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    <description>recent bookmarks from cshalizi</description>
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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20240763">
    <title>Games on Multiplex Networks - American Economic Association</title>
    <dc:date>2026-03-31T18:08:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20240763</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We develop a simple multilayer network model in which agents allocate effort across layers with heterogeneous structures, subject to an aggregate effort constraint. Incentives are shaped by agents' network positions within each layer, and equilibrium behavior reflects both within- and cross-layer interactions. We analyze how shocks propagate through the network and characterize optimal targeting interventions. Our results show that effective policy design must account for effort allocation across layers. We also demonstrate that predictions from monolayer models can diverge sharply from those of multilayer models, underscoring the importance of accounting for network complexity in both empirical and policy analyses."]]></description>
<dc:subject>in_NB game_theory social_networks</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2be7c9d94d49/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10434631241298072">
    <title>Cooperation through rational investments in social organization - Anna Sokolova, Vincent Buskens, Werner Raub, 2025</title>
    <dc:date>2025-04-22T15:07:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10434631241298072</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Repeated interactions and contractual agreements are examples of different ways of organizing interactions in social and economic life and can foster cooperation in social dilemmas. Thus, when involved in social dilemmas, actors have incentives to form long-term relations with repeated interactions or to enter into contractual agreements. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the effects of repeated interactions and contractual agreements as well as their endogenous emergence. In line with earlier evidence, both ways of organizing interactions are found to foster cooperation. Our key contribution is twofold. First, with respect to theory, we derive conditions for investments in social organization. Second, empirically, we find that such investments are more likely when the costs are below a threshold that follows from a parsimonious game-theoretic model assuming equilibrium behavior, self-regarding preferences, and complete information. We find less experimental support for two additional conjectures on investments that are based on reasoning more in line with behavioral game theory."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB institutions evolution_of_cooperation game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:214cd70dbf82/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.19824">
    <title>[2406.19824] Learning to Mitigate Externalities: the Coase Theorem with Hindsight Rationality</title>
    <dc:date>2024-12-09T21:39:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.19824</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In economic theory, the concept of externality refers to any indirect effect resulting from an interaction between players that affects the social welfare. Most of the models within which externality has been studied assume that agents have perfect knowledge of their environment and preferences. This is a major hindrance to the practical implementation of many proposed solutions. To address this issue, we consider a two-player bandit setting where the actions of one of the players affect the other player and we extend the Coase theorem [Coase, 1960]. This result shows that the optimal approach for maximizing the social welfare in the presence of externality is to establish property rights, i.e., enable transfers and bargaining between the players. Our work removes the classical assumption that bargainers possess perfect knowledge of the underlying game. We first demonstrate that in the absence of property rights, the social welfare breaks down. We then design a policy for the players which allows them to learn a bargaining strategy which maximizes the total welfare, recovering the Coase theorem under uncertainty."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics game_theory coase_theorem learning_in_games jordan.michael_i. moulines.eric</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:40778a6e0a9d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:coase_theorem"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:jordan.michael_i."/>
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<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.14483">
    <title>[2401.14483] Four Facets of Forecast Felicity: Calibration, Predictiveness, Randomness and Regret</title>
    <dc:date>2024-09-17T17:59:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.14483</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Machine learning is about forecasting. Forecasts, however, obtain their usefulness only through their evaluation. Machine learning has traditionally focused on types of losses and their corresponding regret. Currently, the machine learning community regained interest in calibration. In this work, we show the conceptual equivalence of calibration and regret in evaluating forecasts. We frame the evaluation problem as a game between a forecaster, a gambler and nature. Putting intuitive restrictions on gambler and forecaster, calibration and regret naturally fall out of the framework. In addition, this game links evaluation of forecasts to randomness of outcomes. Random outcomes with respect to forecasts are equivalent to good forecasts with respect to outcomes. We call those dual aspects, calibration and regret, predictiveness and randomness, the four facets of forecast felicity."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read prediction game_theory learning_theory low-regret_learning calibration</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:fca0556a77fc/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:prediction"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.13102">
    <title>[2206.13102] Modeling Content Creator Incentives on Algorithm-Curated Platforms</title>
    <dc:date>2023-03-22T02:57:24+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.13102</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Content creators compete for user attention. Their reach crucially depends on algorithmic choices made by developers on online platforms. To maximize exposure, many creators adapt strategically, as evidenced by examples like the sprawling search engine optimization industry. This begets competition for the finite user attention pool. We formalize these dynamics in what we call an exposure game, a model of incentives induced by algorithms including modern factorization and (deep) two-tower architectures. We prove that seemingly innocuous algorithmic choices -- e.g., non-negative vs. unconstrained factorization -- significantly affect the existence and character of (Nash) equilibria in exposure games. We proffer use of creator behavior models like ours for an (ex-ante) pre-deployment audit. Such an audit can identify misalignment between desirable and incentivized content, and thus complement post-hoc measures like content filtering and moderation. To this end, we propose tools for numerically finding equilibria in exposure games, and illustrate results of an audit on the MovieLens and LastFM datasets. Among else, we find that the strategically produced content exhibits strong dependence between algorithmic exploration and content diversity, and between model expressivity and bias towards gender-based user and creator groups."]]></description>
<dc:subject>game_theory recommender_systems re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator jordan.michael_i. to_teach:data-mining social_media networked_life philip_k_dick_and_the_fake_humans_rules_everything_around_me in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:73a5583bf609/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:networked_life"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10458-021-09502-0">
    <title>The effect of strategic noise in linear regression | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2021-10-18T14:33:23+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10458-021-09502-0</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We build on an emerging line of work which studies strategic manipulations in training data provided to machine learning algorithms. Specifically, we focus on the ubiquitous task of linear regression. Prior work focused on the design of strategyproof algorithms, which aim to prevent such manipulations altogether by aligning the incentives of data sources. However, algorithms used in practice are often not strategyproof, which induces a strategic game among the agents. We focus on a broad class of non-strategyproof algorithms for linear regression, namely ℓ𝑝ℓp norm minimization (𝑝>1p>1) with convex regularization. We show that when manipulations are bounded, every algorithm in this class admits a unique pure Nash equilibrium outcome. We also shed light on the structure of this equilibrium by uncovering a surprising connection between strategyproof algorithms and pure Nash equilibria of non-strategyproof algorithms in a broader setting, which may be of independent interest. Finally, we analyze the quality of equilibria under these algorithms in terms of the price of anarchy."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB linear_regression game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4b1c4d6354dd/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:linear_regression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.06185">
    <title>[2004.06185] Correlated equilibria and mean field games: a simple model</title>
    <dc:date>2021-07-12T14:49:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.06185</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In the context of simple finite-state discrete time systems, we introduce a generalization of mean field game solution, called correlated solution, which can be seen as the mean field game analogue of a correlated equilibrium. Our notion of solution is justified in two ways: We prove that correlated solutions arise as limits of exchangeable correlated equilibria in restricted (Markov open-loop) strategies for the underlying N-player games, and we show how to construct approximate N-player correlated equilibria starting from a correlated solution to the mean field game."]]></description>
<dc:subject>game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve in_NB mean-field_games</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:cdfbfedcd0e8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mean-field_games"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.08892">
    <title>[2105.08892] A Phase Transition in Large Network Games</title>
    <dc:date>2021-05-20T14:06:23+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.08892</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this paper, we use a model of large random network game where the agents plays selfishly and are affected by their neighbors, to explore the conditions under which the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game is affected by a perturbation in the network. We use a phase transition phenomenon observed in finite rank deformations of large random matrices, to study how the NE changes on crossing critical threshold points. Our main contribution is as follows: when the perturbation strength is greater than a critical point, it impacts the NE of the game, whereas when this perturbation is below this critical point, the NE remains independent of the perturbation parameter. This demonstrates a phase transition in NE which alludes that perturbations can affect the behavior of the society only if their strength is above a critical threshold. We provide numerical examples for this result and present scenarios under which this phenomenon could potentially occur in real world applications."

