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    <title>Pinboard (cshalizi)</title>
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    <description>recent bookmarks from cshalizi</description>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3102/0013189X231155154"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://www.nber.org/papers/w28650"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-22926-001"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/112/10/3098.abstract.html"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature14045.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/48/17071.abstract"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v516/n7529/full/nature13977.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2431710"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://datacolada.org/2014/05/01/20-we-cannot-afford-to-study-effect-size-in-the-lab/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.nicebread.de/a-comment-on-we-cannot-afford-to-study-effect-size-in-the-lab-from-the-datacolada-blog/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.scottfraundorf.com/papers/FraundorfBenjamin_JML.pdf"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/27/9786.abstract"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8949.abstract"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/06/instinct-can-beat-analytical-thinking/"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2917"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://journal.sjdm.org/14/14206/jdm14206.html"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/29/12138.abstract"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.3475"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/40/16271.abstract"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=7715"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/29/11779.abstract"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v501/n7465/full/nature12486.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.sciencemag.org/content/341/6149/976.full"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/36/14574.abstract"/>
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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioural-public-policy/article/abs/motivated-numeracy-and-enlightened-selfgovernment/EC9F2410D5562EF10B7A5E2539063806">
    <title>Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government | Behavioural Public Policy | Cambridge Core</title>
    <dc:date>2024-12-09T21:28:38+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioural-public-policy/article/abs/motivated-numeracy-and-enlightened-selfgovernment/EC9F2410D5562EF10B7A5E2539063806</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Why does public conflict over societal risks persist in the face of compelling and widely accessible scientific evidence? We conducted an experiment to probe two alternative answers: the ‘science comprehension thesis’ (SCT), which identifies defects in the public's knowledge and reasoning capacities as the source of such controversies; and the ‘identity-protective cognition thesis’ (ICT), which treats cultural conflict as disabling the faculties that members of the public use to make sense of decision-relevant science. In our experiment, we presented subjects with a difficult problem that turned on their ability to draw valid causal inferences from empirical data. As expected, subjects highest in numeracy – a measure of the ability and disposition to make use of quantitative information – did substantially better than less numerate ones when the data were presented as results from a study of a new skin rash treatment. Also as expected, subjects’ responses became politically polarized – and even less accurate – when the same data were presented as results from the study of a gun control ban. But contrary to the prediction of SCT, such polarization did not abate among subjects highest in numeracy; instead, it increased. This outcome supported ICT, which predicted that more numerate subjects would use their quantitative-reasoning capacity selectively to conform their interpretation of the data to the result most consistent with their political outlooks. We discuss the theoretical and practical significance of these findings."

--- The framing, as though science-comprehension and identity-protection were the only two possibilities, is transparently silly.  (Though par for the course in a certain sort of psychology and sociology.)  The result, however, may be interesting, if it's robust.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology ideology re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1af1763260df/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ideology"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3102/0013189X231155154">
    <title>The Effect-Size Benchmark That Matters Most: Education Interventions Often Fail - Matthew A. Kraft, 2023</title>
    <dc:date>2023-03-18T12:33:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3102/0013189X231155154</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["It is a healthy exercise to debate the merits of using effect-size benchmarks to interpret research findings. However, these debates obscure a more central insight that emerges from empirical distributions of effect-size estimates in the literature: Efforts to improve education often fail to move the needle. I find that 36% of effect sizes from randomized control trials of education interventions with standardized achievement outcomes are less than 0.05 SD. Publication bias surely masks many more failed efforts from our view. Recognizing the frequency of these failures should be at the core of any approach to interpreting the policy relevance of effect sizes. We can aim high without dismissing as trivial those effects sizes that represent more incremental improvement."

--- On the one hand, that's not much.  OTOH, imagine someone _did_ come up with a twist to teaching that made a big difference, like (wildly) 10SD.  Wouldn't it be adopted so quickly, without any randomized anything, that it would quickly become invisible in this sort of analysis?  (This'd be the social equivalent of a "selective sweep" in evolutionary genetics, and maybe detectable in similar ways.)]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB education psychology experimental_psychology meta-analysis via:? have_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:982f28c7e81f/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01271-w">
    <title>Scaling up interactive argumentation by providing counterarguments with a chatbot | Nature Human Behaviour</title>
    <dc:date>2022-02-15T14:56:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01271-w</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Discussion is more convincing than standard, unidirectional messaging, but its interactive nature makes it difficult to scale up. We created a chatbot to emulate the most important traits of discussion. A simple argument pointing out the existence of a scientific consensus on the safety of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) already led to more positive attitudes towards GMOs, compared with a control message. Providing participants with good arguments rebutting the most common counterarguments against GMOs led to much more positive attitudes towards GMOs, whether the participants could immediately see all the arguments or could select the most relevant arguments in a chatbot. Participants holding the most negative attitudes displayed more attitude change in favour of GMOs. Participants updated their beliefs when presented with good arguments, but we found no evidence that an interactive chatbot proves more persuasive than a list of arguments and counterarguments."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB rhetoric experimental_psychology re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator mercier.hugo via:henry_farrell</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:eb07d829d262/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rhetoric"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mercier.hugo"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:henry_farrell"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qWE9RR4A-6W_Tj6XOdQQ110cLQDUPHAh/view">
    <title>Mercier et Claidière Does discussion make crowds any wiser?.pdf - Google Drive</title>
    <dc:date>2022-01-11T15:36:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qWE9RR4A-6W_Tj6XOdQQ110cLQDUPHAh/view</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Does discussion in large groups help or hinder the wisdom of crowds? To give rise to the wisdom of crowds, by
which large groups can yield surprisingly accurate answers, aggregation mechanisms such as averaging of
opinions or majority voting rely on diversity of opinions, and independence between the voters. Discussion tends
to reduce diversity and independence. On the other hand, discussion in small groups has been shown to improve
the accuracy of individual answers. To test the effects of discussion in large groups, we gave groups of participants (N = 1958 participants in groups of size ranging from 22 to 212; mean 59) one of three types of problems
(demonstrative, factual, ethical) to solve, first individually, and then through discussion. For demonstrative
(logical or mathematical) problems, discussion improved individual answers, as well as the answers reached
through aggregation. For factual problems, discussion improved individual answers, and either improved or had
no effect on the answers reached through aggregation. Our results suggest that, for problems which have a
correct answer, discussion in large groups does not detract from the effects of the wisdom of crowds, and tends on
the contrary to improve on it."

--- Probably via:henryfarrell but tab has been hanging open so long I can't recall]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition social_life_of_the_mind experimental_psychology experimental_sociology mercier.hugo via:? to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:12fa34564f26/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://osf.io/wksv8/">
    <title>OSF Preprints | Scaling up experimental social, behavioral, and economic science</title>
    <dc:date>2022-01-11T15:32:05+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://osf.io/wksv8/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The standard experimental paradigm in the social, behavioral, and economic sciences is extremely limited. Although recent advances in digital technologies and crowdsourcing services allow individual experiments to be deployed and run faster than in traditional physical labs, a majority of experiments still focus on one-off results that do not generalize easily to real-world contexts or even to other variations of the same experiment. As a result, there exist few universally acknowledged findings, and even those are occasionally overturned by new data. We argue that to achieve replicable, generalizable, scalable and ultimately useful social and behavioral science, a fundamental rethinking of the model of virtual-laboratory style experiments is required. Not only is it possible to design and run experiments that are radically different in scale and scope than was possible in an era of physical labs; this ability allows us to ask fundamentally different types of questions than have been asked historically of lab studies. We posit, however, that taking full advantage of this new and exciting potential will require four major changes to the infrastructure, methodology, and culture of experimental science: (1) significant investments in software design and participant recruitment, (2) innovations in experimental design and analysis of experimental data, (3) adoption of new models of collaboration, and (4) a new understanding of the nature and role of theory in experimental social and behavioral science. We conclude that the path we outline, although ambitious, is well within the power of current technology and has the potential to facilitate a new class of scientific advances in social, behavioral and economic studies."

--- This is a very vague abstract, but there are some very serious people in that long author list, so...]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_science_methodology experimental_design experimental_psychology experimental_economics experimental_sociology watts.duncan via:rvenkat lazer.david salganik.matthew_j.</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a15eace00126/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:watts.duncan"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:rvenkat"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:lazer.david"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:salganik.matthew_j."/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/evolutionary-human-sciences/article/machiavellian-strategist-or-cultural-learner-mentalizing-and-learning-over-development-in-a-resourcesharing-game/3775530F483D2FC580F8C763A990031C">
    <title>Machiavellian strategist or cultural learner? Mentalizing and learning over development in a resource-sharing game | Evolutionary Human Sciences | Cambridge Core</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-19T14:56:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/evolutionary-human-sciences/article/machiavellian-strategist-or-cultural-learner-mentalizing-and-learning-over-development-in-a-resourcesharing-game/3775530F483D2FC580F8C763A990031C</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Theorists have sought to identify the key selection pressures that drove the evolution of our species’ cognitive abilities, life histories and cooperative inclinations. Focusing on two leading theories, each capable of accounting for many of the rapid changes in our lineage, we present a simple experiment designed to assess the explanatory power of both the Machiavellian Intelligence and the Cultural Brain/Intelligence Hypotheses. Children (aged 3–7 years) observed a novel social interaction that provided them with behavioural information that could either be used to outmanoeuvre a partner in subsequent interactions or for cultural learning. The results show that, even after four rounds of repeated interaction and sometimes lower pay-offs, children continued to rely on copying the observed behaviour instead of harnessing the available social information to strategically extract pay-offs (stickers) from their partners. Analyses further reveal that superior mentalizing abilities are associated with more targeted cultural learning – the selective copying of fewer irrelevant actions – while superior generalized cognitive abilities are associated with greater imitation of irrelevant actions. Neither mentalizing capacities nor more general measures of cognition explain children's ability to strategically use social information to maximize pay-offs. These results provide developmental evidence favouring the Cultural Brain/Intelligence Hypothesis over the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology cognitive_development cultural_transmission_of_cognitive_tools</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1391e8ff729b/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_development"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.nber.org/papers/w28650">
    <title>Cognitive Biases: Mistakes or Missing Stakes? | NBER</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-15T18:07:39+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nber.org/papers/w28650</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Despite decades of research on heuristics and biases, empirical evidence on the effect of large incentives – as present in relevant economic decisions – on cognitive biases is scant. This paper tests the effect of incentives on four widely documented biases: base rate neglect, anchoring, failure of contingent thinking, and intuitive reasoning in the Cognitive Reflection Test. In laboratory experiments with 1,236 college students in Nairobi, we implement three incentive levels: no incentives, standard lab payments, and very high incentives that increase the stakes by a factor of 100 to more than a monthly income. We find that response times – a proxy for cognitive effort – increase by 40% with very high stakes. Performance, on the other hand, improves very mildly or not at all as incentives increase, with the largest improvements due to a reduced reliance on intuitions. In none of the tasks are very high stakes sufficient to de-bias participants, or come even close to doing so."

