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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/724447">
    <title>On the Ecological and Internal Rationality of Bayesian Conditionalization and Other Belief Updating Strategies | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science: Vol 77, No 1</title>
    <dc:date>2026-04-18T22:13:36+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/724447</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["According to Bayesians, agents should respond to evidence by conditionalizing their prior degrees of belief on what they learn. A major aim of this article is to demonstrate that there are common scenarios where Bayesian conditionalization is less rational—from both an ecological and an internal perspective—than other theoretically well-motivated belief updating strategies, even in simple situations and even for an ‘ideal’ agent who is computationally unbounded. The examples also serve to demarcate the conditions under which Bayesian conditionalization may be expected to be ecologically optimal. A second aim of the article is to argue for a broader notion of rationality than what is typically assumed in formal epistemology. On this broader understanding of rationality, classical decision theoretic principles such as expected utility maximization play a less important role."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology bayesianism rationality</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c9a42dd78d1c/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bayesianism"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://henrich.fas.harvard.edu/sites/g/files/omnuum5811/files/henrich/files/hong_henrich_-_2021_-_the_cultural_evolution_of_epistemic_practices.pdfd">
    <title>The Cultural Evolution of Epistemic Practices: The case of Diviniation</title>
    <dc:date>2026-04-16T17:38:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://henrich.fas.harvard.edu/sites/g/files/omnuum5811/files/henrich/files/hong_henrich_-_2021_-_the_cultural_evolution_of_epistemic_practices.pdfd</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Although a substantial literature in anthropology and comparative religion explores
divination across diverse societies and back into history, little research has integrated
the older ethnographic and historical work with recent insights on human learning,
cultural transmission, and cognitive science. Here we present evidence showing that
divination practices are often best viewed as an epistemic technology, and we formally model the scenarios under which individuals may overestimate the efficacy of
divination that contribute to its cultural omnipresence and historical persistence. We
found that strong prior belief, underreporting of negative evidence, and misinferring
belief from behavior can all contribute to biased and inaccurate beliefs about the
effectiveness of epistemic technologies. We finally suggest how scientific epistemology, as it emerged in Western societies over the past few centuries, has influenced
the importance and cultural centrality of divination practices."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB divination superstition cultural_evolution epistemology via:?</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:55ac0f0a6d48/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:superstition"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/25858/">
    <title>Belief and Social Networks - PhilSci-Archive</title>
    <dc:date>2025-08-16T00:17:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/25858/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Network epistemology is a growing field which studies the relationship between social network structure and belief. The field draws on work from many disciplines, including computer science, economics, philosophy, physics, political science, psychology, and sociology. While the conclusions of the field suggest that the relationship between network structure and belief is quite complex, there are a few general lessons that can be drawn. This chapter discusses what is known, and where fruitful new interdisciplinary work could help expand our understanding."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology social_life_of_the_mind social_networks philosophy_of_science zollman.kevin</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f411eb7777f9/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://academic.oup.com/book/57345?searchresult=1">
    <title>Inquiry Under Bounds | Oxford Academic</title>
    <dc:date>2024-11-06T19:56:36+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://academic.oup.com/book/57345?searchresult=1</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Herbert Simon held that the fundamental turn in the study of bounded rationality is the turn from substantive to procedural rationality. Theories of substantive rationality begin with normative questions about attitudes: what should we prefer, intend, or believe? By contrast, theories of procedural rationality begin with normative questions about processes of inquiry: how should we determine what to prefer, intend, or believe? If Simon was right, then the central task for theories of bounded rationality is to develop an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents. We need, that is, a theory of inquiry under bounds. Inquiry under bounds takes as its starting point a five-point bounded rationality program inspired by recent work in cognitive science. To elaborate and defend that program, I argue, we need an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents. Inquiry under bounds develops an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents: the reason-responsiveness consequentialist view. I use this account to clarify and defend key insights from the bounded tradition as well as to shed light on recent controversies in the epistemology of inquiry."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted downloaded epistemology bounded_rationality</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:204efc259a40/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-mono/10.4324/9781003355274/political-beliefs-oliver-traldi">
    <title>Political Beliefs | A Philosophical Introduction | Oliver Traldi | Tay</title>
    <dc:date>2024-05-14T03:46:01+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-mono/10.4324/9781003355274/political-beliefs-oliver-traldi</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology political_philosophy ideology downloaded</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5c6e1ca74941/</dc:identifier>