--- If equilibria really are unchanged by sufficiently small perturbations, one should be able to partition network space into equivalence classes of networks with the same equilibria, and forget about the details of the network structure, which would be very convenient.  But it seems too good to be true.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory networks phase_transitions re:do-institutions-evolve color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:767bb83ef51e/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:phase_transitions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-control-072020-084434">
    <title>Analysis and Interventions in Large Network Games | Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems</title>
    <dc:date>2021-05-06T13:49:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-control-072020-084434</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We review classic results and recent progress on equilibrium analysis, dynamics, and optimal interventions in network games with both continuous and discrete strategy sets. We study strategic interactions in deterministic networks as well as networks generated from a stochastic network formation model. For the former case, we review a unifying framework for analysis based on the theory of variational inequalities. For the latter case, we highlight how knowledge of the stochastic network formation model can be used by a central planner to design interventions for large networks in a computationally efficient manner when exact network data are not available."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB dynamical_systems networks control_theory_and_control_engineering game_theory re:in_soviet_union_optimization_problem_solves_you</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4256d40d9911/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:dynamical_systems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:control_theory_and_control_engineering"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:in_soviet_union_optimization_problem_solves_you"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/88/1/287/5889965">
    <title>Theory of Strategic Uncertainty and Cultural Diversity | The Review of Economic Studies | Oxford Academic</title>
    <dc:date>2021-02-14T05:33:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://academic.oup.com/restud/article-abstract/88/1/287/5889965</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We identify a new mechanism through which cultural diversity affects economic outcomes, based on a model of culture as shared cognition. Under this view, cultural diversity matters because it increases strategic uncertainty. The model can help better understand a variety of disparate evidence, including why homogeneous societies can be more conformist, why diverse societies may get stuck in a low-trust trap, why companies with a strong culture may fail to adopt superior work practices, and why autocratic rulers in diverse societies may overinvest in state capacity."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory cultural_differences learning_in_games kets.willemien</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e4501d6436e7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_differences"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kets.willemien"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.01587">
    <title>[2102.01587] Games on Endogenous Networks</title>
    <dc:date>2021-02-05T20:07:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.01587</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study network games in which players both create spillovers for one another and choose with whom to associate. The endogenous outcomes include both the strategic actions (e.g., effort levels) and the network in which spillovers occur. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts that extend standard approaches -- Nash equilibrium in actions and pairwise (Nash) stability in links. Our main results show that under suitable monotonicity assumptions on incentives, stable networks take simple forms. Our central conditions concern whether actions and links are strategic complements or substitutes, as well as whether links create positive or negative payoff spillovers. We apply our model to understand the consequences of competition for status, to microfound matching models that assume clique formation, and to interpret empirical findings that highlight unintended consequences of group design."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_networks game_theory golub.benjamin</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:29818a0ccbb2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:golub.benjamin"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://afinetheorem.wordpress.com/2020/10/12/operations-research-and-the-rise-of-applied-game-theory-a-nobel-for-milgrom-and-wilson/">
    <title>Operations Research and the Rise of Applied Game Theory – A Nobel for Milgrom and Wilson | A Fine Theorem</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-22T20:51:57+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://afinetheorem.wordpress.com/2020/10/12/operations-research-and-the-rise-of-applied-game-theory-a-nobel-for-milgrom-and-wilson/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>economics game_theory mechanism_design institutions history_of_ideas science_criticism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:96886c6ae85b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mechanism_design"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_ideas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:science_criticism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.06203">
    <title>[2012.06203] Selfish Creation of Social Networks</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-15T15:05:09+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.06203</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Understanding real-world networks has been a core research endeavor throughout the last two decades. Network Creation Games are a promising approach for this from a game-theoretic perspective. In these games, selfish agents corresponding to nodes in a network strategically decide which links to form to optimize their centrality. Many versions have been introduced and analyzed, but none of them fits to modeling the evolution of social networks. In real-world social networks, connections are often established by recommendations from common acquaintances or by a chain of such recommendations. Thus establishing and maintaining a contact with a friend of a friend is easier than connecting to complete strangers. This explains the high clustering, i.e., the abundance of triangles, in real-world social networks.
"We propose and analyze a network creation model inspired by real-world social networks. Edges are formed in our model via bilateral consent of both endpoints and the cost for establishing and maintaining an edge is proportional to the distance of the endpoints before establishing the connection. We provide results for generic cost functions, which essentially only must be convex functions in the distance of the endpoints without the respective edge. For this broad class of cost functions, we provide many structural properties of equilibrium networks and prove (almost) tight bounds on the diameter, the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability. Moreover, as a proof-of-concept we show via experiments that the created equilibrium networks of our model indeed closely mimics real-world social networks. We observe degree distributions that seem to follow a power-law, high clustering, and low diameters. This can be seen as a promising first step towards game-theoretic network creation models that predict networks featuring all core real-world properties."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_networks game_theory network_formation network_data_analysis to_teach:baby-nets to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:842aaa4a9708/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:network_formation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:network_data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:baby-nets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20200068">
    <title>A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information - American Economic Association</title>
    <dc:date>2020-11-30T16:05:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20200068</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study anonymous repeated games where players may be "commitment types" who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a "pairwise dominant" action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b152fdc84e2c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691190716/the-master-equation-and-the-convergence-problem-in-mean-field-games">
    <title>The Master Equation and the Convergence Problem in Mean Field Games | Princeton University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2020-01-31T00:27:00+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691190716/the-master-equation-and-the-convergence-problem-in-mean-field-games</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Full text through the library: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvckq7qf

--- ETA: I bounced off this so hard it's not even funny.]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted re:do-institutions-evolve game_theory mathematics in_NB downloaded mean-field_games</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:441eec6a378f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mathematics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mean-field_games"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.11693">
    <title>[1910.11693] Building social networks under consent: A survey</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-29T14:22:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.11693</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This survey explores the literature on game-theoretic models of network formation under the hypothesis of mutual consent in link formation. The introduction of consent in link formation imposes a coordination problem in the network formation process. This survey explores the conclusions from this theory and the various methodologies to avoid the main pitfalls. The main insight originates from Myerson's work on mutual consent in link formation and his main conclusion that the empty network (the network without any links) always emerges as a strong Nash equilibrium in any game-theoretic model of network formation under mutual consent and positive link formation costs. Jackson and Wolinsky introduced a cooperative framework to avoid this main pitfall. They devised the notion of a pairwise stable network to arrive at equilibrium networks that are mainly non-trivial. Unfortunately, this notion of pairwise stability requires coordinated action by pairs of decision makers in link formation. I survey the possible solutions in a purely non-cooperative framework of network formation under mutual consent by exploring potential refinements of the standard Nash equilibrium concept to explain the emergence of non-trivial networks. This includes the notions of unilateral and monadic stability. The first one is founded on advanced rational reasoning of individuals about how others would respond to one's efforts to modify the network. The latter incorporates trusting, boundedly rational behaviour into the network formation process. The survey is concluded with an initial exploration of external correlation devices as an alternative framework to address mutual consent in network formation."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_networks game_theory problems_economists_create_for_themselves</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:14169efa1f4f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:problems_economists_create_for_themselves"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1043463119872566">
    <title>Strategic tie formation for long-term exchange relations - Werner Raub, Vincent Buskens, Vincenz Frey,</title>
    <dc:date>2019-09-26T17:21:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1043463119872566</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce and analyze a new game-theoretic model that captures the well-known effects of repeated interactions, while simultaneously endogenizing the formation of long-term relations. We assume strict game-theoretic rationality as well as self-regarding preferences. We highlight the commitment feature of tie formation: through establishing a long-term relation, at cost, actors ensure that they would suffer themselves from future sanctions of own opportunism. This allows for mutually beneficial cooperation in the first place. Some extensions of the model are discussed."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_networks game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:03a12b2ab575/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.09021">
    <title>[1908.09021] The Path to Nash Equilibrium</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-27T15:07:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.09021</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["It has been proved that every non-cooperative game has a Nash equilibrium point. Although many existing algorithms are capable of finding equilibrium points, it is still unclear what force is driving the players to them in the real world. We show that, the players' immediately and constantly pursuing profitable strategies is sufficient for the game to evolve towards equilibrium point, and meanwhile the game needs minimum information exchange among players and no mediation from beyond players. Accordingly, we suggest that in reality the tendency towards Nash equilibrium could be more pervasive and irresistible than expected. Technically, the players' pursuit of profitable strategies gives rise to a sequence of adjusted strategies for our study its approximation to the true equilibrium point.And the sequence can be nicely visualized as a clear path towards an equilibrium point. Our theory has the limitation in optimizing the accuracy of equilibrium point approximation."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory learning_in_games economics re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2622ccfdbda0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-58920-6#about">
    <title>Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2019-01-06T17:43:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-58920-6#about</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This two-volume book offers a comprehensive treatment of the probabilistic approach to mean field game models and their applications. The book is self-contained in nature and includes original material and applications with explicit examples throughout, including numerical solutions.