--- I'm pretty sure this isn't the first high-stakes replication of this sort of effect, but I don't seem to have any others in my bibliographies...]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology experimental_economics heuristics decision-making via:?</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:08c2ae3e36ce/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:?"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03380-y">
    <title>People systematically overlook subtractive changes | Nature</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-08T14:10:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03380-y</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Improving objects, ideas or situations—whether a designer seeks to advance technology, a writer seeks to strengthen an argument or a manager seeks to encourage desired behaviour—requires a mental search for possible changes1,2,3. We investigated whether people are as likely to consider changes that subtract components from an object, idea or situation as they are to consider changes that add new components. People typically consider a limited number of promising ideas in order to manage the cognitive burden of searching through all possible ideas, but this can lead them to accept adequate solutions without considering potentially superior alternatives4,5,6,7,8,9,10. Here we show that people systematically default to searching for additive transformations, and consequently overlook subtractive transformations. Across eight experiments, participants were less likely to identify advantageous subtractive changes when the task did not (versus did) cue them to consider subtraction, when they had only one opportunity (versus several) to recognize the shortcomings of an additive search strategy or when they were under a higher (versus lower) cognitive load. Defaulting to searches for additive changes may be one reason that people struggle to mitigate overburdened schedules11, institutional red tape12 and damaging effects on the planet13,14."

--- That last is a bit of a reach, no?
]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB decision-making problem-solving cognitive_science experimental_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8fdee917d180/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:problem-solving"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03344-2">
    <title>Shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online | Nature</title>
    <dc:date>2021-03-19T13:08:11+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03344-2</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In recent years, there has been a great deal of concern about the proliferation of false and misleading news on social media1,2,3,4. Academics and practitioners alike have asked why people share such misinformation, and sought solutions to reduce the sharing of misinformation5,6,7. Here, we attempt to address both of these questions. First, we find that the veracity of headlines has little effect on sharing intentions, despite having a large effect on judgments of accuracy. This dissociation suggests that sharing does not necessarily indicate belief. Nonetheless, most participants say it is important to share only accurate news. To shed light on this apparent contradiction, we carried out four survey experiments and a field experiment on Twitter; the results show that subtly shifting attention to accuracy increases the quality of news that people subsequently share. Together with additional computational analyses, these findings indicate that people often share misinformation because their attention is focused on factors other than accuracy—and therefore they fail to implement a strongly held preference for accurate sharing. Our results challenge the popular claim that people value partisanship over accuracy8,9, and provide evidence for scalable attention-based interventions that social media platforms could easily implement to counter misinformation online."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epidemiology_of_representations networked_life social_media social_life_of_the_mind eckles.dean to_read re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator experimental_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e902ca1d01cc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:networked_life"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_media"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:eckles.dean"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/how-humans-judge-machines">
    <title>How Humans Judge Machines | The MIT Press</title>
    <dc:date>2020-09-04T17:20:00+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/how-humans-judge-machines</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["How would you feel about losing your job to a machine? How about a tsunami alert system that fails? Would you react differently to acts of discrimination depending on whether they were carried out by a machine or by a human? What about public surveillance? How Humans Judge Machines compares people's reactions to actions performed by humans and machines. Using data collected in dozens of experiments, this book reveals the biases that permeate human-machine interactions. Are there conditions in which we judge machines unfairly?
"Is our judgment of machines affected by the moral dimensions of a scenario? Is our judgment of machine correlated with demographic factors such as education or gender? César Hidalgo and colleagues use hard science to take on these pressing technological questions. Using randomized experiments, they create revealing counterfactuals and build statistical models to explain how people judge artificial intelligence and whether they do it fairly. Through original research, How Humans Judge Machines bring us one step closer to understanding the ethical consequences of AI."

--- Because random economists are the best at doing moral psychology...]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted moral_psychology experimental_psychology algorithmic_fairness color_me_skeptical in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:39caf600309c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:algorithmic_fairness"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-31306-001?doi=1">
    <title>A meta-analysis of procedures to change implicit measures. - PsycNET</title>
    <dc:date>2020-07-13T20:29:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-31306-001?doi=1</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Using a novel technique known as network meta-analysis, we synthesized evidence from 492 studies (87,418 participants) to investigate the effectiveness of procedures in changing implicit measures, which we define as response biases on implicit tasks. We also evaluated these procedures’ effects on explicit and behavioral measures. We found that implicit measures can be changed, but effects are often relatively weak (|ds| < .30). Most studies focused on producing short-term changes with brief, single-session manipulations. Procedures that associate sets of concepts, invoke goals or motivations, or tax mental resources changed implicit measures the most, whereas procedures that induced threat, affirmation, or specific moods/emotions changed implicit measures the least. Bias tests suggested that implicit effects could be inflated relative to their true population values. Procedures changed explicit measures less consistently and to a smaller degree than implicit measures and generally produced trivial changes in behavior. Finally, changes in implicit measures did not mediate changes in explicit measures or behavior. Our findings suggest that changes in implicit measures are possible, but those changes do not necessarily translate into changes in explicit measures or behavior. "]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB implicit_association_test experimental_psychology meta-analysis psychology to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination diversity_and_inclusion_training</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:91e2cb60b478/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:implicit_association_test"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:meta-analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:diversity_and_inclusion_training"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/108/19/7716">
    <title>Role of test motivation in intelligence testing | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2020-06-29T20:12:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/108/19/7716</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Intelligence tests are widely assumed to measure maximal intellectual performance, and predictive associations between intelligence quotient (IQ) scores and later-life outcomes are typically interpreted as unbiased estimates of the effect of intellectual ability on academic, professional, and social life outcomes. The current investigation critically examines these assumptions and finds evidence against both. First, we examined whether motivation is less than maximal on intelligence tests administered in the context of low-stakes research situations. Specifically, we completed a meta-analysis of random-assignment experiments testing the effects of material incentives on intelligence-test performance on a collective 2,008 participants. Incentives increased IQ scores by an average of 0.64 SD, with larger effects for individuals with lower baseline IQ scores. Second, we tested whether individual differences in motivation during IQ testing can spuriously inflate the predictive validity of intelligence for life outcomes. Trained observers rated test motivation among 251 adolescent boys completing intelligence tests using a 15-min “thin-slice” video sample. IQ score predicted life outcomes, including academic performance in adolescence and criminal convictions, employment, and years of education in early adulthood. After adjusting for the influence of test motivation, however, the predictive validity of intelligence for life outcomes was significantly diminished, particularly for nonacademic outcomes. Collectively, our findings suggest that, under low-stakes research conditions, some individuals try harder than others, and, in this context, test motivation can act as a third-variable confound that inflates estimates of the predictive validity of intelligence for life outcomes."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read iq experimental_psychology mental_testing re:g_paper</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:930d5bb66659/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:iq"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mental_testing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:g_paper"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-22926-001">
    <title>Complex intersections of race and class: Among social liberals, learning about White privilege reduces sympathy, increases blame, and decreases external attributions for White people struggling with poverty. - PsycNET</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-21T21:26:05+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-22926-001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["White privilege lessons are sometimes used to increase awareness of racism. However, little research has investigated the consequences of these lessons. Across 2 studies (N = 1,189), we hypothesized that White privilege lessons may both highlight structural privilege based on race, and simultaneously decrease sympathy for other challenges some White people endure (e.g., poverty)—especially among social liberals who may be particularly receptive to structural explanations of inequality. Indeed, both studies revealed that while social liberals were overall more sympathetic to poor people than social conservatives, reading about White privilege decreased their sympathy for a poor White (vs. Black) person. Moreover, these shifts in sympathy were associated with greater punishment/blame and fewer external attributions for a poor White person’s plight. We conclude that, among social liberals, White privilege lessons may increase beliefs that poor White people have failed to take advantage of their racial privilege—leading to negative social evaluations."

--- The mere fact that this is a rather complicated interaction effect makes me want to wait to see how (if at all) it replicates...]]></description>
<dc:subject>class_struggles_in_america inequality social_engineering experimental_psychology to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:cb210fa235c1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:class_struggles_in_america"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inequality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_engineering"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0886-x">
    <title>Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk | Nature Human Behaviour</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-20T13:02:52+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0886-x</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Prospect theory is among the most influential frameworks in behavioural science, specifically in research on decision-making under risk. Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 study tested financial choices under risk, concluding that such judgements deviate significantly from the assumptions of expected utility theory, which had remarkable impacts on science, policy and industry. Though substantial evidence supports prospect theory, many presumed canonical theories have drawn scrutiny for recent replication failures. In response, we directly test the original methods in a multinational study (n = 4,098 participants, 19 countries, 13 languages), adjusting only for current and local currencies while requiring all participants to respond to all items. The results replicated for 94% of items, with some attenuation. Twelve of 13 theoretical contrasts replicated, with 100% replication in some countries. Heterogeneity between countries and intra-individual variation highlight meaningful avenues for future theorizing and applications. We conclude that the empirical foundations for prospect theory replicate beyond any reasonable thresholds."

