <title>Roundtable on Political Islam after the Arab Uprisings - Maydan, May 2018</title>
    <dc:date>2018-07-30T14:22:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.themaydan.com/2018/05/roundtable-political-islam-arab-uprisings/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[“Are the shifts these movements are experiencing generational or ideational in nature? How has populism influenced the evolution of Islamic movements and their response to the Arab uprisings? Perhaps more significantly, how have the Arab uprisings forced us to rethink grand narratives about the nature of Islamic movements?”
]]></description>
<dc:subject>ArabUprisings Islamists Muslim_Brotherhood al-Nahda Egypt AKP Indonesia refugees Morocco repression</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:b20543ad2ed0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:ArabUprisings"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Islamists"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:al-Nahda"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:AKP"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Indonesia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:refugees"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Morocco"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/sunday-review/obama-egypt-coup-trump.html">
    <title>The White House and the Strongman - The New York Times, July 27, 2018</title>
    <dc:date>2018-07-30T01:07:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/sunday-review/obama-egypt-coup-trump.html</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[“It was reassuring that Egypt would not fall into a civil war or a complete massacre of the public or an implosion,” Mr. Kerry said, although he added, “I did not sit back and think, ‘Great, our problems are going to be solved.’”

But the message Mr. Hagel delivered “was totally, totally different,” a senior official on the National Security Council who read transcripts of the calls later told me. “The White House wanted the message to be ‘Democracy is important,’ and Hagel wanted it to be ‘We want to have a good relationship.’ We never could get him to deliver stern talking points.”

Israeli leaders had said they were counting on General Sisi because they worried that — despite Mr. Morsi’s repeated pledges — the Muslim Brotherhood might threaten the border or help Hamas. And General Sisi himself had told Mr. Hagel that “there are some very evil, very bad forces afoot — you cannot understand it like we can understand it here.”

“In Egypt, what was the alternative? It wasn’t Jeffersonian democracy,” Mr. Kerry told me. “Over whatever number of years we have put about $80 billion into Egypt. Most of the time, this is the kind of government they had — almost all of the time. And the reality is, no matter how much I wish it was different, it ain’t going to be different tomorrow.”

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Israel Muslim_Brotherhood obama_administration JohnKerry authoritarian_regime coup junta UAE</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:98dcbaf77833/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Israel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:obama_administration"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:junta"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:UAE"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/197949">
    <title>مصفحات تركية تدخل معارك إدلب لأول مرة (فيديو) - عنب بلدي</title>
    <dc:date>2018-01-11T23:59:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/197949</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Faylaq al-Sham]]></description>
<dc:subject>Turkey aid Mar15 FSA Muslim_Brotherhood weapons</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:94db4d288cfa/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Turkey"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:aid"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:FSA"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:weapons"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/32073.html">
    <title>All Islamists' activities monitored by Syrian Intelligence: document - Zaman al-Wasl, Jan 4, 2018</title>
    <dc:date>2018-01-08T16:46:05+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/32073.html</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The document reveals that the al-Assad intelligence included all religious trends such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist groups, or Sufi paths in their research, and did not leave a single field of activity unobserved whether sermons, da’wa, Quran memorization, Jihad, or teaching. Almost all of these different currents and activities received the same treatment which included, following up on their activities, conducting research on them, meeting and speaking to them, trying to persuade them to become closer to the regime, and plant intelligence agents in their ranks.
Scrutinizing the document shows clearly that the regime adopted a multi-faceted policy in its dealings with various Islamic currents. This policy is based on: monitoring, sorting, containment, and infiltration.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Mar15 intelligence Syria Muslim_Brotherhood Intelligence_community leak Islamists Salafis</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:dd3dac7ad790/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:intelligence"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=75086">
    <title>Writing About Power - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nov 22,2017</title>
    <dc:date>2017-12-23T02:38:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=75086</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Egypt is now back to a situation reminiscent of the late 1950s and early 1960s: a former officer occupying the presidency and ruling through a cabinet of technocrats rather than a ruling party; a duplication within the coercive apparatus, with both civilian and military agencies sharing (and bickering over) the burden of domestic control; a hybrid (or rather confused) economy with the military trying to command and direct economic life toward what it regards as patriotic ends; and an old economic elite—this time monopoly capitalists, not landlords—vacillating between support and obstruction. In contrast to those who insist that an attempted Egyptian revolution was foiled by a counterrevolution organized by the “deep state,” my approach leads me to conclude that the regime is still quite fluid. Politics is in flux and the military and security institutions are maintaining a tricky balance at the apex of power]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt history authoritarian_regime poli-sci Muslim_Brotherhood Military secretPolice Intelligence_community</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:c67947507db8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:history"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:authoritarian_regime"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:poli-sci"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Military"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:secretPolice"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Intelligence_community"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.wired.com/story/jared-kushner-leak-full-audio/">
    <title>Full Audio of Jared Kushner's Congressional Intern Address | WIRED</title>
    <dc:date>2017-08-02T14:48:09+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.wired.com/story/jared-kushner-leak-full-audio/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[You know, this is one way the president is very different. Because people talk about human rights. And I never understood why politicians from government made speeches condemning these world leaders on human rights. Because at the end of the day, it’s like, [unintelligible] Egypt, this guy, President el-Sisi.... He was a general in the army, he basically took out the Muslim Brotherhood, and in a lot of ways saved Egypt from a very, very radicalized direction.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood Kushner Egypt TrumpAdministration Sisi leak</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:fa6cbf6388b9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Kushner"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:TrumpAdministration"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Sisi"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:leak"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.hudson.org/research/13787-the-rise-of-the-violent-muslim-brotherhood">
    <title>The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood - by Mokhtar Awad - Hudson, July 27, 2017</title>
    <dc:date>2017-07-30T19:47:38+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.hudson.org/research/13787-the-rise-of-the-violent-muslim-brotherhood</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The book and the ideological revisions by the new guard are arguably representative of the wider body of the Muslim Brotherhood as Kamal oversaw the Muslim Brotherhood’s affairs after the coup. These ongoing revisions should be studied closely as they offer a critical corrective to analysis of the organization. It demonstrates how a great deal of the scholarship on the group produced in recent decades is increasingly becoming less useful and is in serious need of updating.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood Radical_Islam violence terrorism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:89991520a213/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Radical_Islam"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:violence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:terrorism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://pomeps.org/2017/04/27/the-islamist-voter-base-during-the-arab-spring-more-ideology-than-protest/">
    <title>The Islamist voter base during the Arab Spring: More ideology than protest? – Project on Middle East Political Science, April 27, 2017</title>
    <dc:date>2017-07-09T14:09:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://pomeps.org/2017/04/27/the-islamist-voter-base-during-the-arab-spring-more-ideology-than-protest/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Figure 1 displays the values of respondents indicating that they would vote for an Islamist party “if there were elections tomorrow” compared to any other respondent in the surveys.[6] As can be seen clearly in the figure, Islamist voters do indeed display values in tune with Islamist core messages, most strongly when it comes to the greater role of religion in politics. In contrast, there are no discernible differences between Islamist voters and others regarding economic issues such as preferences for redistribution or economic competition.[7] Figure 2 shows a few demographic features of Islamist voters during the Arab Spring period. To some extent, Islamist parties attracted a slightly better off group compared to the average citizen, with less poverty and more education. At the same time, Islamist voters in the seven countries were, on average, not more likely to have fulltime employment. They were slightly younger but had no gender defined profile. All in all, this does not look like to typical profile of clientelistic voters nor like a pronounced economic grievance profile – at least no more than the average MENA citizen at that time.

In addition, these data contain some items that speak to the protest voter argument, at least partly. It is a sensible assumption that protest voters would be those especially concerned with corruption, given its pervasiveness and the involvement of the old political elites in it. A protest vote can be viewed partly a vote against the corrupted status quo. Figure 3 shows the results of different survey items that address these questions. Contrary to expectations, Islamist voters are not more likely than others to mention corruption as their most important problem. In fact, on all other items relating to corruption, they are less likely than other respondents to believe that corruption is pervasive, that it has increased in recent years or that the government handles it badly. As these items come from three surveys, the general finding that Islamist supporters do not match the protest voter profile when it comes to corruption appears quite robust.