"Volume I of the book is entirely devoted to the theory of mean field games without a common noise. The first half of the volume provides a self-contained introduction to mean field games, starting from concrete illustrations of games with a finite number of players, and ending with ready-for-use solvability results. Readers are provided with the tools necessary for the solution of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of the McKean-Vlasov type at the core of the probabilistic approach. The second half of this volume focuses on the main principles of analysis on the Wasserstein space. It includes Lions' approach to the Wasserstein differential calculus, and the applications of its results to the analysis of stochastic mean field control problems. 
"Together, both Volume I and Volume II will greatly benefit mathematical graduate students and researchers interested in mean field games. The authors provide a detailed road map through the book allowing different access points for different readers and building up the level of technical detail. The accessible approach and overview will allow interested researchers in the applied sciences to obtain a clear overview of the state of the art in mean field games."]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted downloaded game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve stochastic_processes in_NB mean-field_games</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:485877fd6868/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mean-field_games"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/twenty-lectures-on-algorithmic-game-theory/A9D9427C8F43E7DAEF8C702755B6D72B#fndtn-information">
    <title>Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory by Tim Roughgarden</title>
    <dc:date>2019-01-06T01:39:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/twenty-lectures-on-algorithmic-game-theory/A9D9427C8F43E7DAEF8C702755B6D72B#fndtn-information</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted downloaded game_theory theoretical_computer_science re:in_soviet_union_optimization_problem_solves_you</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:7e89bdfde9b0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:theoretical_computer_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:in_soviet_union_optimization_problem_solves_you"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20160980">
    <title>On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey</title>
    <dc:date>2018-03-13T18:39:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20160980</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature's findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory economics experimental_economics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e4d6da7f95d3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://voxeu.org/article/new-paradigm-introductory-course-economics">
    <title>A new paradigm for the introductory course in economics | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal</title>
    <dc:date>2017-09-08T13:48:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://voxeu.org/article/new-paradigm-introductory-course-economics</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Our intro courses fail to reflect the dramatic advances in economics – concerning information problems and strategic interactions, for example – since Samuelson’s paradigm-setting 1948 textbook. Missing, too, is any sustained engagement with new problems we now confront and on which economics has important insights for public policy – climate change, innovation, instability and growing inequality amongst them. This column introduces a free online interactive text – now used as the standard intro at UCL, Sciences Po, and Toulouse School of Economics – which responds."]]></description>
<dc:subject>economics market_failures_in_everything markets_as_collective_calculating_devices kith_and_kin bowles.samuel have_read via:? game_theory behavioral_economics inequality</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:664d86528602/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:market_failures_in_everything"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:markets_as_collective_calculating_devices"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bowles.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:?"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:behavioral_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inequality"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1198/jasa.2009.0155">
    <title>Adversarial Risk Analysis: Journal of the American Statistical Association: Vol 104, No 486</title>
    <dc:date>2017-08-07T22:37:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1198/jasa.2009.0155</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Applications in counterterrorism and corporate competition have led to the development of new methods for the analysis of decision making when there are intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. This field represents a combination of statistical risk analysis and game theory, and is sometimes called adversarial risk analysis. In this article, we describe several formulations of adversarial risk problems, and provide a framework that extends traditional risk analysis tools, such as influence diagrams and probabilistic reasoning, to adversarial problems. We also discuss the research challenges that arise when dealing with these models, illustrate the ideas with examples from business, and point out relevance to national defense."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read risk_assessment risk_vs_uncertainty statistics game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6d7f49205109/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:risk_assessment"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:risk_vs_uncertainty"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo3639393.html">
    <title>Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism, Amadae</title>
    <dc:date>2017-07-10T07:12:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/R/bo3639393.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy, S. M. Amadae tells the remarkable story of how rational choice theory rose from obscurity to become the intellectual bulwark of capitalist democracy. Amadae roots Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy in the turbulent post-World War II era, showing how rational choice theory grew out of the RAND Corporation's efforts to develop a "science" of military and policy decisionmaking. But while the first generation of rational choice theorists—William Riker, Kenneth Arrow, and James Buchanan—were committed to constructing a "scientific" approach to social science research, they were also deeply committed to defending American democracy from its Marxist critics. Amadae reveals not only how the ideological battles of the Cold War shaped their ideas but also how those ideas may today be undermining the very notion of individual liberty they were created to defend."]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted to:NB history_of_science history_of_ideas political_philosophy economics political_economy cold_war game_theory decision_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d9cfdc5b10a0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_ideas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_economy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cold_war"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.probabilityandfinance.com/articles/49.pdf">
    <title>Game-Theoretic Significance Testing</title>
    <dc:date>2017-06-23T17:00:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.probabilityandfinance.com/articles/49.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Glenn Shafer, so who knows?]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB probability statistics hypothesis_testing game_theory shafer.glenn color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ce4a48709716/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:probability"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:hypothesis_testing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:shafer.glenn"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/113/49/13995.abstract">
    <title>Preferential interactions promote blind cooperation and informed defection</title>
    <dc:date>2016-12-07T14:09:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/113/49/13995.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["It is common sense that costs and benefits should be carefully weighed before deciding on a course of action. However, we often disapprove of people who do so, even when their actual decision benefits us. For example, we prefer people who directly agree to do us a favor over those who agree only after securing enough information to ensure that the favor will not be too costly. Why should we care about how people make their decisions, rather than just focus on the decisions themselves? Current models show that punishment of information gathering can be beneficial because it forces blind decisions, which under some circumstances enhances cooperation. Here we show that aversion to information gathering can be beneficial even in the absence of punishment, due to a different mechanism: preferential interactions with reliable partners. In a diverse population where different people have different—and unknown—preferences, those who seek additional information before agreeing to cooperate reveal that their preferences are close to the point where they would choose not to cooperate. Blind cooperators are therefore more likely to keep cooperating even if conditions change, and aversion to information gathering helps to interact preferentially with them. Conversely, blind defectors are more likely to keep defecting in the future, leading to a preference for informed defectors over blind ones. Both mechanisms—punishment to force blind decisions and preferential interactions—give qualitatively different predictions, which may enable experimental tests to disentangle them in real-world situations."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:600d570dea85/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/content/seizing-power">
    <title>Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups</title>
    <dc:date>2016-12-06T16:24:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://jhupbooks.press.jhu.edu/content/seizing-power</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["While coups drive a majority of regime changes and are responsible for the overthrow of many democratic governments, there has been very little empirical work on the subject. Seizing Power develops a new theory of coup dynamics and outcomes, drawing on 300 hours of interviews with coup participants and an original dataset of 471 coup attempts worldwide from 1950 to 2000. Naunihal Singh delivers a concise and empirical evaluation, arguing that understanding the dynamics of military factions is essential to predicting the success or failure of coups.
