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    <title>Pinboard (cshalizi)</title>
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    <description>recent bookmarks from cshalizi</description>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://cailinoconnor.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/New_Social_Contract_Theory-FINAL-V.pdf"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/31102-the-ethical-project/"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://edge.org/conversation/on-iterated-prisoner-dilemma"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://dannyreviews.com/h/Cooperative_Species.html"/>
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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2413847122">
    <title>Reconciling ecology and evolutionary game theory or “When not to think cooperation” | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2025-04-22T15:32:57+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2413847122</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Evolutionary game theory (EGT)—overwhelmingly employed today for the study of cooperation in various systems, from microbes to cancer and from insect to human societies—started with the seminal 1973 paper by Maynard Smith and Price showing that limited animal conflict can be selected at the individual level. Owing to the explanatory potential of this paper and enabled by the powerful machinery of the soon-to-be-developed replicator dynamics, EGT took off at an accelerated pace and began to shape expectations across systems and scales. But, even as EGT has expanded its reach, and even as its mathematical foundations expanded with the development of adaptive dynamics and inclusion of stochastic processes, the replicator equation remains, half a century later, its most widely used equation. Owing to its early development and its staying power, the replicator dynamics has helped set both the baseline expectations and the terminology of the field. However, much like the original 1973 paper, replicator dynamics rests on the assumption that individual differences in reproduction are determined only by the payoff from the game (i.e., in isolation, all individuals, regardless of their strategy, have identical intrinsic growth rates). Here, we argue that this assumption limits the scope of replicator dynamics to such an extent as to warrant not just a more deliberative application process, but also a reconsideration of the broad predictions and terminology that it has generated. Simultaneously, we reestablish a dialog with ecology that can be mutually fruitful, e.g., by providing an explanation for how diverse ecological communities can assemble evolutionarily."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory ecology evolution_of_cooperation via:?</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3025bb8e6a9d/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ecology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:?"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10434631241298072">
    <title>Cooperation through rational investments in social organization - Anna Sokolova, Vincent Buskens, Werner Raub, 2025</title>
    <dc:date>2025-04-22T15:07:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10434631241298072</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Repeated interactions and contractual agreements are examples of different ways of organizing interactions in social and economic life and can foster cooperation in social dilemmas. Thus, when involved in social dilemmas, actors have incentives to form long-term relations with repeated interactions or to enter into contractual agreements. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the effects of repeated interactions and contractual agreements as well as their endogenous emergence. In line with earlier evidence, both ways of organizing interactions are found to foster cooperation. Our key contribution is twofold. First, with respect to theory, we derive conditions for investments in social organization. Second, empirically, we find that such investments are more likely when the costs are below a threshold that follows from a parsimonious game-theoretic model assuming equilibrium behavior, self-regarding preferences, and complete information. We find less experimental support for two additional conjectures on investments that are based on reasoning more in line with behavioral game theory."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB institutions evolution_of_cooperation game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:214cd70dbf82/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
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    <title>Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem | Nature Communications</title>
    <dc:date>2025-04-09T14:53:09+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-025-58043-7</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A canonical social dilemma arises when resources are allocated to people, who can either reciprocate with interest or keep the proceeds. The right resource allocation mechanisms can encourage levels of reciprocation that sustain the commons. Here, in an iterated multiplayer trust game, we use deep reinforcement learning (RL) to design a social planner that promotes sustainable contributions from human participants. We first trained neural networks to behave like human players, creating a stimulated economy that allows us to study the dynamics of receipt and reciprocation. We use RL to train a mechanism to maximise aggregate return to players. The RL mechanism discovers a redistributive policy that leads to a large but also more equal surplus. The mechanism outperforms baseline mechanisms by conditioning its generosity on available resources and temporarily sanctioning defectors. Examining the RL policy allows us to develop a similar but explainable mechanism that is more popular among players."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB mechanism_design neural_networks evolution_of_cooperation institutions collective_action</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3e25436f733b/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="http://cailinoconnor.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/New_Social_Contract_Theory-FINAL-V.pdf">
    <title>Why Natural Social Contracts Are Not Fair</title>
    <dc:date>2023-05-19T03:25:57+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://cailinoconnor.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/New_Social_Contract_Theory-FINAL-V.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Many theorists have employed game theory to model the emergence of stable social norms, or natural “social contracts”. One branch of this literature uses bargaining games to show why many societies have norms and rules for fairness. In cultural evolutionary models, fair bargaining emerges endogenously because it is an efficient way to divide resources (Young, 1993a; Skyrms, 1996; Alexander, 2007). In response, a number of authors have argued that these models miss an important element of real human societies – divisions into groups or social categories. Once such groups are added to cultural evolutionary models, fairness is no longer the expected outcome. Instead “discriminatory norms” often emerge where one group systematically gets more when dividing resources (Axtell et al., 2001; O’Connor, 2019). These results may help explain why categorical inequity is the rule across human societies (Mills, 1997; Pateman, 1988). If one wishes to understand the naturalistic emergence of social contracts, one must account for the presence of categorical divisions, and unfairness, as well as for norms of fairness. This paper overviews this body of work, and pulls out lessons for social contract theory."]]></description>
<dc:subject>self-organization evolution_of_cooperation political_philosophy oconnor.cailin to_teach:statistics_of_inequality_and_discrimination in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0d3d6fc3245f/</dc:identifier>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo14059759">
    <title>From Pleasure Machines to Moral Communities: An Evolutionary Economics without Homo economicus, Hodgson</title>
    <dc:date>2022-01-07T15:43:17+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/F/bo14059759</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Are humans at their core seekers of their own pleasure or cooperative members of society? Paradoxically, they are both. Pleasure-seeking can take place only within the context of what works within a defined community, and central to any community are the evolved codes and principles guiding appropriate behavior, or morality. The complex interaction of morality and self-interest is at the heart of Geoffrey M. Hodgson’s approach to evolutionary economics, which is designed to bring about a better understanding of human behavior.
"In From Pleasure Machines to Moral Communities, Hodgson casts a critical eye on neoclassical individualism, its foundations and flaws, and turns to recent insights from research on the evolutionary bases of human behavior. He focuses his attention on the evolution of morality, its meaning, why it came about, and how it influences human attitudes and behavior. This more nuanced understanding sets the stage for a fascinating investigation of its implications on a range of pressing issues drawn from diverse environments, including the business world and crucial policy realms like health care and ecology.
"This book provides a valuable complement to Hodgson’s earlier work with Thorbjørn Knudsen on evolutionary economics in Darwin’s Conjecture, extending the evolutionary outlook to include moral and policy-related issues."

--- Last tag because my impression, from when I was trying to educate myself on evolutionary economics in graduate school, is that Hodgson has good taste in topics but never really contributes anything insightful about them.  But this is, as I said, an impression I formed a quarter-century ago, when I was vastly more judgmental...]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted evolutionary_economics evolution_of_cooperation moral_psychology color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:31b44a631fe2/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.06199">
    <title>[2105.06199] Evolutionary (in)stability of selfish learning in repeated games</title>
    <dc:date>2021-06-28T03:57:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.06199</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Evolutionary game theory offers a general framework to describe how humans revise their behavior in strategic environments. To model this adaptation process, most previous work assumes that individuals aim to increase their own short-run payoff. This kind of "selfish learning," however, entails the risk of getting trapped in equilibria that are detrimental to everyone. If evolution operates on the level of long-run payoffs, it might thus select for a different learning rule altogether. Motivated by experimental work, we therefore study an alternative rule called "fairness-mediated team learning" (FMTL). An FMTL learner aims to maximize the group payoff while minimizing payoff differences between group members. When adopted by everyone, FMTL is superior to selfish learning, both individually and socially, across many different social dilemmas. Remarkably, however, we show that FMTL exhibits a similar performance even against selfish learners. Based on these observations, we explore the dynamics that arise when the two learning rules themselves are subject to evolution. If individuals are sufficiently patient to consider the long-run consequences of their learning rules, selfish learning is routinely invaded. These results further corroborate previous theoretical attempts to explain why humans take into account their impact on others when making strategic decisions."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB learning_in_games evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dbd66635f36d/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.08636">
    <title>[2104.08636] Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-23T03:18:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.08636</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Can egalitarian norms or conventions survive the presence of dominant individuals who are ensured of victory in conflicts? We investigate the interaction of power asymmetry and partner choice in games of conflict over a contested resource. We introduce three models to study the emergence and resilience of cooperation among unequals when interaction is random, when individuals can choose their partners, and where power asymmetries dynamically depend on accumulated payoffs. We find that the ability to avoid bullies with higher competitive ability afforded by partner choice mostly restores cooperative conventions and that the competitive hierarchy never forms. Partner choice counteracts the hyper dominance of bullies who are isolated in the network and eliminates the need for others to coordinate in a coalition. When competitive ability dynamically depends on cumulative payoffs, complex cycles of coupled network-strategy-rank changes emerge. Effective collaborators gain popularity (and thus power), adopt aggressive behavior, get isolated, and ultimately lose power. Neither the network nor behavior converge to a stable equilibrium. Despite the instability of power dynamics, the cooperative convention in the population remains stable overall and long-term inequality is completely eliminated. The interaction between partner choice and dynamic power asymmetry is crucial for these results: without partner choice, bullies cannot be isolated, and without dynamic power asymmetry, bullies do not lose their power even when isolated. We analytically identify a single critical point that marks a phase transition in all three iterations of our models. This critical point is where the first individual breaks from the convention and cycles start to emerge."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory re:pareto_at_melos</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ee0654e0f776/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/evolutionary-human-sciences/article/childhood-environmental-adversity-is-not-linked-to-lower-levels-of-cooperative-behaviour-in-economic-games/C9F5FD1B298104BFFB0230F32333EC6E">