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    <title>The Dark Side of the Loon. Explaining the Temptations of Obscurantism - Buekens - 2015 - Theoria - Wiley Online Library</title>
    <dc:date>2024-02-01T16:10:35+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/theo.12047</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["After contrasting obscurantism with bullshit, we explore some ways in which obscurantism is typically justified by investigating a notorious test-case: defences of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Obscurantism abuses the reader's natural sense of curiosity and interpretive charity with the promise of deep and profound insights about a designated subject matter that is often vague or elusive. When the attempt to understand what the speaker means requires excessive hermeneutic efforts, interpreters are reluctant to halt their quest for meaning. We diagnose this as a case of psychological loss aversion, in particular, the aversion to acknowledging that there was no hidden meaning after all, or that whatever meaning found was projected onto the text by the reader herself."]]></description>
<dc:subject>rhetoric improvement_of_the_understanding barely-comprehensible_metaphysics epistemology via:PeterErwin</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c9cf38adf836/</dc:identifier>
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<item rdf:about="https://critinq.wordpress.com/2023/09/19/how-we-know-what-we-know/">
    <title>How We Know What We Know | In the Moment</title>
    <dc:date>2023-12-30T21:15:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://critinq.wordpress.com/2023/09/19/how-we-know-what-we-know/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>epistemology philosophy_of_science humanities daston.lorraine have_read via:???</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:fa01dc32a003/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:humanities"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:daston.lorraine"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-023-04299-9">
    <title>Collective deception: toward a network model of epistemic responsibility | Synthese</title>
    <dc:date>2023-12-16T03:15:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-023-04299-9</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["What kind of collective is responsible for the deception that follows disinformation campaigns? Jennifer Lackey argues in The Epistemology of Groups that a group agent is responsible for such deception. She analyzes this deception as a group lie, which involves a group misrepresenting its own beliefs through a jointly accepted assertion or a spokesperson. Against this view, I argue that the group responsible for disinformation campaigns is a diffuse network. This deception involves misrepresenting scientific knowledge, not a group belief. Taking tobacco industry disinformation campaigns as an example, I argue that these corporate groups needed a network of epistemically authoritative sources—including scientists, doctors, and reputable publishers—to create and spread disinformation in order to make a skeptical view of scientific knowledge appear credible. As such, I argue that a network is epistemically responsible for this deception. First, I challenge the assumption within group epistemology that assertion is the basis of epistemic responsibility and argue that credibility enhancement is the basis instead. This explains how non-testimonial forms of support and corroboration from multiple sources can bolster the apparent credibility of an implausible view. Next, I describe the roles of different corroborators to show why it is necessary to include them. Finally, I defend a network model of epistemic responsibility for deception. Understanding how enhancing the credibility of disinformation is a matter of responsibility can help us to build more trustworthy communities."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB networked_life epistemology deceiving_us_has_become_an_industrial_process epidemiology_of_representations social_networks moral_philosophy moral_responsibility re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:dc248cc8dbfd/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_responsibility"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22510/">
    <title>Fake News! - PhilSci-Archive</title>
    <dc:date>2023-09-22T00:56:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/22510/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We review several topics of philosophical interest connected to misleading online content. First we consider proposed definitions of different types of misleading content. Then we consider the epistemology of misinformation, focusing on approaches from virtue epistemology and social epistemology. Finally we discuss how misinformation is related to belief polarization, and argue that models of rational polarization present special challenges for conceptualizing fake news and misinformation."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology epidemiology_of_representations social_life_of_the_mind re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator via:henry_farrell</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6c61749d098b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:actually-dr-internet-is-the-name-of-the-monsters-creator"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:henry_farrell"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-009-3967-7">
    <title>Evolutionary Epistemology | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2021-12-18T06:02:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-009-3967-7</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[I know I read this in graduate school, but I could not tell you a single blessed thing about the contributions.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted books:read epistemology evolutionary_epistemology downloaded</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ccc95b83d4c5/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evolutionary_epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.02522">
    <title>[2107.02522] A nonBayesian view of Hempel's paradox of the ravens</title>