"Singh draws on an aspect of game theory known as a coordination game to explain coup dynamics. He finds a strong correlation between successful coups and the ability of military actors to project control and the inevitability of success. Examining Ghana’s multiple coups and the 1991 coup attempt in the USSR, Singh shows how military actors project an image of impending victory that is often more powerful than the reality on the ground.
"In addition, Singh also identifies three distinct types of coup dynamics, each with a different probability of success, based on where within the organization each coup originated: coups from top military officers, coups from the middle ranks, and mutinous coups from low-level soldiers."

--- Wonder how much this advances over the old Luttwak book...]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted political_science coup_d'etat game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:815881f3fbf9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:coup_d'etat"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/113/46/12985.abstract">
    <title>Networks of conforming or nonconforming individuals tend to reach satisfactory decisions</title>
    <dc:date>2016-11-18T03:19:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/113/46/12985.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Binary decisions of agents coupled in networks can often be classified into two types: “coordination,” where an agent takes an action if enough neighbors are using that action, as in the spread of social norms, innovations, and viral epidemics, and “anticoordination,” where too many neighbors taking a particular action causes an agent to take the opposite action, as in traffic congestion, crowd dispersion, and division of labor. Both of these cases can be modeled using linear-threshold–based dynamics, and a fundamental question is whether the individuals in such networks are likely to reach decisions with which they are satisfied. We show that, in the coordination case, and perhaps more surprisingly, also in the anticoordination case, the agents will indeed always tend to reach satisfactory decisions, that is, the network will almost surely reach an equilibrium state. This holds for every network topology and every distribution of thresholds, for both asynchronous and partially synchronous decision-making updates. These results reveal that irregular network topology, population heterogeneity, and partial synchrony are not sufficient to cause cycles or nonconvergence in linear-threshold dynamics; rather, other factors such as imitation or the coexistence of coordinating and anticoordinating agents must play a role."]]></description>
<dc:subject>networks game_theory information_cascades re:democratic_cognition to_teach:baby-nets in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:daebf1b93689/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:information_cascades"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:baby-nets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/113/43/12099.abstract">
    <title>Expert Game experiment predicts emergence of trust in professional communication networks</title>
    <dc:date>2016-11-18T03:14:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/113/43/12099.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Strong social capital is increasingly recognized as an organizational advantage. Better knowledge sharing and reduced transaction costs increase work efficiency. To mimic the formation of the associated communication network, we propose the Expert Game, where each individual must find a specific expert and receive her help. Participants act in an impersonal environment and under time constraints that provide short-term incentives for noncooperative behavior. Despite these constraints, we observe cooperation between individuals and the self-organization of a sustained trust network, which facilitates efficient communication channels with increased information flow. We build a behavioral model that explains the experimental dynamics. Analysis of the model reveals an exploitation protection mechanism and measurable social capital, which quantitatively describe the economic utility of trust."]]></description>
<dc:subject>game_theory re:democratic_cognition in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:906c814cf449/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-015-9527-7">
    <title>Good manners: signaling social preferences - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-31T14:25:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-015-9527-7</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Certain messages, even when not directly payoff relevant, can be a credible form of communication in light of natural social preferences. Social image concerns and other-regarding preferences interact to create incentives to communicate about how one feels about other people. Recognizing the prevalence of the incentive to communicate about one’s social preferences suggests that many social and economic phenomena—from norms of etiquette to cooperation to gift exchange—should be seen, in part, as forms of signaling. These behaviors may be surprisingly robust to material costs, yet sensitive to context."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB etiquette game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c3e307d8356d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:etiquette"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10739.html">
    <title>Schecter, S. and Gintis, H.: Game Theory in Action: An Introduction to Classical and Evolutionary Models. (eBook, Paperback and Hardcover)</title>
    <dc:date>2016-04-15T14:53:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10739.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Game Theory in Action is a textbook about using game theory across a range of real-life scenarios. From traffic accidents to the sex lives of lizards, Stephen Schecter and Herbert Gintis show students how game theory can be applied in diverse areas including animal behavior, political science, and economics.
"The book's examples and problems look at such fascinating topics as crime-control strategies, climate-change negotiations, and the power of the Oracle at Delphi. The text includes a substantial treatment of evolutionary game theory, where strategies are not chosen through rational analysis, but emerge by virtue of being successful. This is the side of game theory that is most relevant to biology; it also helps to explain how human societies evolve.
"Aimed at students who have studied basic calculus and some differential equations, Game Theory in Action is the perfect way to learn the concepts and practical tools of game theory."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted game_theory evolutionary_game_theory gintis.herbert kith_and_kin</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:beee29a46778/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo16160491">
    <title>How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind: The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality, Erickson, Klein, Daston</title>
    <dc:date>2015-12-28T01:15:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/H/bo16160491</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In the United States at the height of the Cold War, roughly between the end of World War II and the early 1980s, a new project of redefining rationality commanded the attention of sharp minds, powerful politicians, wealthy foundations, and top military brass. Its home was the human sciences—psychology, sociology, political science, and economics, among others—and its participants enlisted in an intellectual campaign to figure out what rationality should mean and how it could be deployed.