--- Well, there's a relief.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB decision-making psychology experimental_economics experimental_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c6521402f84f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352154620300036">
    <title>Thinking clearly about causal inferences of politically motivated reasoning: why paradigmatic study designs often undermine causal inference - ScienceDirect</title>
    <dc:date>2020-02-12T22:14:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352154620300036</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A common inference in behavioral science is that people’s motivation to reach a politically congenial conclusion causally affects their reasoning—known as politically motivated reasoning. Often these inferences are made on the basis of data from randomized experiments that use one of two paradigmatic designs: Outcome Switching, in which identical methods are described as reaching politically congenial versus uncongenial conclusions; or Party Cues, in which identical information is described as being endorsed by politically congenial versus uncongenial sources. Here we argue that these designs often undermine causal inferences of politically motivated reasoning because treatment assignment violates the excludability assumption. Specifically, assignment to treatment alters variables alongside political motivation that affect reasoning outcomes, rendering the designs confounded. We conclude that distinguishing politically motivated reasoning from these confounds is important both for scientific understanding and for developing effective interventions; and we highlight those designs better placed to causally identify politically motivated reasoning."]]></description>
<dc:subject>political_science cognition heuristics causal_inference experimental_psychology to_read via:? in_NB partisandship_and_polarization</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dbf69c27dd7f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:causal_inference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:?"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:partisandship_and_polarization"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psyarxiv.com/ra9qy">
    <title>PsyArXiv Preprints | Collective Problem-Solving of Groups Across Tasks of Varying Complexity</title>
    <dc:date>2020-02-12T13:49:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psyarxiv.com/ra9qy</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["As organizations gravitate to group-based structures, the problem of improving performance through judicious selection of group members has preoccupied scientists and managers alike. However, it remains poorly understood under what conditions groups outperform comparable individuals, which individual attributes best predict group performance, or how task complexity mediates these relationships. Here we describe a novel two-phase experiment in which individuals were evaluated on a series of tasks of varying complexity; then randomly assigned to solve similar tasks either in groups of different compositions or as individuals. We describe two main sets of findings. First, while groups are more efficient than individuals and comparable “nominal group” when the task is complex, this relationship is reversed when the task is simple. Second, we find that average skill level dominates all other factors combined, including social perceptiveness, skill diversity, and diversity of cognitive style. Our findings illustrate the utility of a “solution-oriented” approach to identifying principles of collective performance."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB problem_solving experimental_psychology experimental_sociology collective_cognition watts.duncan re:democratic_cognition to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:cf887026fa4a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:problem_solving"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:watts.duncan"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.12434">
    <title>[1909.12434] Learning the Difference that Makes a Difference with Counterfactually-Augmented Data</title>
    <dc:date>2019-10-01T17:18:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.12434</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Despite alarm over the reliance of machine learning systems on so-called spurious patterns in training data, the term lacks coherent meaning in standard statistical frameworks. However, the language of causality offers clarity: spurious associations are those due to a common cause (confounding) vs direct or indirect effects. In this paper, we focus on NLP, introducing methods and resources for training models insensitive to spurious patterns. Given documents and their initial labels, we task humans with revise each document to accord with a counterfactual target label, asking that the revised documents be internally coherent while avoiding any gratuitous changes. Interestingly, on sentiment analysis and natural language inference tasks, classifiers trained on original data fail on their counterfactually-revised counterparts and vice versa. Classifiers trained on combined datasets perform remarkably well, just shy of those specialized to either domain. While classifiers trained on either original or manipulated data alone are sensitive to spurious features (e.g., mentions of genre), models trained on the combined data are insensitive to this signal. We will publicly release both datasets."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB classifiers statistics experimental_psychology of_a_sort</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:41d582ec8253/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:classifiers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:of_a_sort"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.11156">
    <title>[1904.11156] Nonparametric Estimation and Inference in Economic and Psychological Experiments</title>
    <dc:date>2019-09-17T14:02:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.11156</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The goal of this paper is to provide some tools for nonparametric estimation and inference in psychological and economic experiments. We consider an experimental framework in which each of nsubjects provides T responses to a vector of T stimuli. We propose to estimate the unknown function f linking stimuli to responses through a nonparametric sieve estimator. We give conditions for consistency when either nor Tor both diverge. The rate of convergence depends upon the error covariance structure, that is allowed to differ across subjects. With these results we derive the optimal divergence rate of the dimension of the sieve basis with both n and T. We provide guidance about the optimal balance between the number of subjects and questions in a laboratory experiment and argue that a large nis often better than a large T. We derive conditions for asymptotic normality of functionals of the estimator of Tand apply them to obtain the asymptotic distribution of the Wald test when the number of constraints under the null is finite and when it diverges along with other asymptotic parameters. Lastly, we investigate the previous properties when the conditional covariance matrix is replaced by an estimator."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB statistics social_science_methodology nonparametrics experimental_psychology experimental_economics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e6f79e940f5d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:nonparametrics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000401">
    <title>Debunking the Stanford Prison Experiment</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-09T15:41:24+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000401</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) is one of psychology’s most famous studies. It has been criticized on many grounds, and yet a majority of textbook authors have ignored these criticisms in their discussions of the SPE, thereby misleading both students and the general public about the study’s questionable scientific validity. Data collected from a thorough investigation of the SPE archives and interviews with 15 of the participants in the experiment further question the study’s scientific merit. These data are not only supportive of previous criticisms of the SPE, such as the presence of demand characteristics, but provide new criticisms of the SPE based on heretofore unknown information. These new criticisms include the biased and incomplete collection of data, the extent to which the SPE drew on a prison experiment devised and conducted by students in one of Zimbardo’s classes 3 months earlier, the fact that the guards received precise instructions regarding the treatment of the prisoners, the fact that the guards were not told they were subjects, and the fact that participants were almost never completely immersed by the situation. Possible explanations of the inaccurate textbook portrayal and general misperception of the SPE’s scientific validity over the past 5 decades, in spite of its flaws and shortcomings, are discussed."

--- Preprint: https://psyarxiv.com/mjhnp/]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology experimental_psychology debunking</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a089028f650e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:debunking"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/115/44/E10313">
    <title>Comparing continual task learning in minds and machines | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2018-10-30T18:01:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/115/44/E10313</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Humans can learn to perform multiple tasks in succession over the lifespan (“continual” learning), whereas current machine learning systems fail. Here, we investigated the cognitive mechanisms that permit successful continual learning in humans and harnessed our behavioral findings for neural network design. Humans categorized naturalistic images of trees according to one of two orthogonal task rules that were learned by trial and error. Training regimes that focused on individual rules for prolonged periods (blocked training) improved human performance on a later test involving randomly interleaved rules, compared with control regimes that trained in an interleaved fashion. Analysis of human error patterns suggested that blocked training encouraged humans to form “factorized” representation that optimally segregated the tasks, especially for those individuals with a strong prior bias to represent the stimulus space in a well-structured way. By contrast, standard supervised deep neural networks trained on the same tasks suffered catastrophic forgetting under blocked training, due to representational interference in the deeper layers. However, augmenting deep networks with an unsupervised generative model that allowed it to first learn a good embedding of the stimulus space (similar to that observed in humans) reduced catastrophic forgetting under blocked training. Building artificial agents that first learn a model of the world may be one promising route to solving continual task performance in artificial intelligence research."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB machine_learning neural_networks cognitive_science experimental_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:97d5df213534/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:machine_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neural_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2590054">
    <title>'Ideology' or 'Situation Sense'? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment by Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene Lucci, Katherine Cheng :: SSRN</title>
    <dc:date>2018-09-08T13:52:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2590054</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This paper reports the results of a study on whether political predispositions influence judicial decisionmaking. The study was designed to overcome the two principal limitations on existing empirical studies that purport to find such an influence: the use of nonexperimental methods to assess the decisions of actual judges; and the failure to use actual judges in ideologically-biased-reasoning experiments. The study involved a sample of sitting judges (n = 253), who, like members of a general public sample (n = 800), were culturally polarized on climate change, marijuana legalization and other contested issues. When the study subjects were assigned to analyze statutory interpretation problems, however, only the responses of the general-public subjects and not those of the judges varied in patterns that reflected the subjects’ cultural values. The responses of a sample of lawyers (n = 217) were also uninfluenced by their cultural values; the responses of a sample of law students (n = 284), in contrast, displayed a level of cultural bias only modestly less pronounced than that observed in the general-public sample. Among the competing hypotheses tested in the study, the results most supported the position that professional judgment imparted by legal training and experience confers resistance to identity-protective cognition — a dynamic associated with politically biased information processing generally — but only for decisions that involve legal reasoning. The scholarly and practical implications of the findings are discussed."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read law cognition experimental_psychology kahan.dan</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1000f09d737c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:law"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kahan.dan"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-017-9646-4">
    <title>The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2018-07-24T19:45:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-017-9646-4</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology moral_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:aaf071678199/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/115/23/E5254">
    <title>Field studies of psychologically targeted ads face threats to internal validity | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2018-06-06T16:41:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/115/23/E5254</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The paper uses Facebook’s standard ad platform to compare how different versions of ads perform. However, this process does not create a randomized experiment: users are not randomly assigned to different ads, and individuals may even receive multiple ad types (e.g., both extroverted and introverted ads). Furthermore, ad platforms like Facebook optimize campaign performance by showing ads to users whom the platform expects are more likely to fulfill the campaign’s objective..."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB advertising experimental_psychology causal_inference eckles.dean facebook</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d3c3eff7b0fc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:causal_inference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:eckles.dean"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:facebook"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://psyarxiv.com/r7pd3/">
    <title>PsyArXiv Preprints | Experimental Design and the Reliability of Priming Effects: Reconsidering the &quot;Train Wreck&quot;</title>
    <dc:date>2018-01-24T23:40:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://psyarxiv.com/r7pd3/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Recent failures to replicate high-profile priming effects have raised questions about the reliability of priming phenomena. The studies at the center of the discussion have been labeled “social priming,” and have raised the question as to whether priming phenomena generated in the social psychological literature are particularly problematic. However, the effects identified as “social priming” differ from other priming effects in multiple ways. In the present research, we examine one important difference: whether the effect has been demonstrated with a within- or between-subjects experimental design. To examine the significance of this design feature, we assess the reliability of four well-known priming effects from the cognitive and social psychological literatures using both between- and within-subjects designs and analyses. All four priming effects, both cognitive and social, are reliable when tested using a within-subjects approach. In contrast, only one priming effect reaches that statistical threshold when using the between-subjects approach. These results indicate that the key difference between priming effects identified as more and less reliable is the type of experimental design used to demonstrate the effect, rather than the content domain in which the effect has been demonstrated. This demonstration also serves as a salient illustration of the underappreciated importance of experimental design in considering power and reliability of priming effects."