    <dc:date>2021-07-08T16:29:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.02522</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In Hempel's paradox of the ravens, seeing a red pencil is considered as supporting evidence that all ravens are black. Also known as the Paradox of Confirmation, the paradox and its many resolutions indicate that we cannot underestimate the logical and statistical elements needed in the assessment of evidence in support of a hypothesis. Most of the previous analyses of the paradox are within the Bayesian framework. These analyses and Hempel himself generally accept the paradoxical conclusion; it feels paradoxical supposedly because the amount of evidence is extremely small. Here I describe a nonBayesian analysis of various statistical models with an accompanying likelihood-based reasoning. The analysis shows that the paradox seems paradoxical because there are natural models where observing a red pencil has no relevance to the color of ravens. In general the value of the evidence depends crucially on the sampling scheme and on the assumption about the underlying parameters of the relevant model."

--- IIRC this is also what Peter Godfrey-Smith says in _Theory and Reality_.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology bayesianism likelihood</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:531825dfad91/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bayesianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:likelihood"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520297470/avicennas-theory-of-science">
    <title>Avicenna's Theory of Science by Riccardo Strobino - Hardcover - University of California Press</title>
    <dc:date>2021-07-04T11:38:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520297470/avicennas-theory-of-science</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Avicenna is the most influential figure in the intellectual history of the Islamic world. This book is the first comprehensive study of his theory of science, which profoundly shaped his philosophical method and indirectly influenced philosophers and theologians not only in the Islamic world but also throughout Christian Europe and the medieval Jewish tradition. 
"A sophisticated interpreter of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Avicenna took on the ambitious task of reorganizing Aristotelian philosophy of science into an applicable model of scientific reasoning, striving to identify conditions of certainty for scientific assertions and conditions of adequacy for real definitions. Riccardo Strobino combines philosophical and textual analysis to explore the scope and nature of Avicenna’s contributions to the logic of scientific reasoning in his effort to recalibrate Aristotle’s model and overcome some of its internal limitations. Focusing on a broad array of philosophical innovations at the intersection of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, this book casts light on an essential aspect of the thought of the preeminent philosopher and physician of the Islamic world."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted history_of_ideas epistemology history_of_science philosophy_of_science islamic_civilization downloaded</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0130660b3e79/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_ideas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:islamic_civilization"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.001.0001">
    <title>Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism - Oxford Scholarship</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-23T05:28:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245018.001.0001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:recommended have_read epistemology stove.david_c.</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5750ca673521/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:recommended"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:stove.david_c."/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198826903.001.0001">
    <title>Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political - Oxford Scholarship</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-16T07:09:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198826903.001.0001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This book defends the view that epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character traits, attitudes, or ways of thinking that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping, or sharing of knowledge. An account is given of specific epistemic vices and of the particular ways in which they get in the way of knowledge. Closed-mindedness is an example of a character vice, an epistemic vice that is a character trait. Epistemic insouciance and epistemic malevolence are examples of attitude vices. An example of an epistemic vice that is a way of thinking is wishful thinking. Only epistemic vices that we have the ability to control or modify are strictly blameworthy but all epistemic vices are intellectual failings that reflect badly on the person whose vices they are. Epistemic vices merit criticism if not blame. Many epistemic vices are stealthy, in the sense that they block their own detection by active critical reflection or other means. In these cases, traumatic experiences can sometimes open one’s eyes to one’s own failings but are not guaranteed to do so. Although significant obstacles stand in the way of self-improvement in respect of our epistemic vices, and some epistemic vices are resistant to self-improvement strategies, self-improvement is nevertheless possible in some cases."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology moral_philosophy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e267a68d3e62/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_philosophy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190847289.001.0001">