"How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind brings to life the people—Herbert Simon, Oskar Morgenstern, Herman Kahn, Anatol Rapoport, Thomas Schelling, and many others—and places, including the RAND Corporation, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the Cowles Commission for Research and Economics, and the Council on Foreign Relations, that played a key role in putting forth a “Cold War rationality.” Decision makers harnessed this picture of rationality—optimizing, formal, algorithmic, and mechanical—in their quest to understand phenomena as diverse as economic transactions, biological evolution, political elections, international relations, and military strategy. The authors chronicle and illuminate what it meant to be rational in the age of nuclear brinkmanship."]]></description>
<dc:subject>in_NB books:noted economics game_theory rationality social_science_methodology history_of_science cold_war books:owned</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:70cf7eb0325d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cold_war"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:owned"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.15000024">
    <title>AEAweb: AER (105,6) p. 1665 - Market Failures and Public Policy</title>
    <dc:date>2015-06-05T16:31:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.15000024</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Tirole's Nobel speech, tidied up.]]></description>
<dc:subject>have_skimmed economics economic_policy game_theory industrial_organization market_failures_in_everything in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f9e93106d7de/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_skimmed"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economic_policy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:industrial_organization"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:market_failures_in_everything"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.51.1.5">
    <title>AEAweb: JEL (51,1) p. 5 - Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications</title>
    <dc:date>2015-05-31T23:49:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.51.1.5</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that people's initial responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that structural nonequilibrium "level-k" or "cognitive hierarchy" models often out-predict equilibrium. Even when learning is possible and converges to equilibrium, such models allow better predictions of history-dependent limiting outcomes. This paper surveys recent theory and evidence on strategic thinking and illustrates the applications of level-k models in economics. "]]></description>
<dc:subject>economics game_theory decision-making non-equilibrium learning_in_games via:rvenkat re:do-institutions-evolve in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:cf01c0c794cf/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:non-equilibrium"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:rvenkat"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.02315">
    <title>[1501.02315] Statistical inference of long-term causal effects in multiagent systems under the Neyman-Rubin model</title>
    <dc:date>2015-01-19T15:18:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.02315</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Estimation of causal effects of interventions in dynamical systems of interacting agents is under-developed. In this paper, we explore the intricacies of this problem through standard approaches, and demonstrate the need for more appropriate methods. Working under the Neyman-Rubin causal model, we proceed to develop a causal inference method and we explicate the stability assumptions that are necessary for valid causal inference. Our method consists of a behavioral component that models the evolution of agent behaviors over time and informs on the long-term distribution of agent behaviors in the system, and a game-theoretic component that models the observed distribution of agent actions conditional on adopted behaviors. This allows the imputation of long-term estimates of quantities of interest, and thus the estimation of long-term causal effects of interventions. We demonstrate our method on a dataset from behavioral game theory, and discuss open problems to stimulate future research."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB causal_inference game_theory statistics color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dfff9b454b14/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:causal_inference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.11.3737">
    <title>AER (104,11) p. 3737 - The Power of Communication</title>
    <dc:date>2014-10-27T19:21:52+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.11.3737</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this paper, I offer two ways in which firms can collude: secret monitoring and infrequent coordination. Such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols. I make my case in the context of a repeated Cournotoligopoly with flexible production, prices that follow a Brownian motion and no monetary side payments, an environment where it has previously been argued that any collusion is impossible. Trade associations can easily facilitate collusion by mediating communication amongst firms."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics game_theory imperfect_competition seldom_meet_even_for_merriment_or_diversion_but_it_ends_in_some_conspiracy_against_the_public</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f817dce2678c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:imperfect_competition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:seldom_meet_even_for_merriment_or_diversion_but_it_ends_in_some_conspiracy_against_the_public"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10881.abstract.html">
    <title>Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T16:20:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10881.abstract.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social and technological innovations often spread through social networks as people respond to what their neighbors are doing. Previous research has identified specific network structures, such as local clustering, that promote rapid diffusion. Here we derive bounds that are independent of network structure and size, such that diffusion is fast whenever the payoff gain from the innovation is sufficiently high and the agents’ responses are sufficiently noisy. We also provide a simple method for computing an upper bound on the expected time it takes for the innovation to become established in any finite network. For example, if agents choose log-linear responses to what their neighbors are doing, it takes on average less than 80 revision periods for the innovation to diffuse widely in any network, provided that the error rate is at least 5% and the payoff gain (relative to the status quo) is at least 150%. Qualitatively similar results hold for other smoothed best-response functions and populations that experience heterogeneous payoff shocks."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB diffusion_of_innovations game_theory learning_in_games social_networks heard_the_talk young.h._peyton re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:51036f3231ef/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:diffusion_of_innovations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heard_the_talk"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:young.h._peyton"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10889.abstract.html">
    <title>Culture-dependent strategies in coordination games</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T16:17:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10889.abstract.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We examine different populations’ play in coordination games in online experiments with over 1,000 study participants. Study participants played a two-player coordination game that had multiple equilibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff. Study participants were predominantly from India and the United States. Study participants residing in India played the strategies leading to asymmetric payoffs significantly more frequently than study participants residing in the United States who showed a greater play of the strategy leading to the symmetric payoffs. In addition, when prompted to play asymmetrically, the population from India responded even more significantly than those from the United States. Overall, study participants’ predictions of how others would play were more accurate when the other player was from their own populations, and they coordinated significantly more frequently and earned significantly higher payoffs when matched with other study participants from their own population than when matched across populations."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_economics institutions game_theory evolution_of_cooperation cultural_differences re:do-institutions-evolve jackson.matthew_o. to_read homophily</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:7f84dd5ddf85/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_differences"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:jackson.matthew_o."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:homophily"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10826.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T15:03:39+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10826.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We examine the long-term implication of two models of learning with recency bias: recursive weights and limited memory. We show that both models generate similar beliefs and that both have a weighted universal consistency property. Using the limited-memory model we produce learning procedures that both are weighted universally consistent and converge with probability one to strict Nash equilibrium."]]></description>
<dc:subject>learning_in_games game_theory bounded_rationality non-stationarity re:growing_ensemble_project in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d9520c5d957d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bounded_rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:non-stationarity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:growing_ensemble_project"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ARTL_a_00126#.UzbMAdx_Tuc">
    <title>Institutions and Cooperation in an Ecology of Games</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-29T13:37:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ARTL_a_00126#.UzbMAdx_Tuc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social dilemmas have long been studied formally as cooperation games that pit individual gains against those of the group. In the real world, individuals face an ecology of games where they play many such games simultaneously, often with overlapping co-players. Here, we study an agent-based model of an ecology of public goods games and compare the effectiveness of two institutional mechanisms for promoting cooperation: a simple institution of limited group size (capacity constraints) and a reputational institution based on observed behavior. Reputation is shown to allow much higher relative payoffs for cooperators than do capacity constraints, but only if (1) the rate of reputational information flow is fast enough relative to the rate of social mobility, and (2) cooperators are relatively common in the population. When these conditions are not met, capacity constraints are more effective at protecting the interests of cooperators. Because of the simplicity of the limited-group-size rule, capacity constraints can also generate social organization, which promotes cooperation much more quickly than can reputation. Our results are discussed in terms of both normative prescriptions and evolutionary theory regarding institutions that regulate cooperation. More broadly, the ecology-of-games approach developed here provides an adaptable modeling framework for studying a wide variety of problems in the social sciences."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB institutions game_theory evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:91b946886f59/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://web.eecs.umich.edu/srg/?page_id=1522">
    <title>Bootstrap statistics for empirical games : Strategic Reasoning Group</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-13T15:35:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://web.eecs.umich.edu/srg/?page_id=1522</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Researchers often use normal-form games to model multi-agent interactions. When a game model is based on observational or simulated data about agent payoffs, we call it an empirical game. The payoff matrix of an empirical game can be analyzed like any normal-form game, for example, by identifying Nash equilibria or instances of other solution concepts. Given the game model’s basis in sampled data, however, empirical game analysis must also consider sampling error and distributional properties of candidate solutions. Toward this end, we introduce bootstrap techniques that support statistical reasoning as part of the empirical game-theoretic analysis process. First, we show how the bootstrap can be applied to compute confidence bounds on the regret of reported approximate equilibria. Second, we experimentally demonstrate that applying bootstrapped regret confidence intervals can improve sampling decisions in simulation-based game modeling."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read bootstrap game_theory experimental_economics wellman.michael economics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8a51dcc6c7d8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bootstrap"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:wellman.michael"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://sup.org/book.cgi?id=16730">
    <title>Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-05T21:49:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://sup.org/book.cgi?id=16730</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Epinets presents a new way to think about social networks, which focuses on the knowledge that underlies our social interactions. Guiding readers through the web of beliefs that networked individuals have about each other and probing into what others think, this book illuminates the deeper character and influence of relationships among social network participants."