    <title>Childhood environmental adversity is not linked to lower levels of cooperative behaviour in economic games | Evolutionary Human Sciences | Cambridge Core</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-18T15:50:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/evolutionary-human-sciences/article/childhood-environmental-adversity-is-not-linked-to-lower-levels-of-cooperative-behaviour-in-economic-games/C9F5FD1B298104BFFB0230F32333EC6E</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Cooperation is a universal phenomenon, it is present in all human cultures from hunter–gatherers to industrialised societies, and it constitutes a fundamental aspect of social relationships. There is, however, variability in the amount of resources people invest in cooperative activities. Recent findings indicate that this variability may be partly explained as a contextually appropriate response to environmental conditions. Specifically, adverse environments seem to be associated with less cooperation and recent findings suggest that this effect is partly mediated by differences in individuals’ life-history strategy. In this paper, we set out to replicate and extend these findings by measuring actual cooperative behaviour in three economic games – a Dictator game, a Trust game and a Public Goods game – on a nationally representative sample of 612 people. Although we found that the cooperation and life-history strategy latent variables were adequately captured by the models, the hypothesised relationship between childhood environmental adversity and adult cooperation and the mediation effect by life-history strategy were not found."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation experimental_economics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5bdab1ce6230/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/710028?af=R">
    <title>Reintroducing Kin Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences | Philosophy of Science: Vol 88, No 1</title>
    <dc:date>2021-04-14T20:06:17+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/710028?af=R</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Humans are often altruistic in a variety of contexts, even toward strangers they may never meet again. What explains this behavior? Many argue that kin selection cannot explain it but group selection can. Contra this common line of reasoning, I provide two ways that kin selection might help explain the evolution of broad-scope human altruism: in gene-culture coevolution and in a ‘cultural’ version of kin selection."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB human_evolution evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:58a9947642e2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://journals.aps.org/pre/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevE.102.062419">
    <title>Phys. Rev. E 102, 062419 (2020) - Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of trust games with asymmetric parameters</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-23T03:17:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.aps.org/pre/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevE.102.062419</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful and prosperous societies. The trust game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and trustworthiness, involving a sequential exchange between an investor and a trustee. Deterministic evolutionary game theory predicts no trust and no trustworthiness, whereas the behavioral experiments with the one-shot anonymous trust game show that people substantially trust and respond trustworthily. To explain these discrepancies, previous works often turn to additional mechanisms, which are borrowed from other games such as the prisoner's dilemma. Although these mechanisms lead to the evolution of trust and trustworthiness to an extent, the optimal or the most common strategy often involves no trustworthiness. In this paper, we study the impact of asymmetric demographic parameters (e.g., different population sizes) on game dynamics of the trust game. We show that, in a weak-mutation limit, stochastic evolutionary dynamics with the asymmetric parameters can lead to the evolution of high trust and high trustworthiness without any additional mechanisms in well-mixed finite populations. Even full trust and near full trustworthiness can be the most common strategies. These results are qualitatively different from those of the previous works. Our results thereby demonstrate rich evolutionary dynamics of the asymmetric trust game."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB trust evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c8e8f2e772fc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:trust"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20200068">
    <title>A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information - American Economic Association</title>
    <dc:date>2020-11-30T16:05:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20200068</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We study anonymous repeated games where players may be "commitment types" who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a "pairwise dominant" action, this action is almost always taken. This implies that cooperation is impossible in the repeated prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching. We also bound equilibrium payoffs for general games. Our bound implies that industry profits converge to zero in linear-demand Cournot oligopoly as the number of firms increases."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b152fdc84e2c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190623">
    <title>Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion - American Economic Association</title>
    <dc:date>2020-09-28T15:32:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190623</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Increasingly, algorithms are supplanting human decision-makers in pricing goods and services. To analyze the possible consequences, we study experimentally the behavior of algorithms powered by Artificial Intelligence (Q-learning) in a workhorse oligopoly model of repeated price competition. We find that the algorithms consistently learn to charge supracompetitive prices, without communicating with one another. The high prices are sustained by collusive strategies with a finite phase of punishment followed by a gradual return to cooperation. This finding is robust to asymmetries in cost or demand, changes in the number of players, and various forms of uncertainty."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB market_failures_in_everything imperfect_competition reinforcement_learning evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f7ad0da148e7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:market_failures_in_everything"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:imperfect_competition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:reinforcement_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://science.sciencemag.org/content/369/6508/1183">
    <title>Diversity and prosocial behavior | Science</title>
    <dc:date>2020-09-04T18:27:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://science.sciencemag.org/content/369/6508/1183</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Immigration and globalization have spurred interest in the effects of ethnic diversity in Western societies. Most scholars focus on whether diversity undermines trust, social capital, and collective goods provision. However, the type of prosociality that helps heterogeneous societies function is different from the in-group solidarity that glues homogeneous communities together. Social cohesion in multiethnic societies depends on whether prosocial behavior extends beyond close-knit networks and in-group boundaries. We identify two features of modern societies—social differentiation and economic interdependence—that can set the stage for constructive interactions with dissimilar others. Whether societal adaptations to diversity lead toward integration or division depends on the positions occupied by minorities and immigrants in the social structure and economic system, along with the institutional arrangements that determine their political inclusion."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB diversity sociology evolution_of_cooperation re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:11862e7a9183/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:diversity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/599250?journalCode=ajs&amp;">
    <title>The False Enforcement of Unpopular Norms1 | American Journal of Sociology: Vol 115, No 2</title>
    <dc:date>2020-07-13T16:31:18+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/599250?journalCode=ajs&amp;</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Prevailing theory assumes that people enforce norms in order to pressure others to act in ways that they approve. Yet there are numerous examples of “unpopular norms” in which people compel each other to do things that they privately disapprove. While peer sanctioning suggests a ready explanation for why people conform to unpopular norms, it is harder to understand why they would enforce a norm they privately oppose. The authors argue that people enforce unpopular norms to show that they have complied out of genuine conviction and not because of social pressure. They use laboratory experiments to demonstrate this “false enforcement” in the context of a wine tasting and an academic text evaluation. Both studies find that participants who conformed to a norm due to social pressure then falsely enforced the norm by publicly criticizing a lone deviant. A third study shows that enforcement of a norm effectively signals the enforcer’s genuine support for the norm. These results demonstrate the potential for a vicious cycle in which perceived pressures to conform to and falsely enforce an unpopular norm reinforce one another."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read evolution_of_cooperation information_cascades social_influence sociology re:democratic_cognition macy.michael_w. no_youre_the_one_falsely_enforcing_an_unpopular_norm</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:041074ae3cfd/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:information_cascades"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_influence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:macy.michael_w."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:no_youre_the_one_falsely_enforcing_an_unpopular_norm"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/706879">
    <title>Why Divination?: Evolved Psychology and Strategic Interaction in the Production of Truth | Evolved Psychology and Strategic Interaction in the Production of Truth: Ahead of Print</title>
    <dc:date>2020-01-21T17:03:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/706879</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Divination is found in most human societies, but there is little systematic research to explain (1) why it is persuasive or (2) why divination is required for important collective decisions in many small-scale societies. Common features of human communication and cooperation may help address both questions. A highly recurrent feature of divination is “ostensive detachment,” a demonstration that the diviners are not the authors of the statements they utter. As a consequence, people spontaneously interpret divination as less likely than other statements to be influenced by anyone’s intentions or interests. This is enough to give divination an epistemic advantage compared with other sources of information, answering question 1. This advantage is all the more important in situations where a diagnosis will create differential costs and benefits, for example, determining who is responsible for someone’s misfortune in a small-scale community. Divinatory statements provide a version of the situation that most participants are motivated to agree with, as it provides a focal point for efficient coordination at a minimal cost for almost all participants, which would answer question 2."

