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    <title>Pinboard (cshalizi)</title>
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    <description>recent bookmarks from cshalizi</description>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7208/chicago/9780226836942/html"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/5746/The-Science-of-Weird-ShitWhy-Our-Minds-Conjure-the"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2022.2029386?journalCode=cphp20"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13698"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.06498"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/psychology-of-online-political-hostility-a-comprehensive-crossnational-test-of-the-mismatch-hypothesis/C721597EEB77CC8F494710ED631916E4"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-neuro-100120-092143"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-neuro-092920-120559"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.02726"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.01312"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://psyarxiv.com/a3jf5/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.pnas.org/content/118/16/e2019342118.abstract?etoc"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.pnas.org/content/118/16/e2023123118.abstract?etoc"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/working-mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://oxford-universitypressscholarship-com.cmu.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001/acprof-9780198524021?rskey=9UW923&amp;result=952"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/critical-thinking/dunning-kruger-effect-probably-not-real"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.cos.io/about/news/replications-of-replications-suggest-that-prior-failures-to-replicate-were-not-due-to-failure-to-replicate-well"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.3.220"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://nicolebarbaro.com/2020/04/25/no-maslow-didnt-create-the-famous-hierarchy-of-needs-pyramid/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2020/10/01/2014505117"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.the100.ci/2020/07/31/on-the-origin-of-psychological-research-practices-with-special-regard-to-self-reported-nostril-width/"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/computational-psychiatry-1"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42113-018-0019-z"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://carcinisation.com/2020/07/04/the-ongoing-accomplishment-of-the-big-five/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.pnas.org/content/116/52/26459"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053811920305784"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-31306-001?doi=1"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1984-16352-001"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.paullitvak.com/2018/07/04/generalizability-by-representativeness/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0886-x"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://psyarxiv.com/ugz7y"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://psyarxiv.com/dqmju"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fapl0000476"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://psyarxiv.com/hs7wm/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://theconversation.com/its-time-to-end-the-debate-about-video-games-and-violence-91607"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01573.x"/>
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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20260121-the-mysterious-mushroom-that-makes-you-see-tiny-people">
    <title>'They saw them on their dishes when eating': The mushroom making people hallucinate dozens of tiny humans</title>
    <dc:date>2026-02-07T20:35:11+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20260121-the-mysterious-mushroom-that-makes-you-see-tiny-people</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[--- I was going "Where is Terence McKenna when we actually need him?" all through the article, and then I got to the end...]]></description>
<dc:subject>drugs mushrooms psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5606d3119ebe/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7208/chicago/9780226836942/html">
    <title>Anatomy of a Train Wreck</title>
    <dc:date>2025-02-17T02:26:18+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7208/chicago/9780226836942/html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In 2012, a team of Belgian scientists reported that they had been unable to replicate a canonical experiment in the field of psychology known as “priming.” The original experiment, performed by John Bargh in the nineties, had purported to show that words connoting old age unconsciously influenced—or primed—research subjects, causing them to walk more slowly. When subsequent researchers could not replicate these results, Nobel-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman warned of a “train wreck looming” if Bargh and his colleagues could not address doubts about their work. Since then, the inability to replicate other well-known priming experiments has helped precipitate an ongoing debate over what has gone wrong in psychology, raising fundamental questions about the soundness of research practices in the field.
"Anatomy of a Train Wreck offers the first detailed history of priming research from its origins in the early 1980s to its recent collapse. Ruth Leys places priming experiments in the context of contemporaneous debates over not only the nature of automaticity but also the very foundations of social psychology. While these latest discussions about priming have largely focused on methodology—including sloppy experimental practices, inadequate statistical methods, and publication bias—Leys offers a genealogy of the theoretical expectations and scientific paradigms that have guided and motivated priming research itself. Examining scientists’ intellectual strategies, their responses to criticism, and their assumptions about the nature of subjectivity, Anatomy of a Train Wreck raises crucial questions about the evidence surrounding unconscious influence and probes the larger stakes of the replication crisis: psychology’s status as a science."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB downloaded books:noted psychology history_of_science replication_crisis</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:14ec1688197a/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article/10/1/126220/204233/Awareness-of-Implicit-Attitudes-Revisited-A-Meta">
    <title>Awareness of Implicit Attitudes Revisited: A Meta-Analysis on Replications Across Samples and Settings | Collabra: Psychology | University of California Press</title>
    <dc:date>2025-01-09T14:22:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://online.ucpress.edu/collabra/article/10/1/126220/204233/Awareness-of-Implicit-Attitudes-Revisited-A-Meta</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A long-standing debate in social psychology is whether the cognitions reflected on implicit measures are unconscious. Research by Hahn et al. (2014) has documented that people are able to predict the patterns of their results on Implicit Association Tests (IATs) towards five pairs of social groups prospectively. The present article presents a meta-analysis of 17 published and unpublished exact replication studies conducted by or in close supervision of the original author. Replicating Hahn et al., participants in all 17 studies were able to accurately predict the patterns of their IAT results (meta-analytical within-subject effect size: b = .44; corrected average within-subjects correlation r = .56). This prediction accuracy effect was smaller for online (b = .27; corrected r = .37) than lab (b = .47; corrected r = .61) studies, as well as for general-public (b = .27; corrected r = .36) as opposed to student samples (b = .47; corrected r = .60). Moreover, predictions fully explained implicit-explicit relations, and they seemed to reflect unique insights into participants’ own cognitions beyond mere knowledge about normatively expected patterns of implicit responses. This pattern of results remained the same across samples, settings, countries (Canada, US, and Germany), and languages (English vs. German). Further analyses suggested that lower prediction accuracy in online samples seems to partly reflect a suppression effect from higher consistency between traditional explicit evaluations and predictions. Controlling for explicit evaluations (which exerted a negative unique effect on IAT scores beyond IAT score predictions) reduced the difference between online and lab studies substantially. Together, the results strengthen the hypothesis that the cognitions reflected on implicit evaluations are largely accessible to conscious awareness."

--- Last tag is "to include in references"...]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB implicit_attitudes psychology to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3f40e9a6cdac/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2016-22467-001">
    <title>On the unnecessary ubiquity of hierarchical linear modeling.</title>
    <dc:date>2025-01-08T14:30:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2016-22467-001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In psychology and the behavioral sciences generally, the use of the hierarchical linear model (HLM) and its extensions for discrete outcomes are popular methods for modeling clustered data. HLM and its discrete outcome extensions, however, are certainly not the only methods available to model clustered data. Although other methods exist and are widely implemented in other disciplines, it seems that psychologists have yet to consider these methods in substantive studies. This article compares and contrasts HLM with alternative methods including generalized estimating equations and cluster-robust standard errors. These alternative methods do not model random effects and thus make a smaller number of assumptions and are interpreted identically to single-level methods with the benefit that estimates are adjusted to reflect clustering of observations. Situations where these alternative methods may be advantageous are discussed including research questions where random effects are and are not required, when random effects can change the interpretation of regression coefficients, challenges of modeling with random effects with discrete outcomes, and examples of published psychology articles that use HLM that may have benefitted from using alternative methods. Illustrative examples are provided and discussed to demonstrate the advantages of the alternative methods and also when HLM would be the preferred method. "]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB regression to_teach:linear_models psychology statistics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0afe5c9a51c9/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:linear_models"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41539-024-00228-8">
    <title>Math items about real-world content lower test-scores of students from families with low socioeconomic status | npj Science of Learning</title>
    <dc:date>2024-12-11T16:18:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/s41539-024-00228-8</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In many countries, standardized math tests are important for achieving academic success. Here, we examine whether content of items, the story that explains a mathematical question, biases performance of low-SES students. In a large-scale cohort study of Trends in International Mathematics and Science Studies (TIMSS)—including data from 58 countries from students in grades 4 and 8 (N = 5501,165)—we examine whether item content that is more likely related to challenges for low-SES students (money, food, social relationships) improves their performance, compared with their average math performance. Results show that low-SES students scored lower on items with this specific content than expected based on an individual’s average performance. The effect sizes are substantial: on average, the chance to answer correctly is 18% lower. From a hidden talents approach, these results are unexpected. However, they align with other theoretical frameworks such as scarcity mindset, providing new insights for fair testing."

--- This aligns with my prejudices, so that's an additional reason (beyond it being an ed-psych study) to treat with caution.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology education color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:38f7dc24d58f/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/25152459231187988">
    <title>Selective Hypothesis Reporting in Psychology: Comparing Preregistrations and Corresponding Publications - Olmo R. van den Akker, Marcel A. L. M. van Assen, Manon Enting, Myrthe de Jonge, How Hwee Ong, Franziska Rüffer, Martijn Schoenmakers, Andrea H. Sto</title>
    <dc:date>2024-12-11T16:07:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/25152459231187988</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this study, we assessed the extent of selective hypothesis reporting in psychological research by comparing the hypotheses found in a set of 459 preregistrations with the hypotheses found in the corresponding articles. We found that more than half of the preregistered studies we assessed contained omitted hypotheses (N = 224; 52%) or added hypotheses (N = 227; 57%), and about one-fifth of studies contained hypotheses with a direction change (N = 79; 18%). We found only a small number of studies with hypotheses that were demoted from primary to secondary importance (N = 2; 1%) and no studies with hypotheses that were promoted from secondary to primary importance. In all, 60% of studies included at least one hypothesis in one or more of these categories, indicating a substantial bias in presenting and selecting hypotheses by researchers and/or reviewers/editors. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find sufficient evidence that added hypotheses and changed hypotheses were more likely to be statistically significant than nonselectively reported hypotheses. For the other types of selective hypothesis reporting, we likely did not have sufficient statistical power to test for a relationship with statistical significance. Finally, we found that replication studies were less likely to include selectively reported hypotheses than original studies. In all, selective hypothesis reporting is problematically common in psychological research. We urge researchers, reviewers, and editors to ensure that hypotheses outlined in preregistrations are clearly formulated and accurately presented in the corresponding articles."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system replication_crisis</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c612d1839d5c/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replication_crisis"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7977810/">
    <title>Why Are Self-Report and Behavioral Measures Weakly Correlated? - PMC</title>
    <dc:date>2024-12-11T15:57:01+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7977810/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Accumulating evidence indicates weak correlations between self-report and behavioral measures of the same construct. We suggest that these weak correlations result from the poor reliability of many behavioral measures and the distinct response processes involved in the two measurement types. We also describe how researchers can benefit from appropriate use of these measures."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_measurement measurement psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c1e9f3e74bcf/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:measurement"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://carcinisation.com/2023/08/22/against-automaticity/">
    <title>Against Automaticity – Carcinisation</title>
    <dc:date>2024-12-06T14:00:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://carcinisation.com/2023/08/22/against-automaticity/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["An explanation of why tricks like priming, nudge, the placebo effect, social contagion, the “emotional inception” model of advertising, most “cognitive biases,” and any field with “behavioral” in its name are not real"