--- Fascinating if true.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_design experimental_psychology statistics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a10b1907f0b9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_design"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/114/16/4117.abstract">
    <title>Reach and speed of judgment propagation in the laboratory</title>
    <dc:date>2017-08-29T19:07:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/114/16/4117.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In recent years, a large body of research has demonstrated that judgments and behaviors can propagate from person to person. Phenomena as diverse as political mobilization, health practices, altruism, and emotional states exhibit similar dynamics of social contagion. The precise mechanisms of judgment propagation are not well understood, however, because it is difficult to control for confounding factors such as homophily or dynamic network structures. We introduce an experimental design that renders possible the stringent study of judgment propagation. In this design, experimental chains of individuals can revise their initial judgment in a visual perception task after observing a predecessor’s judgment. The positioning of a very good performer at the top of a chain created a performance gap, which triggered waves of judgment propagation down the chain. We evaluated the dynamics of judgment propagation experimentally. Despite strong social influence within pairs of individuals, the reach of judgment propagation across a chain rarely exceeded a social distance of three to four degrees of separation. Furthermore, computer simulations showed that the speed of judgment propagation decayed exponentially with the social distance from the source. We show that information distortion and the overweighting of other people’s errors are two individual-level mechanisms hindering judgment propagation at the scale of the chain. Our results contribute to the understanding of social-contagion processes, and our experimental method offers numerous new opportunities to study judgment propagation in the laboratory."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_influence experimental_psychology experimental_sociology re:homophily_and_confounding</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:be563a922b4a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_influence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:homophily_and_confounding"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/17/17406/new.html">
    <title>The relationship between crowd majority and accuracy for binary decisions</title>
    <dc:date>2017-08-01T14:46:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://journal.sjdm.org/17/17406/new.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We consider the wisdom of the crowd situation in which individuals make binary decisions, and the majority answer is used as the group decision. Using data sets from nine different domains, we examine the relationship between the size of the majority and the accuracy of the crowd decisions. We find empirically that these calibration curves take many different forms for different domains, and the distribution of majority sizes over decisions in a domain also varies widely. We develop a growth model for inferring and interpreting the calibration curve in a domain, and apply it to the same nine data sets using Bayesian methods. The modeling approach is able to infer important qualitative properties of a domain, such as whether it involves decisions that have ground truths or are inherently uncertain. It is also able to make inferences about important quantitative properties of a domain, such as how quickly the crowd accuracy increases as the size of the majority increases. We discuss potential applications of the measurement model, and the need to develop a psychological account of the variety of calibration curves that evidently exist."]]></description>
<dc:subject>collective_cognition psychology experimental_psychology re:democratic_cognition in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d0ba1c0745cc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.7562">
    <title>[1406.7562] When none of us perform better than all of us together: the role of analogical decision rules in groups</title>
    <dc:date>2015-09-16T14:44:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.7562</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["During social interactions, groups develop collective competencies that (ideally) should assist groups to outperform average standalone individual members (weak cognitive synergy) or the best performing member in the group (strong cognitive synergy). In two experimental studies we manipulate the type of decision rule used in group decision-making (identify the best vs. collaborative), and the way in which the decision rules are induced (direct vs. analogical) and we test the effect of these two manipulations on the emergence of strong and weak cognitive synergy. Our most important results indicate that an analogically induced decision rule (imitate-the-successful heuristic) in which groups have to identify the best member and build on his/her performance (take-the-best heuristic) is the most conducive for strong cognitive synergy. Our studies bring evidence for the role of analogy-making in groups as well as the role of fast-and-frugal heuristics for group decision-making."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to_read analogy experimental_psychology decision-making heuristics collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition via:vaguery in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d336837af773/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:analogy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:vaguery"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.quantamagazine.org/20150512-fruit-flies-individuality/">
    <title>Individuality May Be a Genetic Trait, Study Suggests | Quanta Magazine</title>
    <dc:date>2015-05-13T02:43:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.quantamagazine.org/20150512-fruit-flies-individuality/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[It seems fitting that (lo these many years ago)  both (i) "Under precisely controlled conditions, the organism does what it damn well pleases", and (ii) to call (i) "The first Harvard law of animal behavior".]]></description>
<dc:subject>experimental_psychology experimental_biology via:henry_farrell have_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f63ccd009b89/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:henry_farrell"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/112/18/5631.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>The amplification of risk in experimental diffusion chains</title>
    <dc:date>2015-05-10T12:26:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/112/18/5631.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Understanding how people form and revise their perception of risk is central to designing efficient risk communication methods, eliciting risk awareness, and avoiding unnecessary anxiety among the public. However, public responses to hazardous events such as climate change, contagious outbreaks, and terrorist threats are complex and difficult-to-anticipate phenomena. Although many psychological factors influencing risk perception have been identified in the past, it remains unclear how perceptions of risk change when propagated from one person to another and what impact the repeated social transmission of perceived risk has at the population scale. Here, we study the social dynamics of risk perception by analyzing how messages detailing the benefits and harms of a controversial antibacterial agent undergo change when passed from one person to the next in 10-subject experimental diffusion chains. Our analyses show that when messages are propagated through the diffusion chains, they tend to become shorter, gradually inaccurate, and increasingly dissimilar between chains. In contrast, the perception of risk is propagated with higher fidelity due to participants manipulating messages to fit their preconceptions, thereby influencing the judgments of subsequent participants. Computer simulations implementing this simple influence mechanism show that small judgment biases tend to become more extreme, even when the injected message contradicts preconceived risk judgments. Our results provide quantitative insights into the social amplification of risk perception, and can help policy makers better anticipate and manage the public response to emerging threats."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epidemiology_of_representations experimental_psychology experimental_sociology to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dcd09a1fa7a2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-4-431-55363-2_10">
    <title>Experimental Studies of Cumulative Culture in Modern Humans: What Are the Requirements of the Ratchet? - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2015-04-30T21:08:52+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-4-431-55363-2_10</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The success of Homo sapiens as a species may be explained, at least in part, by their learning abilities. The archaeological record suggests that the material culture of humans during the Palaeolithic was fluid and diverse. Social learning abilities may therefore have allowed Homo sapiens to adapt rapidly to novel or changeable environmental conditions. A capacity for cumulative cultural evolution is certainly apparent in all contemporary human societies, whereas it appears either absent or extremely rare in other extant species. Here I review laboratory studies of cumulative culture in modern adult humans, designed to shed light on the social information required for this type of learning to occur. Although it has been suggested that cumulative culture may depend on a capacity for imitation, we found that imitation (at least in the narrow sense of action copying) was not necessary for human participants to exhibit ratchet-like effects of improvement over learner generations. We discuss the need for high fidelity reproduction in cumulative culture (independent of action copying)."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB cultural_evolution experimental_psychology experimental_sociology cultural_transmission social_life_of_the_mind re:do-institutions-evolve epidemiology_of_representations</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f32274f48af4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_transmission"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/112/12/3835.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>Equality bias impairs collective decision-making across cultures</title>
    <dc:date>2015-03-28T14:05:05+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/112/12/3835.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We tend to think that everyone deserves an equal say in a debate. This seemingly innocuous assumption can be damaging when we make decisions together as part of a group. To make optimal decisions, group members should weight their differing opinions according to how competent they are relative to one another; whenever they differ in competence, an equal weighting is suboptimal. Here, we asked how people deal with individual differences in competence in the context of a collective perceptual decision-making task. We developed a metric for estimating how participants weight their partner’s opinion relative to their own and compared this weighting to an optimal benchmark. Replicated across three countries (Denmark, Iran, and China), we show that participants assigned nearly equal weights to each other’s opinions regardless of true differences in their competence—even when informed by explicit feedback about their competence gap or under monetary incentives to maximize collective accuracy. This equality bias, whereby people behave as if they are as good or as bad as their partner, is particularly costly for a group when a competence gap separates its members."

--- My immediate doubt is that if people are actually making a binding group decision, they'll have to carry it out after they reach their agreement, and _that_ is more likely when everyone feels they've had their say...]]></description>
<dc:subject>decision-making experimental_psychology experimental_sociology social_life_of_the_mind collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition to_read in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8411dcf21631/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/112/10/3098.abstract.html">
    <title>Interplay of approximate planning strategies</title>
    <dc:date>2015-03-12T01:30:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/112/10/3098.abstract.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Humans routinely formulate plans in domains so complex that even the most powerful computers are taxed. To do so, they seem to avail themselves of many strategies and heuristics that efficiently simplify, approximate, and hierarchically decompose hard tasks into simpler subtasks. Theoretical and cognitive research has revealed several such strategies; however, little is known about their establishment, interaction, and efficiency. Here, we use model-based behavioral analysis to provide a detailed examination of the performance of human subjects in a moderately deep planning task. We find that subjects exploit the structure of the domain to establish subgoals in a way that achieves a nearly maximal reduction in the cost of computing values of choices, but then combine partial searches with greedy local steps to solve subtasks, and maladaptively prune the decision trees of subtasks in a reflexive manner upon encountering salient losses. Subjects come idiosyncratically to favor particular sequences of actions to achieve subgoals, creating novel complex actions or “options.”"]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB cognitive_science computational_complexity planning decision-making heuristics to_read psychology experimental_psychology bounded_rationality</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:611e3ea3adce/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:computational_complexity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:planning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bounded_rationality"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v519/n7542/full/nature14024.html">
    <title>Mechanosensory interactions drive collective behaviour in Drosophila : Nature : Nature Publishing Group</title>
    <dc:date>2015-03-12T01:05:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v519/n7542/full/nature14024.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Collective behaviour enhances environmental sensing and decision-making in groups of animals1, 2. Experimental and theoretical investigations of schooling fish, flocking birds and human crowds have demonstrated that simple interactions between individuals can explain emergent group dynamics3, 4. These findings indicate the existence of neural circuits that support distributed behaviours, but the molecular and cellular identities of relevant sensory pathways are unknown. Here we show that Drosophila melanogaster exhibits collective responses to an aversive odour: individual flies weakly avoid the stimulus, but groups show enhanced escape reactions. Using high-resolution behavioural tracking, computational simulations, genetic perturbations, neural silencing and optogenetic activation we demonstrate that this collective odour avoidance arises from cascades of appendage touch interactions between pairs of flies. Inter-fly touch sensing and collective behaviour require the activity of distal leg mechanosensory sensilla neurons and the mechanosensory channel NOMPC5, 6. Remarkably, through these inter-fly encounters, wild-type flies can elicit avoidance behaviour in mutant animals that cannot sense the odour—a basic form of communication. Our data highlight the unexpected importance of social context in the sensory responses of a solitary species and open the door to a neural-circuit-level understanding of collective behaviour in animal groups."