---Exercise for the reader (easy but cynical): Apply this argument to (i) personality tests, (ii) macroeconomic forecasts, (iii) "history will not look kindly on...".]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB anthropology divination cognitive_science boyer.pascal evolution_of_cooperation to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:96284ecd6522/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:anthropology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:divination"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:boyer.pascal"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1043463119872566">
    <title>Strategic tie formation for long-term exchange relations - Werner Raub, Vincent Buskens, Vincenz Frey,</title>
    <dc:date>2019-09-26T17:21:07+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1043463119872566</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce and analyze a new game-theoretic model that captures the well-known effects of repeated interactions, while simultaneously endogenizing the formation of long-term relations. We assume strict game-theoretic rationality as well as self-regarding preferences. We highlight the commitment feature of tie formation: through establishing a long-term relation, at cost, actors ensure that they would suffer themselves from future sanctions of own opportunism. This allows for mutually beneficial cooperation in the first place. Some extensions of the model are discussed."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_networks game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:03a12b2ab575/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s72v">
    <title>A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution on JSTOR</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-22T05:56:31+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s72v</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>books:recommended evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory human_evolution kith_and_kin gintis.herbert bowles.samuel downloaded in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ef57fff8e356/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:recommended"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bowles.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sw18">
    <title>The Calculus of Selfishness: on JSTOR</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-22T05:21:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sw18</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>to:NB books:recommended sigmund.karl evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory to_download</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a101c290ea0c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:recommended"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sigmund.karl"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_download"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.05923">
    <title>[1908.05923] Evolution of cooperation in networks: well-connected cooperators can enhance cooperation but are counteracted by Trojan horses</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-19T13:27:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.05923</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Cooperative behaviour is widespread in nature, but explaining how cooperation evolves constitutes a major scientific challenge. Simulation models has shown that social network structure plays a key role in rendering cooperation evolutionarily stable. However, not much is known about the importance of initial conditions for the evolution of cooperation in networks. Knowledge about this is essential for judging to which extent results from modelling and experiments can tell us something about the real world. Here, we investigate how cooperation is affected by the initial network positions of cooperators in different networks, by means of game-theory based simulation models. We find that placing cooperators on high-degree nodes enhances cooperation in standard scale-free networks but not in standard Poisson networks. In contrast, under increased degree assortativity, Poisson networks can maintain high levels of cooperation, even exceeding those of scale-free networks, when the initial placement of cooperators is perfectly correlated to node degree. When the correlation is not perfect however, defectors placed within clusters of cooperators can act as Trojan horses, allowing defection to invade. The results are relevant both to computer simulations of cooperation in networks and in particular to real-world cooperation experiments, where the number of replications is typically low and stochastic initial correlations between cooperativeness and network position may be present."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB social_networks evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2f6c3db156c6/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.pnas.org/content/116/18/8834.short">
    <title>Evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-16T01:05:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.pnas.org/content/116/18/8834.short</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social norms regulate and coordinate most aspects of human social life, yet they emerge and change as a result of individual behaviors, beliefs, and expectations. A satisfactory account for the evolutionary dynamics of social norms, therefore, has to link individual beliefs and expectations to population-level dynamics, where individual norms change according to their consequences for individuals. Here, we present a model of evolutionary dynamics of social norms that encompasses this objective and addresses the emergence of social norms. In this model, a norm is a set of behavioral prescriptions and a set of environmental descriptions that describe the expected behaviors of those with whom the norm holder will interact. These prescriptions and descriptions are functions of exogenous environmental events. These events have no intrinsic meaning or effect on the payoffs to individuals, yet beliefs/superstitions regarding them can effectuate coordination. Although a norm’s prescriptions and descriptions are dependent on one another, we show how they emerge from random accumulations of beliefs. We categorize the space of social norms into several natural classes and study the evolutionary competition between these classes of norms. We apply our model to the Game of Chicken and the Nash Bargaining Game. Furthermore, we show how the space of norms and evolutionary stability are dependent on the correlation structure of the environment and under which such correlation structures social dilemmas can be ameliorated or exacerbated."]]></description>
<dc:subject>learning_in_games evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve institutions superstition via:henry_farrell in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f2b4d29425d5/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:superstition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:henry_farrell"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300223453/minds-make-societies">
    <title>Minds Make Societies | Yale University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2018-05-16T12:06:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300223453/minds-make-societies</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["“There is no good reason why human societies should not be described and explained with the same precision and success as the rest of nature.” Thus argues evolutionary psychologist Pascal Boyer in this uniquely innovative book.
"Integrating recent insights from evolutionary biology, genetics, psychology, economics, and other fields, Boyer offers precise models of why humans engage in social behaviors such as forming families, tribes, and nations, or creating gender roles. In fascinating, thought-provoking passages, he explores questions such as, Why is there conflict between groups? Why do people believe low-value information such as rumors? Why are there religions? What is social justice? What explains morality? Boyer provides a new picture of cultural transmission that draws on the pragmatics of human communication, the constructive nature of memory in human brains, and human motivation for group formation and cooperation."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted social_theory epidemiology_of_representations evolutionary_psychology anthropology boyer.pascal evolution_of_cooperation cultural_transmission re:do-institutions-evolve books:owned</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:28923fdbb275/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:anthropology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:boyer.pascal"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_transmission"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:owned"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/115/5/951">
    <title>Cooperation, clustering, and assortative mixing in dynamic networks | PNAS</title>
    <dc:date>2018-05-08T00:20:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/115/5/951</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Humans’ propensity to cooperate is driven by our embeddedness in social networks. A key mechanism through which networks promote cooperation is clustering. Within clusters, conditional cooperators are insulated from exploitation by noncooperators, allowing them to reap the benefits of cooperation. Dynamic networks, where ties can be shed and new ties formed, allow for the endogenous emergence of clusters of cooperators. Although past work suggests that either reputation processes or network dynamics can increase clustering and cooperation, existing work on network dynamics conflates reputations and dynamics. Here we report results from a large-scale experiment (total n = 2,675) that embedded participants in clustered or random networks that were static or dynamic, with varying levels of reputational information. Results show that initial network clustering predicts cooperation in static networks, but not in dynamic ones. Further, our experiment shows that while reputations are important for partner choice, cooperation levels are driven purely by dynamics. Supplemental conditions confirmed this lack of a reputation effect. Importantly, we find that when participants make individual choices to cooperate or defect with each partner, as opposed to a single decision that applies to all partners (as is standard in the literature on cooperation in networks), cooperation rates in static networks are as high as cooperation rates in dynamic networks. This finding highlights the importance of structured relations for sustained cooperation, and shows how giving experimental participants more realistic choices has important consequences for whether dynamic networks promote higher levels of cooperation than static networks."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_sociology evolution_of_cooperation social_networks</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:7a94fb9e3566/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25763">
    <title>Social norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation | Nature</title>
    <dc:date>2018-05-07T22:37:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25763</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Indirect reciprocity is the most elaborate and cognitively demanding1 of all known cooperation mechanisms2, and is the most specifically human1,3 because it involves reputation and status. By helping someone, individuals may increase their reputation, which may change the predisposition of others to help them in future. The revision of an individual’s reputation depends on the social norms that establish what characterizes a good or bad action and thus provide a basis for morality3. Norms based on indirect reciprocity are often sufficiently complex that an individual’s ability to follow subjective rules becomes important4,5,6, even in models that disregard the past reputations of individuals, and reduce reputations to either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and actions to binary decisions7,8. Here we include past reputations in such a model and identify the key pattern in the associated norms that promotes cooperation. Of the norms that comply with this pattern, the one that leads to maximal cooperation (greater than 90 per cent) with minimum complexity does not discriminate on the basis of past reputation; the relative performance of this norm is particularly evident when we consider a ‘complexity cost’ in the decision process. This combination of high cooperation and low complexity suggests that simple moral principles can elicit cooperation even in complex environments."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:73b132591896/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25965">
    <title>Altruism in a volatile world | Nature</title>
    <dc:date>2018-05-07T22:33:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25965</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The evolution of altruism—costly self-sacrifice in the service of others—has puzzled biologists1 since The Origin of Species. For half a century, attempts to understand altruism have developed around the concept that altruists may help relatives to have extra offspring in order to spread shared genes2. This theory—known as inclusive fitness—is founded on a simple inequality termed Hamilton’s rule2. However, explanations of altruism have typically not considered the stochasticity of natural environments, which will not necessarily favour genotypes that produce the greatest average reproductive success3,4. Moreover, empirical data across many taxa reveal associations between altruism and environmental stochasticity5,6,7,8, a pattern not predicted by standard interpretations of Hamilton’s rule. Here we derive Hamilton’s rule with explicit stochasticity, leading to new predictions about the evolution of altruism. We show that altruists can increase the long-term success of their genotype by reducing the temporal variability in the number of offspring produced by their relatives. Consequently, costly altruism can evolve even if it has a net negative effect on the average reproductive success of related recipients. The selective pressure on volatility-suppressing altruism is proportional to the coefficient of variation in population fitness, and is therefore diminished by its own success. Our results formalize the hitherto elusive link between bet-hedging and altruism4,9,10,11, and reveal missing fitness effects in the evolution of animal societies."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5a041adeb794/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/anthropology/social-and-cultural-anthropology/evolution-human-co-operation-ritual-and-social-complexity-stateless-societies?format=HB&amp;isbn=9781107180550#M7cTCR8y39ftsf6E.97">
    <title>Evolution human co operation ritual and social complexity stateless societies | Social and cultural anthropology | Cambridge University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2017-08-08T22:17:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/anthropology/social-and-cultural-anthropology/evolution-human-co-operation-ritual-and-social-complexity-stateless-societies?format=HB&amp;isbn=9781107180550#M7cTCR8y39ftsf6E.97</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["How do people living in small groups without money, markets, police and rigid social classes develop norms of economic and social cooperation that are sustainable over time? This book addresses this fundamental question and explains the origin, structure and spread of stateless societies. Using insights from game theory, ethnography and archaeology, Stanish shows how ritual - broadly defined - is the key. Ritual practices encode elaborate rules of behavior and are ingenious mechanisms of organizing society in the absence of coercive states. As well as asking why and how people choose to co-operate, Stanish also provides the theoretical framework to understand this collective action problem. He goes on to highlight the evolution of cooperation with ethnographic and archaeological data from around of the world. Merging evolutionary game theory concepts with cultural evolutionary theory, this book will appeal to those seeking a transdisciplinary approach to one of the greatest problems in human evolution."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted evolution_of_cooperation human_evolution ritual anthropology evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:998accf14750/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ritual"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:anthropology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature21723.html">
    <title>Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure : Nature : Nature Research</title>
    <dc:date>2017-04-01T17:37:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature21723.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a population can affect which traits evolve1, 2. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations remains difficult. Mathematical results are known for special structures in which all individuals have the same number of neighbours3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. The general case, in which the number of neighbours can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class that suggests there is no efficient algorithm9. Whether a simple solution for weak selection exists has remained unanswered. Here we provide a solution for weak selection that applies to any graph or network. Our method relies on calculating the coalescence times10, 11 of random walks12. We evaluate large numbers of diverse population structures for their propensity to favour cooperation. We study how small changes in population structure—graph surgery—affect evolutionary outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation network_data_analysis</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2a9ea0dd81d9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:network_data_analysis"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/113/48/13690.abstract">
    <title>Effect of holding office on the behavior of politicians</title>
    <dc:date>2016-12-07T14:29:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/113/48/13690.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Reciprocity is central to our understanding of politics. Most political exchanges—whether they involve legislative vote trading, interbranch bargaining, constituent service, or even the corrupt exchange of public resources for private wealth—require reciprocity. But how does reciprocity arise? Do government officials learn reciprocity while holding office, or do recruitment and selection practices favor those who already adhere to a norm of reciprocity? We recruit Zambian politicians who narrowly won or lost a previous election to play behavioral games that provide a measure of reciprocity. This combination of regression discontinuity and experimental designs allows us to estimate the effect of holding office on behavior. We find that holding office increases adherence to the norm of reciprocity. This study identifies causal effects of holding office on politicians’ behavior."