--- Thought I'd bookmarked this before?  I suspect it goes too far, because unconscious cognitive processes _are_ real, but it's well-written and at the very least worth thinking against.

by a literal banana]]></description>
<dc:subject>have_read cognitive_science heuristics_and_biases to:blog advertising psychology behavioral_economics re:anti-nudging</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ff65c6754082/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics_and_biases"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:behavioral_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:anti-nudging"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.bps.org.uk/psychologist/ever-changing-psychology-mental-health">
    <title>The ever-changing psychology of mental health | BPS</title>
    <dc:date>2024-09-19T20:02:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.bps.org.uk/psychologist/ever-changing-psychology-mental-health</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Back in the 2010s, a psychiatrist called William Dodson observed something in his adult clients with ADHD. They had, he suggested, a heightened sensitivity to rejection from others.  He assessed this by asking them this question.
"'For your entire life, have you always been much more sensitive than people you know to rejection, teasing, criticism, or your own perception that you failed or have fallen short?'  
"Many of his clients said yes to this question, and Dodson gave it a name. Rejection Sensitivity Dysphoria or RSD. He started writing articles about it. The concept resonated with many. Before long, there were people posting TikTok or Youtube videos about RSD and how to identify it. The list of ways in which RSD manifested itself spread way beyond the original question. It was said to include sensitivity to failure, to arguments, to not having your ideas responded to in meetings. Therapists wrote articles about how important it was to understand RSD and how they saw it in their clients with ADHD (and experienced it themselves). Books were written explaining RSD (and offering self-help). Symptom checklists were published in online magazines. 
"The idea of RSD spread like wildfire. It was a lightbulb moment for many and they said it helped them to understand why life had always been harder for them than for other people. It validated their experiences and emotional reactions. To them, it meant that no longer were they over-sensitive or too emotional – they had RSD. The name made all the difference. It was the reason they had been looking for."]]></description>
<dc:subject>have_read psychology identity_group_formation re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:be5264f0c98c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:identity_group_formation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/5746/The-Science-of-Weird-ShitWhy-Our-Minds-Conjure-the">
    <title>The Science of Weird Shit: Why Our Minds Conjure the Paranormal | Books Gateway | MIT Press</title>
    <dc:date>2024-04-30T14:38:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/5746/The-Science-of-Weird-ShitWhy-Our-Minds-Conjure-the</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["An accessible and gratifying introduction to the world of paranormal beliefs and bizarre experiences.
"Ghostly encounters, alien abduction, reincarnation, talking to the dead, UFO sightings, inexplicable coincidences, out-of-body and near-death experiences. Are these legitimate phenomena? If not, how should we go about understanding them? In this fascinating book, Chris French investigates paranormal claims to discover what lurks behind this “weird shit.” French provides authoritative, evidence-based explanations for a wide range of superficially mysterious phenomena, and then goes further to draw out lessons with wider applications to many other aspects of modern society where critical thinking is urgently needed.
"Using academic, comprehensive, logical, and, at times, mathematical approaches, The Science of Weird Shit convincingly debunks ESP, communicating with the dead, and alien abduction claims, among other phenomena. All the while, however, French maintains that our belief in such phenomena is neither ridiculous nor trivial; if anything, such claims can tell us a great deal about the human mind if we pay them the attention they are due. Filled with light-bulb moments and a healthy dose of levity, The Science of Weird Shit is a clever, memorable, and gratifying read you won't soon forget."]]></description>
<dc:subject>in_NB books:noted downloaded debunking parapsychology psychoceramics psychology popular_science</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f67cbac859eb/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:debunking"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:parapsychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychoceramics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:popular_science"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0286067">
    <title>Causal implicatures from correlational statements | PLOS ONE</title>
    <dc:date>2023-05-22T18:20:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0286067</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Correlation does not imply causation, but this does not necessarily stop people from drawing causal inferences from correlational statements. We show that people do in fact infer causality from statements of association, under minimal conditions. In Study 1, participants interpreted statements of the form “X is associated with Y” to imply that Y causes X. In Studies 2 and 3, participants interpreted statements of the form “X is associated with an increased risk of Y” to imply that X causes Y. Thus, even the most orthodox correlational language can give rise to causal inferences."

--- Good to have this confirmed!]]></description>
<dc:subject>causal_inference psychology to_teach:undergrad-ADA gershman.samuel via:? in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:86677951c9ee/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:causal_inference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:undergrad-ADA"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gershman.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:?"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://tomstafford.substack.com/p/on-the-over-and-under-detection-of">
    <title>On the over and under detection of agency - by Tom Stafford</title>
    <dc:date>2023-03-27T14:48:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://tomstafford.substack.com/p/on-the-over-and-under-detection-of</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>via:henry_farrell theory_of_mind psychology stafford.tom large_language_models_(so_called) artificial_intelligence in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:075758bc9ffc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:henry_farrell"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:theory_of_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stafford.tom"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:large_language_models_(so_called)"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:artificial_intelligence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3102/0013189X231155154">
    <title>The Effect-Size Benchmark That Matters Most: Education Interventions Often Fail - Matthew A. Kraft, 2023</title>
    <dc:date>2023-03-18T12:33:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3102/0013189X231155154</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["It is a healthy exercise to debate the merits of using effect-size benchmarks to interpret research findings. However, these debates obscure a more central insight that emerges from empirical distributions of effect-size estimates in the literature: Efforts to improve education often fail to move the needle. I find that 36% of effect sizes from randomized control trials of education interventions with standardized achievement outcomes are less than 0.05 SD. Publication bias surely masks many more failed efforts from our view. Recognizing the frequency of these failures should be at the core of any approach to interpreting the policy relevance of effect sizes. We can aim high without dismissing as trivial those effects sizes that represent more incremental improvement."