    <title>Knowing Our Limits - Oxford Scholarship</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-16T06:24:00+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190847289.001.0001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Changing our minds isn’t easy. Even when we recognize our views are disputed by intelligent and informed people, we rarely doubt our rightness. Why is this so? How can we become more open-minded, putting ourselves in a better position to tolerate conflict, advance collective inquiry, and learn from differing perspectives in a complex world? In this engrossing, provocative book, Nathan Ballantyne defends the indispensable role of epistemology in tackling these issues. For early modern philosophers, the point of reflecting on inquiry was to understand how our beliefs are often distorted by prejudice and self-interest, and to improve the foundations of human knowledge. Ballantyne seeks to recover and modernize this classical tradition by vigorously defending an interdisciplinary approach to epistemology, blending philosophical theorizing with insights from the social and cognitive sciences. We need tools to help us think more circumspectly about our controversial views. Ballantyne develops a method for distinguishing between our reasonable and unreasonable opinions, in light of evidence about bias, information overload, and rival experts. This method guides us to greater intellectual openness—in the spirit of skeptics from Socrates to Montaigne to Bertrand Russell—making us more inclined to admit that sometimes we don’t have the right answers. With vibrant prose and fascinating examples from science and history, Ballantyne shows how epistemology can help us know our limits."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology to_download</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:0b50491ae600/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_download"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001">
    <title>Morality and Mathematics - Oxford Scholarship</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-16T05:56:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823667.001.0001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This book explores arguments for and against moral realism and mathematical realism, how they interact, and what they can tell us about areas of philosophical interest more generally.Â It argues that our mathematical beliefs have no better claim to being self-evident or provable than our moral beliefs. Nor do our mathematical beliefs have better claim to being empirically justified. It is also incorrect that reflection on the “genealogy” of our moral beliefs establishes a lack of parity between the cases. In general, if one is a moral anti-realist on the basis of epistemological considerations, then one ought to be a mathematical anti-realist too. And yet, the book argues that moral realism and mathematical realism do not stand or fall together – and for a surprising reason. Moral questions, insofar as they are practical, are objective in a sense in which mathematical questions are not, and the sense in which they are objective can only be explained by assuming practical anti-realism. It follows that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which have been widely identified, are actually in tension. The author concludes that the objective questions in the neighborhood of questions of logic, modality, grounding, nature, and more are practical questions as well. Practical philosophy should, therefore, take center stage."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted philosophy moral_philosophy epistemology philosophy_of_mathematics to_doqn</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a7b21395d120/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_mathematics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_doqn"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199656608.001.0001">
    <title>Epistemology of Groups - Oxford Scholarship</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-16T04:28:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199656608.001.0001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible for the U.S.’s inept and deceptive handling of COVID-19 and the harms that American citizens have suffered as a result. But are groups subject to normative assessment simply in virtue of their individual members being so, or are they somehow agents in their own right? Answering this question depends on understanding key concepts in the epistemology of groups, as we cannot hold the Trump Administration responsible without first determining what it believed, knew, and said. Deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. Inflationary theorists maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that neither approach is satisfactory. Groups are more than their members, but not because they have “minds of their own,” as the inflationists hold. Instead, this book shows how group phenomena—like belief, justification, and knowledge—depend on what the individual group members do or are capable of doing while being subject to group-level normative requirements. This framework, it is argued, allows for the correct distribution of responsibility across groups and their individual members."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology collective_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:47d6a548cce1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508930.001.0001">
    <title>Empiricisms: Experience and Experiment from Antiquity to the Anthropocene - Oxford Scholarship</title>
    <dc:date>2021-01-16T04:18:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508930.001.0001</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Empiricisms reassesses the values of experience and experiment in European philosophy and comparatively. It traces the history of empirical philosophy from its birth in Greek medicine to its emergence as a philosophy of modern science. A richly detailed account in Part I of history’s empiricisms establishes a context in Part II for reconsidering the work of the so-called radical empiricists—William James, Henri Bergson, John Dewey, and Gilles Deleuze, each treated in a dedicated chapter. What is “radical” about their work is to return empiricism from epistemology to the ontology and natural philosophy where it began. Empiricisms also sets empirical philosophy in conversation with Chinese tradition, considering technological, scientific, medical, and alchemical sources, as well as selected Confucian, Daoist, and Mohist classics. The work shows how philosophical reflection on experience and a profound experimental practice coexist in traditional China with no interaction or even awareness of each other. Empiricism is more multi-textured than philosophers tend to assume when we explain it to ourselves and to students. One purpose of Empiricisms is to recover the neglected context. A complementary purpose is to elucidate the value of experience and arrive at some idea of what is living and dead in philosophical empiricism."