--- I very much want to see a follow-up study, where Zambian economists recruit American politicians who just went through narrow elections as their experimental subjects.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics experimental_economics evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:9293f62b0af9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/113/49/13995.abstract">
    <title>Preferential interactions promote blind cooperation and informed defection</title>
    <dc:date>2016-12-07T14:09:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/113/49/13995.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["It is common sense that costs and benefits should be carefully weighed before deciding on a course of action. However, we often disapprove of people who do so, even when their actual decision benefits us. For example, we prefer people who directly agree to do us a favor over those who agree only after securing enough information to ensure that the favor will not be too costly. Why should we care about how people make their decisions, rather than just focus on the decisions themselves? Current models show that punishment of information gathering can be beneficial because it forces blind decisions, which under some circumstances enhances cooperation. Here we show that aversion to information gathering can be beneficial even in the absence of punishment, due to a different mechanism: preferential interactions with reliable partners. In a diverse population where different people have different—and unknown—preferences, those who seek additional information before agreeing to cooperate reveal that their preferences are close to the point where they would choose not to cooperate. Blind cooperators are therefore more likely to keep cooperating even if conditions change, and aversion to information gathering helps to interact preferentially with them. Conversely, blind defectors are more likely to keep defecting in the future, leading to a preference for informed defectors over blind ones. Both mechanisms—punishment to force blind decisions and preferential interactions—give qualitatively different predictions, which may enable experimental tests to disentangle them in real-world situations."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:600d570dea85/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/113/36/10215.abstract.html">
    <title>How chimpanzees cooperate in a competitive world</title>
    <dc:date>2016-09-06T18:16:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/113/36/10215.abstract.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Our species is routinely depicted as unique in its ability to achieve cooperation, whereas our closest relative, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), is often characterized as overly competitive. Human cooperation is assisted by the cost attached to competitive tendencies through enforcement mechanisms, such as punishment and partner choice. To examine if chimpanzees possess the same ability to mitigate competition, we set up a cooperative task in the presence of the entire group of 11 adults, which required two or three individuals to pull jointly to receive rewards. This open-group set-up provided ample opportunity for competition (e.g., freeloading, displacements) and aggression. Despite this unique set-up and initial competitiveness, cooperation prevailed in the end, being at least five times as common as competition. The chimpanzees performed 3,565 cooperative acts while using a variety of enforcement mechanisms to overcome competition and freeloading, as measured by (attempted) thefts of rewards. These mechanisms included direct protest by the target, third-party punishment in which dominant individuals intervened against freeloaders, and partner choice. There was a marked difference between freeloading and displacement; freeloading tended to elicit withdrawal and third-party interventions, whereas displacements were met with a higher rate of direct retaliation. Humans have shown similar responses in controlled experiments, suggesting shared mechanisms across the primates to mitigate competition for the sake of cooperation."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation primates</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:bc370d24afc5/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:primates"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/113/35/9763.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>Neurocomputational mechanisms of prosocial learning and links to empathy</title>
    <dc:date>2016-08-30T18:09:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/113/35/9763.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Reinforcement learning theory powerfully characterizes how we learn to benefit ourselves. In this theory, prediction errors—the difference between a predicted and actual outcome of a choice—drive learning. However, we do not operate in a social vacuum. To behave prosocially we must learn the consequences of our actions for other people. Empathy, the ability to vicariously experience and understand the affect of others, is hypothesized to be a critical facilitator of prosocial behaviors, but the link between empathy and prosocial behavior is still unclear. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) participants chose between different stimuli that were probabilistically associated with rewards for themselves (self), another person (prosocial), or no one (control). Using computational modeling, we show that people can learn to obtain rewards for others but do so more slowly than when learning to obtain rewards for themselves. fMRI revealed that activity in a posterior portion of the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex/basal forebrain (sgACC) drives learning only when we are acting in a prosocial context and signals a prosocial prediction error conforming to classical principles of reinforcement learning theory. However, there is also substantial variability in the neural and behavioral efficiency of prosocial learning, which is predicted by trait empathy. More empathic people learn more quickly when benefitting others, and their sgACC response is the most selective for prosocial learning. We thus reveal a computational mechanism driving prosocial learning in humans. This framework could provide insights into atypical prosocial behavior in those with disorders of social cognition."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB psychology reinforcement_learning learning_in_games evolution_of_cooperation neuroscience fmri</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2ee12a3eac04/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:reinforcement_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_in_games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:neuroscience"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:fmri"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10873.html">
    <title>Gintis, H.: Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases of Social Life. (eBook and Hardcover)</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-07T18:00:40+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10873.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this book, acclaimed economist Herbert Gintis ranges widely across many fields—including economics, psychology, anthropology, sociology, moral philosophy, and biology—to provide a rigorous transdisciplinary explanation of some fundamental characteristics of human societies and social behavior. Because such behavior can be understood only through transdisciplinary research, Gintis argues, Individuality and Entanglement advances the effort to unify the behavioral sciences by developing a shared analytical framework—one that bridges research on gene-culture coevolution, the rational-actor model, game theory, and complexity theory. At the same time, the book persuasively demonstrates the rich possibilities of such transdisciplinary work.
"Everything distinctive about human social life, Gintis argues, flows from the fact that we construct and then play social games. Indeed, society itself is a game with rules and politics is the arena in which we affirm and change these rules. Individuality is central to our species because the rules do not change through inexorable macrosocial forces. Rather, individuals band together to change the rules. Our minds are also socially entangled, producing behavior that is socially rational, although it violates the standard rules of individually rational choice. Finally, a moral sense is essential for playing games with socially constructed rules. People generally play by the rules, are ashamed when they break the rules, and are offended when others break the rules, even in societies that lack laws, government, and jails."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted gintis.herbert kith_and_kin evolution_of_cooperation moral_psychology moral_philosophy economics sociology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b982469a3649/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sociology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674088641">
    <title>A Natural History of Human Morality — Michael Tomasello | Harvard University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2015-08-13T16:47:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674088641</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A Natural History of Human Morality offers the most detailed account to date of the evolution of human moral psychology. Based on extensive experimental data comparing great apes and human children, Michael Tomasello reconstructs how early humans gradually became an ultra-cooperative and, eventually, a moral species.
"There were two key evolutionary steps, each founded on a new way that individuals could act together as a plural agent “we”. The first step occurred as ecological challenges forced early humans to forage together collaboratively or die. To coordinate these collaborative activities, humans evolved cognitive skills of joint intentionality, ensuring that both partners knew together the normative standards governing each role. To reduce risk, individuals could make an explicit joint commitment that “we” forage together and share the spoils together as equally deserving partners, based on shared senses of trust, respect, and responsibility. The second step occurred as human populations grew and the division of labor became more complex. Distinct cultural groups emerged that demanded from members loyalty, conformity, and cultural identity. In becoming members of a new cultural “we”, modern humans evolved cognitive skills of collective intentionality, resulting in culturally created and objectified norms of right and wrong that everyone in the group saw as legitimate morals for anyone who would be one of “us”.
"As a result of this two-stage process, contemporary humans possess both a second-personal morality for face-to-face engagement with individuals and a group-minded “objective” morality that obliges them to the moral community as a whole."]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted human_evolution evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_psychology moral_psychology part_played_by_social_labor_in_the_transition_from_ape_to_man tomasello.michael collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d1b6bd71c8c7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:part_played_by_social_labor_in_the_transition_from_ape_to_man"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:tomasello.michael"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674425026">
    <title>The Society of Genes — Itai Yanai, Martin Lercher | Harvard University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2015-08-13T16:46:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674425026</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Nearly four decades ago Richard Dawkins published The Selfish Gene, famously reducing humans to “survival machines” whose sole purpose was to preserve “the selfish molecules known as genes.” How these selfish genes work together to construct the organism, however, remained a mystery. Standing atop a wealth of new research, The Society of Genes now provides a vision of how genes cooperate and compete in the struggle for life.
"Pioneers in the nascent field of systems biology, Itai Yanai and Martin Lercher present a compelling new framework to understand how the human genome evolved and why understanding the interactions among our genes shifts the basic paradigm of modern biology. Contrary to what Dawkins’s popular metaphor seems to imply, the genome is not made of individual genes that focus solely on their own survival. Instead, our genomes comprise a society of genes which, like human societies, is composed of members that form alliances and rivalries.
"In language accessible to lay readers, The Society of Genes uncovers genetic strategies of cooperation and competition at biological scales ranging from individual cells to entire species. It captures the way the genome works in cancer cells and Neanderthals, in sexual reproduction and the origin of life, always underscoring one critical point: that only by putting the interactions among genes at center stage can we appreciate the logic of life."