Drawing on artificial intelligence, the philosophy of language, and epistemic game theory, Moldoveanu and Baum formulate a lexicon and array of conceptual tools that enable readers to explain, predict, and shape the fabric and behavior of social networks. With an innovative and strategically-minded look at the assumptions that enable and clog our networks, this book lays the groundwork for a leap forward in our understanding of human relations.]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted social_networks epistemology game_theory social_influence in_NB color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:745c86e3487d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_influence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.3.898">
    <title>AER (104,3) p. 898 - Strategic Interaction and Networks</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-03T17:23:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.104.3.898</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools, and markets, the entire network determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the network amplifies agents' actions. The paper combines new tools—potential games, optimization, and spectral graph theory—to solve for all Nash and stable equilibria and applies the results to R&D, crime, and the econometrics of peer effects."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_networks social_influence economics game_theory spectral_methods to_read re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:359099adc77f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_influence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:spectral_methods"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.1869">
    <title>[1311.1869] Optimization, Learning, and Games with Predictable Sequences</title>
    <dc:date>2013-11-20T00:10:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.1869</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We provide several applications of Optimistic Mirror Descent, an online learning algorithm based on the idea of predictable sequences. First, we recover the Mirror Prox algorithm for offline optimization, prove an extension to Holder-smooth functions, and apply the results to saddle-point type problems. Next, we prove that a version of Optimistic Mirror Descent (which has a close relation to the Exponential Weights algorithm) can be used by two strongly-uncoupled players in a finite zero-sum matrix game to converge to the minimax equilibrium at the rate of O((log T)/T). This addresses a question of Daskalakis et al 2011. Further, we consider a partial information version of the problem. We then apply the results to convex programming and exhibit a simple algorithm for the approximate Max Flow problem."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB low-regret_learning game_theory learning_theory rakhlin.sasha</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:550e5787f4fa/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:low-regret_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rakhlin.sasha"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/0806.2139">
    <title>[0806.2139] Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Solution Concepts for the 21st Century</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-10T17:25:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0806.2139</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma is neither normatively nor descriptively reasonable. However, new problems arise when considering Nash equilibrium from a computer science perspective: for example, Nash equilibrium is not robust (it does not tolerate ``faulty'' or ``unexpected'' behavior), it does not deal with coalitions, it does not take computation cost into account, and it does not deal with cases where players are not aware of all aspects of the game. Solution concepts that try to address these shortcomings of Nash equilibrium are discussed."]]></description>
<dc:subject>game_theory economics computational_complexity halpern.joseph_y. theoretical_computer_science have_read in_NB re:in_soviet_union_optimization_problem_solves_you</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:62bbb9689ae1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:computational_complexity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:halpern.joseph_y."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:theoretical_computer_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:in_soviet_union_optimization_problem_solves_you"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-012-9318-3?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals.11238">
    <title>Why do groups cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks? - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2013-07-10T14:11:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-012-9318-3?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals.11238</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Previous research has discovered a curious phenomenon: groups cooperate less than individuals in a deterministic prisoner’s dilemma game, but cooperate more than individuals when uncertainty is introduced into the game. We conducted two studies to examine three possible processes that might drive groups to be more cooperative than individuals in reducing risks: group risk concern, group cooperation expectation, and pressure to conform to social norms. We found that ex post guilt aversion and ex-post blame avoidance cause group members to be more risk concerned than individuals under uncertainty. These concerns drive groups to choose the cooperation (and risk-reduction) strategy more frequently than individuals. Groups also have higher cooperation expectations for their corresponding groups than individuals have for their corresponding individuals. We found no evidence of pressure to conform to social norms driving groups to be more cooperative than individuals."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_economics experimental_psychology game_theory re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6fad2ad53d9c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://rpm47.blogspot.com/2013/07/thoughts-on-teaching-introduction-to.html">
    <title>PM's Question Time: Thoughts on Teaching Introduction to International Relations</title>
    <dc:date>2013-07-08T16:42:09+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://rpm47.blogspot.com/2013/07/thoughts-on-teaching-introduction-to.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>pedagogy education academia political_science international_relations teaching game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d620a0a2a265/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:pedagogy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:education"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:academia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:international_relations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:teaching"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://dornsife.usc.edu/weller/research/">
    <title>Research &gt; Nicholas Weller</title>
    <dc:date>2013-05-10T20:52:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://dornsife.usc.edu/weller/research/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>to:NB experimental_economics experimental_sociology game_theory decision-making collective_cognition social_networks re:do-institutions-evolve re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:90014645f79c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.51.1.5">
    <title>Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications</title>
    <dc:date>2013-03-19T16:15:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.51.1.5</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that people's initial responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that structural nonequilibrium "level-k" or "cognitive hierarchy" models often out-predict equilibrium. Even when learning is possible and converges to equilibrium, such models allow better predictions of history-dependent limiting outcomes. This paper surveys recent theory and evidence on strategic thinking and illustrates the applications of level-k models in economics."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB decision_making game_theory experimental_economics bounded_rationality re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4a976027db58/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision_making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bounded_rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.2672">
    <title>[1302.2672] Competing With Strategies</title>
    <dc:date>2013-03-06T15:30:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.2672</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study the problem of online learning with a notion of regret defined with respect to a set of strategies. We develop tools for analyzing the minimax rates and for deriving regret-minimization algorithms in this scenario. While the standard methods for minimizing the usual notion of regret fail, through our analysis we demonstrate existence of regret-minimization methods that compete with such sets of strategies as: autoregressive algorithms, strategies based on statistical models, regularized least squares, and follow the regularized leader strategies. In several cases we also derive efficient learning algorithms."]]></description>
<dc:subject>low-regret_learning game_theory rakhlin.alexander re:growing_ensemble_project in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b4230d85278b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:low-regret_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rakhlin.alexander"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:growing_ensemble_project"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/8/2763.abstract">
    <title>Players of Matching Pennies automatically imitate opponents’ gestures against strong incentives</title>
    <dc:date>2013-02-20T20:09:23+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/8/2763.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["There is a large body of evidence of apparently spontaneous mimicry in humans. This phenomenon has been described as “automatic imitation” and attributed to a mirror neuron system, but there is little direct evidence that it is involuntary rather than intentional. Cook et al. supplied the first such evidence in a unique strategic game design that gave all subjects a pecuniary incentive to avoid imitation [Cook R, Bird G, Lünser G, Huck S, Heyes C (2012) Proc Biol Sci 279(1729):780–786]. Subjects played Rock-Paper-Scissors repeatedly in matches between fixed pairs, sometimes with one and sometimes with both subjects blindfolded. The frequency of draws in the blind-blind condition was at chance, but in the blind-sighted condition it was significantly higher, suggesting automatic imitation had occurred. Automatic imitation would raise novel issues concerning how strategic interactions are modeled in game theory and social science; however, inferring automatic imitation requires significant incentives to avoid it, and subjects’ incentives were less than 3 US cents per 60-game match. We replaced Cook et al.’s Rock-Paper-Scissors with a Matching Pennies game, which allows far stronger incentives to avoid imitation for some subjects, with equally strong incentives to imitate for others. Our results are important in providing evidence of automatic imitation against significant incentives. That some of our subjects had incentives to imitate also enables us clearly to distinguish intentional responding from automatic imitation, and we find evidence that both occur. Thus, our results strongly confirm the occurrence of automatic imitation, and illuminate the way that automatic and intentional processes interact in a strategic context."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_economics experimental_psychology game_theory decision-making imitation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f0633908fe6e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:imitation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116471">
    <title>Identity, Institutions, and Uprisings by Tom Slee :: SSRN</title>
    <dc:date>2012-11-27T22:03:57+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116471</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Three related models of contentious politics in authoritarian states are presented, using the identity-driven rational choice framework of Akerlof & Kranton (2000) as a starting point.