--- Russell deserves to be on his list much more than Bergson.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology empiricism history_of_ideas history_of_philosophy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1da75154fa25/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:empiricism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_ideas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_philosophy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/metainductive-justification-of-induction/C1841B96A958159D3A73B7039B48825A">
    <title>THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION | Episteme | Cambridge Core</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-21T14:16:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/metainductive-justification-of-induction/C1841B96A958159D3A73B7039B48825A</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["I evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductive justification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice.
"My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actual justification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge.
"The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument does not need to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having a justification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB low-regret_learning induction epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:a1bc7af23e80/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:low-regret_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:induction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/ontogenetic-foundations-of-epistemic-norms/634D2469952C06950CBCDCB312C77BFA">
    <title>The Ontogenetic Foundations of Epistemic Norms | Episteme | Cambridge Core</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-16T19:18:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/ontogenetic-foundations-of-epistemic-norms/634D2469952C06950CBCDCB312C77BFA</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this paper, I approach epistemic norms from an ontogenetic point of view. I argue and present evidence that to understand epistemic norms – e.g., scientific norms of methodology and the evaluation of evidence – children must first develop through their social interactions with others three key concepts. First is the concept of belief, which provides the most basic distinction on which scientific investigations rest: the distinction between individual subjective perspectives and an objective reality. Second is the concept of reason, which in the context of science obligates practitioners to justify their claims to others with reasons by grounding them in beliefs that are universally shared within the community. Third is the concept of social norm, which is not primarily epistemic, but provides children with an understanding of norms as collective agreements. The theoretical argument is that all three of these concepts emerge not from just any kind of social interaction, but specifically from social interactions structured by the human species’ unique capacities for shared intentionality."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology science_as_a_social_process cultural_transmission_of_cognitive_tools cognitive_development tomasello.michael</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3297f7dad39a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:science_as_a_social_process"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cultural_transmission_of_cognitive_tools"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_development"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:tomasello.michael"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/material-theory-of-induction-at-the-frontiers-of-science/2D0AA5D6E3A257FA583D148D548FE3CB">
    <title>The Material Theory of Induction at the Frontiers of Science | Episteme | Cambridge Core</title>
    <dc:date>2020-12-16T19:15:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/abs/material-theory-of-induction-at-the-frontiers-of-science/2D0AA5D6E3A257FA583D148D548FE3CB</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["According to John D. Norton's Material Theory of Induction, all reasonable inductive inferences are justified in virtue of background knowledge about local uniformities in nature. These local uniformities indicate that our samples are likely to be representative of our target population in our inductions. However, a variety of critics have noted that there are many circumstances in which induction seems to be reasonable, yet such background knowledge is apparently absent. I call such an absence of circumstances ‘the frontiers of science', where background scientific theories do not provide information about such local uniformities. I argue that the Material Theory of Induction can be reconciled with our intuitions in favour of these inductions. I adapt an attempted justification of induction in general, the Combinatoric Justification of Induction, into a more modest rationalisation at the less foundational level that the critics discuss. Subject to a number of conditions, we can extrapolate from large samples using our knowledge of facts about the minimum proportions of representative subsets of finite sets. I also discuss some of Norton's own criticisms of his theory and argue that he is overly pessimistic. I conclude that Norton's theory at least performs well at the frontiers of science."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB induction epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:79befa0cfbdf/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:induction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://sootyempiric.blogspot.com/2019/11/truth-in-culture-war.html">