The implication of these findings is relatively straightforward. To some extent an important motive for Islamist support is a very simple one, namely that Islamist ideology resonates with voters. This is particularly interesting if one considers that these surveys were taken during the Arab Spring at a moment when Islamist parties attracted particularly high voter shares. Moreover, the share of respondents indicating a preference for Islamist parties in the surveys exceeds the share these parties won in the Arab Spring (or other nearby elections), showing that these are not simply the values of a number of very committed sympathizers. The finding seems intriguing given that scholars (including myself) often explain Islamist support in terms of things other than Islamist ideology, such as their stance against corruption, the fact that they have not been tested in office or their grassroots activities. These factors might of course matter but should not lead us to overlook the attractiveness of the “Islamist part” of Islamist parties for a substantial group.[8] In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the ideological congruence result is fully robust across survey, country, and also holds for earlier surveys by the Arab Barometer and World Values Survey.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood Islamists public_opinion polls ideology corruption ArabUprisings</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:dc1266ec34ac/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:ArabUprisings"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/03/how-egypts-generals-used-street-protests-to-stage-a-coup/">
    <title>How Egypt’s generals used street protests to stage a coup - The Washington Post, July 3, 2017</title>
    <dc:date>2017-07-04T15:41:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/03/how-egypts-generals-used-street-protests-to-stage-a-coup/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Less well-documented is the wave of anti-Muslim Brotherhood violence that destabilized Morsi’s presidency in the period leading up to the military takeover. Figure 1 shows a heat map of attacks on Muslim Brotherhood offices and party headquarters between June 18 and July 3, 2013. Attacks were particularly concentrated in the Nile Delta governorates — areas where Morsi-appointed governors had struggled to assert political authority following his June 2012 election. These public episodes of violence — more than 40 in total — sharply escalated in the week before the June 30 protests, coinciding with public declarations by police officers and Interior Ministry officials that the country’s security forces would not intervene and protect the buildings.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>coup Egypt junta Parliament Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:81b7a42344d2/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Parliament"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/al-jazeera-qatar-saudi-arabia-muslim-brotherhood/531471/">
    <title>Al Jazeera Is At the Center of the Qatar Crisis - The Atlantic</title>
    <dc:date>2017-06-25T08:24:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/al-jazeera-qatar-saudi-arabia-muslim-brotherhood/531471/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>al-jazeera Qatar Saudi-Arabia Muslim_Brotherhood media bias sectarianism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:c4dd7a055463/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:al-jazeera"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Qatar"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Saudi-Arabia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:media"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:bias"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:sectarianism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.syriauntold.com/en/2017/05/no-new-parties-in-liberated-idlib/">
    <title>No New Parties in “Liberated” Idlib | SyriaUntold, May 28, 2017</title>
    <dc:date>2017-06-14T11:30:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.syriauntold.com/en/2017/05/no-new-parties-in-liberated-idlib/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[It has been two years since Idlib governorate fell entirely outside of regime control. However, due to the prevailing state of war and the multitude of jihadist organizations on the ground, new political parties have yet to take shape here. Apart from the Muslim Brotherhood, which resumed its activities through political conferences and relief efforts, party-based political life is nearly non-existent.

In short, Barish adds, in the context of an armed conflict, a mixture of sectarian strife and a “regime’s war against its people,” not to mention the complex geopolitical dynamics, there is little chance for a leftist movement to be effective in the foreseeable future. Political activity, even the sort bound by democratic principles, is still subject to repression and persecution in areas the regime has forgone, to no lesser extent than in regime-controlled areas.

As for the People’s Party, Barish believes that it has distinguished itself from other parties in the vast political ecosystem in which it operates. That is, it has included intellectuals, veteran political dissidents and young activists. However, the party fell short of garnering significance presence in Idlib, which is also the case of the Nasserite current (the Democratic Arab Socialist Union). Furthermore, Barish emphasizes that, as far as the Syrian rebellion’s support base is concerned, the majority of political figures operate on a local rather than national level.]]></description>
<dc:subject>politics Idlib Muslim_Brotherhood leftists</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:441a53fd6abc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:politics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Idlib"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:leftists"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-middle-east-allies-explore-arab-military-coalition-1487154600">
    <title>U.S., Middle East Allies Explore Arab Military Coalition - WSJ, Feb 15, 2017</title>
    <dc:date>2017-04-19T10:49:31+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-middle-east-allies-explore-arab-military-coalition-1487154600</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The Trump administration is in talks with Arab allies about having them form a military alliance that would share intelligence with Israel to help counter their mutual foe, Iran, several Middle Eastern officials said.

The alliance would include countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 

For the Arab countries involved, the alliance would have a NATO-style mutual-defense component under which an attack on one member would be treated as an attack on all, though details are still being worked out, the officials said.

The U.S. would offer military and intelligence support to the alliance, beyond the kind of limited backing it has been providing to a Saudi-led coalition fighting Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, the officials said. But neither the U.S. nor Israel would be part of the mutual-defense pact.

“They’ve been asking diplomatic missions in Washington if we’d be willing to join this force that has an Israeli component,” one Arab diplomat said. “Israel’s role would likely be intelligence sharing, not training or boots on the ground. They’d provide intelligence and targets. That’s what the Israelis are good at.”

Trump administration officials have said they want to revitalize American alliances in the area and take new steps to constrain the regional influence wielded by Iran,

Arab diplomats have told administration officials they would pursue more overt cooperation with Israel if it ceases settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem—something Israel refused to do under intense pressure from the Obama administration.

The diplomats also said their countries’ cooperation would be contingent upon the Trump administration refraining from moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, an effective recognition of Israel’s claim to Jerusalem as its capital. In recent weeks, the administration has walked back previous statements supporting settlement construction and moving the embassy.

One Arab diplomat suggested that the notion that the Trump administration might designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group was being floated as an incentive for Egypt to join the alliance. The current Egyptian government sees the Brotherhood—which it overthrew in a coup in 2013—as a terrorist organization.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood Israel Saudi-Arabia Jordan UAE intelligence TrumpAdministration unnamed_official</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:bcca6827d800/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Israel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Saudi-Arabia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Jordan"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:UAE"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:intelligence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:TrumpAdministration"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:unnamed_official"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://pomeps.org/2017/01/23/the-role-of-traditional-and-new-media-in-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhoods-internal-power-struggle/">
    <title>The role of traditional and new media in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s internal power struggle – Project on Middle East Political Science, Jan 23, 2017</title>
    <dc:date>2017-02-06T14:14:36+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://pomeps.org/2017/01/23/the-role-of-traditional-and-new-media-in-the-egyptian-muslim-brotherhoods-internal-power-struggle/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Media tools played an unprecedented role in how the Muslim Brotherhood adapted to its new reality of repression. The transformations in the MB’s media empire mirrored the mood, tendencies, and power struggles inside the organization, providing a unique window for researchers to study these developments in real time.

The satellite networks and new media platforms also showed how easy it could be for dissidents to challenge leaders and for radicals to introduce their ideas into the body of the Muslim Brotherhood. These media platforms helped bridge the connective tissue lost between members, leaders, and clerics in a time of extreme repression. Through these media platforms, Brotherhood leaders and clerics also attempt to acculturate a fragmented organization and win over a young rebellious generation. When left unchecked, Brotherhood clerics and their Salafist allies with Gulf funding quickly propagated the most hateful, violent, and sectarian expressions of Islamism, arguably helping radicalize some youth by providing them with religious justifications for violence against the state. Now the old guard is using the same media tools to counter these extreme calls and answer the question of who speaks for the Muslim Brotherhood.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood media internal_struggle TV incitement</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:622f700c49ca/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:media"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:internal_struggle"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:TV"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:incitement"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://tcf.org/content/report/into-the-tunnels/">
    <title>Into the Tunnels - TCF, Dec 21, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2017-02-03T13:42:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://tcf.org/content/report/into-the-tunnels/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[ spearheaded the creation of military and judicial institutions that could potentially have evolved into a post-Assad government.
Weakened by its failure to control the tunnel economy and by the death of its leader, the Islam Army’s dominance was shattered by infighting in spring 2016. Since then, the enclave has been split and Assad is now moving to recapture it.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Mar15 internal_struggle corruption smuggling Damascus blockade JayshAl-Islam JabhatAl-Nusra AhrarAl-Sham Muslim_Brotherhood FSA protests Judiciary tunnels</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:680fca3180d4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:internal_struggle"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:corruption"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:smuggling"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Damascus"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:JayshAl-Islam"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:JabhatAl-Nusra"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=64914">
    <title>Down by Law - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oct 20, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2017-01-28T18:23:36+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=64914</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[This is not the first time that the Interior Ministry insults the intelligence of the Egyptian public with statements blaming the country’s economic and social hardships on the Muslim Brotherhood. In October 2015, Hassan Malek—a leading Brotherhood figure and a business tycoon—was arrested  for singlehandedly “undermining the national economy by smuggling foreign currency abroad.” He was also accused of manipulating the exchange rate through a network of currency-exchange bureaus owned by Muslim Brotherhood affiliates and surrogates. He remains behind bars.

