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    <description>recent bookmarks from cshalizi</description>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2012/07/zerodeterminant_strategies_in.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dannyreviews.com/h/Cooperative_Species.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://www.pnas.org/content/109/25/9929.abstract"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~bowles/PersistentInst.pdf"/>
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    <title>OPEC, the Seven Sisters, and oil market dominance: An evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling approach - ScienceDirect</title>
    <dc:date>2026-03-27T19:56:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268116301202?via%3Dihub</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A methodological toolkit comprised of evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling is used to study OPEC and the Seven Sisters as they struggled for control over global petroleum markets during the 1960s and 1970s. An evolutionary game theory model incorporates heterogeneous populations, energy-specific variables, and behavioral considerations to capture the fundamentals of the applied problem. An agent-based model is used to provide detailed results and demonstrate the importance of the natural resource to the outcome of the model."


]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read economic_history agent-based_models evolutionary_game_theory via:aeo 20th_century_history</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ceba46bcf38f/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20230458">
    <title>A Stepping Stone Approach to Norm Transitions - American Economic Association</title>
    <dc:date>2025-09-22T17:14:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20230458</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We propose a model to study when an intermediate action can serve as a stepping stone that enables the elimination of a harmful norm. While the intermediate action may facilitate the first "step," it may also become a new norm. We derive intuitive conditions for stepping stones, which depend on the relative size of social penalties and intrinsic utility benefits. We propose an econometric approach to testing whether an intermediate action is a stepping stone, and apply it to original data on female genital cutting in Somalia. The analysis shows that the intermediate action may become the new norm."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read young.h_peyton institutions cultural_evolution re:do-institutions-evolve evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:97fbe7c5d5da/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_evolution"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/26062/">
    <title>Fairness and Signaling in Bargaining Games - PhilSci-Archive</title>
    <dc:date>2025-08-05T13:26:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/26062/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Cultural evolutionary models of bargaining can elucidate issues related to fairness and justice, and especially how fair and unfair conventions and norms might arise in human societies. One line of this research shows how the presence of social categories in such models creates inequitable equilibria that are not possible in models without social categories. This is taken to help explain why in human groups with social categories, inequity is the rule rather than the exception. But in previous models, it is typically assumed that these categories are rigid---in the sense that they cannot be altered, and easily observable---in the sense that all agents can identify each others' category membership. In reality, social categories are not always so tidy. We introduce evolutionary models where the tags connected with social categories can be flexible, variable, or difficult to observe, i.e., where these tags can carry different amounts of information about group membership. We show how alterations to these tags can undermine the stability of unfair conventions. We argue that these results can inform projects intended to ameliorate inequity, especially projects that seek to alter the properties of tags by promoting experimentation, imitation, and play with identity markers."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read evolutionary_game_theory inequality to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination re:do-institutions-evolve o'connor.cailin</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e203827a0dd2/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2413847122">
    <title>Reconciling ecology and evolutionary game theory or “When not to think cooperation” | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2025-04-22T15:32:57+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2413847122</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Evolutionary game theory (EGT)—overwhelmingly employed today for the study of cooperation in various systems, from microbes to cancer and from insect to human societies—started with the seminal 1973 paper by Maynard Smith and Price showing that limited animal conflict can be selected at the individual level. Owing to the explanatory potential of this paper and enabled by the powerful machinery of the soon-to-be-developed replicator dynamics, EGT took off at an accelerated pace and began to shape expectations across systems and scales. But, even as EGT has expanded its reach, and even as its mathematical foundations expanded with the development of adaptive dynamics and inclusion of stochastic processes, the replicator equation remains, half a century later, its most widely used equation. Owing to its early development and its staying power, the replicator dynamics has helped set both the baseline expectations and the terminology of the field. However, much like the original 1973 paper, replicator dynamics rests on the assumption that individual differences in reproduction are determined only by the payoff from the game (i.e., in isolation, all individuals, regardless of their strategy, have identical intrinsic growth rates). Here, we argue that this assumption limits the scope of replicator dynamics to such an extent as to warrant not just a more deliberative application process, but also a reconsideration of the broad predictions and terminology that it has generated. Simultaneously, we reestablish a dialog with ecology that can be mutually fruitful, e.g., by providing an explanation for how diverse ecological communities can assemble evolutionarily."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory ecology evolution_of_cooperation via:?</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3025bb8e6a9d/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2414291121">
    <title>Social learning with complex contagion | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2025-01-06T21:11:17+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2414291121</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Traditional models of social learning by imitation are based on simple contagion—where an individual may imitate a more successful neighbor following a single interaction. But real-world contagion processes are often complex, meaning that multiple exposures may be required before an individual considers changing their type. We introduce a framework that combines the concepts of simple payoff-biased imitation with complex contagion, to describe how social behaviors spread through a population. We formulate this model as a discrete time and state stochastic process in a finite population, and we derive its continuum limit as an ordinary differential equation that generalizes the replicator equation, a widely used dynamical model in evolutionary game theory. When applied to linear frequency-dependent games, social learning with complex contagion produces qualitatively different outcomes than traditional imitation dynamics: it can shift the Prisoner’s Dilemma from a unique all-defector equilibrium to either a stable mixture of cooperators and defectors in the population, or a bistable system; it changes the Snowdrift game from a single to a bistable equilibrium; and it can alter the Coordination game from bistability at the boundaries to two internal equilibria. The long-term outcome depends on the balance between the complexity of the contagion process and the strength of selection that biases imitation toward more successful types. Our analysis intercalates the fields of evolutionary game theory with complex contagions, and it provides a synthetic framework to describe more realistic forms of behavioral change in social systems."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory social_learning re:do-institutions-evolve to_read social_contagion sds_icsd_search</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:65ca333cef90/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://crookedtimber.org/2024/02/12/how-the-battle-of-the-sexes-sheds-light-on-the-battle-of-the-sexes/">
    <title>How the Battle of the Sexes sheds light on the battle of the sexes — Crooked Timber</title>
    <dc:date>2024-02-18T05:04:39+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://crookedtimber.org/2024/02/12/how-the-battle-of-the-sexes-sheds-light-on-the-battle-of-the-sexes/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>institutions inequality evolutionary_game_theory farrell.henry knight.jack to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8441f1486cae/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:farrell.henry"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1350178X.2022.2035796">
    <title>Darwinian rational expectations: Journal of Economic Methodology: Vol 29, No 2</title>
    <dc:date>2023-12-16T04:09:23+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1350178X.2022.2035796</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The rational expectations hypothesis holds that agents should be modeled as not making systematic forecasting errors and has become a central model-building principle of modern economics. The hypothesis is often justified on the grounds that it coheres with the general methodological principle of economic rationality. In this article, I propose a novel Darwinian market justification for rational expectations which does not require either structural knowledge or statistical learning, as is commonly required in the economic literature. Rather, this Darwinian market account reconceives rationality as a market level phenomenon instead of as an individualistic property."

--- I presume they distinguish this from Alchain somehow.