--- On the one hand, that's not much.  OTOH, imagine someone _did_ come up with a twist to teaching that made a big difference, like (wildly) 10SD.  Wouldn't it be adopted so quickly, without any randomized anything, that it would quickly become invisible in this sort of analysis?  (This'd be the social equivalent of a "selective sweep" in evolutionary genetics, and maybe detectable in similar ways.)]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB education psychology experimental_psychology meta-analysis via:? have_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:982f28c7e81f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:education"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:meta-analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:?"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2022.2029386?journalCode=cphp20">
    <title>From old-fashioned to offensive racism: How social norms determine the measurement object of prejudice questionnaires: Philosophical Psychology: Vol 36, No 2</title>
    <dc:date>2023-01-23T05:41:57+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2022.2029386?journalCode=cphp20</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Recently, an increasing number of scholars have been showing interest in old-fashioned racism again. While recent studies on old-fashioned racism apparently increase our knowledge of this psychological theory of racism, the studies actually shed light on a different type of racism, namely offensive racism. The aim of this text is to argue that psychological theories of racism, like old-fashioned racism and modern racism, depend on societies’ social norms. I will show that questionnaires are highly sensitive to social norms, and if there is change in social norms, the original measurement object alters. The theory of old-fashioned racism implicitly assumes agents that follow (or conform to) the social norm to behave prejudiced. Today, however, this social norm does not exist in Western societies. If agents express the same prejudices today, they indicate their willingness to breach the social norm to behave unprejudiced. Thereby, classic old-fashioned racism measures reflect a new kind of racism today."]]></description>
<dc:subject>surveys social_measurement racism psychology to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dd97f696c74b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:surveys"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_measurement"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:racism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/21677026221114315">
    <title>Are Progressives in Denial About Progress? Yes, but So Is Almost Everyone Else - Gregory Mitchell, Philip E. Tetlock, 2022</title>
    <dc:date>2023-01-18T03:16:11+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/21677026221114315</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Scott Lilienfeld warned that psychology’s ideological uniformity would lead to premature closure on sensitive topics. He encouraged psychologists to question politically convenient results and did so himself in numerous areas. We follow Lilienfeld’s example and examine the empirical foundation beneath claims that positive illusions about societal change sustain inequalities by inducing apathy and opposition to reform. Drawing on data from a large-scale survey, we find almost the opposite: a pervasive tendency, across ideological and demographic categories, to see things as getting worse than they really are. These results cast doubt on functionalist claims that people mobilize beliefs about societal trends to support political positions and suggest a simpler explanation: Most laypeople do not organize information in ways that provide reliable monitoring of social change over time, which makes their views on progress susceptible to memory distortions and high-profile current events and political rhetoric."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB tetlock.phillip psychology us_culture_wars cognitive_science</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8c1b03b4c1d2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:tetlock.phillip"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:us_culture_wars"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13698">
    <title>[2205.13698] Characterizing the robustness of Bayesian adaptive experimental designs to active learning bias</title>
    <dc:date>2022-05-30T20:25:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13698</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Bayesian adaptive experimental design is a form of active learning, which chooses samples to maximize the information they give about uncertain parameters. Prior work has shown that other forms of active learning can suffer from active learning bias, where unrepresentative sampling leads to inconsistent parameter estimates. We show that active learning bias can also afflict Bayesian adaptive experimental design, depending on model misspecification. We develop an information-theoretic measure of misspecification, and show that worse misspecification implies more severe active learning bias. At the same time, model classes incorporating more "noise" - i.e., specifying higher inherent variance in observations - suffer less from active learning bias, because their predictive distributions are likely to overlap more with the true distribution. Finally, we show how these insights apply to a (simulated) preference learning experiment."]]></description>
<dc:subject>bayesianism experimental_design psychology self-promotion misspecification</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b9728939bfda/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bayesianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_design"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:self-promotion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:misspecification"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.06498">
    <title>[2203.06498] The worst of both worlds: A comparative analysis of errors in learning from data in psychology and machine learning</title>
    <dc:date>2022-03-31T23:35:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.06498</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>data_analysis bad_data_analysis psychology data_mining gelman.andrew to_teach:data-mining</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6c960a97eea4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bad_data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:data_mining"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gelman.andrew"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:data-mining"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/119/4/e2110406119">
    <title>Narratives imagined in response to instrumental music reveal culture-bounded intersubjectivity | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2022-01-31T14:32:25+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/119/4/e2110406119</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The scientific literature sometimes considers music an abstract stimulus, devoid of explicit meaning, and at other times considers it a universal language. Here, individuals in three geographically distinct locations spanning two cultures performed a highly unconstrained task: they provided free-response descriptions of stories they imagined while listening to instrumental music. Tools from natural language processing revealed that listeners provide highly similar stories to the same musical excerpts when they share an underlying culture, but when they do not, the generated stories show limited overlap. These results paint a more complex picture of music’s power: music can generate remarkably similar stories in listeners’ minds, but the degree to which these imagined narratives are shared depends on the degree to which culture is shared across listeners. Thus, music is neither an abstract stimulus nor a universal language but has semantic affordances shaped by culture, requiring more sustained attention from psychology."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB music psychology epidemiology_of_representations cultural_differences text_mining</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1a630ce19b17/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:music"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_differences"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:text_mining"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/understanding-intelligence/3DEE41441E6A5A817A29AD5335A92021#fndtn-contents">
    <title>Understanding Intelligence</title>
    <dc:date>2022-01-17T06:26:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/understanding-intelligence/3DEE41441E6A5A817A29AD5335A92021#fndtn-contents</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>to:NB books:noted iq psychology cognitive_science color_me_skeptical re:g_paper</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f5c2c9331663/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:iq"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:g_paper"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pDtzV7OzH3cnB64EPj1iyk3JUpmWqhOK/view">
    <title>Precis Mercier &amp; Sperber.pdf - Google Drive</title>
    <dc:date>2022-01-11T15:37:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pDtzV7OzH3cnB64EPj1iyk3JUpmWqhOK/view</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Precis of their great, great book.
--- Probably via:henryfarrell but tab has been hanging open so long I can't recall]]></description>
<dc:subject>have_skimmed sperber.dan mercier.hugo psychology social_life_of_the_mind rationality rhetoric evolutionary_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:886a004f9b58/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_skimmed"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sperber.dan"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mercier.hugo"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rhetoric"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009022217">
    <title>Good Science: Psychological Inquiry as Everyday Moral Practice</title>
    <dc:date>2022-01-10T20:02:59+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009022217</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Good Science is an account of psychological research emphasizing the moral foundations of inquiry. This volume brings together existing disciplinary critiques of scientism, objectivism, and instrumentalism, and then discusses how these contribute to institutionalized privilege and to less morally responsive research practices. The author draws on historical, critical, feminist, and science studies traditions to provide an alternative account of psychological science and to highlight the irreducibly moral foundations of everyday scientific practice. This work outlines a theoretical framework for thinking about and practicing psychology in ways that center moral responsibility, collective commitment, and justice. The book then applies this framework, describing psychological research practices in terms of the their moral dilemmas. Also included are materials meant to aid in methods instruction and mentoring."