"The first model describes the familiar cascade dynamic of uprisings, but driven by identity polarization rather than preference falsification. The second shows how screening enables some institutions act as havens for dissent, even under strong and stable authoritarian regimes. The third model links rational choice models to the “WUNC displays” of social movement theory and describes the “Dictator’s Dilemma” that uprisings may pose for authoritarian governments.
"Taken together, these models suggest that an identity-driven rational choice framework can describe a wide range of phenomena related to contentious politics in authoritarian states."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read sociology political_science revolution game_theory institutions slee.tom kith_and_kin</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:180223bba28b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:revolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:slee.tom"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://afinetheorem.wordpress.com/2012/09/25/unbeatable-imitation-p-duersch-j-oechssler-b-c-schipper-2012/">
    <title>“Unbeatable Imitation,” P. Duersch, J. Oechssler &amp; B. C. Schipper (2012) « A Fine Theorem</title>
    <dc:date>2012-09-25T14:53:37+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://afinetheorem.wordpress.com/2012/09/25/unbeatable-imitation-p-duersch-j-oechssler-b-c-schipper-2012/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Imitation" is not quite tit-for-tat in Prisoners' Dilemma...]]></description>
<dc:subject>game_theory to:NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:92eec5182568/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.26.3.157">
    <title>Groups Make Better Self-Interested Decisions</title>
    <dc:date>2012-08-06T19:03:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.26.3.157</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this paper, we describe what economists have learned about differences between group and individual decision-making. This literature is still young, and in this paper, we will mostly draw on experimental work (mainly in the laboratory) that has compared individual decision-making to group decision-making, and to individual decision-making in situations with salient group membership. The bottom line emerging from economic research on group decision-making is that groups are more likely to make choices that follow standard game-theoretic predictions, while individuals are more likely to be influenced by biases, cognitive limitations, and social considerations. In this sense, groups are generally less "behavioral" than individuals. An immediate implication of this result is that individual decisions in isolation cannot necessarily be assumed to be good predictors of the decisions made by groups. More broadly, the evidence casts doubts on traditional approaches that model economic behavior as if individuals were making decisions in isolation."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read social_life_of_the_mind collective_cognition game_theory decision-making re:democratic_cognition experimental_psychology experimental_economics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:7c47d5f3f68b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6400">
    <title>[1206.6400] Online Bandit Learning against an Adaptive Adversary: from Regret to Policy Regret</title>
    <dc:date>2012-07-09T18:12:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6400</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Online learning algorithms are designed to learn even when their input is generated by an adversary. The widely-accepted formal definition of an online algorithm's ability to learn is the game-theoretic notion of regret. We argue that the standard definition of regret becomes inadequate if the adversary is allowed to adapt to the online algorithm's actions. We define the alternative notion of policy regret, which attempts to provide a more meaningful way to measure an online algorithm's performance against adaptive adversaries. Focusing on the online bandit setting, we show that no bandit algorithm can guarantee a sublinear policy regret against an adaptive adversary with unbounded memory. On the other hand, if the adversary's memory is bounded, we present a general technique that converts any bandit algorithm with a sublinear regret bound into an algorithm with a sublinear policy regret bound. We extend this result to other variants of regret, such as switching regret, internal regret, and swap regret."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory learning_in_games bandit_problems</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ef7bbc829bf9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bandit_problems"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.3713">
    <title>[1206.3713] Learning the Structure and Parameters of Large-Population Graphical Games from Behavioral Data</title>
    <dc:date>2012-06-23T14:49:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.3713</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We formalize and study the problem of learning the structure and parameters of graphical games from strictly behavioral data. We cast the problem as a maximum likelihood estimation based on a generative model defined by the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. The formulation brings out the interplay between goodness-of-fit and model complexity: good models capture the equilibrium behavior represented in the data while controlling the true number of equilibria, including those potentially unobserved. We provide a generalization bound for maximum likelihood estimation. We discuss several optimization algorithms including convex loss minimization, sigmoidal approximations and exhaustive search. We formally prove that games in our hypothesis space have a small true number of equilibria, with high probability; thus, convex loss minimization is sound. We illustrate our approach, show and discuss promising results on synthetic data and the U.S. congressional voting records."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory statistics economics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:abe41cf69e91/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://rss.sagepub.com/content/24/2/198.abstract?etoc">
    <title>Team reasoning and group identification</title>
    <dc:date>2012-05-30T13:06:25+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://rss.sagepub.com/content/24/2/198.abstract?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The team reasoning approach explains cooperation in terms of group identification, which in turn is explicated in terms of agency transformation and payoff transformation. Empirical research in social psychology is consistent with the significance of agency and payoff transformation. However, it also reveals that group identification depends on social categorization processes to a greater extent than is currently acknowledged within the team reasoning approach. In light of this, Bacharach’s claim that group identification is prompted by a perceived conflict between individual and collective interests has to be rejected. Instead, it is triggered by the salience of a social category. Sugden’s account of the role of trust in team reasoning needs to be modified: rather than by evidence of behavior, it is induced by common knowledge of shared membership of a particular group. The upshot is that the empirical adequacy of the team reasoning approach can be substantially enhanced by incorporating the notion of category salience as a key explanatory variable."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory social_psychology social_life_of_the_mind</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:09237385863a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/0810.3023">
    <title>[0810.3023] Iterated Regret Minimization: A More Realistic Solution Concept</title>
    <dc:date>2012-02-15T15:53:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0810.3023</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts--and most notably Nash equilibrium--predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. In this paper, we introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret."