--- ETA: On a quick scan, Alchain shows up at the very end.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics rationality evolutionary_game_theory philosophy_of_science</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:76add62eaeba/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21910/">
    <title>The Map/Territory Relationship in Game-Theoretic Modeling of Cultural Evolution - PhilSci-Archive</title>
    <dc:date>2023-12-16T04:00:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/21910/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The cultural red king effect occurs when discriminatory bargaining practices emerge because of a disparity in learning speed between members of a minority and a majority. This effect has been shown to occur in some Nash Demand Game models and has been proposed as a tool for shedding light on the origins of sexist and racist discrimination in academic collaborations. This paper argues that none of the three main strategies used in the literature to support the epistemic value of these models—structural similarity, empirical confirmation, and how-possibly explanations—provides strong support for this modeling practice in its present form."

--- Re last tag, obviously I wouldn't actually teach this, but I should read this if I'm going to teach that kind of model again]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory institutions inequality philosophy_of_science social_science_methodology to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:20bc71876bb6/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inequality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.08636">
    <title>[2104.08636] Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-23T03:18:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.08636</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Can egalitarian norms or conventions survive the presence of dominant individuals who are ensured of victory in conflicts? We investigate the interaction of power asymmetry and partner choice in games of conflict over a contested resource. We introduce three models to study the emergence and resilience of cooperation among unequals when interaction is random, when individuals can choose their partners, and where power asymmetries dynamically depend on accumulated payoffs. We find that the ability to avoid bullies with higher competitive ability afforded by partner choice mostly restores cooperative conventions and that the competitive hierarchy never forms. Partner choice counteracts the hyper dominance of bullies who are isolated in the network and eliminates the need for others to coordinate in a coalition. When competitive ability dynamically depends on cumulative payoffs, complex cycles of coupled network-strategy-rank changes emerge. Effective collaborators gain popularity (and thus power), adopt aggressive behavior, get isolated, and ultimately lose power. Neither the network nor behavior converge to a stable equilibrium. Despite the instability of power dynamics, the cooperative convention in the population remains stable overall and long-term inequality is completely eliminated. The interaction between partner choice and dynamic power asymmetry is crucial for these results: without partner choice, bullies cannot be isolated, and without dynamic power asymmetry, bullies do not lose their power even when isolated. We analytically identify a single critical point that marks a phase transition in all three iterations of our models. This critical point is where the first individual breaks from the convention and cycles start to emerge."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory re:pareto_at_melos</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ee0654e0f776/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:pareto_at_melos"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-origins-of-unfairness-9780198789970?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;#">
    <title>The Origins of Unfairness: Social Categories and Cultural Evolution - Cailin O'Connor - Oxford University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-16T03:04:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-origins-of-unfairness-9780198789970?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;#</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In almost every human society some people get more and others get less. Why is inequity the rule in these societies? In The Origins of Unfairness, philosopher Cailin O'Connor firstly considers how groups are divided into social categories, like gender, race, and religion, to address this question. She uses the formal frameworks of game theory and evolutionary game theory to explore the cultural evolution of the conventions which piggyback on these seemingly irrelevant social categories. These frameworks elucidate a variety of topics from the innateness of gender differences, to collaboration in academia, to household bargaining, to minority disadvantage, to homophily. They help to show how inequity can emerge from simple processes of cultural change in groups with gender and racial categories, and under a wide array of situations. The process of learning conventions of coordination and resource division is such that some groups will tend to get more and others less. O'Connor offers solutions to such problems of coordination and resource division and also shows why we need to think of inequity as part of an ever evolving process. Surprisingly minimal conditions are needed to robustly produce phenomena related to inequity and, once inequity emerges in these models, it takes very little for it to persist indefinitely. Thus, those concerned with social justice must remain vigilant against the dynamic forces that push towards inequity."

--- Straight into my veins, as the saying goes.  (I read the introduction as an online sample and liked it a lot.)]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted cultural_evolution inequality social_theory evolutionary_game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve downloaded institutions sexism gender identity_group_formation to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3ad04d98a175/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inequality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sexism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gender"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:identity_group_formation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.14524">
    <title>[2012.14524] Why does individual learning endure when crowds are wiser?</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-03T20:01:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.14524</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The ability to learn from others (social learning) is often deemed a cause of human species success. But if social learning is indeed more efficient (whether less costly or more accurate) than individual learning, it raises the question of why would anyone engage in individual information seeking, which is a necessary condition for social learning's efficacy. We propose an evolutionary model solving this paradox, provided agents (i) aim not only at information quality but also vie for audience and prestige, and (ii) do not only value accuracy but also reward originality -- allowing them to alleviate herding effects. We find that under some conditions (large enough success rate of informed agents and intermediate taste for popularity), both social learning's higher accuracy and the taste for original opinions are evolutionary-stable, within a mutually beneficial division of labour-like equilibrium. When such conditions are not met, the system most often converges towards mutually detrimental equilibria."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cognition social_life_of_the_mind collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ab63dca78864/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://journals.aps.org/pre/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevE.102.062419">
    <title>Phys. Rev. E 102, 062419 (2020) - Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of trust games with asymmetric parameters</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-23T03:17:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.aps.org/pre/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevE.102.062419</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The trust game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential exchange between an investor and a trustee. Deterministic evolutionary game theory predicts no trust and no trustworthiness, whereas the behavioral experiments with the one-shot anonymous trust game show that people substantially trust and respond trustworthily. To explain these discrepancies, previous works often turn to additional mechanisms, which are borrowed from other games such as the prisoner's dilemma. Although these mechanisms lead to the evolution of trust and trustworthiness to an extent, the optimal or the most common strategy often involves no trustworthiness. In this paper, we study the impact of asymmetric demographic parameters (e.g., different population sizes) on game dynamics of the trust game. We show that, in a weak-mutation limit, stochastic evolutionary dynamics with the asymmetric parameters can lead to the evolution of high trust and high trustworthiness without any additional mechanisms in well-mixed finite populations. Even full trust and near full trustworthiness can be the most common strategies. These results are qualitatively different from those of the previous works. Our results thereby demonstrate rich evolutionary dynamics of the asymmetric trust game."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB trust evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c8e8f2e772fc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:trust"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.05237">
    <title>[2012.05237] Applications of Mean Field Games in Financial Engineering and Economic Theory</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-12T18:11:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.05237</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This is an expanded version of the lecture given at the AMS Short Course on Mean Field Games, on January 13, 2020 in Denver CO. The assignment was to discuss applications of Mean Field Games in finance and economics. I need to admit upfront that several of the examples reviewed in this chapter were already discussed in book form. Still, they are here accompanied with discussions of, and references to, works which appeared over the last three years. Moreover, several completely new sections are added to show how recent developments in financial engineering and economics can benefit from being viewed through the lens of the Mean Field Game paradigm. The new financial engineering applications deal with bitcoin mining and the energy markets, while the new economic applications concern models offering a smooth transition between macro-economics and finance, and contract theory."]]></description>