--- I am sympathetic to the idea that the _pursuit_ of science rests on certain moral presuppositions, but I am very distrustful of most of the people who advocate this idea, and these blurbs do nothing to allay my mistrust.  (Nor does suggesting that _psychology_ can serve as an exemplar of "good science". [I realize that's snobbery on my part.])  Last tag applies.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted philosophy_of_science moral_philosophy psychology color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b79b2c9f7a1c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://osf.io/b8tvk/">
    <title>OSF Preprints | Directional motives and different priors are observationally equivalent</title>
    <dc:date>2021-12-13T06:21:52+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://osf.io/b8tvk/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Many experimental and observational studies use the way that subjects respond to information as evidence that partisan bias or directional motives influence (or do not influence) political beliefs. For a natural and tractable formulation belief formation with both accuracy and directional motives, this is not possible. Any subject influenced by directional motives has a "Fully Bayesian Equivalent" with identical beliefs upon observing any signal. As a result, comparing how individuals or groups with different partisanship or priors respond to information has no diagnostic value in detecting motivated reasoning, even in a multivariate or dynamic setting. Conversely, providing a ``Bayesian rationalization'' consistent with a pattern of updating is not meaningful evidence for a lack of directional motives. These results have theoretical implications for the convergence of beliefs among those with directional motives and practical implications for empirical studies that aim to detect directional motives."]]></description>
<dc:subject>psychology bounded_rationality bayesianism to:blog have_read in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:bced20d10754/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bounded_rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bayesianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/10/opinion/instagram-facebook-mental-health-study.html">
    <title>Opinion | Does Instagram Harm Girls? No One Actually Knows. - The New York Times</title>
    <dc:date>2021-10-12T03:58:42+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/10/opinion/instagram-facebook-mental-health-study.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>social_media psychology re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2981633d804c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_media"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://blog.pnas.org/2021/10/frustrations-can-combust-into-a-riot-regardless-of-age-politics-or-gender/">
    <title>Frustrations can combust into a riot regardless of age, politics, or gender | National Academy of Sciences</title>
    <dc:date>2021-10-06T15:51:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://blog.pnas.org/2021/10/frustrations-can-combust-into-a-riot-regardless-of-age-politics-or-gender/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[--- I'm sorry, but as described, this is idiotic, because extrapolating from "pressing buttons in a videogame" to "engaging in physical violence, putting yourself at risk of bodily harm" is idiotic.  If they wanted to extrapolate to willingness to engage in online harassment / trolling / mobbing, that'd be more to the point.
(It is, of course, possible that the write-up of the study is grossly distorting it, and this is addressed somehow by the actual paper, though I can't begin to imagine how.  If I ever read the paper and come away convinced, I will eat crow and remove the last tag.)]]></description>
<dc:subject>psychology violence why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system riots utter_stupidity</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a13e16eb9742/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:violence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:riots"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:utter_stupidity"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20191432">
    <title>Asymmetric Attention - American Economic Association</title>
    <dc:date>2021-08-30T15:11:52+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20191432</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We document that the expectations of households, firms, and professional forecasters in standard surveys simultaneously extrapolate from recent events and underreact to new information. Existing models of expectation formation, whether behavioral or rational, cannot account for these observations. We develop a rational theory of extrapolation based on limited attention, which is consistent with this evidence. In particular, we show that limited, asymmetric attention to procyclical variables can explain the coexistence of extrapolation and underreactions. We illustrate these mechanisms in a microfounded macroeconomic model, which generates expectations consistent with the survey data, and show that asymmetric attention increases business cycle fluctuations."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB prediction psychology macroeconomics re:your_favorite_dsge_sucks</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f8e69572c603/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:prediction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:macroeconomics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:your_favorite_dsge_sucks"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/psychology-of-online-political-hostility-a-comprehensive-crossnational-test-of-the-mismatch-hypothesis/C721597EEB77CC8F494710ED631916E4">
    <title>The Psychology of Online Political Hostility: A Comprehensive, Cross-National Test of the Mismatch Hypothesis | American Political Science Review | Cambridge Core</title>
    <dc:date>2021-08-29T02:59:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/psychology-of-online-political-hostility-a-comprehensive-crossnational-test-of-the-mismatch-hypothesis/C721597EEB77CC8F494710ED631916E4</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Why are online discussions about politics more hostile than offline discussions? A popular answer argues that human psychology is tailored for face-to-face interaction and people’s behavior therefore changes for the worse in impersonal online discussions. We provide a theoretical formalization and empirical test of this explanation: the mismatch hypothesis. We argue that mismatches between human psychology and novel features of online environments could (a) change people’s behavior, (b) create adverse selection effects, and (c) bias people’s perceptions. Across eight studies, leveraging cross-national surveys and behavioral experiments (total N = 8,434), we test the mismatch hypothesis but only find evidence for limited selection effects. Instead, hostile political discussions are the result of status-driven individuals who are drawn to politics and are equally hostile both online and offline. Finally, we offer initial evidence that online discussions feel more hostile, in part, because the behavior of such individuals is more visible online than offline."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_media psychology re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator via:henry_farrell</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0335925b7d1e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_media"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:henry_farrell"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-neuro-100120-092143">
    <title>Adaptive Prediction for Social Contexts: The Cerebellar Contribution to Typical and Atypical Social Behaviors | Annual Review of Neuroscience</title>
    <dc:date>2021-07-09T16:37:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-neuro-100120-092143</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social interactions involve processes ranging from face recognition to understanding others’ intentions. To guide appropriate behavior in a given context, social interactions rely on accurately predicting the outcomes of one's actions and the thoughts of others. Because social interactions are inherently dynamic, these predictions must be continuously adapted. The neural correlates of social processing have largely focused on emotion, mentalizing, and reward networks, without integration of systems involved in prediction. The cerebellum forms predictive models to calibrate movements and adapt them to changing situations, and cerebellar predictive modeling is thought to extend to nonmotor behaviors. Primary cerebellar dysfunction can produce social deficits, and atypical cerebellar structure and function are reported in autism, which is characterized by social communication challenges and atypical predictive processing. We examine the evidence that cerebellar-mediated predictions and adaptation play important roles in social processes and argue that disruptions in these processes contribute to autism."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB neuroscience psychology prediction</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0da0d18e55c8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:prediction"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-neuro-092920-120559">
    <title>Human Representation Learning | Annual Review of Neuroscience</title>
    <dc:date>2021-07-09T16:37:01+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-neuro-092920-120559</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The central theme of this review is the dynamic interaction between information selection and learning. We pose a fundamental question about this interaction: How do we learn what features of our experiences are worth learning about? In humans, this process depends on attention and memory, two cognitive functions that together constrain representations of the world to features that are relevant for goal attainment. Recent evidence suggests that the representations shaped by attention and memory are themselves inferred from experience with each task. We review this evidence and place it in the context of work that has explicitly characterized representation learning as statistical inference. We discuss how inference can be scaled to real-world decisions by approximating beliefs based on a small number of experiences. Finally, we highlight some implications of this inference process for human decision-making in social environments."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology cognitive_science induction</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:93935a482990/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:induction"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-neuro-100120-085519">
    <title>Perceptual Inference, Learning, and Attention in a Multisensory World | Annual Review of Neuroscience</title>
    <dc:date>2021-07-09T16:36:11+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-neuro-100120-085519</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Adaptive behavior in a complex, dynamic, and multisensory world poses some of the most fundamental computational challenges for the brain, notably inference, decision-making, learning, binding, and attention. We first discuss how the brain integrates sensory signals from the same source to support perceptual inference and decision-making by weighting them according to their momentary sensory uncertainties. We then show how observers solve the binding or causal inference problem—deciding whether signals come from common causes and should hence be integrated or else be treated independently. Next, we describe the multifarious interplay between multisensory processing and attention. We argue that attentional mechanisms are crucial to compute approximate solutions to the binding problem in naturalistic environments when complex time-varying signals arise from myriad causes. Finally, we review how the brain dynamically adapts multisensory processing to a changing world across multiple timescales."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB neuroscience psychology perception causal_inference</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a75db7576c16/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:causal_inference"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.02726">
    <title>[2106.02726] Popularity is linked to neural coordination: Neural evidence for an Anna Karenina principle in social networks</title>
    <dc:date>2021-07-08T16:41:00+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.02726</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["People differ in how they attend to, interpret, and respond to their surroundings. Convergent processing of the world may be one factor that contributes to social connections between individuals. We used neuroimaging and network analysis to investigate whether the most central individuals in their communities (as measured by in-degree centrality, a notion of popularity) process the world in a particularly normative way. More central individuals had exceptionally similar neural responses to their peers and especially to each other in brain regions associated with high-level interpretations and social cognition (e.g., in the default-mode network), whereas less-central individuals exhibited more idiosyncratic responses. Self-reported enjoyment of and interest in stimuli followed a similar pattern, but accounting for these data did not change our main results. These findings suggest an "Anna Karenina principle" in social networks: Highly-central individuals process the world in exceptionally similar ways, whereas less-central individuals process the world in idiosyncratic ways."]]></description>
<dc:subject>neuroscience psychology porter.mason_a. social_networks re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8b15a4e17774/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:porter.mason_a."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.01312">
    <title>[2107.01312] Lonely individuals process the world in idiosyncratic ways</title>
    <dc:date>2021-07-08T16:40:40+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.01312</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Loneliness (i.e., the distressing feeling that often accompanies the subjective sense of social disconnection) is detrimental to mental and physical health, and deficits in self-reported feelings of being understood by others is a risk factor for loneliness. What contributes to these deficits in lonely people? We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to unobtrusively measure the relative alignment of various aspects of people's mental processing of naturalistic stimuli (specifically, videos) as they unfold over time. We thereby tested whether lonely people actually process the world in idiosyncratic ways, rather than only exaggerating or misperceiving how dissimilar others' views are to their own (which could lead them to feel misunderstood, even if they actually see the world similarly to those around them). We found evidence for such idiosyncrasy: lonely individuals' neural responses during free viewing of the videos were dissimilar to peers in their communities, particularly in brain regions (e.g., regions of the default-mode network) in which similar responses have been associated with shared psychological perspectives and subjective understanding. Our findings were robust even after controlling for demographic similarities, participants' overall levels of objective social isolation, and their friendships with each other. These results suggest that being surrounded predominantly by people who see the world differently from oneself may be a risk factor for loneliness, even if one is friends with them."]]></description>
<dc:subject>neuroscience psychology loneliness porter.mason_a. social_networks re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1c7d033d75e8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:loneliness"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:porter.mason_a."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050928">
    <title>The Social Neuroscience of Prejudice | Annual Review of Psychology</title>
    <dc:date>2021-06-28T03:14:18+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050928</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The social neuroscience approach to prejudice investigates the psychology of intergroup bias by integrating models and methods of neuroscience with the social psychology of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Here, we review major contemporary lines of inquiry, including current accounts of group-based categorization; formation and updating of prejudice and stereotypes; effects of prejudice on perception, emotion, and decision making; and the self-regulation of prejudice. In each section, we discuss key social neuroscience findings, consider interpretational challenges and connections with the behavioral literature, and highlight how they advance psychological theories of prejudice. We conclude by discussing the next-generation questions that will continue to guide the social neuroscience approach toward addressing major societal issues of prejudice and discrimination."

]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5a9d399b2de5/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psyarxiv.com/a3jf5/">
    <title>PsyArXiv Preprints | Rethinking the Link Between Self-Reported Personality Traits and Political Preferences</title>
    <dc:date>2021-06-18T15:47:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psyarxiv.com/a3jf5/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Research on personality and political preferences generally assumes unidirectional causal influence of the former on the latter. However, there are reasons to believe that citizens might adopt what they perceive as politically congruent psychological attributes, or at least be motivated to view themselves as having these attributes. We test this hypothesis in a series of studies. Results of preregistered panel analyses in three countries suggest reciprocal causal influences between self-reported personality traits and political preferences. In two two-wave survey experiments, a subtle political prime at the beginning of a survey resulted in self-reported personality traits that were more aligned with political preferences gauged in a previous assessment. We discuss how concurrent assessment within the context of a political survey might overestimate the causal influence of personality traits on political preferences, and how political polarization might be exacerbated by political opponents adopting different personality characteristics or self-perceptions thereof."

--- It's hard to imagine a finding better suited to my prejudices, hence the last tag.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read psychology personality_testing psychometrics polarization social_measurement via:henry_farrell i_want_to_believe</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:95668300f7ee/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:personality_testing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychometrics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:polarization"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_measurement"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:henry_farrell"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:i_want_to_believe"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/118/16/e2019342118.abstract?etoc">
    <title>Two sources of uncertainty independently modulate temporal expectancy | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-21T14:04:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/118/16/e2019342118.abstract?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The environment is shaped by two sources of temporal uncertainty: the discrete probability of whether an event will occur and—if it does—the continuous probability of when it will happen. These two types of uncertainty are fundamental to every form of anticipatory behavior including learning, decision-making, and motor planning. It remains unknown how the brain models the two uncertainty parameters and how they interact in anticipation. It is commonly assumed that the discrete probability of whether an event will occur has a fixed effect on event expectancy over time. In contrast, we first demonstrate that this pattern is highly dynamic and monotonically increases across time. Intriguingly, this behavior is independent of the continuous probability of when an event will occur. The effect of this continuous probability on anticipation is commonly proposed to be driven by the hazard rate (HR) of events. We next show that the HR fails to account for behavior and propose a model of event expectancy based on the probability density function of events. Our results hold for both vision and audition, suggesting independence of the representation of the two uncertainties from sensory input modality. These findings enrich the understanding of fundamental anticipatory processes and have provocative implications for many aspects of behavior and its neural underpinnings."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology neuroscience decision-making neural_control_of_action</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4a9eda580d66/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neural_control_of_action"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/118/16/e2023123118.abstract?etoc">
    <title>Sensitivity to geometric shape regularity in humans and baboons: A putative signature of human singularity | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-21T14:02:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/118/16/e2023123118.abstract?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Among primates, humans are special in their ability to create and manipulate highly elaborate structures of language, mathematics, and music. Here we show that this sensitivity to abstract structure is already present in a much simpler domain: the visual perception of regular geometric shapes such as squares, rectangles, and parallelograms. We asked human subjects to detect an intruder shape among six quadrilaterals. Although the intruder was always defined by an identical amount of displacement of a single vertex, the results revealed a geometric regularity effect: detection was considerably easier when either the base shape or the intruder was a regular figure comprising right angles, parallelism, or symmetry rather than a more irregular shape. This effect was replicated in several tasks and in all human populations tested, including uneducated Himba adults and French kindergartners. Baboons, however, showed no such geometric regularity effect, even after extensive training. Baboon behavior was captured by convolutional neural networks (CNNs), but neither CNNs nor a variational autoencoder captured the human geometric regularity effect. However, a symbolic model, based on exact properties of Euclidean geometry, closely fitted human behavior. Our results indicate that the human propensity for symbolic abstraction permeates even elementary shape perception. They suggest a putative signature of human singularity and provide a challenge for nonsymbolic models of human shape perception."