The government’s accusations aren’t limited to Egypt’s finances. In November of last year, after there was flooding in Alexandria due to heavy rains and an outdated sewage system, the Interior Ministry offered up a familiar explanation for the catastrophe. It arrested a Muslim Brotherhood cell accused of blocking the sewage system, leading to the inundation of the city.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood Propaganda lies</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:e7b4b51c4d44/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Propaganda"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:lies"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/66585">
    <title>Will History Repeat Itself? - Carnegie Middle East Center, Jan 6, 2017</title>
    <dc:date>2017-01-28T15:53:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/66585</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>Turkey AhrarAl-Sham Mar15 Muslim_Brotherhood history Syria</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:c3c99ed13b97/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Turkey"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:AhrarAl-Sham"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:history"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Syria"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://pomeps.org/2016/06/03/from-co-optation-to-crackdown-gulf-states-reactions-to-the-rise-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-during-the-arab-spring/">
    <title>From Co-optation to Crackdown: Gulf States’ Reactions to the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring – Project on Middle East Political Science, May 3, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-10-02T19:22:38+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://pomeps.org/2016/06/03/from-co-optation-to-crackdown-gulf-states-reactions-to-the-rise-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-during-the-arab-spring/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Examining recent statements made by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments about the Muslim Brotherhood, it is difficult to believe that its members were almost universally welcomed into the Gulf states in the 1950s, with some of their ranks holding ministerial positions into the 2000s. The rise of Islamist opposition movements during the Arab Spring led governments across the region to focus keenly on the Muslim Brotherhood as it emerged as the primary voice of political opposition. I argue that the reason for such a focus on the Ikhwan inside the Gulf lies beyond regional politics alone; rather, the persistent presence of Muslim Brotherhood movements inside the GCC states led their governments to articulate different policies toward such groups. Indeed, each of the Gulf states has developed a distinct strategy to manage the Ikhwan, ranging from a soft form of co-optation seen in Qatar to a harsh crackdown in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

That such policies diverge so widely demonstrates the degree to which each Gulf regime considers the Ikhwan threatening to its hold on power. As the whole, government treatment of these organizations in the GCC varies according to the degree to which regimes consider them linked to broader opposition movements. The more the Brotherhood is seen to collude with secular opposition or hold political sway through government positions, the more dangerous it are considered, and thus likelier a crackdown will result. The link between activities of local Brotherhood branches and support for the Ikhwan abroad, however, is less direct. Those states which co-opt rather than shut down Brotherhood movements tend to feel less threatened by them not only domestically, but also abroad. Still, domestic calculations about the political threat posed by the Brotherhood are remarkably subjective and often rest on individual rulers’ opinions about and experiences with the organization.]]></description>
<dc:subject>UAE Qatar Saudi-Arabia Oman Bahrain Muslim_Brotherhood repression opposition Kuwait</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:25e5fbfe3a09/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Qatar"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Saudi-Arabia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Oman"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Bahrain"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:opposition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Kuwait"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/17/how-emigration-to-the-gulf-is-influencing-egyptian-voters/">
    <title>How migration to the Gulf is influencing Egyptian voters - The Washington Post, Sep 17, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-10-01T09:26:01+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/17/how-emigration-to-the-gulf-is-influencing-egyptian-voters/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[My results suggest that migrant family members connected to the Gulf voted heavily for the major parties, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafist al-Nour party. While only 30 percent of non-migrants voted for the FJP, 36 percent of Gulf migrant families did so. Disaggregating Gulf migrant family members by destination country, support for the FJP was 32 percent for those who had migrated to Saudi Arabia, but 45 percent and 53 percent for those who had migrated to Kuwait and the UAE, respectively. While the numbers are too small to draw unequivocal conclusions, it is striking that the migrants to Saudi Arabia in our sample did not seem to differ from non-migrant families in terms of voting for the FJP but that the ones to Kuwait and the UAE did.
The same is not the case for the Salafist al-Nour party. The strongest support for al-Nour came from voters whose family members had migrated to Saudi Arabia. While only 15 percent of non-migrant families voted for al-Nour in Egypt, among migrant families this figure increased to 26 percent for all Gulf countries and 32 percent for Saudi Arabia. Compared with other countries, the size of migration to Saudi Arabia and the share of al-Nour’s vote among these migrant families suggest a strong link between migration to Saudi Arabia and the electoral success of al-Nour.


]]></description>
<dc:subject>Salafis Muslim_Brotherhood Egypt immigration elections</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:6c8d61c44fc4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Salafis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:immigration"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:elections"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/no-end-sight">
    <title>No End In Sight | The Cipher Brief, Aug 12, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-10-01T08:07:05+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/no-end-sight</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[

The Brotherhood is now an organization in shambles, slowly rebuilding its networks across Egypt and attempting to lead an opposition from exile. The movement has been largely divided over the question of what strategy to pursue to topple Sisi. Some advocate violence, while others are biding their time, hoping that a combination of protests, international pressure, economic sabotage, or an unlikely counter-coup might rid them of Sisi. Most seem convinced that a revolution is just right around the corner, as far away from reality as this is.

This is sometimes portrayed as an internal struggle between hawks and doves, but in truth, both sides are as rigid as the other and do not seem to have learned the fundamental lesson of why they failed. The Muslim Brotherhood and its apologists continue to blame Morsi’s overthrow on a “deep state” conspiracy in league with regional powers and the West. When asked, many say the Brotherhood’s real mistake was a failure to thoroughly purge military and state institutions while in power.

The Brotherhood has simply been too ineffective in its bid to destabilize the country for Sisi to have an incentive to make peace. The group has little, if anything, to offer Sisi so long as he is able to keep them in check and this will likely be the case for the foreseeable future. The Brotherhood’s famed social services system has turned out to be a paper tiger, rather than being a “parallel” state taking care of Egypt’s needy as analysts had believed. Egypt’s massive informal charity network has corrected itself and the gap left by the Brotherhood was quickly filled. Even in this perceived area of strength for the Brotherhood, Sisi doesn’t need them.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood repression Sisi Egypt authoritarian_regime internal_struggle terrorism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:640b0b45b9a3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Sisi"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:authoritarian_regime"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:internal_struggle"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:terrorism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/64609">
    <title>No More ‘Hama Rules’ - Carnegie Middle East Center, Sep 19, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-09-29T13:09:15+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/64609</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The recent multiplication of references to the Fighting Vanguard and the jihad of the 1980s acts as a case study of the paradoxes lying behind confident assertions about the supposed radicalization of the Syrian rebel scene. Groups often deemed “radical” in the West might not recruit primarily on the basis of an “Islamist” religious and ideological agenda, but in spite of it. What may attract fighters to a group sometimes has more to do with its capacity to frame its language in a way reflecting local identities and narratives. 
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Hama history Syria Mar15 Muslim_Brotherhood AhrarAl-Sham</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:e36e52115f64/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Hama"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:history"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Syria"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:AhrarAl-Sham"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy">
    <title>The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 13, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-06-20T13:24:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context/j1iy</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Forces throughout the Middle East are attempting to roll back the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which seized territory in Iraq and Syria in 2014. But regardless of how the jihadi group fares militarily, its ideology remains a long-term challenge. The Islamic State’s ideology is multifaceted and cannot be traced to one individual, movement, or period. Understanding it is crucial to defeating the group.

A Hybrid Ideology
The Islamic State presents itself as the representative of authentic Islam as practiced by the early generations of Muslims—Salafism—and it draws on an especially strict brand of Salafism in particular, Wahhabism.
It is overly simplistic, however, to blame any one ideology for the Islamic State’s extremism. Its extremism is the product of a hybridization of doctrinaire Salafism and other Islamist currents.
The Islamic State relies on the jihadi literature of ideologues who support its stance as well as clerics who do not formally support the group. These clerics adhere to a set of ideas that significantly deviate from mainstream Islam, and many are direct heirs of the Sahwa, an intellectual religious movement that began in earnest in the 1970s.
The Sahwa blended Salafi concepts with revolutionary ideas from political Islam in a broad sense, but primarily currents influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. The intermarriage polarized and produced new and unpredictable religious currents.
Politically submissive Salafism gave way to political takfirism—excommunication after one Muslim declares another an infidel or apostate. This ideology carries the banner of caliphate, jihad, and rebellion.
The Islamic State is part of a legacy of takfiri schools and ideas to emerge from al-Qaeda. But the Islamic State’s ideological rigidity stands out. Its refusal to bend creates a culture of takfirism within takfirism.
The Ideology in Practice
The Islamic State promotes a political ideology and a worldview that actively classifies and excommunicates fellow Muslims.
The group is adept at cultivating and exploiting preexisting sectarian fissures in the Middle East. The Islamic State taps into communal hatred and religious concepts to recruit and justify its acts, or to foster sympathy and neutralize forces that actively reject it. It has proven particularly powerful in outbidding al-Qaeda for recruits.
It uses clerics’ material to justify the takfir of the Saudi state and Muslim rulers across the Middle East, and to support the rejection of official institutions and forces.
For the Islamic State, clerics offer justifications for its savagery, especially against fellow Muslims. And the group cites stories from early Islamic history to justify its brutal practices to new recruits.]]></description>
<dc:subject>ISIS Salafis Mar15 ideology Radical_Islam AQ Muslim_Brotherhood clergy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:e848ee4910f8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:ISIS"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Salafis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:ideology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Radical_Islam"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:AQ"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:clergy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.mei.edu/content/article/egypt-and-hamas-cooperation-works">
    <title>Egypt and Hamas—Cooperation in the Works? | Middle East Institute, June 16, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-06-19T11:37:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.mei.edu/content/article/egypt-and-hamas-cooperation-works</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Egypt, which enjoys friendly relations with both the Palestinian Authority and Israel, understands that it must normalize relations with Hamas to be able to act as a mediator between the three parties. The Egyptian government, which has yet to achieve convincing results in the fight against terrorist groups in Sinai, is also in need of Hamas’ cooperation in this area.