<dc:subject>economics evolutionary_game_theory interacting_particle_systems stochastic_processes to_read in_NB mean-field_games</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0d8d6af43c87/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:interacting_particle_systems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mean-field_games"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.12983">
    <title>[2011.12983] Best response dynamics on random graphs</title>
    <dc:date>2020-11-30T03:03:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.12983</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph G(n,p). Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of such a population. Players update their strategies synchronously. At each round, each player selects the strategy that is the best response to the current set of strategies its neighbours play. We show that such a system reduces to generalised majority and minority dynamics. We show rapid convergence to unanimity for p in a range that depends on a certain characteristic of the payoff matrix. In the presence of a bias among the pure Nash equilibria of the game, we determine a sharp threshold on p above which the largest connected component reaches unanimity with high probability. For p below this critical value, where this does not happen, we identify those substructures inside the largest component that remain discordant throughout the evolution of the system."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB learning_in_games networks evolutionary_game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3f40d5d4ec4a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aop/1585123327">
    <title>Delarue , Lacker , Ramanan : From the master equation to mean field game limit theory: Large deviations and concentration of measure</title>
    <dc:date>2020-11-18T22:49:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.aop/1585123327</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study a sequence of symmetric nn-player stochastic differential games driven by both idiosyncratic and common sources of noise, in which players interact with each other through their empirical distribution. The unique Nash equilibrium empirical measure of the nn-player game is known to converge, as nn goes to infinity, to the unique equilibrium of an associated mean field game. Under suitable regularity conditions, in the absence of common noise, we complement this law of large numbers result with nonasymptotic concentration bounds for the Wasserstein distance between the nn-player Nash equilibrium empirical measure and the mean field equilibrium. We also show that the sequence of Nash equilibrium empirical measures satisfies a weak large deviation principle, which can be strengthened to a full large deviation principle only in the absence of common noise. For both sets of results, we first use the master equation, an infinite-dimensional partial differential equation that characterizes the value function of the mean field game, to construct an associated McKean–Vlasov interacting nn-particle system that is exponentially close to the Nash equilibrium dynamics of the nn-player game for large nn, by refining estimates obtained in our companion paper. Then we establish a weak large deviation principle for McKean–Vlasov systems in the presence of common noise. In the absence of common noise, we upgrade this to a full large deviation principle and obtain new concentration estimates for McKean–Vlasov systems. Finally, in two specific examples that do not satisfy the assumptions of our main theorems, we show how to adapt our methodology to establish large deviations and concentration results."]]></description>
<dc:subject>learning_in_games evolutionary_game_theory large_deviations stochastic_processes re:do-institutions-evolve concentration_of_measure in_NB mean-field_games</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:40dfa7a8a0ce/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:large_deviations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:concentration_of_measure"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mean-field_games"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/108/Supplement_4/21285.short">
    <title>The dynamics of social innovation | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-16T17:48:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/108/Supplement_4/21285.short</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social norms and institutions are mechanisms that facilitate coordination between individuals. A social innovation is a novel mechanism that increases the welfare of the individuals who adopt it compared with the status quo. We model the dynamics of social innovation as a coordination game played on a network. Individuals experiment with a novel strategy that would increase their payoffs provided that it is also adopted by their neighbors. The rate at which a social innovation spreads depends on three factors: the topology of the network and in particular the extent to which agents interact in small local clusters, the payoff gain of the innovation relative to the status quo, and the amount of noise in the best response process. The analysis shows that local clustering greatly enhances the speed with which social innovations spread. It also suggests that the welfare gains from innovation are more likely to occur in large jumps than in a series of small incremental improvements."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB diffusion_of_innovations social_networks re:do-institutions-evolve evolutionary_game_theory young.h._peyton have_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8090ca866f29/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:diffusion_of_innovations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:young.h._peyton"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/107/47/20196.short">
    <title>The spread of innovations in social networks | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2020-05-16T17:47:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/107/47/20196.short</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Which network structures favor the rapid spread of new ideas, behaviors, or technologies? This question has been studied extensively using epidemic models. Here we consider a complementary point of view and consider scenarios where the individuals’ behavior is the result of a strategic choice among competing alternatives. In particular, we study models that are based on the dynamics of coordination games. Classical results in game theory studying this model provide a simple condition for a new action or innovation to become widespread in the network. The present paper characterizes the rate of convergence as a function of the structure of the interaction network. The resulting predictions differ strongly from the ones provided by epidemic models. In particular, it appears that innovation spreads much more slowly on well-connected network structures dominated by long-range links than in low-dimensional ones dominated, for example, by geographic proximity."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB diffusion_of_innovations social_networks evolutionary_game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve have_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:77e8a495d77a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:diffusion_of_innovations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s72v">
    <title>A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution on JSTOR</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-22T05:56:31+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s72v</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>books:recommended evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory human_evolution kith_and_kin gintis.herbert bowles.samuel downloaded in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ef57fff8e356/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:recommended"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bowles.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sw18">
    <title>The Calculus of Selfishness: on JSTOR</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-22T05:21:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sw18</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>to:NB books:recommended sigmund.karl evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory to_download</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a101c290ea0c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:recommended"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sigmund.karl"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_download"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/116/18/8834.short">
    <title>Evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-16T01:05:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/116/18/8834.short</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social norms regulate and coordinate most aspects of human social life, yet they emerge and change as a result of individual behaviors, beliefs, and expectations. A satisfactory account for the evolutionary dynamics of social norms, therefore, has to link individual beliefs and expectations to population-level dynamics, where individual norms change according to their consequences for individuals. Here, we present a model of evolutionary dynamics of social norms that encompasses this objective and addresses the emergence of social norms. In this model, a norm is a set of behavioral prescriptions and a set of environmental descriptions that describe the expected behaviors of those with whom the norm holder will interact. These prescriptions and descriptions are functions of exogenous environmental events. These events have no intrinsic meaning or effect on the payoffs to individuals, yet beliefs/superstitions regarding them can effectuate coordination. Although a norm’s prescriptions and descriptions are dependent on one another, we show how they emerge from random accumulations of beliefs. We categorize the space of social norms into several natural classes and study the evolutionary competition between these classes of norms. We apply our model to the Game of Chicken and the Nash Bargaining Game. Furthermore, we show how the space of norms and evolutionary stability are dependent on the correlation structure of the environment and under which such correlation structures social dilemmas can be ameliorated or exacerbated."]]></description>
<dc:subject>learning_in_games evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve institutions superstition via:henry_farrell in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f2b4d29425d5/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:superstition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:henry_farrell"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25763">
    <title>Social norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation | Nature</title>