--- Dehane is generally worth reading, but it's a contributed paper by an Academy member, so who knows?]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB primates psychology perception human_evolution</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4dcd99f103ce/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:primates"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:perception"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/working-mind">
    <title>The Working Mind: Meaning and Mental Attention in Human Development | The MIT Press</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-09T18:35:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/working-mind</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In The Working Mind, Juan Pascual-Leone and Janice M. Johnson propose a general organismic-causal theory that explicates working memory and executive function developmentally and by doing so clarifies the nature of human intelligence. Pascual-Leone and Johnson explain “from within” (that is, from a subject's own processing perspective) cognitive developmental stages of growth, describing key causal factors that can account for the emergence of the working mind as a functional totality. Among these factors is a maturationally growing mental attention.
"After reviewing meaning-driven processes and constructivist knowledge principles that underlie what Pascual-Leone and Johnson term their Theory of Constructive Operators (TCO), they propose the TCO as as a developmental and neuropsychological approach to human cognitive and affective processes and their development. They present a novel method of mental task analysis that generates from-within process models of subjects' attempts to solve specific tasks. They provide an interpretation of brain semiotic processes that deploys TCO in functionally distinct brain locations. Finally, they show how TCO explicates complex human issues including consciousness, the self, the will, motivation, and individual differences, with applications in education, psychotherapy, and cognitive neuropsychology."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted cognitive_development psychology memory attention neuropsychology color_me_skeptical books:suggest_to_library</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1db11a80fe6a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_development"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:memory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:attention"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuropsychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:suggest_to_library"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://oxford-universitypressscholarship-com.cmu.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001/acprof-9780198524021?rskey=9UW923&amp;result=952">
    <title>Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate - Oxford Scholarship</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-23T06:39:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://oxford-universitypressscholarship-com.cmu.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524021.001.0001/acprof-9780198524021?rskey=9UW923&amp;result=952</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Dan Sperber, David Premack, and Ann James Premack (eds.)
"An understanding of cause-effect relationships is fundamental to the study of cognition. In this book, chapters based on comparative psychology, social psychology, developmental psychology, anthropology, and philosophy present the newest developments in the study of causal cognition and discuss their different perspectives. They reflect on the role and forms of causal knowledge, both in animal and human cognition, on the development of human causal cognition from infancy, and on the relationship between individual and cultural aspects of causal understanding. This book presents an informative, insightful, and interdisciplinary debate."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB causality cognitive_science psychology books:noted</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:505527fff17a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:causality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815068.001.0001">
    <title>Explaining Imagination - Oxford Scholarship</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-16T05:02:59+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815068.001.0001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Imagination will remain a mystery—we will not be able to explain imagination—until we can break it into simpler parts that are more easily understood. Explaining Imagination is a guidebook for doing just that, where the simpler parts are other familiar mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions, and intentions. In different combinations and contexts, these states constitute cases of imagining. This reductive approach to imagination is at direct odds with the current orthodoxy, which sees imagination as an irreducible, sui generis mental state or process—one that influences our judgments, beliefs, desires, and so on, without being constituted by them. Explaining Imagination looks closely at the main contexts where imagination is thought to be at work and argues that, in each case, the capacity is best explained by appeal to a person’s beliefs, judgments, desires, intentions, or decisions. The proper conclusion is not that there are no imaginings after all, but that these other states simply constitute the relevant cases of imagining. Contexts explored in depth include: hypothetical and counterfactual reasoning, engaging in pretense, appreciating fictions, and generating creative works. The special role of mental imagery within states like beliefs, desires, and judgments is explained in a way that is compatible with reducing imagination to more basic folk psychological states. A significant upshot is that, in order to create an artificial mind with an imagination, we need only give it these more ordinary mental states."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology imagination books:noted</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:38a8848720e8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:imagination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-072720-094140">
    <title>Active Forgetting: Adaptation of Memory by Prefrontal Control | Annual Review of Psychology</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-10T20:47:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-072720-094140</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Over the past century, psychologists have discussed whether forgetting might arise from active mechanisms that promote memory loss to achieve various functions, such as minimizing errors, facilitating learning, or regulating one's emotional state. The past decade has witnessed a great expansion in knowledge about the brain mechanisms underlying active forgetting in its varying forms. A core discovery concerns the role of the prefrontal cortex in exerting top-down control over mnemonic activity in the hippocampus and other brain structures, often via inhibitory control. New findings reveal that such processes not only induce forgetting of specific memories but also can suppress the operation of mnemonic processes more broadly, triggering windows of anterograde and retrograde amnesia in healthy people. Recent work extends active forgetting to nonhuman animals, presaging the development of a multilevel mechanistic account that spans the cognitive, systems, network, and even cellular levels. This work reveals how organisms adapt their memories to their cognitive and emotional goals and has implications for understanding vulnerability to psychiatric disorders."

]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB memory neuroscience psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1b3b915e2ac0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:memory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-062220-051256">
    <title>Understanding Human Cognitive Uniqueness | Annual Review of Psychology</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-06T17:15:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-062220-051256</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Humanity has regarded itself as intellectually superior to other species for millennia, yet human cognitive uniqueness remains poorly understood. Here, we evaluate candidate traits plausibly underlying our distinctive cognition (including mental time travel, tool use, problem solving, social cognition, and communication) as well as domain generality, and we consider how human cognitive uniqueness may have evolved. We conclude that there are no traits present in humans and absent in other animals that in isolation explain our species’ superior cognitive performance; rather, there are many cognitive domains in which humans possess unusually potent capabilities compared to those found in other species. Humans are flexible cognitive all-rounders, whose proficiency arises through interactions and reinforcement between cognitive domains at multiple scales."]]></description>
<dc:subject>psychology evolution_of_cognition human_evolution evolutionary_psychology in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:58e37926b42b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051053">
    <title>The Psychology of Reaching: Action Selection, Movement Implementation, and Sensorimotor Learning | Annual Review of Psychology</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-06T17:13:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051053</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The study of motor planning and learning in humans has undergone a dramatic transformation in the 20 years since this journal's last review of this topic. The behavioral analysis of movement, the foundational approach for psychology, has been complemented by ideas from control theory, computer science, statistics, and, most notably, neuroscience. The result of this interdisciplinary approach has been a focus on the computational level of analysis, leading to the development of mechanistic models at the psychological level to explain how humans plan, execute, and consolidate skilled reaching movements. This review emphasizes new perspectives on action selection and motor planning, research that stands in contrast to the previously dominant representation-based perspective of motor programming, as well as an emerging literature highlighting the convergent operation of multiple processes in sensorimotor learning."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB neuroscience neural_control_of_action psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d38c87ad1128/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neural_control_of_action"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/critical-thinking/dunning-kruger-effect-probably-not-real">
    <title>The Dunning-Kruger Effect Is Probably Not Real | Office for Science and Society - McGill University</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-03T20:51:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.mcgill.ca/oss/article/critical-thinking/dunning-kruger-effect-probably-not-real</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[--- It's rather annoying that there was no link to the R code, but I reproduced the basics with a little bit of work (incorporated below for reference).  Setting the measurement standard deviation (s) to 1, as in my code, gives a modest but perceptible over-estimation at low percentiles and under-estimation at high percentiles; set it to 5 and marvel.



n <- 1000
s <- 1
actual.raw <- rnorm(n)
perceived.raw <- actual.raw+rnorm(n,sd=s)

buckets <- cut(actual.raw,
               breaks=quantile(actual.raw,
                               probs=c(0:4)/4))

perceived <- 100*ecdf(perceived.raw)(perceived.raw)
actual <- 100*ecdf(actual.raw)(actual.raw)


plot(x=actual, y=perceived, cex=0.1,
     xlab="Actual percentile", ylab="Perceived percentile")
points(y=aggregate(perceived~buckets,
                   FUN=mean)[,2],
       x=aggregate(actual~buckets,
                   FUN=mean)[,2],
       pch=16, col="blue")
abline(0,1, col="grey")
abline(lm(perceived~actual),col="blue")