--- Metaphorical application of the finding that "wild-type flies can elicit avoidance behaviour in mutant animals that cannot sense the odour" is left as an exercise.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_biology experimental_psychology social_life_of_the_mind collective_cognition drosophila neuroscience</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c77310075a42/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:drosophila"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4240">
    <title>[1407.4240] Unconscious lie detection as an example of a widespread fallacy in the Neurosciences</title>
    <dc:date>2015-01-20T00:59:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.4240</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Neuroscientists frequently use a certain statistical reasoning to establish the existence of distinct neuronal processes in the brain. We show that this reasoning is flawed and that the large corresponding literature needs reconsideration. We illustrate the fallacy with a recent study that received an enormous press coverage because it concluded that humans detect deceit better if they use unconscious processes instead of conscious deliberations. The study was published under a new open-data policy that enabled us to reanalyze the data with more appropriate methods. We found that unconscious performance was close to chance - just as the conscious performance. This illustrates the flaws of this widely used statistical reasoning, the benefits of open-data practices, and the need for careful reconsideration of studies using the same rationale."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read statistics to_teach:undergrad-ADA psychology experimental_psychology bad_data_analysis have_skimmed</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6036d92d5703/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:undergrad-ADA"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bad_data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_skimmed"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature14045.html">
    <title>Internal models direct dragonfly interception steering : Nature : Nature Publishing Group</title>
    <dc:date>2014-12-18T02:51:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature14045.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Sensorimotor control in vertebrates relies on internal models. When extending an arm to reach for an object, the brain uses predictive models of both limb dynamics and target properties. Whether invertebrates use such models remains unclear. Here we examine to what extent prey interception by dragonflies (Plathemis lydia), a behaviour analogous to targeted reaching, requires internal models. By simultaneously tracking the position and orientation of a dragonfly’s head and body during flight, we provide evidence that interception steering is driven by forward and inverse models of dragonfly body dynamics and by models of prey motion. Predictive rotations of the dragonfly’s head continuously track the prey’s angular position. The head–body angles established by prey tracking appear to guide systematic rotations of the dragonfly’s body to align it with the prey’s flight path. Model-driven control thus underlies the bulk of interception steering manoeuvres, while vision is used for reactions to unexpected prey movements. These findings illuminate the computational sophistication with which insects construct behaviour."

--- Something was lost by not titling this "Faster, dragonfly! Kill, kill!"

--- ETA, from the accompanying news & views piece: "Of course, there is a limit to how much laboratory studies can tell us about dragonfly predation in the wild. The current experiments used... slow, laboratory-reared fruit flies that rarely take evasive action..."]]></description>
<dc:subject>psychology neuroscience cognition insects experimental_psychology experimental_biology neural_control_of_action inference_to_latent_objects in_NB to_read to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:eab2bbcec94f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:insects"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neural_control_of_action"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inference_to_latent_objects"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/48/17071.abstract">
    <title>Rethinking natural altruism: Simple reciprocal interactions trigger children’s benevolence</title>
    <dc:date>2014-12-06T17:12:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/48/17071.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A very simple reciprocal activity elicited high degrees of altruism in 1- and 2-y-old children, whereas friendly but nonreciprocal activity yielded little subsequent altruism. In a second study, reciprocity with one adult led 1- and 2-y-olds to provide help to a new person. These results question the current dominant claim that social experiences cannot account for early occurring altruistic behavior. A third study, with preschool-age children, showed that subtle reciprocal cues remain potent elicitors of altruism, whereas a fourth study with preschoolers showed that even a brief reciprocal experience fostered children’s expectation of altruism from others. Collectively, the studies suggest that simple reciprocal interactions are a potent trigger of altruism for young children, and that these interactions lead children to believe that their relationships are characterized by mutual care and commitment."

- Contributed, so who knows?]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation experimental_psychology psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d9e444599972/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v516/n7529/full/nature13977.html">
    <title>Business culture and dishonesty in the banking industry : Nature : Nature Publishing Group</title>
    <dc:date>2014-12-06T17:06:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v516/n7529/full/nature13977.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Trust in others’ honesty is a key component of the long-term performance of firms, industries, and even whole countries1, 2, 3, 4. However, in recent years, numerous scandals involving fraud have undermined confidence in the financial industry5, 6, 7. Contemporary commentators have attributed these scandals to the financial sector’s business culture8, 9, 10, but no scientific evidence supports this claim. Here we show that employees of a large, international bank behave, on average, honestly in a control condition. However, when their professional identity as bank employees is rendered salient, a significant proportion of them become dishonest. This effect is specific to bank employees because control experiments with employees from other industries and with students show that they do not become more dishonest when their professional identity or bank-related items are rendered salient. Our results thus suggest that the prevailing business culture in the banking industry weakens and undermines the honesty norm, implying that measures to re-establish an honest culture are very important."

--- Comment is superfluous, except that as a customer, I really want to know which bank.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_economics experimental_psychology trust evolution_of_cooperation institutions</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2fedb643d943/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:trust"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2431710">
    <title>Arguments, More than Confidence, Explain the Good Performance of Reasoning Groups by Emmanuel Trouche, Emmanuel Sander, Hugo Mercier :: SSRN</title>
    <dc:date>2014-10-13T12:53:41+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2431710</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In many intellective tasks groups consistently outperform individuals. One factor is that the individual(s) with the best answer is able to convince the other group members using sound argumentation. Another factor is that the most confident group member imposes her answer whether it is right or wrong. In Experiments 1 and 2, individual participants were given arguments against their answer in intellective tasks. Demonstrating sound argumentative competence, many participants changed their mind to adopt the correct answer even though the arguments had no confidence markers, and barely any participant changed their mind to adopt an incorrect answer. Confidence could not explain who changed their mind, as the least confident participants were as likely to change their mind as the most confident. In Experiments 3 (adults) and 4 (10-year-olds), participants solved intellective tasks individually and then in groups, before solving transfer problems individually. Demonstrating again sound argumentative competence, participants adopted the correct answer when it was present in the group, and many succeeded in transferring this understanding to novel problems. Moreover, the group member with the right answer nearly always managed to convince the group even when she was not the most confident. These results show that argument quality can overcome confidence among the factors influencing the discussion of intellective tasks. Explanations for apparent exceptions are discussed."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to_read cognitive_science experimental_psychology social_life_of_the_mind collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition mercier.hugo in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a110534d6d7f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mercier.hugo"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://datacolada.org/2014/05/01/20-we-cannot-afford-to-study-effect-size-in-the-lab/">
    <title>Data Colada | [20] We cannot afford to study effect size in the lab</title>
    <dc:date>2014-09-18T01:05:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://datacolada.org/2014/05/01/20-we-cannot-afford-to-study-effect-size-in-the-lab/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>statistics data_analysis psychology experimental_psychology estimation to_teach</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:422078f0deba/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:estimation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nicebread.de/a-comment-on-we-cannot-afford-to-study-effect-size-in-the-lab-from-the-datacolada-blog/">
    <title>Felix Schönbrodt's website</title>
    <dc:date>2014-09-18T01:05:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nicebread.de/a-comment-on-we-cannot-afford-to-study-effect-size-in-the-lab-from-the-datacolada-blog/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>statistics data_analysis psychology experimental_psychology estimation to_teach</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:7272d0a3931b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:estimation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.scottfraundorf.com/papers/FraundorfBenjamin_JML.pdf">
    <title>Knowing the Crowd Within: Metacognitive Limits on Combining Multiple Judgments</title>
    <dc:date>2014-09-08T13:46:24+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.scottfraundorf.com/papers/FraundorfBenjamin_JML.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We investigated how decision-makers use multiple opportunities to judge a quantity. Decision-makers undervalue the benefit of combining their own judgment with an advisor’s, but theories disagree about whether this bias would apply to combining several of one’s own judgments. Participants estimated percentage answers to general knowledge questions (e.g., What percent of the world's population uses the Internet?) on two occasions. In a final decision phase, they selected their first, second, or average estimate to report for each question. We manipulated the cues available for this final decision. Given cues to general theories (the labels first guess, second guess, average), participants mostly averaged, but no more frequently on trials where the average was most accurate. Given item-specific cues (numerical values of the options), metacognitive accuracy was at chance. Given both cues, participants mostly averaged and switched strategies based on whichever yielded the most accurate value on a given trial. These results indicate that underappreciation of averaging estimates does not stem only from social differences between the self and an advisor and that combining general and item-specific cues benefits metacognition"]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read experimental_psychology cognitive_science decision-making collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5c82a1b664b6/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2124/papers/popeleches_QJE.pdf">
    <title>HOME COMPUTER USE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN CAPITAL</title>
    <dc:date>2014-09-03T22:26:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2124/papers/popeleches_QJE.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of home computers on child and adolescent outcomes by exploiting a voucher pro- gram in Romania. Our main results indicate that home computers have both posi- tive and negative effects on the development of human capital. Children who won a voucher to purchase a computer had significantly lower school grades but show improved computer skills. There is also some evidence that winning a voucher increased cognitive skills, as measured by Raven’s Progressive Matrices. We do not find much evidence for an effect on non-cognitive outcomes. Parental rules re- garding homework and computer use attenuate the effects of computer ownership, suggesting that parental monitoring and supervision may be important mediating factors."

--- Note that the concept of "human capital" appears to be entirely superfluous to what they actually do with the data.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read computers cognitive_development experimental_psychology to_teach:undergrad-ADA causal_inference</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:aaf68ba3ba56/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:computers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_development"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:undergrad-ADA"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:causal_inference"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://author-zone.com/serif-readability-myth/">
    <title>The Serif Readability Myth - Author-Zone</title>
    <dc:date>2014-08-30T19:32:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://author-zone.com/serif-readability-myth/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>natural_history_of_truthiness typography experimental_psychology history_of_science social_life_of_the_mind via:vaguery tracked_down_references</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8f0f2d2726dc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:natural_history_of_truthiness"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:typography"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:vaguery"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:tracked_down_references"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/27/9786.abstract">
    <title>Behavioral and neural correlates of increased self-control in the absence of increased willpower</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-31T15:11:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/27/9786.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["People often exert willpower to choose a more valuable delayed reward over a less valuable immediate reward, but using willpower is taxing and frequently fails. In this research, we demonstrate the ability to enhance self-control (i.e., forgoing smaller immediate rewards in favor of larger delayed rewards) without exerting additional willpower. Using behavioral and neuroimaging data, we show that a reframing of rewards (i) reduced the subjective value of smaller immediate rewards relative to larger delayed rewards, (ii) increased the likelihood of choosing the larger delayed rewards when choosing between two real monetary rewards, (iii) reduced the brain reward responses to immediate rewards in the dorsal and ventral striatum, and (iv) reduced brain activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (a correlate of willpower) when participants chose the same larger later rewards across the two choice frames. We conclude that reframing can promote self-control while avoiding the need for additional willpower expenditure."