    <dc:date>2018-05-07T22:37:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25763</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Indirect reciprocity is the most elaborate and cognitively demanding1 of all known cooperation mechanisms2, and is the most specifically human1,3 because it involves reputation and status. By helping someone, individuals may increase their reputation, which may change the predisposition of others to help them in future. The revision of an individual’s reputation depends on the social norms that establish what characterizes a good or bad action and thus provide a basis for morality3. Norms based on indirect reciprocity are often sufficiently complex that an individual’s ability to follow subjective rules becomes important4,5,6, even in models that disregard the past reputations of individuals, and reduce reputations to either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and actions to binary decisions7,8. Here we include past reputations in such a model and identify the key pattern in the associated norms that promotes cooperation. Of the norms that comply with this pattern, the one that leads to maximal cooperation (greater than 90 per cent) with minimum complexity does not discriminate on the basis of past reputation; the relative performance of this norm is particularly evident when we consider a ‘complexity cost’ in the decision process. This combination of high cooperation and low complexity suggests that simple moral principles can elicit cooperation even in complex environments."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:73b132591896/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25965">
    <title>Altruism in a volatile world | Nature</title>
    <dc:date>2018-05-07T22:33:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25965</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The evolution of altruism—costly self-sacrifice in the service of others—has puzzled biologists1 since The Origin of Species. For half a century, attempts to understand altruism have developed around the concept that altruists may help relatives to have extra offspring in order to spread shared genes2. This theory—known as inclusive fitness—is founded on a simple inequality termed Hamilton’s rule2. However, explanations of altruism have typically not considered the stochasticity of natural environments, which will not necessarily favour genotypes that produce the greatest average reproductive success3,4. Moreover, empirical data across many taxa reveal associations between altruism and environmental stochasticity5,6,7,8, a pattern not predicted by standard interpretations of Hamilton’s rule. Here we derive Hamilton’s rule with explicit stochasticity, leading to new predictions about the evolution of altruism. We show that altruists can increase the long-term success of their genotype by reducing the temporal variability in the number of offspring produced by their relatives. Consequently, costly altruism can evolve even if it has a net negative effect on the average reproductive success of related recipients. The selective pressure on volatility-suppressing altruism is proportional to the coefficient of variation in population fitness, and is therefore diminished by its own success. Our results formalize the hitherto elusive link between bet-hedging and altruism4,9,10,11, and reveal missing fitness effects in the evolution of animal societies."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5a041adeb794/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/anthropology/social-and-cultural-anthropology/evolution-human-co-operation-ritual-and-social-complexity-stateless-societies?format=HB&amp;isbn=9781107180550#M7cTCR8y39ftsf6E.97">
    <title>Evolution human co operation ritual and social complexity stateless societies | Social and cultural anthropology | Cambridge University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2017-08-08T22:17:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/anthropology/social-and-cultural-anthropology/evolution-human-co-operation-ritual-and-social-complexity-stateless-societies?format=HB&amp;isbn=9781107180550#M7cTCR8y39ftsf6E.97</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["How do people living in small groups without money, markets, police and rigid social classes develop norms of economic and social cooperation that are sustainable over time? This book addresses this fundamental question and explains the origin, structure and spread of stateless societies. Using insights from game theory, ethnography and archaeology, Stanish shows how ritual - broadly defined - is the key. Ritual practices encode elaborate rules of behavior and are ingenious mechanisms of organizing society in the absence of coercive states. As well as asking why and how people choose to co-operate, Stanish also provides the theoretical framework to understand this collective action problem. He goes on to highlight the evolution of cooperation with ethnographic and archaeological data from around of the world. Merging evolutionary game theory concepts with cultural evolutionary theory, this book will appeal to those seeking a transdisciplinary approach to one of the greatest problems in human evolution."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted evolution_of_cooperation human_evolution ritual anthropology evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:998accf14750/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ritual"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:anthropology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature21723.html">
    <title>Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure : Nature : Nature Research</title>
    <dc:date>2017-04-01T17:37:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature21723.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a population can affect which traits evolve1, 2. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations remains difficult. Mathematical results are known for special structures in which all individuals have the same number of neighbours3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. The general case, in which the number of neighbours can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class that suggests there is no efficient algorithm9. Whether a simple solution for weak selection exists has remained unanswered. Here we provide a solution for weak selection that applies to any graph or network. Our method relies on calculating the coalescence times10, 11 of random walks12. We evaluate large numbers of diverse population structures for their propensity to favour cooperation. We study how small changes in population structure—graph surgery—affect evolutionary outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation network_data_analysis</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2a9ea0dd81d9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:network_data_analysis"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10739.html">
    <title>Schecter, S. and Gintis, H.: Game Theory in Action: An Introduction to Classical and Evolutionary Models. (eBook, Paperback and Hardcover)</title>
    <dc:date>2016-04-15T14:53:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10739.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Game Theory in Action is a textbook about using game theory across a range of real-life scenarios. From traffic accidents to the sex lives of lizards, Stephen Schecter and Herbert Gintis show students how game theory can be applied in diverse areas including animal behavior, political science, and economics.
"The book's examples and problems look at such fascinating topics as crime-control strategies, climate-change negotiations, and the power of the Oracle at Delphi. The text includes a substantial treatment of evolutionary game theory, where strategies are not chosen through rational analysis, but emerge by virtue of being successful. This is the side of game theory that is most relevant to biology; it also helps to explain how human societies evolve.
"Aimed at students who have studied basic calculus and some differential equations, Game Theory in Action is the perfect way to learn the concepts and practical tools of game theory."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted game_theory evolutionary_game_theory gintis.herbert kith_and_kin</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:beee29a46778/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://iopscience.iop.org/book/978-0-7503-1137-3.pdf">
    <title>Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games - Books - IOPscience</title>
    <dc:date>2015-02-14T15:39:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://iopscience.iop.org/book/978-0-7503-1137-3.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this monograph we bring together a conceptual treatment of evolutionary dynamics and a path-ensemble approach to non-equilibrium stochastic processes. Our framework is evolutionary game theory, in which the map from individual types and their interactions to the fitness that determines their evolutionary success is modeled as a game played among agents in the population. Our approach, however, is not anchored either in analogy to play or in motivations to interpret particular interactions as games. Rather, we argue that games are a flexible and reasonably generic framework to capture, classify and analyze the processes in development and some forms of inter-agent interaction that lie behind arbitrary frequency-dependent fitness models."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted evolutionary_game_theory stochastic_processes large_deviations smith.eric kith_and_kin re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e41492d67c6a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:large_deviations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:smith.eric"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10789.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>Spatial interactions and cooperation can change the speed of evolution of complex phenotypes</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T17:51:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10789.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Complex traits arise from the interactions among multiple gene products. In the case where the complex phenotype is separated from the wild type by a fitness valley or a fitness plateau, the generation of a complex phenotype may take a very long evolutionary time. Interestingly, the rate of evolution depends in nontrivial ways on various properties of the underlying stochastic process, such as the spatial organization of the population and social interactions among cells. Here we review some of our recent work that investigates these phenomena in asexual populations. The role of spatial constraints is quite complex: there are realistic cases where spatial constrains can accelerate or delay evolution, or even influence it in a nonmonotonic fashion, where evolution works fastest for intermediate-range constraints. Social interactions among cells can be studied in the context of the division-of-labor games. Under a range of circumstances, cooperation among cells can lead to a relatively fast creation of a complex phenotype as an emerging (distributed) property. If we further assume the presence of cheaters, we observe the emergence of a fully mutated population of cells possessing the complex phenotype. Applications of these ideas to cancer initiation and biofilm formation in bacteria are discussed."