--- Very nice, except that this is exactly what _Dawkins_ said.  I can't remember if the "parliament of genes" metaphor, complete with alliances and rivalries, was in _The Selfish Gene_ or in _The Extended Phenotype_, but this is the line he's been pushing since at least 1982, so this framing does not seem altogether honest to me.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted evolutionary_biology genetics evolution_of_cooperation popular_science color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:97dcaa936843/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:genetics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:popular_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/48/17071.abstract">
    <title>Rethinking natural altruism: Simple reciprocal interactions trigger children’s benevolence</title>
    <dc:date>2014-12-06T17:12:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/48/17071.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A very simple reciprocal activity elicited high degrees of altruism in 1- and 2-y-old children, whereas friendly but nonreciprocal activity yielded little subsequent altruism. In a second study, reciprocity with one adult led 1- and 2-y-olds to provide help to a new person. These results question the current dominant claim that social experiences cannot account for early occurring altruistic behavior. A third study, with preschool-age children, showed that subtle reciprocal cues remain potent elicitors of altruism, whereas a fourth study with preschoolers showed that even a brief reciprocal experience fostered children’s expectation of altruism from others. Collectively, the studies suggest that simple reciprocal interactions are a potent trigger of altruism for young children, and that these interactions lead children to believe that their relationships are characterized by mutual care and commitment."

- Contributed, so who knows?]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation experimental_psychology psychology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d9e444599972/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v516/n7529/full/nature13977.html">
    <title>Business culture and dishonesty in the banking industry : Nature : Nature Publishing Group</title>
    <dc:date>2014-12-06T17:06:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v516/n7529/full/nature13977.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Trust in others’ honesty is a key component of the long-term performance of firms, industries, and even whole countries1, 2, 3, 4. However, in recent years, numerous scandals involving fraud have undermined confidence in the financial industry5, 6, 7. Contemporary commentators have attributed these scandals to the financial sector’s business culture8, 9, 10, but no scientific evidence supports this claim. Here we show that employees of a large, international bank behave, on average, honestly in a control condition. However, when their professional identity as bank employees is rendered salient, a significant proportion of them become dishonest. This effect is specific to bank employees because control experiments with employees from other industries and with students show that they do not become more dishonest when their professional identity or bank-related items are rendered salient. Our results thus suggest that the prevailing business culture in the banking industry weakens and undermines the honesty norm, implying that measures to re-establish an honest culture are very important."

--- Comment is superfluous, except that as a customer, I really want to know which bank.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_economics experimental_psychology trust evolution_of_cooperation institutions</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2fedb643d943/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:trust"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/47/16784.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>The ecology of religious beliefs</title>
    <dc:date>2014-11-25T22:53:03+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/47/16784.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Although ecological forces are known to shape the expression of sociality across a broad range of biological taxa, their role in shaping human behavior is currently disputed. Both comparative and experimental evidence indicate that beliefs in moralizing high gods promote cooperation among humans, a behavioral attribute known to correlate with environmental harshness in nonhuman animals. Here we combine fine-grained bioclimatic data with the latest statistical tools from ecology and the social sciences to evaluate the potential effects of environmental forces, language history, and culture on the global distribution of belief in moralizing high gods (n = 583 societies). After simultaneously accounting for potential nonindependence among societies because of shared ancestry and cultural diffusion, we find that these beliefs are more prevalent among societies that inhabit poorer environments and are more prone to ecological duress. In addition, we find that these beliefs are more likely in politically complex societies that recognize rights to movable property. Overall, our multimodel inference approach predicts the global distribution of beliefs in moralizing high gods with an accuracy of 91%, and estimates the relative importance of different potential mechanisms by which this spatial pattern may have arisen. The emerging picture is neither one of pure cultural transmission nor of simple ecological determinism, but rather a complex mixture of social, cultural, and environmental influences. Our methods and findings provide a blueprint for how the increasing wealth of ecological, linguistic, and historical data can be leveraged to understand the forces that have shaped the behavior of our own species."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB statistics causal_inference religion evolution_of_cooperation historical_materialism color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2544058843bb/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:causal_inference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:religion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:historical_materialism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v515/n7525/full/nature13884.html">
    <title>Life cycles, fitness decoupling and the evolution of multicellularity : Nature : Nature Publishing Group</title>
    <dc:date>2014-11-05T18:34:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v515/n7525/full/nature13884.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Cooperation is central to the emergence of multicellular life; however, the means by which the earliest collectives (groups of cells) maintained integrity in the face of destructive cheating types is unclear. One idea posits cheats as a primitive germ line in a life cycle that facilitates collective reproduction. Here we describe an experiment in which simple cooperating lineages of bacteria were propagated under a selective regime that rewarded collective-level persistence. Collectives reproduced via life cycles that either embraced, or purged, cheating types. When embraced, the life cycle alternated between phenotypic states. Selection fostered inception of a developmental switch that underpinned the emergence of collectives whose fitness, during the course of evolution, became decoupled from the fitness of constituent cells. Such development and decoupling did not occur when groups reproduced via a cheat-purging regime. Our findings capture key events in the evolution of Darwinian individuality during the transition from single cells to multicellularity."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read experimental_biology evolutionary_biology biology evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1683aa48d3a2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10789.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>Spatial interactions and cooperation can change the speed of evolution of complex phenotypes</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T17:51:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10789.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Complex traits arise from the interactions among multiple gene products. In the case where the complex phenotype is separated from the wild type by a fitness valley or a fitness plateau, the generation of a complex phenotype may take a very long evolutionary time. Interestingly, the rate of evolution depends in nontrivial ways on various properties of the underlying stochastic process, such as the spatial organization of the population and social interactions among cells. Here we review some of our recent work that investigates these phenomena in asexual populations. The role of spatial constraints is quite complex: there are realistic cases where spatial constrains can accelerate or delay evolution, or even influence it in a nonmonotonic fashion, where evolution works fastest for intermediate-range constraints. Social interactions among cells can be studied in the context of the division-of-labor games. Under a range of circumstances, cooperation among cells can lead to a relatively fast creation of a complex phenotype as an emerging (distributed) property. If we further assume the presence of cheaters, we observe the emergence of a fully mutated population of cells possessing the complex phenotype. Applications of these ideas to cancer initiation and biofilm formation in bacteria are discussed."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_biology evolutionary_game_theory biofilms</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0b46af55f037/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:biofilms"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10830.abstract.html?etoc">
    <title>Complexity in models of cultural niche construction with selection and homophily</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T17:47:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10830.abstract.html?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Niche construction is the process by which organisms can alter the ecological environment for themselves, their descendants, and other species. As a result of niche construction, differences in selection pressures may be inherited across generations. Homophily, the tendency of like phenotypes to mate or preferentially associate, influences the evolutionary dynamics of these systems. Here we develop a model that includes selection and homophily as independent culturally transmitted traits that influence the fitness and mate choice determined by another focal cultural trait. We study the joint dynamics of a focal set of beliefs, a behavior that can differentially influence the fitness of those with certain beliefs, and a preference for partnering based on similar beliefs. Cultural transmission, selection, and homophily interact to produce complex evolutionary dynamics, including oscillations, stable polymorphisms of all cultural phenotypes, and simultaneous stability of oscillation and fixation, which have not previously been observed in models of cultural evolution or gene–culture interactions. We discuss applications of this model to the interaction of beliefs and behaviors regarding education, contraception, and animal domestication."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB cultural_evolution homophily evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory niche_construction institutions re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:80bca0d8cb38/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:homophily"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:niche_construction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10889.abstract.html">
    <title>Culture-dependent strategies in coordination games</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-29T16:17:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/Supplement_3/10889.abstract.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We examine different populations’ play in coordination games in online experiments with over 1,000 study participants. Study participants played a two-player coordination game that had multiple equilibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff. Study participants were predominantly from India and the United States. Study participants residing in India played the strategies leading to asymmetric payoffs significantly more frequently than study participants residing in the United States who showed a greater play of the strategy leading to the symmetric payoffs. In addition, when prompted to play asymmetrically, the population from India responded even more significantly than those from the United States. Overall, study participants’ predictions of how others would play were more accurate when the other player was from their own populations, and they coordinated significantly more frequently and earned significantly higher payoffs when matched with other study participants from their own population than when matched across populations."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_economics institutions game_theory evolution_of_cooperation cultural_differences re:do-institutions-evolve jackson.matthew_o. to_read homophily</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:7f84dd5ddf85/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_differences"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:jackson.matthew_o."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:homophily"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1820">
    <title>Shtetl-Optimized » Blog Archive » Eigenmorality</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-21T15:19:42+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1820</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[- Observations:
1. The idea that justice is doing good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies is actually _in_ Plato (it's proposed in _Republic_ I 332d, and rejected by Socrates with downright sophistry).  --- ETA: doing good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies is however revived as a desideratum for the guardians of the ideal city (_Republic_ II 375), and its psychological plausibility is held to be established by the fact (!) that pure-bred dogs are lovers of knowledge and wisdom (II 376).  I am not, as they say, making this up.
2. The idea that justice is doing good to the good and bad to the wicked is also in Plato (_Republic_ I  334d -- 335b).  This is not _quite_ the "eigenmoses" idea.  It too is rejected because treating people badly makes them worse (I 335c), and because it's supposedly "it is certainly not the property of good to do harm, or treat people badly" (335d), which seems question-begging.
3. The problem of two internally-cooperating but mutually-hostile sub-populations seems insuperable for this approach.
4. I still very much like the idea of using self-consistent linear algebra to break out of vicious circles (cf. http://bactra.org/weblog/479.html).]]></description>
<dc:subject>ethics moral_philosophy evolution_of_cooperation eigenproblems pagerank have_read aaronson.scott series_of_footnotes one_mans_vicious_circle_is_another_mans_successive_approximation blogged</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:42a7890d1cc0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ethics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:eigenproblems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:pagerank"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:aaronson.scott"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:series_of_footnotes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:one_mans_vicious_circle_is_another_mans_successive_approximation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:blogged"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/feature/2014/4/why-some-animals-forgo-reproduction-in-complex-societies/1">
    <title>Why Some Animals Forgo Reproduction in Complex Societies » American Scientist</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-19T13:51:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/feature/2014/4/why-some-animals-forgo-reproduction-in-complex-societies/1</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Guided by the evolutionary framework, we began by investigating whether clownfish nonbreeders might forgo their own reproduction and help the breeders reproduce, thereby gaining indirect genetic benefits.