    <title>Truth in the Culture War</title>
    <dc:date>2020-07-28T19:20:42+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://sootyempiric.blogspot.com/2019/11/truth-in-culture-war.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[To be clear, the last tag applies to the people being critiqued, since the truth (hah!) of the criticism is immediate to anyone who knows how the phrase "correspondence theory of truth" is used in philosophy.]]></description>
<dc:subject>us_culture_wars truth philosophy_of_science epistemology logic utter_stupidity</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6969203492f2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:us_culture_wars"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:truth"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:logic"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:utter_stupidity"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/homepage/cv.html#material_theory">
    <title>John D. Norton: The Material Theory of Induction</title>
    <dc:date>2020-07-28T19:00:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/homepage/cv.html#material_theory</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Which are the good inductive inferences or the proper relations of inductive support? We have sought for millennia to answer by means of universally applicable formal rules or schema. These efforts have failed. Background facts, not rules, ultimately determine which are the good inductive inferences. No formal rule applies universally. Each is confined to a restricted domain whose background facts there authorize them."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted to_read induction philosophy_of_science epistemology norton.john_d. downloaded</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:061c8b728461/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:induction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:norton.john_d."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:downloaded"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/vices-of-the-mind-9780198826903?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;#">
    <title>Vices of the Mind - Quassim Cassam - Oxford University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2019-08-02T22:35:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://global.oup.com/academic/product/vices-of-the-mind-9780198826903?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;#</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Epistemic vices are character traits, attitudes or thinking styles that prevent us from gaining, keeping or sharing knowledge. In this book, Quassim Cassam gives an account of the nature and importance of these vices, which include closed-mindedness, intellectual arrogance, wishful thinking, and prejudice. In providing the first extensive coverage of vice epistemology, an exciting new area of philosophical research, Vices of the Mind uses real examples drawn primarily from the world of politics to develop a compelling theory of epistemic vice. Cassam defends the view that as well as getting in the way of knowledge these vices are blameworthy or reprehensible. Key events such as the 2003 Iraq War and the 2016 Brexit vote, and notable figures including Donald Trump are analysed in detail to illustrate what epistemic vice looks like in the modern world. The traits covered in this landmark work include a hitherto unrecognised epistemic vice called 'epistemic insouciance'. Cassam examines both the extent to which we are responsible for our failings and the factors that make it difficult to know our own vices. If we are able to overcome self-ignorance and recognise our epistemic vices then is there is anything we can do about them? Vices of the Mind picks up on this concern in its conclusion by detailing possible self-improvement strategies and closing with a discussion of what makes some epistemic vices resistant to change."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted philosophy moral_psychology moral_philosophy epistemology books:suggest_to_library</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5cac36b8e546/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:suggest_to_library"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674987111">
    <title>Shen Gua’s Empiricism — Ya Zuo | Harvard University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2018-08-09T14:10:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674987111</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Shen Gua (1031–1095) is a household name in China, known as a distinguished renaissance man and the author of Brush Talks from Dream Brook, an old text whose remarkable “scientific” discoveries make it appear curiously ahead of its time. In this first book-length study of Shen in English, Ya Zuo reveals the connection between Shen’s life as an active statesman and his ideas, specifically the empirical stance manifested through his wide-ranging inquiries. She places Shen on the broad horizon of premodern Chinese thought, and presents his empiricism within an extensive narrative of Chinese epistemology.