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory biofilms</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0b46af55f037/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:biofilms"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10830.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>Complexity in models of cultural niche construction with selection and homophily</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T17:47:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10830.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Niche construction is the process by which organisms can alter the ecological environment for themselves, their descendants, and other species. As a result of niche construction, differences in selection pressures may be inherited across generations. Homophily, the tendency of like phenotypes to mate or preferentially associate, influences the evolutionary dynamics of these systems. Here we develop a model that includes selection and homophily as independent culturally transmitted traits that influence the fitness and mate choice determined by another focal cultural trait. We study the joint dynamics of a focal set of beliefs, a behavior that can differentially influence the fitness of those with certain beliefs, and a preference for partnering based on similar beliefs. Cultural transmission, selection, and homophily interact to produce complex evolutionary dynamics, including oscillations, stable polymorphisms of all cultural phenotypes, and simultaneous stability of oscillation and fixation, which have not previously been observed in models of cultural evolution or gene–culture interactions. We discuss applications of this model to the interaction of beliefs and behaviors regarding education, contraception, and animal domestication."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB cultural_evolution homophily evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory niche_construction institutions re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:80bca0d8cb38/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:homophily"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:niche_construction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.0994">
    <title>[1404.0994] Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods</title>
    <dc:date>2014-04-14T16:50:17+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.0994</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Evolutionary game theory is a successful mathematical framework geared towards understanding the selective pressures that affect the evolution of the strategies of agents engaged in interactions with potential conflicts. While a mathematical treatment of the costs and benefits of decisions can predict the optimal strategy in simple settings, more realistic situations (finite populations, non-vanishing mutations rates, communication between agents, and spatial interactions) require agent-based methods where each agent is modeled as an individual, carries its own genes that determine its decisions, and where the evolutionary outcome can only be ascertained by evolving the population of agents forward in time. Here we discuss the use of agent-based methods in evolutionary game theory and contrast standard results to those obtainable by a mathematical treatment. We conclude that agent-based methods can predict evolutionary outcomes where purely mathematical treatments cannot tread, but that mathematics is crucial to validate the computational simulations."]]></description>
<dc:subject>agent-based_models evolutionary_game_theory in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d42af47d7b68/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:agent-based_models"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ARTL_a_00126#.UzbMAdx_Tuc">
    <title>Institutions and Cooperation in an Ecology of Games</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-29T13:37:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ARTL_a_00126#.UzbMAdx_Tuc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social dilemmas have long been studied formally as cooperation games that pit individual gains against those of the group. In the real world, individuals face an ecology of games where they play many such games simultaneously, often with overlapping co-players. Here, we study an agent-based model of an ecology of public goods games and compare the effectiveness of two institutional mechanisms for promoting cooperation: a simple institution of limited group size (capacity constraints) and a reputational institution based on observed behavior. Reputation is shown to allow much higher relative payoffs for cooperators than do capacity constraints, but only if (1) the rate of reputational information flow is fast enough relative to the rate of social mobility, and (2) cooperators are relatively common in the population. When these conditions are not met, capacity constraints are more effective at protecting the interests of cooperators. Because of the simplicity of the limited-group-size rule, capacity constraints can also generate social organization, which promotes cooperation much more quickly than can reputation. Our results are discussed in terms of both normative prescriptions and evolutionary theory regarding institutions that regulate cooperation. More broadly, the ecology-of-games approach developed here provides an adaptable modeling framework for studying a wide variety of problems in the social sciences."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB institutions game_theory evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:91b946886f59/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10436-013-0231-8">
    <title>Runs, panics and bubbles: Diamond–Dybvig and Morris–Shin reconsidered - Online First - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2013-07-09T20:58:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10436-013-0231-8</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The basic two-noncooperative-equilibrium-point model of Diamond and Dybvig is considered along with the work of Morris and Shin utilizing the possibility of outside noise to select a unique equilibrium point. Both of these approaches are essentially nondynamic. We add an explicit replicator dynamic from evolutionary game theory to provide for a sensitivity analysis that encompasses both models and contains the results of both depending on parameter settings."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics evolutionary_game_theory replicator_dynamics financial_speculation kith_and_kin smith.eric</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:cb88b46dac90/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:financial_speculation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:smith.eric"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.2666">
    <title>[1208.2666] Evolutionary instability of Zero Determinant strategies demonstrates that winning isn't everything</title>
    <dc:date>2013-06-27T15:16:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.2666</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the opponent's strategy, or else to set the ratio between a ZD player's and their opponent's expected payoff. Here we show that while ZD strategies are weakly dominant, they are not evolutionarily stable and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that ZD strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize other ZD strategies can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d68b8c347e6c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/pdf/stabilityofgetrevised3.pdf">
    <title>The Stability of Walrasian General Equilibium under a replicator dynamic</title>
    <dc:date>2013-04-25T04:31:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/IMG/pdf/stabilityofgetrevised3.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We prove the stability of equilibrium in a completely decentralized Walrasian general equilibrium economy in which prices are fully controlled by economic agents, with production and trade occurring out of equilibrium."]]></description>
<dc:subject>have_read economics evolutionary_game_theory gintis.herbert kith_and_kin to:blog in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0f7b49bac585/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/17/6913.abstract">
    <title>Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games</title>
    <dc:date>2013-04-23T18:42:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/17/6913.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the ability to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions, thus allowing for reciprocation. Recently, a new class of strategies has been proposed, so-called “zero-determinant” strategies. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one’s own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies allows “extortioners” to ensure that any increase in one player’s own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here, we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations, they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in coevolutionary arms races between two distinct populations. Significantly, they benefit the population that evolves at the slower rate, an example of the so-called “Red King” effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory nowak_martin_a. sigmund.karl</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a961fff1ff3b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:nowak_martin_a."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sigmund.karl"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.5656">
    <title>[1303.5656] Replicator dynamics with turnover of players</title>
    <dc:date>2013-03-26T02:52:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.5656</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study adaptive dynamics in games where players abandon the population at a given rate, and are replaced by naive players characterized by a prior distribution over the admitted strategies. We demonstrate how such process leads macroscopically to a variant of the replicator equation, with an additional term accounting for player turnover. We study how Nash equilibria and the dynamics of the system are modified by this additional term, for prototypical examples such as the rock-scissor-paper game and different classes of two-action games played between two distinct populations. We conclude by showing how player turnover can account for non-trivial departures from Nash equilibria observed in data from lowest unique bid auctions."