# For contrast:
plot(x=actual.raw, y=perceived.raw, cex=0.1,
     xlab="Actual raw score", ylab="Perceived raw score")
abline(0,1, col="grey")
abline(lm(perceived.raw~actual.raw),col="blue")]]></description>
<dc:subject>debunking bad_data_analysis psychology dunning-kruger visual_display_of_quantitative_information to_teach:linear_models via:tsuomela</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:faac8efe5364/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:debunking"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bad_data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:dunning-kruger"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:visual_display_of_quantitative_information"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:linear_models"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:tsuomela"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050807">
    <title>Judging Truth | Annual Review of Psychology</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-03T19:27:15+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050807</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Deceptive claims surround us, embedded in fake news, advertisements, political propaganda, and rumors. How do people know what to believe? Truth judgments reflect inferences drawn from three types of information: base rates, feelings, and consistency with information retrieved from memory. First, people exhibit a bias to accept incoming information, because most claims in our environments are true. Second, people interpret feelings, like ease of processing, as evidence of truth. And third, people can (but do not always) consider whether assertions match facts and source information stored in memory. This three-part framework predicts specific illusions (e.g., truthiness, illusory truth), offers ways to correct stubborn misconceptions, and suggests the importance of converging cues in a post-truth world, where falsehoods travel further and faster than the truth."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology cognitive_science deceiving_us_has_become_an_industrial_process epidemiology_of_representations</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:9b66494a891f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:deceiving_us_has_become_an_industrial_process"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050837">
    <title>Implicit Social Cognition | Annual Review of Psychology</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-03T19:24:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050837</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In the last 20 years, research on implicit social cognition has established that social judgments and behavior are guided by attitudes and stereotypes of which the actor may lack awareness. Research using the methods of implicit social cognition has produced the concept of implicit bias, which has generated wide attention not only in social, clinical, and developmental psychology, but also in disciplines outside of psychology, including business, law, criminal justice, medicine, education, and political science. Although this rapidly growing body of research offers prospects of useful societal applications, the theory needed to confidently guide those applications remains insufficiently developed. This article describes the methods that have been developed, the findings that have been obtained, and the theoretical questions that remain to be answered."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a4c45a35c126/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051044">
    <title>Emotional Objectivity: Neural Representations of Emotions and Their Interaction with Cognition | Annual Review of Psychology</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-03T19:23:17+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-051044</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Recent advances in our understanding of information states in the human brain have opened a new window into the brain's representation of emotion. While emotion was once thought to constitute a separate domain from cognition, current evidence suggests that all events are filtered through the lens of whether they are good or bad for us. Focusing on new methods of decoding information states from brain activation, we review growing evidence that emotion is represented at multiple levels of our sensory systems and infuses perception, attention, learning, and memory. We provide evidence that the primary function of emotional representations is to produce unified emotion, perception, and thought (e.g., “That is a good thing”) rather than discrete and isolated psychological events (e.g., “That is a thing. I feel good”). The emergent view suggests ways in which emotion operates as a fundamental feature of cognition, by design ensuring that emotional outcomes are the central object of perception, thought, and action."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology cognitive_science emotion</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a01402f705cc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:emotion"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/370/6522/eaay0214">
    <title>Poverty, depression, and anxiety: Causal evidence and mechanisms | Science</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-11T06:24:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://science.sciencemag.org/content/370/6522/eaay0214</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Why are people who live in poverty disproportionately affected by mental illness? We review the interdisciplinary evidence of the bidirectional causal relationship between poverty and common mental illnesses—depression and anxiety—and the underlying mechanisms. Research shows that mental illness reduces employment and therefore income, and that psychological interventions generate economic gains. Similarly, negative economic shocks cause mental illness, and antipoverty programs such as cash transfers improve mental health. A crucial step toward the design of effective policies is to better understand the mechanisms underlying these causal effects."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics psychology sociology psychiatry poverty inequality seamless_garments_of_dysfunction</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b7cc23e33f73/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychiatry"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:poverty"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inequality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:seamless_garments_of_dysfunction"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psyarxiv.com/rybh9/">
    <title>PsyArXiv Preprints | How computational modeling can force theory building in psychological science</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-03T03:01:39+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psyarxiv.com/rybh9/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Psychology endeavors to develop theories of human capacities and behaviors based on a variety of methodologies and dependent measures. We argue that one of the most divisive factors in our field is whether researchers choose to employ computational modeling of theories (over and above data) during the scientific inference process. Modeling is undervalued, yet holds promise for advancing psychological science. The inherent demands of computational modeling guide us towards better science by forcing us to conceptually analyze, specify, and formalise intuitions which otherwise remain unexamined — what we dub “open theory”. Constraining our inference process through modeling enables us to build explanatory and predictive theories. Herein, we present scientific inference in psychology as a path function, where each step shapes the next. Computational modeling can constrain these steps, thus advancing scientific inference over and above stewardship of experimental practice (e.g., preregistration). If psychology continues to eschew computational modeling, we predict more replicability “crises” and persistent failure at coherent theory-building. This is because without formal modelling we lack open and transparent theorising. We also explain how to formalise, specify, and implement a computational model, emphasizing that the advantages of modeling can be achieved by anyone with benefit to all."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology cognitive_science modeling</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dcccb0192551/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:modeling"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://philpapers.org/rec/DORGG">
    <title>Kevin Dorst &amp; Matthew Mandelkern, Good Guesses - PhilPapers</title>
    <dc:date>2020-11-29T19:19:38+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://philpapers.org/rec/DORGG</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This paper is about guessing: how people respond to a question when they aren’t certain of the answer. Guesses show surprising and systematic patterns that the most obvious theories don’t explain. We offer a theory that does explain them: we propose that people aim to optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity in forming their guess. After spelling out our theory, we use it to argue that guessing plays a central role in our cognitive lives. In particular, our account of guessing yields new theories of (1) belief, (2) assertion, and (3) the conjunction fallacy—the psychological finding that people sometimes rate conjunctions as more probable than their conjuncts. More generally, we suggest that guessing helps explain how boundedly rational agents like us navigate a complex, uncertain world."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read psychology cognitive_science guessing philosophy_of_mind rationality relevance_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:edac8844225a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:guessing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:relevance_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-soc-121919-054736">
    <title>Social Networks and Cognition | Annual Review of Sociology</title>
    <dc:date>2020-11-19T22:11:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-soc-121919-054736</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social network analysis, now often thought of simply as network science, has penetrated nearly every scientific and many scholarly fields and has become an indispensable resource. Yet, social networks are special by virtue of being specifically social, and our growing understanding of the brain is affecting our understanding of how social networks form, mature, and are exploited by their members. We discuss the expanding research on how the brain manages social information, how this information is heuristically processed, and how network cognitions are affected by situation and circumstance. In the process, we argue that the cognitive turn in social networks exemplifies the modern conception of the brain as fundamentally reprogrammable by experience and circumstance. Far from social networks being dependent upon the brain, we anticipate a modern view in which cognition and social networks coconstitute each other."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_networks psychology cognitive_science</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:597a2cc8000a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cos.io/about/news/replications-of-replications-suggest-that-prior-failures-to-replicate-were-not-due-to-failure-to-replicate-well">
    <title>Replications of replications suggest that prior failures to replicate were not due to failure to replicate well</title>
    <dc:date>2020-11-14T17:28:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cos.io/about/news/replications-of-replications-suggest-that-prior-failures-to-replicate-were-not-due-to-failure-to-replicate-well</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Critics said that a well-known psychology replication project failed to replicate findings because the replications had problems. Replications of the replications suggest otherwise."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology social_science_methodology science_as_a_social_process re:neutral_model_of_inquiry via:rvenkat</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e069691355df/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:science_as_a_social_process"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:neutral_model_of_inquiry"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:rvenkat"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.3.220">
    <title>Facts and Myths about Misperceptions - American Economic Association</title>
    <dc:date>2020-11-08T08:52:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.34.3.220</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Misperceptions threaten to warp mass opinion and public policy on controversial issues in politics, science, and health. What explains the prevalence and persistence of these false and unsupported beliefs, which seem to be genuinely held by many people? Though limits on cognitive resources and attention play an important role, many of the most destructive misperceptions arise in domains where individuals have weak incentives to hold accurate beliefs and strong directional motivations to endorse beliefs that are consistent with a group identity such as partisanship. These tendencies are often exploited by elites who frequently create and amplify misperceptions to influence elections and public policy. Though evidence is lacking for claims of a "post-truth" era, changes in the speed with which false information travels and the extent to which it can find receptive audiences require new approaches to counter misinformation. Reducing the propagation and influence of false claims will require further efforts to inoculate people in advance of exposure (for example, media literacy), debunk false claims that are already salient or widespread (for example, fact-checking), reduce the prevalence of low-quality information (for example, changing social media algorithms), and discourage elites from promoting false information (for example, strengthening reputational sanctions)."]]></description>
<dc:subject>psychoceramics deceiving_us_has_become_an_industrial_process psychology democracy re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator nyhan.brendan epidemiology_of_representations in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5eeee5aa07fe/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychoceramics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:deceiving_us_has_become_an_industrial_process"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:democracy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:nyhan.brendan"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://nicolebarbaro.com/2020/04/25/no-maslow-didnt-create-the-famous-hierarchy-of-needs-pyramid/">
    <title>No, Maslow Didn’t Create the Famous Hierarchy of Needs Pyramid | Dr. Nicole Barbaro</title>
    <dc:date>2020-10-27T13:16:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://nicolebarbaro.com/2020/04/25/no-maslow-didnt-create-the-famous-hierarchy-of-needs-pyramid/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:984de95dc672/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2020/10/01/2014505117">
    <title>The logic of universalization guides moral judgment | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2020-10-05T18:36:01+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/early/2020/10/01/2014505117</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["To explain why an action is wrong, we sometimes say, “What if everybody did that?” In other words, even if a single person’s behavior is harmless, that behavior may be wrong if it would be harmful once universalized. We formalize the process of universalization in a computational model, test its quantitative predictions in studies of human moral judgment, and distinguish it from alternative models. We show that adults spontaneously make moral judgments consistent with the logic of universalization, and report comparable patterns of judgment in children. We conclude that, alongside other well-characterized mechanisms of moral judgment, such as outcome-based and rule-based thinking, the logic of universalizing holds an important place in our moral minds."