It is within this context that we can understand the recent positive signals being exchanged between the Egyptian government and Hamas. Last month, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi stated that Egypt was ready to broker reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, which followed a surprise visit in March by a Hamas delegation to Cairo. The visit launched an effort for normalizing relations after years of hostility and Egyptian accusations of Hamas masterminding, aiding, and participating in terror attacks in Sinai and other parts of Egypt.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt Hamas Gaza Sinai Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:1fd05446a12f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Hamas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Gaza"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Sinai"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/16/arabs-have-not-given-up-on-democracy/">
    <title>When it comes to democracy, Egyptians hate the player but Tunisians hate the game - The Washington Post, Oct 16, 2015</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-24T08:26:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/10/16/arabs-have-not-given-up-on-democracy/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Measures of commitment to democracy tell a similar story. At the time of the Arab uprisings, fewer than half of the citizens associated democracy with potential problems such as weak economic performance, instability, indecision and citizens’ unpreparedness. In the years that followed, attitudes changed little in all but one country.

The answer rests in who people blamed for the state of their country after the revolutions. Egyptians held the party in power — the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party — and its ideology accountable for the challenges they endured following the revolution. In June 2011, fewer than half (43 percent) of Egyptians said they trusted the Muslim Brotherhood. Similarly, just over one-third (36 percent) of Egyptians favored giving religious leaders influence over decisions of government, a question commonly used to measure of support for political Islam. These findings suggest that the electoral dominance of the Brotherhood in the post-revolutionary period was not grounded in ideological support but rather in organizational strength and a lack of credible alternatives. Citizens were so unenthusiastic that in the first free and fair elections they had ever experienced, roughly half of the electorate stayed home rather than vote for any of the candidates on the ballot.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Tunisia ArabUprisings democracy Egypt economy polls Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:330fa3cb2aa8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Tunisia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:ArabUprisings"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:democracy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:economy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:polls"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/28/contrary-to-popular-opinion-egypts-transition-wasnt-always-doomed-to-fail/">
    <title>Contrary to popular opinion, Egypt’s transition wasn’t always doomed to fail - The Washington Post, Jan 28, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-24T08:15:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/28/contrary-to-popular-opinion-egypts-transition-wasnt-always-doomed-to-fail/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The role of anti-Brotherhood political leaders, activists and the National Salvation Front in these events was also far from predetermined. The military’s choice was enabled by the support of the National Salvation Front, the coalition of opposition figures that mobilized against Morsi and offered a civilian cover to the coup. Without explicit support from this broad spectrum of opposition leaders, it is unlikely that the military would have been emboldened to act so decisively. Even in the midst of escalation, these civilian leaders could have insisted upon Morsi’s resignation, a referendum on his leadership or early presidential elections as their sole goals. However, such options were likely eschewed in that chaotic period for fear that ambiguity would undermine the military’s motivation to act.

The NSF’s choice to set aside concerns about the potential ramifications of military intervention and to align fully with the coup has come to seem inevitable but was not

Perhaps the greatest miscalculations were made by the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi. Neither the NSF nor the military’s choices would have been politically viable were it not for the remarkably poor decisions by Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood after Mubarak’s fall, especially during their year in power. Even at the late stage of June 2013 — when the military was publicly signaling its frustration with President Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood-led government and its inclination for some form of intervention — a coup was still not inevitable and could have been avoided. Had Morsi read the military’s calculations more clearly or anticipated the size of the June 30 protests, he might have taken greater steps to head off the challenge with preemptive concessions.

Why did the Muslim Brotherhood make such poor decisions, and what might it have chosen instead? First, and perhaps most important, senior Brotherhood leaders sought to preserve the coherence of their organization above and beyond any other national goals. The Brotherhood leadership was afraid that major concessions and compromise would alienate much of the rank and file, many of whom were demanding a more radical policy toward state reform and the elimination of the old regime.

Second, the Brotherhood chose confrontation because it misunderstood its own position in Egyptian society and the scope of dissatisfaction with its rule. ]]></description>
<dc:subject>coup Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood junta Sisi Tamarod</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:d17b0d645dbd/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:coup"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:junta"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Sisi"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Tamarod"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/how-tunisias-ennahda-party-turned-from-their-islamist-roots/?postshare=2751464027474985&amp;tid=ss_tw">
    <title>How Tunisia’s Ennahda party turned from its Islamist roots - The Washington Post, May 23, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-24T08:08:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/23/how-tunisias-ennahda-party-turned-from-their-islamist-roots/?postshare=2751464027474985&amp;tid=ss_tw</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[But under pressure for its failures in government from 2011 to 2014, the movement shifted strategy. It diluted its Islamising ambition in drafting the constitution and reversed an earlier commitment to exclude former senior figures from Ben Ali’s party from political life, the Democratic Constitutional Rally.

After losing the second elections in October 2014, the Ennahda leadership pushed hard for a minor role in a coalition with its rival Nidaa Tounes, a new party largely representing the political and economic elite of the old era. It voted in favor of a new anti-terrorism law that was harsher in parts than that of Ben Ali, and it backed an unpopular draft bill that would amnesty those businessmen accused of financial crimes. This was, Ennahda said, a “strategy of consensus” that was required for the greater cause of a successful democratic transition.

How can we explain this shift? The most common explanation is that Ennahda was simply acting pragmatically. Even if it had really wanted to apply sharia law or to take a more confrontational stance against the former regime elites, the reality of transition politics instead required compromise. After all, Ennahda’s defeat in the October 2014 elections showed it couldn’t win repeated victories at the ballot box. Perhaps there was more to be gained by settling for a second-best outcome in uncertain times, especially in a system in which proportional representation and a mixed parliamentary-presidential model meant that coalition governments were more likely than a two-party system. But this implies that the movement’s adaptation was merely presentational and only the result of the political upheavals of the past few years.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>al-Nahda Tunisia Islamists Muslim_Brotherhood Sidibouzid</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:8a032d882967/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:al-Nahda"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Tunisia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Islamists"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Sidibouzid"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://pomeps.org/2016/02/26/the-islamist-identity-crisis-how-mainstream-islamism-lost-control-of-its-own-narrative/">
    <title>The Islamist Identity Crisis: How Mainstream Islamism Lost Control of Its Own Narrative – Project on Middle East Political Science, Jan 29, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-23T14:49:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://pomeps.org/2016/02/26/the-islamist-identity-crisis-how-mainstream-islamism-lost-control-of-its-own-narrative/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[I argue here that the combination of four factors stemming from these recent political developments in the Middle East has put severe strain on both the internal and public narratives of many Islamist movements worldwide, and has accelerated the weakening and fragmentation of Islamist political movements. Specifically, a) resurgent authoritarianism, b) the aggressive spread of violent and often theatrical jihadism, c) state-sponsored sectarian interventions, and d) internal organizational crisis within movements have each helped lead to a loss of narrative control. The consequences of the loss of this narrative control are significant because the lack of clear messaging facilitates fragmentation among Islamist political actors and rewards the most provocative ideological narratives. This in turn creates long-term challenges for domestic politics and security within the countries in which Islamist movements have popular support. I address each of these four challenges to mainstream Islamist narratives in turn.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Islamists Muslim_Brotherhood sectarianism authoritarian_regime ISIS jihadists internal_struggle</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:384f7bac5118/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Islamists"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:sectarianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:authoritarian_regime"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:ISIS"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:jihadists"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:internal_struggle"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=62942&amp;mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRovvaXMZKXonjHpfsX76%2B4lX66g38431UFwdcjKPmjr1YoFS8J0aPyQAgobGp5I5FEIQ7XYTLB2t60MWA%3D%3D">
    <title>The Great Brotherhood Divide - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mar 2, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-23T14:24:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=62942&amp;mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRovvaXMZKXonjHpfsX76%2B4lX66g38431UFwdcjKPmjr1YoFS8J0aPyQAgobGp5I5FEIQ7XYTLB2t60MWA%3D%3D</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[2  factions within the Muslim Brotherhood are dueling for control, diminishing the group’s ability to address challenges  from the regime and driving its supporters to other actors, among them the Islamic State. 