- "There's a sucker born every minute"?]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB replicator_dynamics evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:89e24aadfe2f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.2270">
    <title>[1303.2270] Entropy-driven dynamics and robust learning procedures in games</title>
    <dc:date>2013-03-13T02:53:36+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.2270</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Starting from a heuristic learning scheme for strategic n-person games, we derive a new class of continuous-time learning dynamics which consist of a replicator-like term adjusted by an entropic penalty that keeps players' strategies away from the boundary of the game's strategy space. These entropy-driven dynamics are equivalent to players taking an exponentially discounting aggregate of their on-going payoffs and then using a quantal response choice model to pick an action based on these performance scores. Owing to this inherent duality, these dynamics satisfy a variant of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory and converge to (arbitrarily precise) quantal approximations of Nash equilibria in potential games. Motivated by applications to traffic engineering, we exploit this duality in order to design a discrete-time, payoff-based learning algorithm which retains these convergence properties and only requires players to observe their in-game payoffs: in fact, the algorithm retains its robustness in the presence of stochastic perturbations and observation errors, and does not require any synchronization between players."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory replicator_dynamics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dc80e1b8eee4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://afinetheorem.wordpress.com/2012/09/06/survival-of-dominated-strategies-under-evolutionary-dynamics-j-hofbauer-w-sandholm-2011/">
    <title>“Survival of Dominated Strategies Under Evolutionary Dynamics,” J. Hofbauer &amp; W. Sandholm (2011) « A Fine Theorem</title>
    <dc:date>2012-09-06T13:15:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://afinetheorem.wordpress.com/2012/09/06/survival-of-dominated-strategies-under-evolutionary-dynamics-j-hofbauer-w-sandholm-2011/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[This is a nice write-up of an interesting paper, but I note again the economist's typical obsession with rank and hierarchical status (i.e., is an author a "top" person?).]]></description>
<dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory evolutionary_economics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:005ce34eea64/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_economics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://edge.org/conversation/on-iterated-prisoner-dilemma">
    <title>On &quot;iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Contains Strategies That Dominate Any Evolutionary Opponent&quot;  | Conversation | Edge</title>
    <dc:date>2012-08-08T01:46:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://edge.org/conversation/on-iterated-prisoner-dilemma</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Only the comment by Sigmund and Nowak is really worth reading, so I reproduce it in full.

"Being close means not being there. We had known about strategies that allow to nail down the opponent's payoff to an arbitrary level [1,2], but not about the vast and fascinating realm of zero determinant (ZD) strategies that enforce a linear relation between the payoffs for the two players. This opens a new facet in the study of trigger strategies and folk theorems for iterated games, and offers a highly stimulating approach for moral philosophers enquiring about 'egoistic' and 'tuistic' viewpoints.
"Our only quibble with the Press-Dyson paper is semantic. The title speaks of 'evolutionary opponents', which suggests evolutionary game theory. But biological or cultural evolution is not a phenomenon on the level of the individual. It requires a population. The 'evolutionary' players of Press and Dyson don't evolve but adapt. With their splendidly 'mischievous' extortionate strategies, Press and Dyson contribute to classical game theory, by considering two players who grapple with each other in a kind of mental jiu-jitsu. The leverage afforded by zero-determinant strategies offers a splendid new arsenal of throws, locks, and holds.
"Which of these strategies can flourish in an evolutionary setting is less clear. Being successful, in this context, feeds back at the population level. It means that more and more players will act like you, be they your offspring or your epigones. Thus you are increasingly likely to encounter your own kind. If your 'extortionate' strategy guarantees that you do twice as well as your opponent, and your opponents' strategy guarantees that she does twice as well as you, this only means that both get nothing. The only norm which is not self-defeating through population dynamics requires players to guarantee each other as much as themselves. We are then back to Tit For Tat. Press and Dyson are perfectly aware of this, of course. In a nutshell, they have uncovered a vast set of strategies linking the scores of two players deterministically (as TFT does), but asymmetrically (unlike TFT). This enriches the canvas of individual interactions, but not necessarily the range of outcomes open to evolving populations.
"[1] M.A. Nowak, M.C. Boerlijst, K.Sigmund, Equal pay for all prisoners, AMS Monthly 104 (1997) 303-307.
"[2] K. Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness, Princeton UP, Princeton, New Jersey (2010)."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:blog evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3cef1e9fbafa/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2012/07/zerodeterminant_strategies_in.html">
    <title>Zero-Determinant Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma | The n-Category Café</title>
    <dc:date>2012-08-08T01:45:18+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2012/07/zerodeterminant_strategies_in.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Shorter: Tit for Tat rules, OK?]]></description>
<dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b45c04960621/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://dannyreviews.com/h/Cooperative_Species.html">
    <title>A Cooperative Species (Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis) - review</title>
    <dc:date>2012-07-16T17:35:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://dannyreviews.com/h/Cooperative_Species.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>book_reviews kith_and_kin human_evolution evolution_of_cooperation bowles.samuel gintis.herbert yee.danny evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6e826c43f3ca/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:book_reviews"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bowles.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:yee.danny"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/109/25/9929.abstract">
    <title>Direct reciprocity in structured populations</title>
    <dc:date>2012-06-19T21:44:40+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/109/25/9929.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Reciprocity and repeated games have been at the center of attention when studying the evolution of human cooperation. Direct reciprocity is considered to be a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, and it is generally assumed that it can lead to high levels of cooperation. Here we explore an open-ended, infinite strategy space, where every strategy that can be encoded by a finite state automaton is a possible mutant. Surprisingly, we find that direct reciprocity alone does not lead to high levels of cooperation. Instead we observe perpetual oscillations between cooperation and defection, with defection being substantially more frequent than cooperation. The reason for this is that “indirect invasions” remove equilibrium strategies: every strategy has neutral mutants, which in turn can be invaded by other strategies. However, reciprocity is not the only way to promote cooperation. Another mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, which has received as much attention, is assortment because of population structure. Here we develop a theory that allows us to study the synergistic interaction between direct reciprocity and assortment. This framework is particularly well suited for understanding human interactions, which are typically repeated and occur in relatively fluid but not unstructured populations. We show that if repeated games are combined with only a small amount of assortment, then natural selection favors the behavior typically observed among humans: high levels of cooperation implemented using conditional strategies."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a6766168747c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.0344">
    <title>[1206.0344] Long-Run Analysis of the Stochastic Replicator Dynamics in the Presence of Random Jumps</title>
    <dc:date>2012-06-07T15:44:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.0344</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We further generalize the stochastic version of the replicator dynamics due to Fudenberg and Harris cite{FH92}. In particular, we add a random jump term to the payoff function to simulate anomalous events and their effects on the fitness. Assuming a $2 times 2$ game and using a particular characteristic of the jump functions we are able to estimate the ergodic measure for all games. Lastly, working with results and methods developed by Imhoff cite{I05}, we prove some stability theorems for an arbitrary $n times n$ game."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory replicator_dynamics ergodic_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:10ae8db0b210/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ergodic_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.3863">
    <title>[1204.3863] The mechanics of stochastic slowdown in evolutionary games</title>
    <dc:date>2012-05-10T23:52:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.3863</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called `stochastic slowdown' effect, previously observed in (Altrock et. al, 2010) for simple evolutionary dynamics. Slowdown here refers to the fact that a beneficial mutation may take longer to fixate than a neutral one. More precisely, the fixation time conditioned on the mutant taking over can show a maximum at intermediate selection strength. We show that this phenomenon is present in the prisoner's dilemma, and also discuss counterintuitive slowdown and speedup in coexistence games. In order to establish the microscopic origins of these phenomena, we calculate the average sojourn times. This allows us to identify the transient states which contribute most to the slowdown effect, and enables us to provide an understanding of slowdown in the takeover of a small group of cooperators by defectors: Defection spreads quickly initially, but the final steps to takeover can be delayed significantly. The analysis of coexistence games reveals even more intricate behavior. In small populations, the conditional average fixation time can show multiple extrema as a function of the selection strength, e.g., slowdown, speedup, and slowdown again. We classify two-player games with respect to the possibility to observe non-monotonic behavior of the conditional average fixation time as a function of selection strength."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:adf92013ba9e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.0608">
    <title>[1204.0608] Mixing times in evolutionary game dynamics</title>