]]></description>
<dc:subject>moral_psychology cognitive_science psychology in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b74f5209dfea/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.the100.ci/2020/07/31/on-the-origin-of-psychological-research-practices-with-special-regard-to-self-reported-nostril-width/">
    <title>On the origin of psychological research practices, with special regard to self-reported nostril width – The 100% CI</title>
    <dc:date>2020-10-01T21:44:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.the100.ci/2020/07/31/on-the-origin-of-psychological-research-practices-with-special-regard-to-self-reported-nostril-width/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>funny:malicious funny:academic funny:pointed social_science_methodology psychology sociology_of_science why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:bbca35ab0d76/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:funny:malicious"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:funny:academic"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:funny:pointed"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sociology_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/psychology/cognition/neuroscience-expertise?format=PB&amp;WT.mc_id=CBY-KT-The%2BNeuroscience%2Bof%2BCreativity">
    <title>Neuroscience of expertise | Cognition | Cambridge University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2020-10-01T01:18:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/psychology/cognition/neuroscience-expertise?format=PB&amp;WT.mc_id=CBY-KT-The%2BNeuroscience%2Bof%2BCreativity</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The Neuroscience of Expertise examines the ways in which the brain accommodates the incredible feats of experts. It builds on a tradition of cognitive research to explain how the processes of perception, attention, and memory come together to enable experts' outstanding performance. The text explains how the brain adapts to enable the complex cognitive machinery behind expertise, and provides a unifying framework to illuminate the seemingly unconnected performance of experts in different domains. Whether it is a radiologist who must spot a pathology in a split second, a chess grandmaster who finds the right path in a jungle of possible continuations, or a tennis professional who reacts impossibly quickly to return a serve, The Neuroscience of Expertise offers insight into the universal cognitive and neural mechanisms behind these achievements."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted neuroscience psychology expertise books:suggest_to_library</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:07353423d836/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:expertise"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:suggest_to_library"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/computational-psychiatry-1">
    <title>Computational Psychiatry | The MIT Press</title>
    <dc:date>2020-09-21T03:56:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/computational-psychiatry-1</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Computational psychiatry applies computational modeling and theoretical approaches to psychiatric questions, focusing on building mathematical models of neural or cognitive phenomena relevant to psychiatric diseases. It is a young and rapidly growing field, drawing on concepts from psychiatry, psychology, computer science, neuroscience, electrical and chemical engineering, mathematics, and physics. This book, accessible to nonspecialists, offers the first introductory textbook in computational psychiatry.
"After more than 100 years of psychological theories, psychopharmacological research, and clinical experience, the challenges of understanding and treating mental illness remain. Computational psychiatry seeks to explain how psychiatric dysfunction may emerge mechanistically, and how it may be classified, predicted, and clinically addressed. It has the potential to bridge advances in neuroscience and clinical applications, connecting low-level biological features with high-level cognitive features. After a survey of computational psychiatry methods, the book covers biologically detailed models of working memory and decision making and computational models of cognitive control. It then describes the application of computational approaches to schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, addiction, and Tourette's syndrome. Finally, the book briefly discusses additional disorders and offers guidelines for future research. Chapters also offer discussions of related issues, chapter summaries, and suggestions for further study. The book can be used as a textbook by students and as a reference for scientists and clinicians interested in applying computational models to diagnosis and treatment strategies."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted psychiatry psychology modeling books:suggest_to_library</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:837ed6c0dc6f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychiatry"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:modeling"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:suggest_to_library"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42113-018-0019-z">
    <title>Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Tensions Between Scientific Judgement and Statistical Model Selection | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2020-09-01T12:04:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42113-018-0019-z</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Discussions of model selection in the psychological literature typically frame the issues as a question of statistical inference, with the goal being to determine which model makes the best predictions about data. Within this setting, advocates of leave-one-out cross-validation and Bayes factors disagree on precisely which prediction problem model selection questions should aim to answer. In this comment, I discuss some of these issues from a scientific perspective. What goal does model selection serve when all models are known to be systematically wrong? How might “toy problems” tell a misleading story? How does the scientific goal of explanation align with (or differ from) traditional statistical concerns? I do not offer answers to these questions, but hope to highlight the reasons why psychological researchers cannot avoid asking them."]]></description>
<dc:subject>model_selection social_science_methodology via:arsyed statistics psychology in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c275d9352b65/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:model_selection"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:arsyed"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://carcinisation.com/2020/07/04/the-ongoing-accomplishment-of-the-big-five/">
    <title>The Ongoing Accomplishment of the Big Five – Carcinisation</title>
    <dc:date>2020-07-16T16:04:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://carcinisation.com/2020/07/04/the-ongoing-accomplishment-of-the-big-five/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Preach, Brother Literal Banana, preach!]]></description>
<dc:subject>personality_tests inference_to_latent_objects psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b19b300cd00a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:personality_tests"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inference_to_latent_objects"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/116/52/26459">
    <title>Social media-predicted personality traits and values can help match people to their ideal jobs | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2020-07-16T15:49:42+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/116/52/26459</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Work is thought to be more enjoyable and beneficial to individuals and society when there is congruence between one’s personality and one’s occupation. We provide large-scale evidence that occupations have distinctive psychological profiles, which can successfully be predicted from linguistic information unobtrusively collected through social media. Based on 128,279 Twitter users representing 3,513 occupations, we automatically assess user personalities and visually map the personality profiles of different professions. Similar occupations cluster together, pointing to specific sets of jobs that one might be well suited for. Observations that contradict existing classifications may point to emerging occupations relevant to the 21st century workplace. Findings illustrate how social media can be used to match people to their ideal occupation."

--- Some observations:
1. They did not actually measure people's personality traits; they _assumed_ that a commercial IBM product can map word usage to personality traits.
1a. In particular, they _assumed_ that this remains accurate for what people write on Twitter, as opposed to whatever context IBM developed their system in (not specified here).
2. They did not actually measure "ideal" occupations; they saw whether a classifier using the estimated personality traits could map people to their actual occupations.
2a. They artificially balance their 10 professions so that each has 955 members.  (I presume that they randomly sampled the occupations with more members, though I don't quite see them saying that; maybe I missed it.  Also, I presume they did _not_ go hunting for the best group of 10 occupations.)  So the baseline accuracy would be only 10%, and getting about 70% under CV does indeed mean that there's some signal here.
2b. It's good that they include error bars on their accuracy figures!
2c.  Since they include those error bars, we can see that the difference in classification accuracy between the different methods are both small and statistically insignificant.  In particular, good old fashioned logistic regression is pretty much on par with everything else.
2d. They don't seem to have actually tried the obvious classifier here, which would map each person to the occupation whose feature-vector center ("medoid") was closest to the person's feature-vector ("prototype method").  But they did at least use k-nearest-neighbors, which performed about as well as all the others.
3. Calling this evidence that we could go from analyzing Twitter word usage to "ideal" job recommendations presumes that most people are _already_ in their ideal jobs.
4. This was edited by Susan Fiske [https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2017/02/08/authority-figures-spread-happy-talk-still-dont-get-it/].

_Maybe_ people reveal their personalities, in the Big 5 sense, by what they write on Twitter.  (Operationally, "personality" in the Big 5 sense is pretty close to "what words would you use to describe yourself on a questionnaire?")  And _maybe_ the way people reveal their personalities in their word usage on Twitter is so context-independent that it can reliably generalize across all the different sub-cultures and sub-societies and self-organized genre conventions of Twitter, so there is one globally reliable mapping.  (I am not going to repeat all of [http://bactra.org/weblog/770.html], but I could.)  And _maybe_ IBM has provided that mapping with an API.  And _maybe_ people with different personalities select in to different professions.  (As an alternative: different occupations train people differently, which alters their personalities, or at least the verbal expressions thereof, and different occupations expose people to different situations, which alters what they say and maybe even shapes their personalities.)  And _maybe_ people select in to professions where they are happier.  And _maybe_ if we looked at how young people talk on Twitter, before they've chosen an occupation, and extract their personality from it, and map them to a profession with lots of similar personality vectors already in it, they'll be happier in that occupation than in others.  But this study provides at best very, very weak evidence for all this.  (I want to say "no evidence at all", but I also don't want to get into arguments about the theory of evidence.)  What the study does show is that people in different occupations use different words on Twitter, and that these differences are detectable through the filter of IBM's purported personality estimator.

]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB have_read bad_science bad_data_analysis classifiers text_mining personality_tests logistic_regression social_media psychology why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system to_teach:data-mining forty_minutes_of_my_life_im_not_getting_back trapped_in_plutos_republic to:blog twitter re:career_advising_in_plutos_republic</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:780cca65f6d0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bad_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bad_data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:classifiers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:text_mining"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:personality_tests"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:logistic_regression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_media"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:data-mining"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:forty_minutes_of_my_life_im_not_getting_back"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:trapped_in_plutos_republic"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:twitter"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:career_advising_in_plutos_republic"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053811920305784">
    <title>Little evidence for associations between the Big Five personality traits and variability in brain gray or white matter - ScienceDirect</title>
    <dc:date>2020-07-14T15:38:00+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1053811920305784</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Attempts to link the Big Five personality traits of Openness-to-Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism with variability in trait-like features of brain structure have produced inconsistent results. Small sample sizes and heterogeneous methodology have been suspected in driving these inconsistencies. Here, using data collected from 1,107 university students (636 women, mean age 19.69 ​± ​1.24 years), representing the largest sample to date of unrelated individuals, we tested for associations between the Big Five personality traits and measures of cortical thickness and surface area, subcortical volume, and white matter microstructural integrity. In addition to replication analyses based on a prior study, we conducted exploratory whole-brain analyses. Four supplementary analyses were also conducted to examine 1) possible associations with lower-order facets of personality; 2) modulatory effects of sex; 3) effect of controlling for non-target personality traits; and 4) parcellation scheme effects. Our analyses failed to identify significant associations between the Big Five personality traits and brain morphometry, except for a weak association between greater surface area of the superior temporal gyrus and lower conscientiousness scores. As the latter association is not supported by previous studies, it should be treated with caution. Our supplementary analyses mirrored these predominantly null findings, suggesting they were not substantively biased by our analytic choices. Collectively, these results indicate that if there are associations between the Big Five personality traits and brain structure, they are likely of very small effect size and will require very large samples for reliable detection."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB personality_tests neuroscience psychology re:g_paper</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6a72ec17c19b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:personality_tests"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:g_paper"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-31306-001?doi=1">
    <title>A meta-analysis of procedures to change implicit measures. - PsycNET</title>
    <dc:date>2020-07-13T20:29:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-31306-001?doi=1</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Using a novel technique known as network meta-analysis, we synthesized evidence from 492 studies (87,418 participants) to investigate the effectiveness of procedures in changing implicit measures, which we define as response biases on implicit tasks. We also evaluated these procedures’ effects on explicit and behavioral measures. We found that implicit measures can be changed, but effects are often relatively weak (|ds| < .30). Most studies focused on producing short-term changes with brief, single-session manipulations. Procedures that associate sets of concepts, invoke goals or motivations, or tax mental resources changed implicit measures the most, whereas procedures that induced threat, affirmation, or specific moods/emotions changed implicit measures the least. Bias tests suggested that implicit effects could be inflated relative to their true population values. Procedures changed explicit measures less consistently and to a smaller degree than implicit measures and generally produced trivial changes in behavior. Finally, changes in implicit measures did not mediate changes in explicit measures or behavior. Our findings suggest that changes in implicit measures are possible, but those changes do not necessarily translate into changes in explicit measures or behavior. "]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB implicit_association_test experimental_psychology meta-analysis psychology to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination diversity_and_inclusion_training</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:91e2cb60b478/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:implicit_association_test"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:meta-analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:diversity_and_inclusion_training"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1984-16352-001">
    <title>Effectiveness of coaching for aptitude tests. - PsycNET</title>
    <dc:date>2020-06-25T19:16:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1984-16352-001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Conducted a meta-analytic approach to determine the effects of coaching on aptitude test scores in 38 studies. In 14 studies on the Scholastic Aptitude Test, coaching raised scores by an average of 0.15 standard deviations; in 24 studies on other aptitude and intelligence tests, coaching raised scores by an average of 0.43 standard deviations. Studies that used pretests reported stronger coaching effects than did studies with posttest-only designs. Other study features were not significantly related to outcomes of the coaching studies."