In February 2014, the youth—who were increasingly calling for revolutionary action—successfully pressured the group to hold internal elections to restructure its governing bodies and address the leadership vacuum. This allowed them to take a more active role in internal leadership, especially on the “crisis management committee.” Since then, following the arrest of Mohamed Wahdan, a member of the guidance bureau aligned with the youth, the crisis management committee has been disbanded and replaced by the “high administrative committee.” This has added to the tension between the youth and old guard, whom the youth claim were behind Wahdan’s arrest and took advantage of the leadership vacuum to place Mahmoud Ezzat (also a member of the guidance office and deputy guide) as the Brotherhood’s default supreme guide. 

Led by guidance bureau member Mohamed Kamal and the Brotherhood’s official spokesman, Mohamed Montasser, the youth group—which includes members in Egypt and abroad—has united under what is now called the “current of conscience.” The group is keen to keep the decentralized structures produced by last year’s internal elections; they also call for violent action against President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and reject prospects of political reconciliation and integration. 

The second is the “old guard,” or the “elders’ current,” led by Mahmoud Ezzat. The old guard, not accustomed to such rebellion, is looking to undo the younger members’ rise to leadership. Each of these factions has its own administrative offices, rhetoric, and spokesman. Although the split lines up along generational lines, it is more ideological, as even within each demographic there are figures that support the other camp’s approach. But beyond seeking greater influence over what is left of the organization, neither group has a comprehensive vision for the future of the Brotherhood. ]]></description>
<dc:subject>internal_struggle Muslim_Brotherhood Egypt youth</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:650be025edc1/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="http://syriadirect.org/news/victory-army-commander-on-restructuring-infighting-led-to-%E2%80%98breakdown-of-our-operational-effectiveness%E2%80%99/">
    <title>Inside the Victory Army restructuring: Infighting led to ‘breakdown of our operational effectiveness’ - Syria Direct</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-04T13:56:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://syriadirect.org/news/victory-army-commander-on-restructuring-infighting-led-to-%E2%80%98breakdown-of-our-operational-effectiveness%E2%80%99/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[“The entrance of the Turkistan Islamic Party is important, as they will balance the coalition’s relations with other factions and reduce the chances of a clash with Jund al-Aqsa,” a Victory Army commander who requested anonymity told Syria Direct on Monday.

“The primary reason for the breakdown of our operational effectiveness was the infighting between the coalition’s factions, and particularly that caused by Jund al-Aqsa,” Hussam a-Salama, a commander with Ahrar a-Sham affiliate Liwa a-Sunna in the Victory Army, told Syria Direct on Monday.

“By excluding Jund al-Aqsa, we can restructure the Victory Army,” he added.

The restructuring allows for the return of Feilaq a-Sham, a founding member of the coalition, with more than 20 battalions spread across four Syrian provinces, including Idlib and Aleppo.

“The primary reason for the breakdown of our operational effectiveness was the infighting between the coalition’s factions, and particularly that caused by Jund al-Aqsa,” Hussam a-Salama, a commander with Ahrar a-Sham affiliate Liwa a-Sunna in the Victory Army, told Syria Direct on Monday.

“By excluding Jund al-Aqsa, we can restructure the Victory Army,” he added.

The restructuring allows for the return of Feilaq a-Sham, a founding member of the coalition, with more than 20 battalions spread across four Syrian provinces, including Idlib and Aleppo.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Idlib JayshAl-Fatah internal_struggle ISIS Muslim_Brotherhood ForeignFighters China</dc:subject>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/07/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization-or-a-firewall-against-violent-extremism/">
    <title>Is the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization or a firewall against violent extremism? - The Washington Post, Mar 7, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-04-30T07:38:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/07/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-a-terrorist-organization-or-a-firewall-against-violent-extremism/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The Muslim Brotherhood, at least in post-coup Egypt, no longer enjoys a strong presence in society with an elaborate network of social services and a tolerated public presence. Its patient strategy of long-term change through participation lies in ruins. Its organization has been shattered, with its leadership either in prison, exiled or dead and the survivors divided between multiple power centers inside Egypt and abroad. It is no longer deeply embedded in society or engaged in a patient strategy of Islamization of the political and cultural realms. It no longer has a robust internal organization, vast financial resources, a clearly defined ideology, or a tightly disciplined membership. It is neither shrouded in secrecy nor is it rigidly hierarchical.

The breaching of the Brotherhood firewall does seem to have coincided with a dramatic escalation in violent extremism. There are other factors, of course, but Egypt’s spiraling violence suggests that the military coup and subsequent violent repression of the Brotherhood did indeed open the space for more violent and radical actors.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood Radical_Islam ISIS al-Qaeda Egypt repression terrorism</dc:subject>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/04/five-years-after-arab-uprisings-security-trumps-reforms-in-jordan/">
    <title>Five years after Arab uprisings, security trumps reforms in Jordan - The Washington Post, Mar 4, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-04-30T07:36:37+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/04/five-years-after-arab-uprisings-security-trumps-reforms-in-jordan/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[They demanded that the regime restore the formerly larger state role in providing public sector employment. But many Herak activists also echoed the traditional opposition in calling for greater democratization. New and old forms of opposition stressed the problem of corruption, which many associated with the neoliberal development strategy of shifting Jordan’s large public sector toward ever more privatization.

The “story” of Jordan and the Arab Spring is therefore not just one of a domestic struggle between a regime and its often-divided opposition. It is also a story of Jordan in the crossfire of regional disasters from the Syrian civil war to the rise of the Islamic State. Added to these concerns, Jordan is also home to at least 630,000 Syrian refugees and about 600,000 additional Syrians not officially registered as refugees — all in a country of less than 7 million people. Dealing with the refugee crisis and addressing the real fears of militancy and terrorism from the Islamic State are almost all-consuming for the regime and the state.

Many opposition forces have pulled back, essentially waiting for Jordan to survive this latest set of regional challenges, before pressing harder for an agenda of greater domestic change. This importantly implies a loyal opposition, although one that has still not acquiesced to the status quo.

Many Jordanians – regime supporters and regime critics alike – agree that Jordan’s safety must come first, and they value the stability and security that Jordan has maintained thus far in the Arab Spring period. ]]></description>
<dc:subject>Jordan ArabUprisings Mar15 stability Muslim_Brotherhood tribes identity</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:ea14535bb6b9/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="http://www.mei.edu/content/article/qatar%E2%80%99s-cabinet-reshuffle-and-new-regional-approach">
    <title>Qatar’s Cabinet Reshuffle and a New Regional Approach - MEI, Mar 8,2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-04-26T07:39:18+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.mei.edu/content/article/qatar%E2%80%99s-cabinet-reshuffle-and-new-regional-approach</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>Qatar government Muslim_Brotherhood foreign_policy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:3188aeb281f0/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/08/rethinking-political-islam">
    <title>Rethinking Political Islam | Brookings Institution</title>
    <dc:date>2016-04-22T09:36:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2015/08/rethinking-political-islam</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood Islamists middle_east</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:367aa048cb19/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:middle_east"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2016/03/ennahda-islamists-muslim-democrats-ounissi">
    <title>Ennahda from within: Islamists or “Muslim Democrats”? - Brookings, Mar 23,2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-04-10T06:40:23+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2016/03/ennahda-islamists-muslim-democrats-ounissi</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>Tunisia al-Nahda Islamists Muslim_Brotherhood ideology</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:733e976fa84b/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="http://pomeps.org/2016/03/21/pomeps-conversation-59-merouan-mekouar/">
    <title>POMEPS Conversation 59: Merouan Mekouar</title>
    <dc:date>2016-04-01T18:16:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://pomeps.org/2016/03/21/pomeps-conversation-59-merouan-mekouar/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>Morocco reform authoritarian_regime Muslim_Brotherhood monarchy society prostitution internet</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:05c0f6463fe8/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="http://al3ahdnewspaper.com/%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7/">
    <title>حوار خاص: مسؤول العلاقات السياسية الخارجية في حركة “أحرار الشام الإسلامية” | صحيفة العهد</title>
    <dc:date>2016-03-26T17:41:23+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://al3ahdnewspaper.com/%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[no problem with the flag, part of the revo]]></description>
<dc:subject>AhrarAl-Sham JabhatAl-Nusra JayshAl-Fatah Mar15 Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:63157747d8de/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:JabhatAl-Nusra"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:JayshAl-Fatah"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Face-off-between-Hamas-Cairo-448739">
    <title>Analysis: Face off between Hamas, Cairo - Middle East - Jerusalem Post</title>
    <dc:date>2016-03-22T11:21:25+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Face-off-between-Hamas-Cairo-448739</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Hamas staunchly denied all accusations but the latest attempt at some form of understanding last week was a failure. In the background, Riyadh’s attempt to defuse the situation in order to keep the coalition against Iran together may have been the decisive factor in rescinding the decision to call Hamas a terrorist organization. Egypt also wants to maintain some form of working relationship with Hamas because of the pivotal role of that organization in the Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Egypt and Hamas achieve some kind of understanding. Hamas has to be able to operate in the Sinai Peninsula to keep up its fight against Israel, but can only do so through continued cooperation with Daesh. This is against Egypt’s vital interests and there can be no compromise on the issue.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Saudi-Arabia ISIS Sinai Hamas Egypt Sisi Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:d0d4f88a882b/</dc:identifier>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/muslim-brotherhood-ends-link-egyptian-mother-group">
    <title>Muslim Brotherhood ends link with Egyptian mother group | Jordan Times, Feb 14, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-02-17T12:57:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/muslim-brotherhood-ends-link-egyptian-mother-group</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[ The Muslim Brotherhood has modified its by-law, ending the group’s affiliation with the mother group in Cairo, a move that was described by defectors from the movement as “too late”.