"To test the predictions of this hypothesis, we spent a year in Papua New Guinea, scuba diving every day, monitoring survival and reproduction in 71 groups of clownfish on two reefs. (This was as amazing as it sounds, but bouts of malaria and strange fungal infections mean that the experience is not for the faint-hearted).
...
"After another couple of years spent compiling the data and conducting statistical analyses, we were faced with an intriguing result: The nonbreeders had no effect on the survival or reproduction of breeders. Further, genetic analyses showed that the nonbreeders were not closely related to the breeders, because they disperse from their natal territories as larvae very early in life. Taken together these null results indicated something quite remarkable: Kin selection, one of the founding concepts of social evolution, would play no role in explaining these fishy societies."

--- I will not spoil their ending.]]></description>
<dc:subject>have_read biology evolutionary_biology evolution_of_cooperation fish ecology experimental_biology to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ab897cb431e4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:fish"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ecology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/37/14889.abstract">
    <title>Money and trust among strangers</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-17T18:55:00+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/37/14889.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["What makes money essential for the functioning of modern society? Through an experiment, we present evidence for the existence of a relevant behavioral dimension in addition to the standard theoretical arguments. Subjects faced repeated opportunities to help an anonymous counterpart who changed over time. Cooperation required trusting that help given to a stranger today would be returned by a stranger in the future. Cooperation levels declined when going from small to large groups of strangers, even if monitoring and payoffs from cooperation were invariant to group size. We then introduced intrinsically worthless tokens. Tokens endogenously became money: subjects took to reward help with a token and to demand a token in exchange for help. Subjects trusted that strangers would return help for a token. Cooperation levels remained stable as the groups grew larger. In all conditions, full cooperation was possible through a social norm of decentralized enforcement, without using tokens. This turned out to be especially demanding in large groups. Lack of trust among strangers thus made money behaviorally essential. To explain these results, we developed an evolutionary model. When behavior in society is heterogeneous, cooperation collapses without tokens. In contrast, the use of tokens makes cooperation evolutionarily stable."

--- But _of course_ the subjects would start using the tokens as money: they were all from a society which has been coordinating using money for centuries.  I don't see how this sheds any light whatsoever on how our society came to be the way it is, or whether one could have an equally large & stranger-filled society that didn't use money.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_sociology experimental_economics evolution_of_cooperation money institutions color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:9ad63f2d008a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:money"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/2/752.abstract">
    <title>Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-17T18:42:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/2/752.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Individuals usually punish free riders but refuse to sanction those who cooperate but do not punish. This missing second-order peer punishment is a fundamental problem for the stabilization of cooperation. To solve this problem, most societies today have implemented central authorities that punish free riders and tax evaders alike, such that second-order punishment is fully established. The emergence of such stable authorities from individual decisions, however, creates a new paradox: it seems absurd to expect individuals who do not engage in second-order punishment to strive for an authority that does. Herein, we provide a mathematical model and experimental results from a public goods game where subjects can choose between a community with and without second-order punishment in two different ways. When subjects can migrate continuously to either community, we identify a bias toward institutions that do not punish tax evaders. When subjects have to vote once for all rounds of the game and have to accept the decision of the majority, they prefer a society with second-order punishment. These findings uncover the existence of a democracy premium. The majority-voting rule allows subjects to commit themselves and to implement institutions that eventually lead to a higher welfare for all."]]></description>
<dc:subject>democracy evolution_of_cooperation institutions in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ed7202b846b2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:democracy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ARTL_a_00126#.UzbMAdx_Tuc">
    <title>Institutions and Cooperation in an Ecology of Games</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-29T13:37:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ARTL_a_00126#.UzbMAdx_Tuc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Social dilemmas have long been studied formally as cooperation games that pit individual gains against those of the group. In the real world, individuals face an ecology of games where they play many such games simultaneously, often with overlapping co-players. Here, we study an agent-based model of an ecology of public goods games and compare the effectiveness of two institutional mechanisms for promoting cooperation: a simple institution of limited group size (capacity constraints) and a reputational institution based on observed behavior. Reputation is shown to allow much higher relative payoffs for cooperators than do capacity constraints, but only if (1) the rate of reputational information flow is fast enough relative to the rate of social mobility, and (2) cooperators are relatively common in the population. When these conditions are not met, capacity constraints are more effective at protecting the interests of cooperators. Because of the simplicity of the limited-group-size rule, capacity constraints can also generate social organization, which promotes cooperation much more quickly than can reputation. Our results are discussed in terms of both normative prescriptions and evolutionary theory regarding institutions that regulate cooperation. More broadly, the ecology-of-games approach developed here provides an adaptable modeling framework for studying a wide variety of problems in the social sciences."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB institutions game_theory evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:91b946886f59/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/111/7/2614.abstract">
    <title>Population genomics of the honey bee reveals strong signatures of positive selection on worker traits</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-11T21:08:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/111/7/2614.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Most theories used to explain the evolution of eusociality rest upon two key assumptions: mutations affecting the phenotype of sterile workers evolve by positive selection if the resulting traits benefit fertile kin, and that worker traits provide the primary mechanism allowing social insects to adapt to their environment. Despite the common view that positive selection drives phenotypic evolution of workers, we know very little about the prevalence of positive selection acting on the genomes of eusocial insects. We mapped the footprints of positive selection in Apis mellifera through analysis of 40 individual genomes, allowing us to identify thousands of genes and regulatory sequences with signatures of adaptive evolution over multiple timescales. We found Apoidea- and Apis-specific genes to be enriched for signatures of positive selection, indicating that novel genes play a disproportionately large role in adaptive evolution of eusocial insects. Worker-biased proteins have higher signatures of adaptive evolution relative to queen-biased proteins, supporting the view that worker traits are key to adaptation. We also found genes regulating worker division of labor to be enriched for signs of positive selection. Finally, genes associated with worker behavior based on analysis of brain gene expression were highly enriched for adaptive protein and cis-regulatory evolution. Our study highlights the significant contribution of worker phenotypes to adaptive evolution in social insects, and provides a wealth of knowledge on the loci that influence fitness in honey bees."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB genetics evolutionary_biology evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:95026859d36d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:genetics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cognitionandculture.net/workshops/big-gods">
    <title>'Big Gods'</title>
    <dc:date>2013-12-09T16:14:00+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.cognitionandculture.net/workshops/big-gods</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[A book seminar.]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted evolution_of_cooperation epidemiology_of_representations religion history_of_religion world_history color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0decea619d6f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:religion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_religion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:world_history"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10147.html">
    <title>Ahlquist, J. and Levi, M.: In the Interest of Others: Organizations and Social Activism.</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-20T17:31:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10147.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In the Interest of Others develops a new theory of organizational leadership and governance to explain why some organizations expand their scope of action in ways that do not benefit their members directly. John Ahlquist and Margaret Levi document eighty years of such activism by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union in the United States and the Waterside Workers Federation in Australia. They systematically compare the ILWU and WWF to the Teamsters and the International Longshoremen's Association, two American transport industry labor unions that actively discouraged the pursuit of political causes unrelated to their own economic interests.
"Drawing on a wealth of original data, Ahlquist and Levi show how activist organizations can profoundly transform the views of members about their political efficacy and the collective actions they are willing to contemplate. They find that leaders who ask for support of projects without obvious material benefits must first demonstrate their ability to deliver the goods and services members expect. These leaders must also build governance institutions that coordinate expectations about their objectives and the behavior of members.
"In the Interest of Others reveals how activist labor unions expand the community of fate and provoke preferences that transcend the private interests of individual members. Ahlquist and Levi then extend this logic to other membership organizations, including religious groups, political parties, and the state itself."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted unions organizations institutions political_economy solidarity evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0fee6fe4d611/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:unions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:organizations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_economy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:solidarity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10063.html">
    <title>Norenzayan, A.: Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict.</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-05T02:01:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10063.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["How did human societies scale up from small, tight-knit groups of hunter-gatherers to the large, anonymous, cooperative societies of today--even though anonymity is the enemy of cooperation? How did organized religions with "Big Gods"--the great monotheistic and polytheistic faiths--spread to colonize most minds in the world? In Big Gods, Ara Norenzayan makes the surprising and provocative argument that these fundamental puzzles about the origins of civilization are one and the same, and answer each other.
"Once human minds could conceive of supernatural beings, Norenzayan argues, the stage was set for rapid cultural and historical changes that eventually led to large societies with Big Gods--powerful, omniscient, interventionist deities concerned with regulating the moral behavior of humans. How? As the saying goes, "watched people are nice people." It follows that people play nice when they think Big Gods are watching them, even when no one else is. Yet at the same time that sincere faith in Big Gods unleashed unprecedented cooperation within ever-expanding groups, it also introduced a new source of potential conflict between competing groups.