--- Contributed rather than reviewed, so who knows?]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology decision-making self-control psychology dweck.carol</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:44f2c6f1d5e5/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:self-control"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:dweck.carol"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v503/n7476/full/nature12774.html">
    <title>Experimental evidence for the influence of group size on cultural complexity : Nature : Nature Publishing Group</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-31T15:09:18+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v503/n7476/full/nature12774.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The remarkable ecological and demographic success of humanity is largely attributed to our capacity for cumulative culture1, 2, 3. The accumulation of beneficial cultural innovations across generations is puzzling because transmission events are generally imperfect, although there is large variance in fidelity. Events of perfect cultural transmission and innovations should be more frequent in a large population4. As a consequence, a large population size may be a prerequisite for the evolution of cultural complexity4, 5, although anthropological studies have produced mixed results6, 7, 8, 9 and empirical evidence is lacking10. Here we use a dual-task computer game to show that cultural evolution strongly depends on population size, as players in larger groups maintained higher cultural complexity. We found that when group size increases, cultural knowledge is less deteriorated, improvements to existing cultural traits are more frequent, and cultural trait diversity is maintained more often. Our results demonstrate how changes in group size can generate both adaptive cultural evolution and maladaptive losses of culturally acquired skills. As humans live in habitats for which they are ill-suited without specific cultural adaptations11, 12, it suggests that, in our evolutionary past, group-size reduction may have exposed human societies to significant risks, including societal collapse13."

--- See also "communication arising", doi:10.1038/nature13411, and reply]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read experimental_psychology experimental_sociology cultural_evolution social_life_of_the_mind collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition human_evolution</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4f5b26cbfde1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.abstract">
    <title>Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-31T14:46:37+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Emotional states can be transferred to others via emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions without their awareness. Emotional contagion is well established in laboratory experiments, with people transferring positive and negative emotions to others. Data from a large real-world social network, collected over a 20-y period suggests that longer-lasting moods (e.g., depression, happiness) can be transferred through networks [Fowler JH, Christakis NA (2008) BMJ 337:a2338], although the results are controversial. In an experiment with people who use Facebook, we test whether emotional contagion occurs outside of in-person interaction between individuals by reducing the amount of emotional content in the News Feed. When positive expressions were reduced, people produced fewer positive posts and more negative posts; when negative expressions were reduced, the opposite pattern occurred. These results indicate that emotions expressed by others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via social networks. This work also suggests that, in contrast to prevailing assumptions, in-person interaction and nonverbal cues are not strictly necessary for emotional contagion, and that the observation of others’ positive experiences constitutes a positive experience for people."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB contagion social_influence social_media networked_life network_data_analysis experimental_psychology experimental_sociology sentiment_analysis text_mining to:blog my_initial_skeptical_coloration_became_on_examination_a_permanent_stain</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5992f3385f40/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:contagion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_influence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_media"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:networked_life"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:network_data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sentiment_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:text_mining"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:my_initial_skeptical_coloration_became_on_examination_a_permanent_stain"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8949.abstract">
    <title>Way-finding in displaced clock-shifted bees proves bees use a cognitive map</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-31T14:45:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8949.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Mammals navigate by means of a metric cognitive map. Insects, most notably bees and ants, are also impressive navigators. The question whether they, too, have a metric cognitive map is important to cognitive science and neuroscience. Experimentally captured and displaced bees often depart from the release site in the compass direction they were bent on before their capture, even though this no longer heads them toward their goal. When they discover their error, however, the bees set off more or less directly toward their goal. This ability to orient toward a goal from an arbitrary point in the familiar environment is evidence that they have an integrated metric map of the experienced environment. We report a test of an alternative hypothesis, which is that all the bees have in memory is a collection of snapshots that enable them to recognize different landmarks and, associated with each such snapshot, a sun-compass–referenced home vector derived from dead reckoning done before and after previous visits to the landmark. We show that a large shift in the sun-compass rapidly induced by general anesthesia does not alter the accuracy or speed of the homeward-oriented flight made after the bees discover the error in their initial postrelease flight. This result rules out the sun-referenced home-vector hypothesis, further strengthening the now extensive evidence for a metric cognitive map in bees."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB bees insects cognitive_science experimental_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:9527efba8315/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bees"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:insects"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/14/14307/jdm14307.html">
    <title>Using metacognitive cues to infer others' thinking</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T14:57:20+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://journal.sjdm.org/14/14307/jdm14307.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Three studies tested whether people use cues about the way other people think—for example, whether others respond fast vs. slow—to infer what responses other people might give to reasoning problems. People who solve reasoning problems using deliberative thinking have better insight than intuitive problem-solvers into the responses that other people might give to the same problems. Presumably because deliberative responders think of intuitive responses before they think of deliberative responses, they are aware that others might respond intuitively, particularly in circumstances that hinder deliberative thinking (e.g., fast responding). Intuitive responders, on the other hand, are less aware of alternative responses to theirs, so they infer that other people respond as they do, regardless of the way others respond."

--- I will be curious to see how they back up that "Presumably because".]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology cognitive_science</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b2981f3eac0e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.7586">
    <title>[1406.7586] Facts and Figuring: An Experimental Investigation of Network Structure and Performance in Information and Solution Spaces</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-12T01:09:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.7586</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Using data from a large laboratory experiment on problem solving in which we varied the structure of 16-person networks we investigate how an organization's network structure may be constructed to optimize performance in complex problem-solving tasks. Problem solving involves both search for information and search for theories to make sense of that information. We show that the effect of network structure is opposite for these two equally important forms of search. Dense clustering encourages members of a network to generate more diverse information, but it also has the power to discourage the generation of diverse theories: clustering promotes exploration in information space, but decreases exploration in solution space. Previous research, tending to focus on only one of those two spaces, had produced inconsistent conclusions about the value of network clustering. By adopting an experimental platform on which information was measured separately from solutions, we were able to reconcile past contradictions and clarify the effects of network clustering on performance. The finding both provides a sharper tool for structuring organizations for knowledge work and reveals the challenges inherent in manipulating network structure to enhance performance, as the communication structure that helps one aspect of problem solving may harm the other."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to_read experimental_sociology experimental_psychology collective_cognition social_life_of_the_mind lazer.david re:democratic_cognition in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:840a6a86fa57/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:lazer.david"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.7564">
    <title>[1406.7564] Analytical reasoning task reveals limits of social learning in networks</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-12T01:07:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.7564</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social learning -by observing and copying others- is a highly successful cultural mechanism for adaptation, outperforming individual information acquisition and experience. Here, we investigate social learning in the context of the uniquely human capacity for reflective, analytical reasoning. A hallmark of the human mind is our ability to engage analytical reasoning, and suppress false associative intuitions. Through a set of lab-based network experiments, we find that social learning fails to propagate this cognitive strategy. When people make false intuitive conclusions, and are exposed to the analytic output of their peers, they recognize and adopt this correct output. But they fail to engage analytical reasoning in similar subsequent tasks. Thus, humans exhibit an 'unreflective copying bias,' which limits their social learning to the output, rather than the process, of their peers' reasoning -even when doing so requires minimal effort and no technical skill. In contrast to much recent work on observation-based social learning, which emphasizes the propagation of successful behavior through copying, our findings identify a limit on the power of social networks in situations that require analytical reasoning."

--- OK, before reading beyond the abstract, I have a problem.  To learn from someone else here by just seeing their conclusion, you'd have to solve a potentially very complicated inverse problem, of reconstructing their train of reasoning.  In a phrase: social learning of reasoning only works if you share the reasons.  (Thus Mercier and Sperber, or for that matter Socrates.)]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read experimental_psychology social_life_of_the_mind re:democratic_cognition color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d3e89b1fde26/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full">
    <title>Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-29T19:12:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Emotional states can be transferred to others via emotional contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions without their awareness. Emotional contagion is well established in laboratory experiments, with people transferring positive and negative emotions to others. Data from a large real-world social network, collected over a 20-y period suggests that longer-lasting moods (e.g., depression, happiness) can be transferred through networks [Fowler JH, Christakis NA (2008) BMJ 337:a2338], although the results are controversial. In an experiment with people who use Facebook, we test whether emotional contagion occurs outside of in-person interaction between individuals by reducing the amount of emotional content in the News Feed. When positive expressions were reduced, people produced fewer positive posts and more negative posts; when negative expressions were reduced, the opposite pattern occurred. These results indicate that emotions expressed by others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via social networks. This work also suggests that, in contrast to prevailing assumptions, in-person interaction and nonverbal cues are not strictly necessary for emotional contagion, and that the observation of others’ positive experiences constitutes a positive experience for people."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read social_influence contagion experimental_psychology psychology re:homophily_and_confounding color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b7336a677816/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_influence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:contagion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:homophily_and_confounding"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/06/instinct-can-beat-analytical-thinking/">
    <title>Instinct Can Beat Analytical Thinking - Justin Fox - Harvard Business Review</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-25T13:04:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/06/instinct-can-beat-analytical-thinking/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>cognitive_science experimental_psychology decision-making heuristics gigerenzer.gerd interview via:? have_read to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2b00bc272a8d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gigerenzer.gerd"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:interview"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:?"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/37/14837.abstract">
    <title>Beliefs about willpower determine the impact of glucose on self-control</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-17T18:55:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/37/14837.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Past research found that the ingestion of glucose can enhance self-control. It has been widely assumed that basic physiological processes underlie this effect. We hypothesized that the effect of glucose also depends on people’s theories about willpower. Three experiments, both measuring (experiment 1) and manipulating (experiments 2 and 3) theories about willpower, showed that, following a demanding task, only people who view willpower as limited and easily depleted (a limited resource theory) exhibited improved self-control after sugar consumption. In contrast, people who view willpower as plentiful (a nonlimited resource theory) showed no benefits from glucose—they exhibited high levels of self-control performance with or without sugar boosts. Additionally, creating beliefs about glucose ingestion (experiment 3) did not have the same effect as ingesting glucose for those with a limited resource theory. We suggest that the belief that willpower is limited sensitizes people to cues about their available resources including physiological cues, making them dependent on glucose boosts for high self-control performance."