The group on Thursday adopted an amended definition of the movement, removing “affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo” from its by-law, said Murad Adaileh, a veteran member of the group and the spokesperson for its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF).

Adaileh told The Jordan Times that the amendment was proposed three years ago and was under discussion, arguing that it has “no relation with the recent crisis” of the Brotherhood, which has seen hundreds defecting from the largest opposition group.

However, he declined to respond to critics who see the amendment as a “cosmetic” move to improve the group’s image domestically, after it witnessed a perceived setback in its popularity in the Kingdom, amid moves by other Arab countries to demonise the 88-year-old Islamist organisation as a terrorist group.

However, Adaileh insisted that the amendment to the law would not change the entity’s position towards several issues, without further elaboration of these issues.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood Jordan internal_struggle</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:694d76d4a43a/</dc:identifier>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35566441">
    <title>Syria conflict: Rebels pledge to keep fighting - BBC News</title>
    <dc:date>2016-02-13T12:10:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35566441</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Three Syrian rebel groups have expressed doubts to the BBC over the cessation of hostilities agreement:
A spokesman for the Free Syrian Army said: "We remain sceptical all the time about the Russians."
The conservative Ahrar al-Sham group said that it would not stop fighting until government shelling stopped, safe border crossings were opened for civilians, prisoners released and besieged areas relieved
Faylaq al-Sham - part of a coalition of seven different groups operating in the north - said that it would not relinquish its weapons until President Assad was removed]]></description>
<dc:subject>Mar15 ceasefire FSA AhrarAl-Sham Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:010928cb43da/</dc:identifier>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-02-04/egypts-new-radicalism">
    <title>The Muslim Brotherhood's Jihadism | Foreign Affairs, Feb 4, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-02-09T09:13:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-02-04/egypts-new-radicalism</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Still, the seeds for a radicalized Muslim Brotherhood, a sort of Brotherhood jihadism, have been planted. During the height of the revolutionary wing’s influence in early 2015, some of its leaders, as it is believed, informally commissioned a group of Islamic scholars to write a sharia-based manual on the question of violence. The result was a 93-page book titled The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup. It was an obvious attempt at ijtihad, or legal reasoning, by non-Salafi jihadist scholars to reconcile Brotherhood creed with a methodology of violence. These scholars declared that neither Sisi nor his government were apostates but were instead ahl baghy, or seditionists,who had turned against the religiously legitimate leader: Mohamed Morsi. And since Sisi and his government had used violence against Muslim believers, they were considered enemy combatants who should be slain, according to sharia law.



This attempt at retheorizing jihad is still new, and it is not clear whether it will go anywhere. Indeed, Egyptian Islamism is going through a transformational phase no less significant and unpredictable than that which gave birth to the first jihadi cells that eventually became al Qaeda. Some of the Egyptian youth may not be satisfied with the Brotherhood’s attempt at “incremental jihad,” and instead join or form more serious and committed factions. But one thing is for sure: the reservoir of angry Islamist youths who are susceptible to recruitment will only deepen if the violent faction of the Brotherhood continues to indoctrinate thousands of Brotherhood youth with its new treatise and if the government continues with its extreme repression of Islamists. Then, the leap between declaring Sisi and his administration seditionists or apostates won’t be too great. ISIS has already been claiming low-intensity attacks in Giza Province since last fall, though the recruits are still amateurs. If or when ISIS does gain a stronger foothold in Egypt, it could turn the newly radicalized into a formidable force and may push more Islamist youth from the Brotherhood to the Caliphate.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>takfir Egypt jihadists internal_struggle Muslim_Brotherhood terrorism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:d554859f9d15/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="http://fikraforum.org/?p=8565#.VreWAVh94U0">
    <title>The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Headed for Internal Collapse? | Fikra Forum, Feb 4, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-02-07T19:23:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://fikraforum.org/?p=8565#.VreWAVh94U0</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The military intervention into political life, on the heels of popular demonstrations against the Morsi government, resulted in many Brotherhood leaders' arrests and jailings. The most important Brotherhood leadership ideologically, including the current Brotherhood leader Mohamed Badie, the former leader Mahdi Akef, deputy leader Khairat al-Shater, President of the Republic Mohamed Morsi, former Speaker of Parliament Saad al-Katatni, Mohamed al-Beltagi, Essam al-Erian, and Helmy al-Gazzar all suddenly found their control of the group restricted by their incarceration. Those leaders who escaped arrest fled to Qatar and Turkey, notably: the Brotherhood’s first deputy Mahmoud Ezzat, General Secretary Mahmoud Hussein, former official spokesman Mahmoud Ghazlan (recently arrested), and London office head Ibrahim Mounir. Those scattered abroad continue to manage the foreign affairs portfolio and the Brotherhood’s sources of funding, giving the group control over the organizational leadership.

Nevertheless, the jailings and relocations have displaced the historic leadership. Its popularity has receded and has been effectively challenged by a revolutionary leadership bringing together the Brotherhood’s Youth, Students, Media, and Popular Mobilization Committees, groups at the forefront in leading the Brotherhood protests against the Egyptian regime.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood internal_struggle non-violence terrorism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:901f7b6b5b48/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:internal_struggle"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:terrorism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/20160116/the-uncle-the-life-and-death-of-isils-man-in-southern-syria#full">
    <title>‘The Uncle’: The life and death of ISIL’s man in southern Syria | The National, Jan 16, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-02-01T15:11:11+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/20160116/the-uncle-the-life-and-death-of-isils-man-in-southern-syria#full</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[By this time he was increasingly seen by other rebels as under the sway of Sheikh Mohammad Sorour Zein Al Abideen, a Syrian Islamic scholar from Deraa and a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, well known since the 1980s for anti-Shiite, anti-Iranian writings. Sheikh Sorour’s work was admired by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq until 2006.

Rebel commanders, activists and his colleagues said Sheikh Sorour had strong connections with Qatar, where he owned property, Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Khal. All of them were part of a network channeling money to rebel factions independently of the Military Operations Command (MOC), a centre in Amman staffed by western and Arab military officers, tasked with aiding moderate rebels.

By mid-2014, the Yarmouk Martyrs’ Brigade had grown in strength and was stockpiling arms and cash far in excess of its MOC allocations, rebel commanders said, fuelling concern about Al Khal’s connections with the Muslim Brotherhood and possible extremist radicals based in the Gulf states who were funding the likes of Al Nusra.

“They always denied having any connection with the Muslim Brotherhood but we knew they were receiving funding from them and they became one of the most powerful Islamic factions on the southern front,” said a rebel commander. He said mid-2014 was the point at which the Yarmouk Martyrs’ Brigade seemed to step decisively away from the moderates’ orbit into a more radical sphere.

There were also signs that Al Khal’s forces were increasingly staying out of battles with the regime and conserving their strength – a strategy perfected by ISIL in its strongholds in eastern Syria. Some members of the Yarmouk Martyrs’ Brigade, unhappy with the direction it was heading, began to leave, joining other, moderate groups. But Al Khal, flush with cash and weapons, continued to attract recruits.