--- From 1984; surely there must be more recent meta-analyses?]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB standardized_testing psychology re:g_paper mental_testing education</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1bfb56b740da/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:standardized_testing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:g_paper"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mental_testing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:education"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.paullitvak.com/2018/07/04/generalizability-by-representativeness/">
    <title>Generalizability by Representativeness | Paul Litvak</title>
    <dc:date>2020-06-23T01:01:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.paullitvak.com/2018/07/04/generalizability-by-representativeness/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>psychology social_science_methodology heuristics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:041e6520ca6b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0886-x">
    <title>Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk | Nature Human Behaviour</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-20T13:02:52+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0886-x</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Prospect theory is among the most influential frameworks in behavioural science, specifically in research on decision-making under risk. Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 study tested financial choices under risk, concluding that such judgements deviate significantly from the assumptions of expected utility theory, which had remarkable impacts on science, policy and industry. Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds."

--- Well, there's a relief.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB decision-making psychology experimental_economics experimental_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c6521402f84f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psyarxiv.com/ugz7y">
    <title>PsyArXiv Preprints | Invisible Hands and Fine Calipers: A Call to Use Formal Theory as a Toolkit for Theory Construction</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-11T21:48:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psyarxiv.com/ugz7y</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In recent years, a growing chorus of researchers have argued that psychological theory is in a state of crisis: theories are rarely developed in a way that indicates an accumulation of knowledge and they are often absent from our research entirely. More than 40 years ago, Paul Meehl raised these very concerns. Yet, in the ensuing decades, little has improved. We aim to chart a better path forward for psychological theory by revisiting Meehl's criticisms, his proposed solution, and the reasons his solution failed to meaningful change the status of psychological theory. We argue that Meehl identified serious shortcomings in our evaluation of psychological theories and that his proposed solution would substantially strengthen theory testing. However, we also argue that he failed to provide researchers a set of tools for theory construction. To advance psychological theory, we must equip researchers with tools to better generate, evaluate, and develop their theories. We argue that formal theories provide this much needed set of tools, equipping researchers with tools for thinking, evaluating explanation, informing theory development, strengthening measurement, and moving toward collaborative construction of psychological theories that allow us to explain, predict, and control psychological phenomena."

--- Curious to see exactly what they mean by "formal theory".]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_science_methodology psychology to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:cd5ce2f9f77a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psyarxiv.com/dqmju">
    <title>PsyArXiv Preprints | The Sisyphean Cycle of Technology Panics</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-03T16:03:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psyarxiv.com/dqmju</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Widespread concerns about new technologies – whether they be novels, radios or smartphones – are repeatedly found throughout history. While past panics are often met with amusement today, current concerns routinely engender large research investments and policy debate. What we learn from studying past technological panics, however, is that these investments are often inefficient and ineffective. What causes technological panics to repeatedly reincarnate? And why does research routinely fail to address them? To answer such questions, this article examines the network of political, population and academic factors driving the Sisyphean Cycle of Technology Panics. In this cycle, psychologists are encouraged to spend time investigating new technologies, and how they affect children and young people, to calm a worried population. Their endeavour is however rendered ineffective due to a lacking theoretical baseline; researchers cannot build on what has been learnt researching past technologies of concern. Thus academic study seemingly restarts for each new technology of interest, slowing down the policy interventions necessary to ensure technologies are benefitting society. This article highlights how the Sisyphean Cycle of Technology Panics stymies psychology’s positive role in steering technological change, and highlights the pervasive need for improved research and policy approaches to new technologies."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB history_of_ideas history_of_technology psychology the_present_before_it_was_widely_distributed via:aelkus</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:eb7c36ff4a80/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_ideas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_technology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:the_present_before_it_was_widely_distributed"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:aelkus"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fapl0000476">
    <title>Meta-analytic five-factor model personality intercorrelations: Eeny, meeny, miney, moe, how, which, why, and where to go.</title>
    <dc:date>2020-04-03T02:55:31+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fapl0000476</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Meta-analysis is frequently combined with multiple regression or path analysis to examine how the Big Five/Five-Factor Model (FFM) personality traits relate to work outcomes. A common approach in such studies is to construct a synthetic correlation matrix by combining new meta-analyses of FFM–criterion correlations with previously published meta-analytic FFM intercorrelations. Many meta-analytic FFM intercorrelation matrices exist in the literature, with 3 matrices being frequently used in industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology and related fields (i.e., Mount, Barrick, Scullen, & Rounds, 2005; Ones, 1993; van der Linden, te Nijenhuis, & Bakker, 2010). However, it is unknown how the choice of FFM matrix influences study conclusions, why we observe such differences in the matrices, and which matrix researchers and practitioners should use for their specific studies. We conducted 3 studies to answer these questions. In Study 1, we demonstrate that researchers’ choice of FFM matrix can substantively alter conclusions from meta-analytic regressions or path analyses. In Study 2, we present a new meta-analysis of FFM intercorrelations using measures explicitly constructed around the FFM and based on employee samples. In Study 3, we systematically explore the sources of differences in FFM intercorrelations using second-order meta-analyses of 44 meta-analytic FFM matrices. We find that personality rating source (self vs. other) and inventory-specific substantive and methodological features are the primary moderators of meta-analytic FFM intercorrelations. Based on the findings from these studies, we provide a framework to guide future researchers in choosing a meta-analytic FFM matrix that is most appropriate for their specific studies, research questions, and contexts."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB factor_analysis psychology meta-analysis</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:7ba08b74cf67/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:factor_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:meta-analysis"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psyarxiv.com/hs7wm/">
    <title>PsyArXiv Preprints | Measurement Schmeasurement: Questionable Measurement Practices and How to Avoid Them</title>
    <dc:date>2020-01-30T23:46:31+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psyarxiv.com/hs7wm/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this paper we define questionable measurement practices (QMPs) as undisclosed decisions researchers make that leave questions about the measurements in a study unanswered. This makes it impossible to evaluate a wide range of potential validity threats to the conclusions of a study. We demonstrate that psychology is plagued by a measurement schmeasurement attitude: QMPs are common, hide a stunning source of researcher degrees of freedom, pose a serious threat to cumulative psychological science, but are largely ignored. We address these challenges by providing a set of questions that researchers and consumers of scientific research can consider to identify and avoid QMPs. Transparent answers to these measurement questions promote rigorous research, allow for thorough evaluations of a study’s inferences, and are necessary for meaningful replication studies."]]></description>
<dc:subject>psychology psychometrics measurement social_measurement to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e95ed22c38e0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychometrics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:measurement"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_measurement"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://theconversation.com/its-time-to-end-the-debate-about-video-games-and-violence-91607">
    <title>It's time to end the debate about video games and violence</title>
    <dc:date>2020-01-26T16:35:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://theconversation.com/its-time-to-end-the-debate-about-video-games-and-violence-91607</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>video_games bad_science psychology moral_panics have_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e837a30b662a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:video_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bad_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_panics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01573.x">
    <title>Reasoning From Unfamiliar Premises: A Study With Unschooled Adults - Maria Dias, Antonio Roazzi, Paul L. Harris, 2005</title>
    <dc:date>2020-01-26T01:41:38+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01573.x</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A long tradition of research initiated by Luria in the 1930s has established that unschooled adults perform poorly on reasoning tasks. Particularly when the premises are unfamiliar, they adopt an inappropriate empirical bias. However, recent findings show that young children with little or no schooling reason competently if prompted to think of the unfamiliar premises as pertaining to a distant planet. We tested two groups of adults: illiterate, unschooled adults and adults with limited schooling. Both groups received problems that included either a premise with unknown content or a premise contradicting their everyday experience. When given a minimal prompt, both groups manifested the customary empirical bias. By contrast, when explicitly prompted to think of the unfamiliar premises as pertaining to a distant planet, they reasoned accurately and appropriately justified their conclusions in terms of the supplied premises."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology cognitive_science luria.a.r.</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6daaebdd680a/</dc:identifier>
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