    <dc:date>2012-04-14T17:47:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.0608</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Without mutation and migration, evolutionary dynamics ultimately leads to the extinction of all but one species. Such fixation processes are well understood and can be characterized analytically with methods from statistical physics. However, many biological arguments focus on stationary distributions in a mutation-selection equilibrium. Here, we address the equilibration time required to reach stationarity in the presence of mutation, this is known as the mixing time in the theory of Markov processes. We show that mixing times in evolutionary games have the opposite behaviour from fixation times when the intensity of selection increases: In coordination games with bistabilities, the fixation time decreases, but the mixing time increases. In coexistence games with metastable states, the fixation time increases, but the mixing time decreases. Our results are based on simulations and the WKB approximation of the master equation."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory markov_models mixing re:do-institutions-evolve stochastic_processes metastability</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:43be49123f9d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:markov_models"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mixing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:metastability"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.jstor.org/action/showArticleInfo?doi=10.1086%2F663243">
    <title>Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation</title>
    <dc:date>2012-02-08T21:57:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.jstor.org/action/showArticleInfo?doi=10.1086%2F663243</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Cooperation and the allocation of common resources are core features of social behavior. Games idealizing both interactions have been studied separately. But here, rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooperate, and then, if they jointly cooperate, they bargain over the fruits of their cooperation. It is shown that the dynamics of the combined game cannot simply be reduced to the dynamics of the individual games and that both cooperation and fair division are more likely in the combined game than in the constituent games taken separately."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:15655bf9e2e4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.santafe.edu/research/working-papers/abstract/d49ae327d6f56ce1d45bf5f012b13915/">
    <title>Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games | Santa Fe Institute</title>
    <dc:date>2011-04-03T00:06:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.santafe.edu/research/working-papers/abstract/d49ae327d6f56ce1d45bf5f012b13915/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[In a public form, at last.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>re:do-institutions-evolve large_deviations evolutionary_game_theory macro_from_micro statistical_mechanics stochastic_processes kith_and_kin convergence_of_stochastic_processes have_read smith.eric</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d4cc3b44abb4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:large_deviations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:macro_from_micro"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistical_mechanics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:convergence_of_stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:smith.eric"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1102.0876">
    <title>[1102.0876] Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning</title>
    <dc:date>2011-02-16T20:14:59+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1102.0876</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>learning_in_games evolutionary_game_theory to:NB re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:86ffdfc711b8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.springerlink.com/content/766qj70p8q8858t0/">
    <title>Economic Darwinism (Sloth and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2011)</title>
    <dc:date>2011-02-13T23:32:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.springerlink.com/content/766qj70p8q8858t0/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory evolutionary_economics equilibrium_selection re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dcb4586d1700/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:equilibrium_selection"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2443">
    <title>[0803.2443] Discrete stochastic processes, replicator and Fokker-Planck equations of coevolutionary dynamics in finite and infinite populations</title>
    <dc:date>2011-02-04T07:29:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0803.2443</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Finite-size fluctuations in coevolutionary dynamics arise in models of biological as well as of social and economic systems. This brief tutorial review surveys a systematic approach starting from a stochastic process discrete both in time and state. The limit $N\to \infty$ of an infinite population can be considered explicitly, generally leading to a replicator-type equation in zero order, and to a Fokker-Planck-type equation in first order in $1/\sqrt{N}$. Consequences and relations to some previous approaches are outlined."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>stochastic_processes replicator_dynamics re:bayes_as_evol evolutionary_game_theory to:NB to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:11aa7ee1bfdd/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:bayes_as_evol"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/reviews/calculus-of-selfishness.html">
    <title>Review of Karl Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness</title>
    <dc:date>2010-12-11T23:21:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/reviews/calculus-of-selfishness.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>books:recommended evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory self-promotion</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a68ed791b665/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:recommended"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:self-promotion"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/107/47/20196.abstract?etoc">
    <title>The spread of innovations in social networks — PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2010-11-25T15:16:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/107/47/20196.abstract?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>social_networks diffusion_of_innovations evolutionary_game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve to_read re:critique_of_diffusion re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e9d071607648/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:diffusion_of_innovations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:critique_of_diffusion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3666">
    <title>[1011.3666] The tragedy of the commons in a multi-population complementarity game</title>
    <dc:date>2010-11-22T21:44:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3666</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve to:NB to_read jost.jurgen</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:efb02c00d4c1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:jost.jurgen"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3674">
    <title>[1011.3674] Learning, evolution and population dynamics</title>
    <dc:date>2010-11-22T21:43:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3674</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve to_read to:NB jost.jurgen</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6ae840d3e393/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:jost.jurgen"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://globaljustice.stanford.edu/events/6247">
    <title>Is Liberal Society a Parasite on Tradition? - Bowles</title>
    <dc:date>2010-11-21T14:13:09+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://globaljustice.stanford.edu/events/6247</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>liberalism evolutionary_game_theory social_theory bowles.samuel via:mtraven</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4df802a71e9f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:liberalism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bowles.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:mtraven"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3538">
    <title>[0811.3538] Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics</title>
    <dc:date>2010-11-14T15:11:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3538</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this review, we summarize recent developments in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of finite populations."  Looks decent, at first scan.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory stochastic_processes to_teach:complexity-and-inference to:NB</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d6fb809c5197/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:complexity-and-inference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://beaker.biology.washington.edu/research/pubs/2009/Kerr_Godfrey-Smith_2009.pdf">
    <title>Selection in Ephemeral Networks (Godfrey-Smith and Kerr, 2009)</title>
    <dc:date>2010-11-08T01:17:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://beaker.biology.washington.edu/research/pubs/2009/Kerr_Godfrey-Smith_2009.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A model of “ephemeral” population structure is pre- sented that applies not only to biological systems in which discrete groups form but also to networks without group boundaries. The evolution of altruistic behaviors is discussed. Nonrandom interaction and nonlinear fitness structures are modeled; together, these factors can produce stable polymorphisms of altruistic and selfish types, as well as bistability. Empirical applications of the model may be found in microbes, marine invertebrates, annual plants, and other organisms."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>networks evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve have_read godfrey-smith.peter</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4bc478685452/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:godfrey-smith.peter"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&amp;version=1.0&amp;verb=Display&amp;handle=euclid.aoap/1279638789">
    <title>Mertikopoulos, Moustakas: The emergence of rational behavior in the presence of stochastic perturbations</title>
    <dc:date>2010-07-21T15:20:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&amp;version=1.0&amp;verb=Display&amp;handle=euclid.aoap/1279638789</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game’s payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the replicator dynamics that is quite different from the “aggregate shocks” approach of evolutionary game theory. Irrespective of the perturbations’ magnitude, we find that strategies which are dominated (even iteratively) eventually become extinct and that the game’s strict Nash equilibria are stochastically asymptotically stable. We complement our analysis by illustrating these results in the case of congestion games."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory learning_in_games replicator_dynamics</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:58666661ca92/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2580">
    <title>[1005.2580] Persistence in fluctuating environments</title>