--- Contributed rather than peer-reviewed, so who knows?]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology self-control dweck.carol</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e281076f2b3d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:self-control"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:dweck.carol"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/52/20941.abstract">
    <title>Working-memory capacity protects model-based learning from stress</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-17T18:44:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/52/20941.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Accounts of decision-making have long posited the operation of separate, competing valuation systems in the control of choice behavior. Recent theoretical and experimental advances suggest that this classic distinction between habitual and goal-directed (or more generally, automatic and controlled) choice may arise from two computational strategies for reinforcement learning, called model-free and model-based learning. Popular neurocomputational accounts of reward processing emphasize the involvement of the dopaminergic system in model-free learning and prefrontal, central executive–dependent control systems in model-based choice. Here we hypothesized that the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis stress response—believed to have detrimental effects on prefrontal cortex function—should selectively attenuate model-based contributions to behavior. To test this, we paired an acute stressor with a sequential decision-making task that affords distinguishing the relative contributions of the two learning strategies. We assessed baseline working-memory (WM) capacity and used salivary cortisol levels to measure HPA axis stress response. We found that stress response attenuates the contribution of model-based, but not model-free, contributions to behavior. Moreover, stress-induced behavioral changes were modulated by individual WM capacity, such that low-WM-capacity individuals were more susceptible to detrimental stress effects than high-WM-capacity individuals. These results enrich existing accounts of the interplay between acute stress, working memory, and prefrontal function and suggest that executive function may be protective against the deleterious effects of acute stress."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB decision-making experimental_psychology cognitive_science stress</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:02d22ab98d65/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stress"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/12/4403.abstract">
    <title>How stereotypes impair women’s careers in science</title>
    <dc:date>2014-04-24T13:47:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/12/4403.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Women outnumber men in undergraduate enrollments, but they are much less likely than men to major in mathematics or science or to choose a profession in these fields. This outcome often is attributed to the effects of negative sex-based stereotypes. We studied the effect of such stereotypes in an experimental market, where subjects were hired to perform an arithmetic task that, on average, both genders perform equally well. We find that without any information other than a candidate’s appearance (which makes sex clear), both male and female subjects are twice more likely to hire a man than a woman. The discrimination survives if performance on the arithmetic task is self-reported, because men tend to boast about their performance, whereas women generally underreport it. The discrimination is reduced, but not eliminated, by providing full information about previous performance on the task. By using the Implicit Association Test, we show that implicit stereotypes are responsible for the initial average bias in sex-related beliefs and for a bias in updating expectations when performance information is self-reported. That is, employers biased against women are less likely to take into account the fact that men, on average, boast more than women about their future performance, leading to suboptimal hiring choices that remain biased in favor of men."