--- Quite astonishingly, no mention at all of low-regret learning!]]></description>
<dc:subject>game_theory online_learning have_read in_NB halpern.joseph_y. re:knightian_uncertainty low-regret_learning</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ec42f726a8be/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:online_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:halpern.joseph_y."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:knightian_uncertainty"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:low-regret_learning"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.springerlink.com/content/33176r20r8381516/">
    <title>Infinite in the Lab: How Do People Play Repeated Games? - Theory and Decision, Volume 72, Number 2 - SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2012-01-20T19:34:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.springerlink.com/content/33176r20r8381516/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We introduce a novel mechanism to eliminate endgame effects in repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments. In the main phase of a supergame our mechanism generates more persistent cooperation than finite horizon or random continuation rules. Moreover, we find evidence for cooperation-enhancing “active/reactive” strategies which concentrate in the initial phase of a supergame as subjects gain experience."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics experimental_economics game_theory decision-making evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8e7cbf73eae7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://rss.sagepub.com/content/23/3/347.abstract?etoc">
    <title>Not ‘Just the two of us’: Third party externalities of social dilemmas</title>
    <dc:date>2011-08-11T15:55:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://rss.sagepub.com/content/23/3/347.abstract?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Many real-life social dilemmas contain third parties who cannot make decisions in the dilemma, but are affected by its outcome (receive externalities) nonetheless. Dilemmas with identical payoffs for decision-making actors may greatly vary in their externalities for third parties. If actors value the welfare of thirds, externalities will affect actors’ decisions. ... two studies that employ four one-shot, 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas (PDs) that differ only in their externalities. The PDs respectively include a third party that (i) is indifferent, (ii) prefers defection, (iii) prefers cooperation. Our results show that while aggregate behavior is not affected by externalities, individual behavior is. Compared to a PD without externalities, prosocial individuals cooperate more when a third benefits from cooperation, but do not defect more when a third benefits from defection. The opposite pattern is found for competitive individuals."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>experimental_economics game_theory prisoners_dilemma externalities economics to:NB altruism</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8c1b83ecca19/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:prisoners_dilemma"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:externalities"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:altruism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.2026">
    <title>[1104.2026] Collaboration in Social Networks</title>
    <dc:date>2011-04-18T01:33:23+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.2026</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>game_theory social_networks re:do-institutions-evolve to:NB to_read re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0fdc9a7187a7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://abandonedfootnotes.blogspot.com/2011/03/simple-model-of-cults-of-personality.html">
    <title>Abandoned Footnotes: A Simple Model of Cults of Personality</title>
    <dc:date>2011-03-14T17:09:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://abandonedfootnotes.blogspot.com/2011/03/simple-model-of-cults-of-personality.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Similar dynamics apply to religions, too, of course.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>authoritarianism personality_cults dictatorship game_theory signaling political_science marquez.xavier to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d81df5468423/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:authoritarianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:personality_cults"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:dictatorship"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:signaling"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:marquez.xavier"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.springerlink.com/content/g64l0g58m16k860g/">
    <title>Learning to Compete, Coordinate and Cooperate in Repeated Games Using Reinforcement Learning</title>
    <dc:date>2011-03-08T13:03:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.springerlink.com/content/g64l0g58m16k860g/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["problem of learning in repeated general-sum matrix games when a learning algorithm can observe the actions but not the payoffs of its associates. ... non-stationarity of the environment caused by learning associates in these games, most state-of-the-art algorithms perform poorly ... due to an inability to make profitable compromises.=,,, agent must effectively balance competing objectives, including bounding losses, playing optimally with respect to current beliefs, and taking calculated, but profitable, risks. ... we present ... M-Qubed, a reinforcement learning algorithm ... balancing best-response, cautious, and optimistic learning biases... learns to make profitable compromises across a wide-range of repeated matrix games played with many kinds of learners... average payoffs meet or exceed its maximin value in the limit.., in two-player games... average payoffs approach the value of the Nash bargaining solution... robust behavior in round-robin and evolutionary tournaments..."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>machine_learning learning_in_games reinforcement_learning re:do-institutions-evolve re:knightian_uncertainty game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:801b28889e37/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:machine_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:reinforcement_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:knightian_uncertainty"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/gossner/Articles/compinfo.pdf">
    <title>Comparison of Information Structures</title>
    <dc:date>2011-02-11T23:02:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/gossner/Articles/compinfo.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Preprint, subsequently published Games and economic Behavior 30 (2000): 44--63
]]></description>
<dc:subject>game_theory re:knightian_uncertainty value_of_information decision_theory statistics to:NB via:mraginsky</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:af17c285c91f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:knightian_uncertainty"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:value_of_information"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:mraginsky"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://whimsley.typepad.com/whimsley/2010/05/identity-economics-by-george-akerlof-and-rachel-kranton-a-rambling-review.html">
    <title>&quot;Identity Economics&quot; by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton: A Rambling Review - Whimsley</title>
    <dc:date>2010-06-02T01:50:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://whimsley.typepad.com/whimsley/2010/05/identity-economics-by-george-akerlof-and-rachel-kranton-a-rambling-review.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>book_reviews economics game_theory identity_formation slee.tom via:jbdelong track_down_references akerlof.george kranton.rachel</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:76a11ae0d4bf/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:book_reviews"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:identity_formation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:slee.tom"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:jbdelong"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:track_down_references"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:akerlof.george"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kranton.rachel"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://crookedtimber.org/2009/08/06/hommes-de-lettres-and-inorganic-intellectuals/">
    <title>Hommes De Lettres and Inorganic Intellectuals — Crooked Timber</title>
    <dc:date>2009-08-06T17:32:40+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://crookedtimber.org/2009/08/06/hommes-de-lettres-and-inorganic-intellectuals/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>progressive_forces intellectuals intellectuals_in_politics economics political_economy ideology game_theory social_life_of_the_mind scialabba.george farrell.henry</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:865b67a3547f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:progressive_forces"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:intellectuals"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:intellectuals_in_politics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_economy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ideology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:scialabba.george"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:farrell.henry"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=1559">
    <title>Language Log » &quot;Internet Asperger's Syndrome&quot; and &quot;Austistic economics&quot;</title>
    <dc:date>2009-07-09T12:36:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=1559</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>autism rectification_of_names cultural_criticism moral_psychology computer_networks_as_provinces_of_the_commonwealth_of_letters experimental_economics fmri game_theory liberman.mark</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:20991d77b7ab/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:autism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rectification_of_names"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_criticism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:computer_networks_as_provinces_of_the_commonwealth_of_letters"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:fmri"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:liberman.mark"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.5328">
    <title>[0903.5328] A Stochastic View of Optimal Regret through Minimax Duality</title>
    <dc:date>2009-04-28T11:12:40+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.5328</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study the regret of optimal strategies for online convex optimization games. Using von Neumann's minimax theorem, we show that the optimal regret in this adversarial setting is closely related to the behavior of the empirical minimization algorithm in a stochastic process setting: it is equal to the maximum, over joint distributions of the adversary's action sequence, of the difference between a sum of minimal expected losses and the minimal empirical loss. ... the optimal regret has a natural geometric interpretation, since it can be viewed as the gap in Jensen's inequality for a concave functional--the minimizer over the player's actions of expected loss--defined on a set of probability distributions. ... obtain upper and lower bounds on the regret of an optimal strategy for a variety of online learning problems. Our method provides upper bounds without the need to construct a learning algorithm; the lower bounds provide explicit optimal strategies for the adversary."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>statistics game_theory learning_in_games minimax</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:62b30b2b7ae1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:minimax"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8901.html">
    <title>Gintis, H.: The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences.</title>
    <dc:date>2009-04-10T20:10:25+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8901.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>books:noted gintis.herbert economics game_theory evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation social_science_methodology kith_and_kin adaptive_behavior books:owned</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1e219d498525/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:adaptive_behavior"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:owned"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pitt.edu/~ablume/images/iv_09_2_4.pdf">
    <title>Intentional Vagueness (Blume and Board)</title>
    <dc:date>2009-02-07T04:09:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pitt.edu/~ablume/images/iv_09_2_4.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that 
identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that 
strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they 
deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available 
to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a vague language can be welfare 
enhancing because it mitigates conﬂict. In equilibria that satisfy a dynamic stability 
condition intentional vagueness increases with the degree of conﬂict between sender 
and receiver."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>linguistics pragmatics game_theory vagueness to:NB to_read blume.andreas</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:161d52c9856c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:linguistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:pragmatics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:vagueness"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:blume.andreas"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>