"Relying on Shen as a searchlight, Zuo focuses in on how an individual thinker summoned conditions and concepts from the vast Chinese intellectual tradition to build a singular way of knowing. Moreover, her study of Shen provides insights into the complex dynamics in play at the dawn of the age of Neo-Confucianism and compels readers to achieve a deeper appreciation of the diversity in Chinese thinking."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted history_of_ideas song_dynasty china empiricism confucianism philosophy epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b6fe284e5fe2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_ideas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:song_dynasty"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:china"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:empiricism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:confucianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/POSC_a_00275">
    <title>A New Problem-Solving Paradigm for Philosophy of Science | Perspectives on Science | MIT Press Journals</title>
    <dc:date>2018-04-04T14:07:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/POSC_a_00275</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A paradigm instructs in how to do research successfully. Analytic philosophy of science, currently dominant, models paradigmatic rational science as a system of logical inferences. It is, however, an abundantly inadequate paradigm. This paper presents an alternative paradigm: science as an organized collection of problem solving processes. This position is backed, on the one side, by a cognitive model of problem solving process applicable to all problem solving circumstances and, on the other, by a non-formal conception of rationality that provides a wider enriched notion of rational research process than is available to the analytic paradigm. The result is a very different way of looking at science and of doing history and philosophy of science. The position is developed sufficiently to display its nature and merits."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB philosophy_of_science cognitive_science epistemology rationality</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6d24ab8bb6b6/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognitive_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo27256174">
    <title>Creatively Undecided: Toward a History and Philosophy of Scientific Agency, Fisch</title>
    <dc:date>2018-01-06T00:21:21+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/C/bo27256174</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper are believed by many who study science to be the two key thinkers of the twentieth century. Each addressed the question of how scientific theories change, but they came to different conclusions.
"By turning our attention to ambiguity and indecision in science, Menachem Fisch, in Creatively Undecided, offers a new way to look at how scientific understandings change. Following Kuhn, Fisch argues that scientific practice depends on the framework in which it is conducted, but he also shows that those frameworks can be understood as the possible outcomes of the rational deliberation that Popper viewed as central to theory change. How can a scientist subject her standards to rational appraisal if that very act requires the use of those standards? The way out, Fisch argues, is by looking at the incentives scientists have to create alternative frameworks in the first place. Fisch argues that while science can only be transformed from within, by people who have standing in the field, criticism from the outside is essential. We may not be able to be sufficiently self-critical on our own, but trusted criticism from outside, even if resisted, can begin to change our perspective—at which point transformative self-criticism becomes a real option. "]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted philosophy_of_science epistemology changing_your_mind re:democratic_cognition in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:41db321597f0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:changing_your_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-within-its-proper-bounds-9780198807520?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;#">
    <title>Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds - Edouard Machery - Oxford University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2017-11-02T14:46:31+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://global.oup.com/academic/product/philosophy-within-its-proper-bounds-9780198807520?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;#</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should re-orient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors. Any resolution to many of these contemporary issues would require an epistemic access to metaphysical possibilities and necessities, which, Machery argues, we do not have. In effect, then, Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds defends a form of modal skepticism. The book assesses the main philosophical method for acquiring the modal knowledge that the resolution of modally immodest philosophical issues turns on: the method of cases, that is, the consideration of actual or hypothetical situations (which cases or thought experiments describe) in order to determine what facts hold in these situations. Canvassing the extensive work done by experimental philosophers over the last 15 years, Edouard Machery shows that the method of cases is unreliable and should be rejected. Importantly, the dismissal of modally immodest philosophical issues is no cause for despair - many important philosophical issues remain within our epistemic reach. In particular, reorienting the course of philosophy would free time and resources for bringing back to prominence a once-central intellectual endeavor: conceptual analysis."

--- Giving a talk today in town, which I will have to miss.

--- ETA: I will be disappointed if he doesn't quote Pope:
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan; 
The proper study of mankind is man.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted philosophy epistemology skepticism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:df19177a1c15/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:skepticism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0974-z">
    <title>Optimistic realism about scientific progress | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2017-09-28T18:41:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0974-z</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Scientific realists use the “no miracle argument” to show that the empirical and pragmatic success of science is an indicator of the ability of scientific theories to give true or truthlike representations of unobservable reality. While antirealists define scientific progress in terms of empirical success or practical problem-solving, realists characterize progress by using some truth-related criteria. This paper defends the definition of scientific progress as increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Antirealists have tried to rebut realism with the “pessimistic metainduction”, but critical realists turn this argument into an optimistic view about progressive science."]]></description>
<dc:subject>philosophy_of_science epistemology in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ceb41d72b150/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674975002">
    <title>As If — Kwame Anthony Appiah | Harvard University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2017-09-07T16:03:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674975002</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Idealization is a fundamental feature of human thought. We build simplified models in our scientific research and utopias in our political imaginations. Concepts like belief, desire, reason, and justice are bound up with idealizations and ideals. Life is a constant adjustment between the models we make and the realities we encounter. In idealizing, we proceed “as if” our representations were true, while knowing they are not. This is not a dangerous or distracting occupation, Kwame Anthony Appiah shows. Our best chance of understanding nature, society, and ourselves is to open our minds to a plurality of imperfect depictions that together allow us to manage and interpret our world.