    <dc:date>2010-05-17T15:58:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2580</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Understanding under what conditions interacting populations, whether they be plants, animals, or viral particles, coexist... Both biotic interactions and environmental fluctuations ... can facilitate or disrupt coexistence. To better understand this interplay between these deterministic and stochastic forces, we develop a mathematical theory extending the nonlinear theory of permanence for deterministic systems to stochastic difference and differential equations. Our condition for coexistence requires that there is a fixed set of weights associated with the interacting populations and this weighted combination of populations' invasion rates is positive for any (ergodic) stationary distribution associated with a subcollection of populations. ... with] sufficient noise ... the populations approach a unique positive stationary distribution. ... coexistence criterion is robust to small perturbations of the model functions."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>population_dynamics stochastic_processes evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d12ba079f463/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:population_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://rajivsethi.blogspot.com/2010/04/trading-strategies-and-market.html">
    <title>Rajiv Sethi: Trading Strategies and Market Efficiency</title>
    <dc:date>2010-04-26T19:12:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://rajivsethi.blogspot.com/2010/04/trading-strategies-and-market.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>financial_markets economics evolutionary_game_theory sethi.rajiv</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:820591fabe92/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:financial_markets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sethi.rajiv"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&amp;tid=12312">
    <title>Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics - The MIT Press</title>
    <dc:date>2010-04-21T03:49:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://mitpress.mit.edu/catalog/item/default.asp?ttype=2&amp;tid=12312</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[http://bactra.org/weblog/algae-2015-08.html#sandholm]]></description>
<dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory replicator_dynamics books:recommended</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:280c39d2e21f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:recommended"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~bowles/PersistentInst.pdf">
    <title>Persistent Institutions</title>
    <dc:date>2010-02-09T20:05:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~bowles/PersistentInst.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>re:do-institutions-evolve evolutionary_game_theory institutions path_dependence bowles.samuel kith_and_kin have_read inequality exploitation oppression institutional_change suresh.naidu re:democratic_cognition to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:58b747b241bf/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:path_dependence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bowles.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:inequality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:exploitation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:oppression"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutional_change"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:suresh.naidu"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/wpabstract/200904008">
    <title>The Coevolution of Preferences and Institutions: History and Theory (Bowles)</title>
    <dc:date>2009-06-19T17:36:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.santafe.edu/research/publications/wpabstract/200904008</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The joint dynamics of population-level social institutions and individual preferences (or more broadly cultures) are illustrated in four case studies: the end of Communist Party rule in the German Democratic Republic, the transformation of traditional contracts governing agricultural work in the Philippines, the demise of Apartheid in South Africa, and the spread and retreat of female genital cutting in West Africa. A stochastic evolutionary game model of the underlying processes captures five interrelated aspects of real world historical dynamics: its often bottom- up and decentralized nature, the complementarity between cultural and institutional dynamics, the long term persistence of inefficient institutions, the often revolutionary nature of institutional and cultural change and the prominent role of technical change in the process of institutional and cultural innovation."  --- Do I detect, comrades, in that last sentence, an echo of "in the last instance"?
]]></description>
<dc:subject>institutions evolutionary_economics bowles.samuel to_read cultural_evolution kith_and_kin re:do-institutions-evolve evolutionary_game_theory historical_materialism</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:128323f593ec/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bowles.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:historical_materialism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.3297">
    <title>[0905.3297] Replicators in Fine-grained Environment: Adaptation and Polymorphism</title>
    <dc:date>2009-06-10T16:38:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.3297</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[A cute use of averaging techniques --- start with replicator equations with time-dependent perturbations to the fitness function, and replace them with different, time-independent replicator equations with a different fitness function.  I think the particular averaging trick they use here will break down if the perturbations are not strictly periodic...
]]></description>
<dc:subject>replicator_dynamics evolutionary_game_theory averaged_equations_of_motion</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b41c2b6dd76d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:averaged_equations_of_motion"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.jstor.org/pss/1555525">
    <title>Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games (JSTOR: Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 3 (May, 2003), pp. 873-903)</title>
    <dc:date>2009-05-08T04:13:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.jstor.org/pss/1555525</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>replicator_dynamics evolutionary_game_theory stochastic_processes large_deviations re:almost_none re:do-institutions-evolve benaim.michael weibull.jorgen</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b13abf377597/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stochastic_processes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:large_deviations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:almost_none"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:benaim.michael"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:weibull.jorgen"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8901.html">
    <title>Gintis, H.: The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences.</title>
    <dc:date>2009-04-10T20:10:25+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8901.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>books:noted gintis.herbert economics game_theory evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation social_science_methodology kith_and_kin adaptive_behavior books:owned</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1e219d498525/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:adaptive_behavior"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:owned"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/FLECOM.html">
    <title>Comeuppance: Costly Signaling, Altruistic Punishment, and Other Biological Components of Fiction</title>
    <dc:date>2009-02-05T04:34:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/FLECOM.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Flesch integrates evolutionary psychology into literary studies, creating a new theory of fiction in which form and content flawlessly intermesh.  Fiction, Flesch contends, gives us our most powerful way of making sense of the social world. Comeuppance begins with an exploration of the appeal of gossip and ends with an account of how we can think about characters and care about them as much as about persons we know to be real. We praise a storyteller who contrives a happy or at least an appropriate ending, and fault the writer who refuses us one. Flesch uses Darwinian theory to show how fiction satisfies our desire to see the good vindicated and the wicked get their comeuppance."  --- This would seem to have so many obvious counterexamples that I want to read the book just to watch the train-wreck.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted narrative_theory evolutionary_psychology evolutionary_game_theory color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5dd9b91ddc1a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:narrative_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/0812.4295">
    <title>[0812.4295] How to explore replicator equations?</title>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T21:01:39+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/0812.4295</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["replicator equations (RE) are among the basic tools in mathematical theory of selection and evolution. We develop a method for reducing a wide class of the RE, which in general are systems of differential equations in Banach space to escort systems of ODEs that in many cases can be explored analytically. The method has potential for different applications; some examples are given."

- The method does not seem to apply when fitness fluctuates stochastically.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>replicator_dynamics dynamical_systems evolutionary_game_theory mathematical_biology to:NB re:bayes_as_evol karev.g.p.</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1a0bb5fc48a8/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:replicator_dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:dynamical_systems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mathematical_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:bayes_as_evol"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:karev.g.p."/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7225/abs/nature07601.html?lang=en">
    <title>Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment : Abstract : Nature</title>
    <dc:date>2008-12-31T18:58:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v457/n7225/abs/nature07601.html?lang=en</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d992183741e4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v449/n7164/abs/nature06198.html">
    <title>The equilibria that allow bacterial persistence in human hosts : Abstract : Nature</title>
    <dc:date>2007-10-17T23:08:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v449/n7164/abs/nature06198.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We propose that microbes that have developed persistent relationships with human hosts have evolved cross-signalling mechanisms that permit homeostasis that conforms to Nash equilibria and, more specifically, to evolutionarily stable strategies. This imp
]]></description>
<dc:subject>normal_flora human_evolution microbial_evolution evolutionary_game_theory ecology</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6aeaddf6090a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:normal_flora"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:microbial_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ecology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>