Three months after halting funds to Al Khal, however, the MOC reopened the flow. Rebels familiar with MOC operations said it transferred US$50,000 (Dh183,600) to the Yarmouk Martyrs’ Brigade in September, half the amount Al Khal had requested for his troops, thought to number more than 650 at the time.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>ISIS Quneitra Daraa foreign_aid Muslim_Brotherhood Qatar sharia</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:08cff95c841f/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Quneitra"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Daraa"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:foreign_aid"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Qatar"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:sharia"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/discussing-recent-poll-results-from-the-middle-east">
    <title>Discussing Recent Poll Results from the Middle East - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Jan 5, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-01-31T12:22:11+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/discussing-recent-poll-results-from-the-middle-east</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><dc:subject>Russia Hizbollah Assad Iran polls arab_world Muslim_Brotherhood Hamas</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:41eeea069c10/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Hizbollah"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Assad"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Iran"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:polls"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:arab_world"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Hamas"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-01-17/brotherhood-breaks-down">
    <title>Can the Muslim Brotherhood Survive | Foreign Affairs, Jan 17, 2016</title>
    <dc:date>2016-01-18T15:20:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2016-01-17/brotherhood-breaks-down</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Yet the reformists always represented a small minority within the Brotherhood’s leadership, and the Qutbists—often led by Ezzat—sidelined them whenever a significant disagreement emerged. For example, when young reformists attempted to establish a Brotherhood-oriented political party in 1996 against the wishes of the executive Guidance Office, they were banished from the organization. Similarly, when two prominent reformist leaders criticized a 2007 Brotherhood “platform” that called for banning non-Muslims from running for president of Egypt, they were voted out of the Guidance Office in subsequent internal elections. The Brotherhood later banished them for their continued disobedience following the 2011 uprising. And when a group of young Brotherhood cadres rejected the Guidance Office’s edict commanding all Muslim Brothers to support the organization’s nascent Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in March 2011, the young cadres were soon banished as well. 

In recent weeks, the Qatar-based preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi has attempted to mediate the crisis, and his deputy recently proposed that the Brotherhood establish new bylaws for managing the organization. But it will be difficult to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. Although the split within the Brotherhood is partly generational, it also reflects severe differences regarding the organization’s goals and strategy—whether it should seek power now, as the youths demand, or in the distant future, as the Qutbists believe, as well as what tools it should use to assert Islamist rule. Yet these questions are increasingly theoretical. The Egyptian government’s obliteration of the organization within Egypt means that the Brotherhood has no realistic shot at power anytime soon, and its various factions thus have little incentive to reunify in pursuit of shared ambitions. To be sure, the Brotherhood’s vision for establishing an Islamist state in Egypt won’t evaporate, but the rigid internal discipline that defined its decision-making and mobilization is now a thing of the past. As a result, the Iron Man is now a relic.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>internal_struggle youth Muslim_Brotherhood Egypt violence</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:73e84a78cf0c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:internal_struggle"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:youth"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:violence"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/12/07-why-israel-outlawed-northern-branch-islamic-movement-rubin">
    <title>Why Israel outlawed the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement | Brookings Institution, Dec 7, 2015</title>
    <dc:date>2016-01-07T12:39:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/12/07-why-israel-outlawed-northern-branch-islamic-movement-rubin</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[There are significant challenges to this policy that underscore the idea that political interests may have outweighed longer-term security calculations. First, enforcement will be extremely difficult since there is no real membership list of this organization nor is there a way to determine affiliation except if someone holds office. Support for the Northern Branch numbers in the tens of thousands, although it is impossible to know the exact number because the definition of “support” is unclear. Because of the Northern Branch’s extensive social service provisions, it is often difficult to discern between support, sympathy, and the use of services that the state fails to provide. For example, this problem became clear when, as part of the crackdown, the authorities shut down, Jaffa Association for Charity, a charity to which the Israeli welfare services had referred needy families.


]]></description>
<dc:subject>Israel Muslim_Brotherhood NetanyahuGovt Shabak</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:6d13a00c3802/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:NetanyahuGovt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Shabak"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://merip.org/mero/mero123015">
    <title>Between Terror and Tyranny | Middle East Research and Information Project, Dec 30, 2015</title>
    <dc:date>2016-01-03T09:51:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://merip.org/mero/mero123015</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Five years since the Arab uprisings and two and a half years on from the coup in Egypt, the Society of Muslim Brothers and movements inspired by its ideology across the region find themselves in as precarious a position as any they have faced in the past half-century. With politics in the Arab world being forged by the forces of resurgent authoritarianism and unbending militant extremism, long-standing conservative movements in the mold of the Muslim Brothers have increasingly found themselves violently repressed or politically marginalized. Already uncomfortable with the prospect of revolutionary change, these movements have responded to the setbacks to democratic openings since 2013 by desperately attempting to recover some semblance of the old order. The swift reaction by Saudi Arabia and its regional allies to preserve the prevailing regional system of conservative, pro-Western autocracies by suppressing popular calls by Arab protest movements to forge their political destinies reverberated loudly within the Islamist opposition. By casting their lot with this restored Saudi agenda, mainline Islamists aim to regain the grudging acceptance of the region’s power brokers, even if it means endorsing economically exploitative policies, exclusionary politics, the alarming rise of sectarian rhetoric, and costly wars in Syria and Yemen. In the minds of Islamist leaders from Rabat to Sanaa, anything less would see their movements doomed to irrelevance.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood Islamists Saudi-Arabia Yemen Egypt al-Nahda authoritarian_regime repression Tunisia</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:748b5ef12181/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Islamists"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Saudi-Arabia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Yemen"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:al-Nahda"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:authoritarian_regime"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Tunisia"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://abujamajem.wordpress.com/2015/12/16/jabhat-al-nusrah-leader-on-splits-in-egyptian-brotherhood-and-thats-what-jihadists-are-waiting-for-2/#more-242">
    <title>Jabhat al-Nusrah leader on splits in Egyptian Brotherhood: “And that’s what jihadists are waiting for…” | Abu al-Jamajem // أبو الجماجم</title>
    <dc:date>2015-12-20T11:35:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://abujamajem.wordpress.com/2015/12/16/jabhat-al-nusrah-leader-on-splits-in-egyptian-brotherhood-and-thats-what-jihadists-are-waiting-for-2/#more-242</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Al-Gharib – who may himself be Egyptian, although I can’t say that definitively – provides a sort of outside, jihadist perspective on the Brotherhood’s splits and how its leadership have struggled with how far to take violent revolutionary action. He also refers more or less matter-of-factly to the Brotherhood’s links to various nascent militant organizations, including al-Uqab al-Thouri (Revolutionary Punishment). ]]></description>
<dc:subject>JabhatAl-Nusra Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood internal_struggle jihadists</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:bc4e4e23fb40/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:JabhatAl-Nusra"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:internal_struggle"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:jihadists"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-12/opposition-wants-a-say-in-choosing-syrian-leaders">
    <title>Opposition Wants a Say in Choosing Syrian Leaders - Bloomberg View, Nov 12, 2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-12-17T14:49:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-12/opposition-wants-a-say-in-choosing-syrian-leaders</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[about the Track II effort

Hachimi was part of a delegation of Syrian opposition representatives visiting the U.S. last week to present the results of a two-year project that brought together a wide swath of Syrian political groups, ethnic groups and fighting brigades. Over 1,000 Syrians participated in hundreds of meetings to come up with their own proposal for how to move toward peace. They are now circulating a paper with their proposals to governments around the world.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Mar15 FSA AhrarAl-Sham Muslim_Brotherhood NFZ</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:2d3d462b90bb/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:FSA"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:AhrarAl-Sham"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:NFZ"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/11/03-us-egypt-relationship-hamid#.VjpXjv1uUqQ.twitter">
    <title>Rethinking the U.S.-Egypt relationship | Brookings Institution, Nov 3, 2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-12-06T13:22:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/11/03-us-egypt-relationship-hamid#.VjpXjv1uUqQ.twitter</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[I will make four main arguments here. First, the level of repression under President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi surpasses that of President Hosni Mubarak and even his predecessors, in terms of the number of Egyptians killed, wounded, detained, and “disappeared” since the military coup of July 3, 2013. Meanwhile, the nature of repression is more dangerous – and therefore of greater concern for U.S. policymakers – because it enjoys a significant degree of popular support, drawing on media and mass hysteria, cult of personality, and the dehumanization of political opponents. Second, Sissi’s heavy-handed approach to Sinai security has fueled the extremist insurgency there, calling into question Egypt’s role as a reliable counterterrorism partner. Third, state institutions that were previously seen as “national” organizations – namely the military, judiciary, and religious establishment – have, for the first time in decades, become partisans in a bloody civil conflict. This has led the Muslim Brotherhood, other Islamist activists, as well as secular revolutionaries to gradually shift their perception of the Egyptian from a problem to be reformed to an enemy to be undermined and even destroyed. With the thorough politicization of state institutions, there are no longer any domestic actors which can play the crucial role of third party guarantor during any future national reconciliation process. This means that regional and international actors, including the United States and the European Union, will need to play a more active role in laying the groundwork for future dialogue.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>repression Egypt obama_administration Muslim_Brotherhood Al-Azhar massacre terrorism instability</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:32c2fc6a3e4d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:obama_administration"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Al-Azhar"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:massacre"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:terrorism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:instability"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=61724">
    <title>Going Home: An Interview with Tarif al-Sayyed Issa - Syria in Crisis, Oct 22,2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-12-05T09:56:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=61724</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[I am still part of the Muslim Brotherhood, of course. In the Brotherhood, we have a committee for each Syrian province and I am one of the members of the Idlib committee.