"In some parts of the world, such as northern Europe, secular institutions have precipitated religion's decline by usurping its community-building functions. These societies with atheist majorities--some of the most cooperative, peaceful, and prosperous in the world--climbed religion's ladder, and then kicked it away. So while Big Gods answers fundamental questions about the origins and spread of world religions, it also helps us understand another, more recent social transition--the rise of cooperative societies without belief in gods."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted history_of_religion psychology evolution_of_cooperation we_would_have_to_invent_him</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:86b742e71824/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_religion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:we_would_have_to_invent_him"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/36/14586.abstract">
    <title>Ontogeny of prosocial behavior across diverse societies</title>
    <dc:date>2013-09-04T03:57:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/36/14586.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species, but there is substantial variation in the extent of cooperation across societies. Understanding the sources of this variability may provide insights about the forces that sustain cooperation. We examined the ontogeny of prosocial behavior by studying 326 children 3–14 y of age and 120 adults from six societies (age distributions varied across societies). These six societies span a wide range of extant human variation in culture, geography, and subsistence strategies, including foragers, herders, horticulturalists, and urban dwellers across the Americas, Oceania, and Africa. When delivering benefits to others was personally costly, rates of prosocial behavior dropped across all six societies as children approached middle childhood and then rates of prosociality diverged as children tracked toward the behavior of adults in their own societies. When prosocial acts did not require personal sacrifice, prosocial responses increased steadily as children matured with little variation in behavior across societies. Our results are consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of acquired cultural norms in shaping costly forms of cooperation and creating cross-cultural diversity."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB experimental_psychology cross-cultural_psychology evolution_of_cooperation institutions</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d6d38a2abc2e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cross-cultural_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:institutions"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.2666">
    <title>[1208.2666] Evolutionary instability of Zero Determinant strategies demonstrates that winning isn't everything</title>
    <dc:date>2013-06-27T15:16:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.2666</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the opponent's strategy, or else to set the ratio between a ZD player's and their opponent's expected payoff. Here we show that while ZD strategies are weakly dominant, they are not evolutionarily stable and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that ZD strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize other ZD strategies can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d68b8c347e6c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item7097514/?site_locale=en_US">
    <title>An Economic Theory of Greed, Love, Groups, and Networks - Academic and Professional Books - Cambridge University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2013-05-11T15:50:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item7097514/?site_locale=en_US</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Why are people loyal? How do groups form and how do they create incentives for their members to abide by group norms? Until now, economics has only been able to partially answer these questions. In this groundbreaking work, Paul Frijters presents a new unified theory of human behaviour. To do so, he incorporates comprehensive yet tractable definitions of love and power, and the dynamics of groups and networks, into the traditional mainstream economic view. The result is an enhanced view of human societies that nevertheless retains the pursuit of self-interest at its core. This book provides a digestible but comprehensive theory of our socioeconomic system, which condenses its immense complexity into simplified representations. The result both illuminates humanity's history and suggests ways forward for policies today, in areas as diverse as poverty reduction and tax compliance."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted economics evolution_of_cooperation social_networks color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3e00ad654d33/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/110/17/6913.abstract">
    <title>Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games</title>
    <dc:date>2013-04-23T18:42:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/110/17/6913.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the ability to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of previous interactions, thus allowing for reciprocation. Recently, a new class of strategies has been proposed, so-called “zero-determinant” strategies. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one’s own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies allows “extortioners” to ensure that any increase in one player’s own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here, we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations, they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in coevolutionary arms races between two distinct populations. Significantly, they benefit the population that evolves at the slower rate, an example of the so-called “Red King” effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory nowak_martin_a. sigmund.karl</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a961fff1ff3b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:nowak_martin_a."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sigmund.karl"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.0558">
    <title>[1302.0558] Evolutionary dynamics of time-resolved social interactions</title>
    <dc:date>2013-03-06T14:45:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.0558</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Cooperation among unrelated individuals is frequently observed in social groups when their members join efforts and resources to obtain a shared benefit which is unachievable by singles. However, understanding why cooperation arises despite the natural tendency of individuals towards selfish behaviors is still an open problem and represents one of the most fascinating challenges in volutionary dynamics. 
Very recently, the structural characterization of the networks upon which social interactions take place has shed some light on the mechanisms by which cooperative behaviours emerge and eventually overcome the individual temptation to defect. In particular, it has been found that the heterogeneity in the number of social ties and the presence of tightly-knit communities lead to a significant increase of cooperation as compared with the unstructured and homogeneous connection patterns considered in classical evolutionary dynamics. Here we investigate the role of social ties dynamics for the emergence of cooperation in a family of social dilemmas. Social interactions are in fact intrinsically dynamic, fluctuating and intermitting over time, and can be represented by time-varying networks, that is graphs where connections between nodes appear, disappear, or are rewired over time. By considering two experimental data sets of human interactions with detailed time information, we show that the temporal dynamics of social ties has a profound dramatic impact on the evolution of cooperation: the observed dynamics of pairwise interactions tend to favor selfish behaviors."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolution_of_cooperation social_networks</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:37dfaedce27e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://rss.sagepub.com/content/24/4/463.abstract?etoc">
    <title>Do religious cognitions promote prosociality?</title>
    <dc:date>2012-11-23T16:28:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://rss.sagepub.com/content/24/4/463.abstract?etoc</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Researchers have long argued that religion increases prosocial behavior, but results are equivocal. Recent findings on priming religious concepts seem to show that religion drives other-regarding behaviors. However, here I suggest that some religious concepts may not only be priming religion, but also anticipated rewards. I present the results of a new experiment that primes reward-related and reward-unrelated religious or secular concepts. Results show that priming reward-related concepts positively impacts prosocial behavior (specifically, generosity), regardless of their religious content. Religious cognitions alone are not sufficient to elicit generosity: reward cognitions must be present as well."]]></description>
<dc:subject>experimental_psychology evolution_of_cooperation religion in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c080a8c7fdda/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:religion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/109/34/13686.abstract">
    <title>Task-switching costs promote the evolution of division of labor and shifts in individuality</title>
    <dc:date>2012-08-22T16:21:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/109/34/13686.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["From microbes to humans, the success of many organisms is achieved by dividing tasks among specialized group members. The evolution of such division of labor strategies is an important aspect of the major transitions in evolution. As such, identifying specific evolutionary pressures that give rise to group-level division of labor has become a topic of major interest among biologists. To overcome the challenges associated with studying this topic in natural systems, we use actively evolving populations of digital organisms, which provide a unique perspective on the de novo evolution of division of labor in an open-ended system. We provide experimental results that address a fundamental question regarding these selective pressures: Does the ability to improve group efficiency through the reduction of task-switching costs promote the evolution of division of labor? Our results demonstrate that as task-switching costs rise, groups increasingly evolve division of labor strategies. We analyze the mechanisms by which organisms coordinate their roles and discover strategies with striking biological parallels, including communication, spatial patterning, and task-partitioning behaviors. In many cases, under high task-switching costs, individuals cease to be able to perform tasks in isolation, instead requiring the context of other group members. The simultaneous loss of functionality at a lower level and emergence of new functionality at a higher level indicates that task-switching costs may drive both the evolution of division of labor and also the loss of lower-level autonomy, which are both key components of major transitions in evolution."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to_read agent-based_models evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_economics evolutionary_biology collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition dr_marx_dr_karl_marx_to_the_red_courtesy_phone_please in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:518b99be4d40/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:agent-based_models"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:dr_marx_dr_karl_marx_to_the_red_courtesy_phone_please"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/31102-the-ethical-project/">
    <title>The Ethical Project // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame</title>
    <dc:date>2012-08-21T13:48:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/31102-the-ethical-project/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Pretty reasonable review.  My take: http://bactra.org/weblog/algae-2011-11.html#kitcher]]></description>
<dc:subject>book_reviews ethics evolution_of_cooperation philosophy kitcher.philip</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c157a1c06b24/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:book_reviews"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ethics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kitcher.philip"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://edge.org/conversation/on-iterated-prisoner-dilemma">
    <title>On &quot;iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Contains Strategies That Dominate Any Evolutionary Opponent&quot;  | Conversation | Edge</title>
    <dc:date>2012-08-08T01:46:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://edge.org/conversation/on-iterated-prisoner-dilemma</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Only the comment by Sigmund and Nowak is really worth reading, so I reproduce it in full.

"Being close means not being there. We had known about strategies that allow to nail down the opponent's payoff to an arbitrary level [1,2], but not about the vast and fascinating realm of zero determinant (ZD) strategies that enforce a linear relation between the payoffs for the two players. This opens a new facet in the study of trigger strategies and folk theorems for iterated games, and offers a highly stimulating approach for moral philosophers enquiring about 'egoistic' and 'tuistic' viewpoints.
"Our only quibble with the Press-Dyson paper is semantic. The title speaks of 'evolutionary opponents', which suggests evolutionary game theory. But biological or cultural evolution is not a phenomenon on the level of the individual. It requires a population. The 'evolutionary' players of Press and Dyson don't evolve but adapt. With their splendidly 'mischievous' extortionate strategies, Press and Dyson contribute to classical game theory, by considering two players who grapple with each other in a kind of mental jiu-jitsu. The leverage afforded by zero-determinant strategies offers a splendid new arsenal of throws, locks, and holds.
"Which of these strategies can flourish in an evolutionary setting is less clear. Being successful, in this context, feeds back at the population level. It means that more and more players will act like you, be they your offspring or your epigones. Thus you are increasingly likely to encounter your own kind. If your 'extortionate' strategy guarantees that you do twice as well as your opponent, and your opponents' strategy guarantees that she does twice as well as you, this only means that both get nothing. The only norm which is not self-defeating through population dynamics requires players to guarantee each other as much as themselves. We are then back to Tit For Tat. Press and Dyson are perfectly aware of this, of course. In a nutshell, they have uncovered a vast set of strategies linking the scores of two players deterministically (as TFT does), but asymmetrically (unlike TFT). This enriches the canvas of individual interactions, but not necessarily the range of outcomes open to evolving populations.