--- There is a bit of a leap from "an experimental market, where subjects were hired to perform an arithmetic task" to "careers in science", but OK.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read experimental_psychology experimental_economics sexism science_as_a_social_process</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b788a6231886/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sexism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:science_as_a_social_process"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/16/5842.abstract">
    <title>Language learners privilege structured meaning over surface frequency</title>
    <dc:date>2014-04-24T00:11:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/16/5842.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Although it is widely agreed that learning the syntax of natural languages involves acquiring structure-dependent rules, recent work on acquisition has nevertheless attempted to characterize the outcome of learning primarily in terms of statistical generalizations about surface distributional information. In this paper we investigate whether surface statistical knowledge or structural knowledge of English is used to infer properties of a novel language under conditions of impoverished input. We expose learners to artificial-language patterns that are equally consistent with two possible underlying grammars—one more similar to English in terms of the linear ordering of words, the other more similar on abstract structural grounds. We show that learners’ grammatical inferences overwhelmingly favor structural similarity over preservation of superficial order. Importantly, the relevant shared structure can be characterized in terms of a universal preference for isomorphism in the mapping from meanings to utterances. Whereas previous empirical support for this universal has been based entirely on data from cross-linguistic language samples, our results suggest it may reflect a deep property of the human cognitive system—a property that, together with other structure-sensitive principles, constrains the acquisition of linguistic knowledge."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB cognitive_science grammar_induction experimental_psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5a931eac7fb1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:grammar_induction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/15/5503.abstract">
    <title>Oxytocin promotes group-serving dishonesty</title>
    <dc:date>2014-04-24T00:10:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/15/5503.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["To protect and promote the well-being of others, humans may bend the truth and behave unethically. Here we link such tendencies to oxytocin, a neuropeptide known to promote affiliation and cooperation with others. Using a simple coin-toss prediction task in which participants could dishonestly report their performance levels to benefit their group’s outcome, we tested the prediction that oxytocin increases group-serving dishonesty. A double-blind, placebo-controlled experiment allowing individuals to lie privately and anonymously to benefit themselves and fellow group members showed that healthy males (n = 60) receiving intranasal oxytocin, rather than placebo, lied more to benefit their group, and did so faster, yet did not necessarily do so because they expected reciprocal dishonesty from fellow group members. Treatment effects emerged when lying had financial consequences and money could be gained; when losses were at stake, individuals in placebo and oxytocin conditions lied to similar degrees. In a control condition (n = 60) in which dishonesty only benefited participants themselves, but not fellow group members, oxytocin did not influence lying. Together, these findings fit a functional perspective on morality revealing dishonesty to be plastic and rooted in evolved neurobiological circuitries, and align with work showing that oxytocin shifts the decision-maker’s focus from self to group interests. These findings highlight the role of bonding and cooperation in shaping dishonesty, providing insight into when and why collaboration turns into corruption."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology moral_psychology endocrinology pro-social_behavior_or_not</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8824a5ddac79/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:endocrinology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:pro-social_behavior_or_not"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/04/cat_intelligence_and_cognition_are_cats_smarter_than_dogs.html">
    <title>Cat intelligence and cognition: Are cats smarter than dogs?</title>
    <dc:date>2014-04-22T01:02:39+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/04/cat_intelligence_and_cognition_are_cats_smarter_than_dogs.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[In typical _Slate_ style, the article actually has nothing to do with whether cats are smarter than dogs, but the sub-heading, "inside the mind of the world’s most uncooperative research subject", isn't bad.]]></description>
<dc:subject>experimental_psychology cats under_precisely_controlled_experimental_conditions_the_organism_does_what_it_damn_well_pleases</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:35fc16ee9e2f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cats"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:under_precisely_controlled_experimental_conditions_the_organism_does_what_it_damn_well_pleases"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2917">
    <title>[1404.2917] How to test cognitive theory with fMRI</title>
    <dc:date>2014-04-20T18:23:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2917</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The objective of this chapter is to provide a guide to using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to inform cognitive theory. This is, of course, a daunting task, as the premise itself - that fMRI data can inform cognitive theory - is still actively debated. Below, we touch on this debate as a means of framing our guide. In particular, we argue that cognitive theories can be constrained by neuroscientific data, including that offered by fMRI, but to do so requires embellishing the cognitive theory so that it can make predictions for neuroscience; much the same as how testing a cognitive theory using behavior requires embellishing that theory to make experimentally realizable behavioral predictions (i.e., the process of generating operational definitions). Moreover, recent years have seen the development of several new approaches that allow fMRI to better test neurally-embellished models. Along with a review of several ways of testing neurally-embellished cognitive theory using fMRI, we also consider the inferential challenges that can accompany these approaches. Readers of this chapter should gain an understanding of both of the potential power and the challenges associated with fMRI as a cognitive neuroscience methodology."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB fmri experimental_psychology cognitive_science statistics methodological_advice to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1d5626c547fe/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:fmri"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:methodological_advice"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://journal.sjdm.org/14/14206/jdm14206.html">
    <title>Approximating rationality under incomplete information: Adaptive inferences for missing cue values based on cue-discrimination</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-31T19:00:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://journal.sjdm.org/14/14206/jdm14206.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In a highly uncertain world, individuals often have to make decisions in situations with incomplete information. We investigated in three experiments how partial cue information is treated in complex probabilistic inference tasks. Specifically, we test a mechanism to infer missing cue values that is based on the discrimination rate of cues (i.e., how often a cue makes distinct predictions for choice options). We show analytically that inferring missing cue values based on discrimination rate maximizes the probability for a correct inference in many decision environments and that it is therefore adaptive to use it. Results from three experiments show that individuals are sensitive to the discrimination rate and use it when it is a valid inference mechanism but rely on other inference mechanisms, such as the cues’ base-rate of positive information, when it is not. We find adaptive inferences for incomplete information in environments in which participants are explicitly provided with information concerning the base-rate and discrimination rate of cues (Exp. 1) as well as in environments in which they learn these properties by experience (Exp. 2). Results also hold in environments of further increased complexity (Exp. 3). In all studies, participants show a high ability to adaptively infer incomplete information and to integrate this inferred information with other available cues to approximate the naïve Bayesian solution."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology decision_theory heuristics cognitive_science</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:931d2c25a5b2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.51.4.1155">
    <title>JEL (51,4) p. 1155 - A Review Essay about Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis by Paul Glimcher</title>
    <dc:date>2013-12-12T16:42:31+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.51.4.1155</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Neuroeconomics aims to discover mechanisms of economic decision, and express them mathematically, to predict observed choice. While the contents of neuroeconomic models and evidence are obviously different than in traditional economics, (some of the) goals are identical: to explain and predict choice, the effects of comparative statics, and perhaps make interesting new welfare judgments that are defensible. To this end, Paul Glimcher's important book carefully describes how economics, psychological, and neural levels of explanation can be linked (a structure which has been successful in visual neuroscience). As Glimcher shows, the neural evidence is quite strong for a process of learning valuations through prediction error, and a simple model of neural valuation and comparison that corresponds to random utility (though subject to normalization, which produces menu effects). There is also rapidly growing evidence for more complicated constructs in behavioral economics, including prospect theory's account of risky choice, hyperbolic time discounting, level-k models of games, and social preferences corresponding to internal reward based on what happens to other agents."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology experimental_economics decision-making neuroscience economics to_read entableted</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:98db417de23d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:entableted"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/29/12138.abstract">
    <title>Family-based training program improves brain function, cognition, and behavior in lower socioeconomic status preschoolers</title>
    <dc:date>2013-11-22T19:09:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/29/12138.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Using information from research on the neuroplasticity of selective attention and on the central role of successful parenting in child development, we developed and rigorously assessed a family-based training program designed to improve brain systems for selective attention in preschool children. One hundred forty-one lower socioeconomic status preschoolers enrolled in a Head Start program were randomly assigned to the training program, Head Start alone, or an active control group. Electrophysiological measures of children’s brain functions supporting selective attention, standardized measures of cognition, and parent-reported child behaviors all favored children in the treatment program relative to both control groups. Positive changes were also observed in the parents themselves. Effect sizes ranged from one-quarter to half of a standard deviation. These results lend impetus to the further development and broader implementation of evidence-based education programs that target at-risk families."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read re:g_paper cognitive_development experimental_psychology inequality color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0341dc4e307c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:g_paper"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_development"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inequality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.3475">
    <title>[1311.3475] Social Influence and the Collective Dynamics of Opinion Formation</title>
    <dc:date>2013-11-18T14:25:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1311.3475</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social influence is the process by which individuals adapt their opinion, revise their beliefs, or change their behavior as a result of social interactions with other people. In our strongly interconnected society, social influence plays a prominent role in many self-organized phenomena such as herding in cultural markets, the spread of ideas and innovations, and the amplification of fears during epidemics. Yet, the mechanisms of opinion formation remain poorly understood, and existing physics-based models lack systematic empirical validation. Here, we report two controlled experiments showing how participants answering factual questions revise their initial judgments after being exposed to the opinion and confidence level of others. Based on the observation of 59 experimental subjects exposed to peer-opinion for 15 different items, we draw an influence map that describes the strength of peer influence during interactions. A simple process model derived from our observations demonstrates how opinions in a group of interacting people can converge or split over repeated interactions. In particular, we identify two major attractors of opinion: (i) the expert effect, induced by the presence of a highly confident individual in the group, and (ii) the majority effect, caused by the presence of a critical mass of laypeople sharing similar opinions. Additional simulations reveal the existence of a tipping point at which one attractor will dominate over the other, driving collective opinion in a given direction. These findings have implications for understanding the mechanisms of public opinion formation and managing conflicting situations in which self-confident and better informed minorities challenge the views of a large uninformed majority."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology experimental_sociology decision-making social_influence social_life_of_the_mind collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:098b63e02176/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_influence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/40/16271.abstract">
    <title>Perceptuo-motor, cognitive, and description-based decision-making seem equally good</title>
    <dc:date>2013-10-21T15:49:52+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/40/16271.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Classical studies suggest that high-level cognitive decisions (e.g., choosing between financial options) are suboptimal. In contrast, low-level decisions (e.g., choosing where to put your feet on a rocky ridge) appear near-optimal: the perception–cognition gap. Moreover, in classical tasks, people appear to put too much weight on unlikely events. In contrast, when people can learn through experience, they appear to put too little weight on unlikely events: the description–experience gap. We eliminated confounding factors and, contrary to what is commonly believed, found results suggesting that (i) the perception–cognition gap is illusory and due to differences in the way performance is assessed; (ii) the description–experience gap arises from the assumption that objective probabilities match subjective ones; (iii) people’s ability to make decisions is better than the classical literature suggests; and (iv) differences between decision-makers are more important for predicting peoples’ choices than differences between choice tasks."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB decision-making cognitive_science heuristics experimental_psychology to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a2efa66af728/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:heuristics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=7715">
    <title>Language Log » Annals of overgeneralization</title>
    <dc:date>2013-10-11T23:55:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=7715</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>bad_data_analysis literary_criticism experimental_psychology evisceration why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system liberman.mark</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b42f3428b0ea/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bad_data_analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:literary_criticism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evisceration"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_academic_publishing_system"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:liberman.mark"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/29/11779.abstract">
    <title>How psychological framing affects economic market prices in the lab and field</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-19T19:03:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/29/11779.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A fundamental debate in social sciences concerns how individual judgments and choices, resulting from psychological mechanisms, are manifested in collective economic behavior. Economists emphasize the capacity of markets to aggregate information distributed among traders into rational equilibrium prices. However, psychologists have identified pervasive and systematic biases in individual judgment that they generally assume will affect collective behavior. In particular, recent studies have found that judged likelihoods of possible events vary systematically with the way the entire event space is partitioned, with probabilities of each of N partitioned events biased toward 1/N. Thus, combining events into a common partition lowers perceived probability, and unpacking events into separate partitions increases their perceived probability. We look for evidence of such bias in various prediction markets, in which prices can be interpreted as probabilities of upcoming events. In two highly controlled experimental studies, we find clear evidence of partition dependence in a 2-h laboratory experiment and a field experiment on National Basketball Association (NBA) and Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA World Cup) sports events spanning several weeks. We also find evidence consistent with partition dependence in nonexperimental field data from prediction markets for economic derivatives (guessing the values of important macroeconomic statistics) and horse races. Results in any one of the studies might be explained by a specialized alternative theory, but no alternative theories can explain the results of all four studies. We conclude that psychological biases in individual judgment can affect market prices, and understanding those effects requires combining a variety of methods from psychology and economics."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics psychology experimental_psychology experimental_economics decision-making market_failures_in_everything</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:cbec3c097da1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:market_failures_in_everything"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v501/n7465/full/nature12486.html">
    <title>Video game training enhances cognitive control in older adults : Nature : Nature Publishing Group</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-05T01:28:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v501/n7465/full/nature12486.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Cognitive control is defined by a set of neural processes that allow us to interact with our complex environment in a goal-directed manner1. Humans regularly challenge these control processes when attempting to simultaneously accomplish multiple goals (multitasking), generating interference as the result of fundamental information processing limitations2. It is clear that multitasking behaviour has become ubiquitous in today’s technologically dense world3, and substantial evidence has accrued regarding multitasking difficulties and cognitive control deficits in our ageing population4. Here we show that multitasking performance, as assessed with a custom-designed three-dimensional video game (NeuroRacer), exhibits a linear age-related decline from 20 to 79 years of age. By playing an adaptive version of NeuroRacer in multitasking training mode, older adults (60 to 85 years old) reduced multitasking costs compared to both an active control group and a no-contact control group, attaining levels beyond those achieved by untrained 20-year-old participants, with gains persisting for 6 months. Furthermore, age-related deficits in neural signatures of cognitive control, as measured with electroencephalography, were remediated by multitasking training (enhanced midline frontal theta power and frontal–posterior theta coherence). Critically, this training resulted in performance benefits that extended to untrained cognitive control abilities (enhanced sustained attention and working memory), with an increase in midline frontal theta power predicting the training-induced boost in sustained attention and preservation of multitasking improvement 6 months later. These findings highlight the robust plasticity of the prefrontal cognitive control system in the ageing brain, and provide the first evidence, to our knowledge, of how a custom-designed video game can be used to assess cognitive abilities across the lifespan, evaluate underlying neural mechanisms, and serve as a powerful tool for cognitive enhancement."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology experimental_psychology aging video_games</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f3f168d8ec7d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:aging"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:video_games"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.sciencemag.org/content/341/6149/976.full">
    <title>Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-04T23:56:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.sciencemag.org/content/341/6149/976.full</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The poor often behave in less capable ways, which can further perpetuate poverty. We hypothesize that poverty directly impedes cognitive function and present two studies that test this hypothesis. First, we experimentally induced thoughts about finances and found that this reduces cognitive performance among poor but not in well-off participants. Second, we examined the cognitive function of farmers over the planting cycle. We found that the same farmer shows diminished cognitive performance before harvest, when poor, as compared with after harvest, when rich. This cannot be explained by differences in time available, nutrition, or work effort. Nor can it be explained with stress: Although farmers do show more stress before harvest, that does not account for diminished cognitive performance. Instead, it appears that poverty itself reduces cognitive capacity. We suggest that this is because poverty-related concerns consume mental resources, leaving less for other tasks. These data provide a previously unexamined perspective and help explain a spectrum of behaviors among the poor. We discuss some implications for poverty policy."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology to_read social_psychology inequality poverty economics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2f14b21de017/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inequality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:poverty"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/36/14574.abstract">
    <title>Neural mechanisms of communicative innovation</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-04T03:58:17+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/36/14574.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Human referential communication is often thought as coding–decoding a set of symbols, neglecting that establishing shared meanings requires a computational mechanism powerful enough to mutually negotiate them. Sharing the meaning of a novel symbol might rely on similar conceptual inferences across communicators or on statistical similarities in their sensorimotor behaviors. Using magnetoencephalography, we assess spectral, temporal, and spatial characteristics of neural activity evoked when people generate and understand novel shared symbols during live communicative interactions. Solving those communicative problems induced comparable changes in the spectral profile of neural activity of both communicators and addressees. This shared neuronal up-regulation was spatially localized to the right temporal lobe and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and emerged already before the occurrence of a specific communicative problem. Communicative innovation relies on neuronal computations that are shared across generating and understanding novel shared symbols, operating over temporal scales independent from transient sensorimotor behavior."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB neuroscience linguistics experimental_psychology relevance</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:92e2cb6849c7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:linguistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:relevance"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/36/14586.abstract">
    <title>Ontogeny of prosocial behavior across diverse societies</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-04T03:57:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/36/14586.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species, but there is substantial variation in the extent of cooperation across societies. Understanding the sources of this variability may provide insights about the forces that sustain cooperation. We examined the ontogeny of prosocial behavior by studying 326 children 3–14 y of age and 120 adults from six societies (age distributions varied across societies). These six societies span a wide range of extant human variation in culture, geography, and subsistence strategies, including foragers, herders, horticulturalists, and urban dwellers across the Americas, Oceania, and Africa. When delivering benefits to others was personally costly, rates of prosocial behavior dropped across all six societies as children approached middle childhood and then rates of prosociality diverged as children tracked toward the behavior of adults in their own societies. When prosocial acts did not require personal sacrifice, prosocial responses increased steadily as children matured with little variation in behavior across societies. Our results are consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of acquired cultural norms in shaping costly forms of cooperation and creating cross-cultural diversity."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology cross-cultural_psychology evolution_of_cooperation institutions</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d6d38a2abc2e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cross-cultural_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>