Part of my job now, as I see it, is to convince people of the need for a civilian leadership. I go around mosques and other places, meeting people and trying to explain to them that the country will never get up on its feet again without a strong civil society. I have met with all the workers’ unions in Idlib, with the professional associations, and so on.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>Mar15 Idlib JayshAl-Fatah crime localGovt civil_society Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:3ba886e607c5/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Mar15"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Idlib"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:JayshAl-Fatah"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:crime"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:localGovt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:civil_society"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.tcf.org/blog/detail/egypts-next-phase">
    <title>Egypt’s Next Phase: Sustainable Instability : Blog of the Century, July 1, 2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-11-19T13:38:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.tcf.org/blog/detail/egypts-next-phase</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[However, apart from a vigorous and at times conspiracy-addled form of hyper-nationalism, this current form of statism has proven largely vacuous, with few new ideas as to how to effectively govern the country, only a reflexive call for a strong centralized state. There is no underlying ideology or vision governing state decision-making.

Institutional interests and corporatist attitudes are now a key factor in decision-making. Despite the ascendance of President Sisi and his sizable popular support, he is not yet in a position to govern in the centralized manner that typified the late Mubarak period. The result is that the regime does not operate as a coherent whole, notwithstanding broad agreement among senior leaders with respect to orientation and goals. Major decisions and institutional reforms require the expenditure of political capital by President Sisi, and such potentially bruising internal fights are often seen as unnecessary distractions during this period of consolidation. With respect to any one major issue, President Sisi could likely push through a decision, but the absence of such progress is reflective of current regime priorities. 

]]></description>
<dc:subject>authoritarian_regime Sisi Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood repression</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:250818482255/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=61683">
    <title>Egypt’s Escalating Islamist Insurgency-Carnegie, Oct 21, 2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-11-10T07:53:09+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=61683</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Fragmentation and Violence on the Rise

The state crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest Islamist group, in addition to divisions within the organization have weakened the Brotherhood leadership and have paved the way for its loss of control over a growing number of members.
 
Various Salafists, ultraconservative Islamists, have rallied around the Brotherhood, framing the struggle with the regime as one between a secular state and Islam.
 
Two increasingly distinct Brotherhood factions have emerged. One embraces confrontational tactics and violence while the other emphasizes nonviolence. In reality, however, many leaders tolerate escalating levels of violence, stopping short of endorsing murder.
 
Brotherhood and Salafi radicals justify political violence as a legitimate tool of protest and encourage youth to adopt violence under the guise of self-defense, religiously justified retribution, and defending Islam.
 
Nonjihadi violent groups mainly composed of Islamist youth began to rely on anarchic violence starting in late 2013. Two years later, these groups have not only persisted but have also grown more sophisticated, conducting armed ambushes and improvised-explosive-device attacks against security forces.
 
Jihadi groups tirelessly attempt to tap into brewing anger and to recruit Islamist youth for their budding insurgency.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt ISIS AQ ABM Muslim_Brotherhood internal_struggle Salafis Sinai coup repression rape torture authoritarian_regime youth</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:39e010188644/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:ABM"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Salafis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Sinai"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:coup"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:rape"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:authoritarian_regime"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:youth"/>
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<item rdf:about="http://feeds.washingtonpost.com/c/34656/f/666713/s/4aba39bb/sc/7/l/0L0Swashingtonpost0N0Cblogs0Cmonkey0Ecage0Cwp0C20A150C10A0C160Carabs0Ehave0Enot0Egiven0Eup0Eon0Edemocracy0C/story01.htm">
    <title>When it comes to democracy, Egyptians hate the player but Tunisians hate the game - WaPo, Oct 13,2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-10-19T20:20:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://feeds.washingtonpost.com/c/34656/f/666713/s/4aba39bb/sc/7/l/0L0Swashingtonpost0N0Cblogs0Cmonkey0Ecage0Cwp0C20A150C10A0C160Carabs0Ehave0Enot0Egiven0Eup0Eon0Edemocracy0C/story01.htm</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Returning to the broader survey results, why did the uprisings have minimal effect on attitudes toward democracy across the region? One reason may be how citizens think about the protests. In 2013, respondents were asked to identify the three main causes of the Arab uprisings. In six of the nine countries surveyed, fewer than half name “civil and political freedoms and emancipation from oppression” — elements critical to a democratic governance — as one of the three most important impetuses for the protests. Rather, citizens were far more likely to link the uprisings to state corruption or economic outcomes. By implication, few citizens across the region appear to have directly attributed the changes brought about by the uprisings — whether good or bad — to democracy itself.]]></description>
<dc:subject>democracy ArabUprisings Tunisia Muslim_Brotherhood Egypt Jan25 Sidibouzid</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:01ac82c2a75b/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:ArabUprisings"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Tunisia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Jan25"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Sidibouzid"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.hudson.org/research/11530-the-brotherhood-divided">
    <title>The Brotherhood Divided - by Samuel Tadros - Hudson, Aug 20,2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-10-12T16:23:40+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.hudson.org/research/11530-the-brotherhood-divided</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Coup and divisions inside MB]]></description>
<dc:subject>Egypt Muslim_Brotherhood jihadists Salafis internal_struggle media</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:4efcf7a08a01/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:jihadists"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Salafis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:internal_struggle"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:media"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.agsiw.org/the-limited-rehabilitation-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-the-gulf/">
    <title>Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington | The (Limited) Rehabilitation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf - Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, July 31,2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-09-30T11:55:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.agsiw.org/the-limited-rehabilitation-of-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-the-gulf/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Faced with the dual challenge of confronting an Iran emerging from under the shadow of international sanctions and an “Islamic state” solidifying on their borders, several Gulf states are reconciling their relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and other activist Sunni Islamist movements. Outreach to Muslim Brotherhood affiliates – led by Saudi Arabia – is already significantly reshaping the regional order. Less noted are the implications of these strategic moves for politics within Gulf states, where Muslim Brotherhood groups have been on the defensive, especially since the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt in 2013.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Muslim_Brotherhood Hamas Saudi-Arabia Qatar Iran UAE Egypt repression</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:b2ff45dc032e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Hamas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Saudi-Arabia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Qatar"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Iran"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:UAE"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Egypt"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:repression"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/people-get-wrong-political-islam/">
    <title>Column: What most people get wrong about political Islam | PBS NewsHour</title>
    <dc:date>2015-09-29T14:11:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/people-get-wrong-political-islam/</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We don’t need to speculate: Two oft-cited “models” of Muslim democratic success — Indonesia and Malaysia — feature significantly more sharia ordinances than Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, or Lebanon, to name only a few. In one article, the Indonesia scholar Robin Bush documents sharia by-laws implemented in South Sulawesi, West Java, and other conservative regions. They include: requiring civil servants and students to wear “Muslim clothing,” requiring women to wear the headscarf to receive local government services; requiring demonstrations of Quranic reading ability to be admitted to university or to receive a marriage license. But there’s a catch. According to one study by the Jakarta-based Wahid Institute, most of these regulations have come from officials from secular parties like Golkar. How is this possible? The implementation of sharia law is part of mainstream discourse that cuts across party lines, suggesting that Islamism is not necessarily about Islamists but is about a broader population that is open to sharia ordinances. As the leading scholar of Islamism in Southeast Asia Joseph Liow writes, “the piecemeal implementation of sharia by-laws across Indonesia has not elicited widespread opposition from local populations.”

Islamism, then, doesn’t necessarily require Islamists. On the other hand, it is very difficult to have liberalism without liberals, and liberals have remained weak in most Muslim-majority countries. In the two fascinating and often overlooked cases of Indonesia and Malaysia, democracy went hand in hand with Islamization. To put it differently, where many assume that democracy can’t exist with Islamism, it is more likely the opposite.]]></description>
<dc:subject>Islamists Indonesia Muslim_Brotherhood</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:6c7c4fe23f3c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Islamists"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Indonesia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/05/22-kuwait-secular-groups-political-parties">
    <title>Exclusion-Moderation: The emergence of Islamist cooperation with secular groups in Kuwait, Brookings, May 22,2015</title>
    <dc:date>2015-07-18T20:33:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/05/22-kuwait-secular-groups-political-parties</link>
    <dc:creator>elizrael</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[As part of the opposition coalition, the ICM dropped its once primary demand of amending article two of the constitution to proclaim shari‘a as the sole source of legislation. The bloc seems increasingly willing to work alongside other opposition movements to ensure at least limited political reform. A recent post on the ICM’s website by Islamist former MP Mubarak al-Duwailah explicitly calls for the setting aside of “traditional differences” in an effort to further the reform movement, suggesting efforts to temper ideological politics. ]]></description>
<dc:subject>Kuwait Muslim_Brotherhood oppression</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/b:8d4614b65dea/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Kuwait"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:Muslim_Brotherhood"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:elizrael/t:oppression"/>
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