"[1] M.A. Nowak, M.C. Boerlijst, K.Sigmund, Equal pay for all prisoners, AMS Monthly 104 (1997) 303-307.
"[2] K. Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness, Princeton UP, Princeton, New Jersey (2010)."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:blog evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3cef1e9fbafa/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2012/07/zerodeterminant_strategies_in.html">
    <title>Zero-Determinant Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma | The n-Category Café</title>
    <dc:date>2012-08-08T01:45:18+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2012/07/zerodeterminant_strategies_in.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Shorter: Tit for Tat rules, OK?]]></description>
<dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b45c04960621/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://dannyreviews.com/h/Cooperative_Species.html">
    <title>A Cooperative Species (Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis) - review</title>
    <dc:date>2012-07-16T17:35:51+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://dannyreviews.com/h/Cooperative_Species.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>book_reviews kith_and_kin human_evolution evolution_of_cooperation bowles.samuel gintis.herbert yee.danny evolutionary_game_theory</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6e826c43f3ca/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:book_reviews"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bowles.samuel"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:gintis.herbert"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:yee.danny"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/109/25/9929.abstract">
    <title>Direct reciprocity in structured populations</title>
    <dc:date>2012-06-19T21:44:40+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/109/25/9929.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Reciprocity and repeated games have been at the center of attention when studying the evolution of human cooperation. Direct reciprocity is considered to be a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, and it is generally assumed that it can lead to high levels of cooperation. Here we explore an open-ended, infinite strategy space, where every strategy that can be encoded by a finite state automaton is a possible mutant. Surprisingly, we find that direct reciprocity alone does not lead to high levels of cooperation. Instead we observe perpetual oscillations between cooperation and defection, with defection being substantially more frequent than cooperation. The reason for this is that “indirect invasions” remove equilibrium strategies: every strategy has neutral mutants, which in turn can be invaded by other strategies. However, reciprocity is not the only way to promote cooperation. Another mechanism for the evolution of cooperation, which has received as much attention, is assortment because of population structure. Here we develop a theory that allows us to study the synergistic interaction between direct reciprocity and assortment. This framework is particularly well suited for understanding human interactions, which are typically repeated and occur in relatively fluid but not unstructured populations. We show that if repeated games are combined with only a small amount of assortment, then natural selection favors the behavior typically observed among humans: high levels of cooperation implemented using conditional strategies."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a6766168747c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.jstor.org/action/showArticleInfo?doi=10.1086%2F663243">
    <title>Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation</title>
    <dc:date>2012-02-08T21:57:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.jstor.org/action/showArticleInfo?doi=10.1086%2F663243</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Cooperation and the allocation of common resources are core features of social behavior. Games idealizing both interactions have been studied separately. But here, rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooperate, and then, if they jointly cooperate, they bargain over the fruits of their cooperation. It is shown that the dynamics of the combined game cannot simply be reduced to the dynamics of the individual games and that both cooperation and fair division are more likely in the combined game than in the constituent games taken separately."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:15655bf9e2e4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.springerlink.com/content/33176r20r8381516/">
    <title>Infinite in the Lab: How Do People Play Repeated Games? - Theory and Decision, Volume 72, Number 2 - SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2012-01-20T19:34:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.springerlink.com/content/33176r20r8381516/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We introduce a novel mechanism to eliminate endgame effects in repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments. In the main phase of a supergame our mechanism generates more persistent cooperation than finite horizon or random continuation rules. Moreover, we find evidence for cooperation-enhancing “active/reactive” strategies which concentrate in the initial phase of a supergame as subjects gain experience."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB economics experimental_economics game_theory decision-making evolution_of_cooperation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8e7cbf73eae7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision-making"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/2/3/412.abstract">
    <title>Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting</title>
    <dc:date>2011-12-18T16:03:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/2/3/412.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[An unusually literal reading of Mencken's "conscience is the little voice that tells us someone might be watching":  "We examined the effect of an image of a pair of eyes on contributions to an honesty box used to collect money for drinks in a university coffee room. People paid nearly three times as much for their drinks when eyes were displayed rather than a control image. This finding provides the first evidence from a naturalistic setting of the importance of cues of being watched, and hence reputational concerns, on human cooperative behaviour."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB have_read experimental_psychology evolution_of_cooperation experimental_economics to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f7f5cbf8efc7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.sciencemag.org/content/334/6062/1548.full?rss=1">
    <title>High Relatedness Is Necessary and Sufficient to Maintain Multicellularity in Dictyostelium</title>
    <dc:date>2011-12-15T23:41:52+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.sciencemag.org/content/334/6062/1548.full?rss=1</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Cool!  "Most complex multicellular organisms develop clonally from a single cell. This should limit conflicts between cell lineages that could threaten the extensive cooperation of cells within multicellular bodies. Cellular composition can be manipulated in the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, which allows us to test and confirm the two key predictions of this theory. Experimental evolution at low relatedness favored cheating mutants that could destroy multicellular development. However, under high relatedness, the forces of mutation and within-individual selection are too small for these destructive cheaters to spread, as shown by a mutation accumulation experiment. Thus, we conclude that the single-cell bottleneck is a powerful stabilizer of cellular cooperation in multicellular organisms."]]></description>
<dc:subject>slime_molds evolutionary_biology experimental_biology evolution_of_cooperation evo-devo developmental_biology major_transitions_of_evolution have_read in_NB to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c1c539661594/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:slime_molds"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evo-devo"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:developmental_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:major_transitions_of_evolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pnas.org/content/108/48/19193.abstract">
    <title>Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans</title>
    <dc:date>2011-12-01T13:11:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pnas.org/content/108/48/19193.abstract</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Human populations are both highly cooperative and highly organized. Human interactions are not random but rather are structured in social networks. Importantly, ties in these networks often are dynamic, changing in response to the behavior of one's social partners. This dynamic structure permits an important form of conditional action that has been explored theoretically but has received little empirical attention: People can respond to the cooperation and defection of those around them by making or breaking network links. Here, we present experimental evidence of the power of using strategic link formation and dissolution, and the network modification it entails, to stabilize cooperation in sizable groups. Our experiments explore large-scale cooperation, where subjects’ cooperative actions are equally beneficial to all those with whom they interact. Consistent with previous research, we find that cooperation decays over time when social networks are shuffled randomly every round or are fixed across all rounds. We also find that, when networks are dynamic but are updated only infrequently, cooperation again fails. However, when subjects can update their network connections frequently, we see a qualitatively different outcome: Cooperation is maintained at a high level through network rewiring. Subjects preferentially break links with defectors and form new links with cooperators, creating an incentive to cooperate and leading to substantial changes in network structure. Our experiments confirm the predictions of a set of evolutionary game theoretic models and demonstrate the important role that dynamic social networks can play in supporting large-scale human cooperation."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB have_read experimental_sociology social_networks evolution_of_cooperation christakis.nicholas</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a9948443d16f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:experimental_sociology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:christakis.nicholas"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v479/n7372/full/nature10601.html">
    <title>Stepwise evolution of stable sociality in primates : Nature : Nature Publishing Group</title>
    <dc:date>2011-11-12T21:01:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v479/n7372/full/nature10601.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Although much attention has been focused on explaining and describing the diversity of social grouping patterns among primates1, 2, 3, less effort has been devoted to understanding the evolutionary history of social living4. This is partly because social behaviours do not fossilize, making it difficult to infer changes over evolutionary time. However, primate social behaviour shows strong evidence for phylogenetic inertia, permitting the use of Bayesian comparative methods to infer changes in social behaviour through time, thereby allowing us to evaluate alternative models of social evolution. Here we present a model of primate social evolution, whereby sociality progresses from solitary foraging individuals directly to large multi-male/multi-female aggregations (approximately 52 million years (Myr) ago), with pair-living (approximately 16 Myr ago) or single-male harem systems (approximately 16 Myr ago) derivative from this second stage. This model fits the data significantly better than the two widely accepted alternatives (an unstructured model implied by the socioecological hypothesis or a model that allows linear stepwise changes in social complexity through time). We also find strong support for the co-evolution of social living with a change from nocturnal to diurnal activity patterns, but not with sex-biased dispersal. This supports suggestions that social living may arise because of increased predation risk associated with diurnal activity. Sociality based on loose aggregation is followed by a second shift to stable or bonded groups. This structuring facilitates the evolution of cooperative behaviours5 and may provide the scaffold for other distinctive anthropoid traits including coalition formation, cooperative resource defence and large brains.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB primates evolutionary_biology evolution_of_cooperation behavioral_ecology human_evolution</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a59d86462024/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:primates"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_biology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:behavioral_ecology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:human_evolution"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/reviews/calculus-of-selfishness.html">
    <title>Review of Karl Sigmund, The Calculus of Selfishness</title>
    <dc:date>2010-12-11T23:21:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/reviews/calculus-of-selfishness.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>books:recommended evolution_of_cooperation evolutionary_game_theory self-promotion</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a68ed791b665/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:recommended"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:self-promotion"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3666">
    <title>[1011.3666] The tragedy of the commons in a multi-population complementarity game</title>
    <dc:date>2010-11-22T21:44:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3666</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve to:NB to_read jost.jurgen</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:efb02c00d4c1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:jost.jurgen"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3674">
    <title>[1011.3674] Learning, evolution and population dynamics</title>
    <dc:date>2010-11-22T21:43:43+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3674</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>evolutionary_game_theory evolution_of_cooperation re:do-institutions-evolve to_read to:NB jost.jurgen</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6ae840d3e393/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolution_of_cooperation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:do-institutions-evolve"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:jost.jurgen"/>
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</item>
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