"The philosopher Hans Vaihinger first delineated the “as if” impulse at the turn of the twentieth century, drawing on Kant, who argued that rational agency required us to act as if we were free. Appiah extends this strategy to examples across philosophy and the human and natural sciences. In a broad range of activities, we have some notion of the truth yet continue with theories that we recognize are, strictly speaking, false. From this vantage point, Appiah demonstrates that a picture one knows to be unreal can be a vehicle for accessing reality.
"As If explores how strategic untruth plays a critical role in far-flung areas of inquiry: decision theory, psychology, natural science, and political philosophy. A polymath who writes with mainstream clarity, Appiah defends the centrality of the imagination not just in the arts but in science, morality, and everyday life."]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted philosophy epistemology philosophy_of_science approximation modeling idealization in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d992f3c0970c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:approximation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:modeling"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:idealization"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/true-enough">
    <title>True Enough | The MIT Press</title>
    <dc:date>2017-09-05T23:38:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/true-enough</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Philosophy valorizes truth, holding that there can never be epistemically good reasons to accept a known falsehood, or to accept modes of justification that are not truth conducive. How can this stance account for the epistemic standing of science, which unabashedly relies on models, idealizations, and thought experiments that are known not to be true? In True Enough, Catherine Elgin argues that we should not assume that the inaccuracy of models and idealizations constitutes an inadequacy. To the contrary, their divergence from truth or representational accuracy fosters their epistemic functioning. When effective, models and idealizations are, Elgin contends, felicitous falsehoods that exemplify features of the phenomena they bear on. Because works of art deploy the same sorts of felicitous falsehoods, she argues, they also advance understanding.
"Elgin develops a holistic epistemology that focuses on the understanding of broad ranges of phenomena rather than knowledge of individual facts. Epistemic acceptability, she maintains, is a matter not of truth-conduciveness, but of what would be reflectively endorsed by the members of an idealized epistemic community—a quasi-Kantian realm of epistemic ends."

--- Well, the first part sounds interesting...]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted modeling epistemology philosophy_of_science in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:85574dc241ad/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:modeling"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10901.html">
    <title>Sosa, E.: Epistemology (eBook and Hardcover).</title>
    <dc:date>2017-01-15T21:36:06+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10901.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this concise book, one of the world’s leading epistemologists provides a sophisticated, revisionist introduction to the problem of knowledge in Western philosophy. Modern and contemporary accounts of epistemology tend to focus on limited questions of knowledge and skepticism, such as how we can know the external world, other minds, the past through memory, the future through induction, or the world’s depth and structure through inference. This book steps back for a better view of the more general issues posed by the ancient Greek Pyrrhonists. Returning to and illuminating this older, broader epistemological tradition, Ernest Sosa develops an original account of the subject, giving it substance not with Cartesian theology but with science and common sense.
"Descartes is a part of this ancient tradition, but he goes beyond it by considering not just whether knowledge is possible at all but also how we can properly attain it. In Cartesian epistemology, Sosa finds a virtue-theoretic account, one that he extends beyond the Cartesian context. Once epistemology is viewed in this light, many of its problems can be solved or fall away."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f35381144c91/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo24550762">
    <title>A Democratic Theory of Judgment, Zerilli</title>
    <dc:date>2017-01-04T14:04:14+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/D/bo24550762</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this sweeping look at political and philosophical history, Linda M. G. Zerilli unpacks the tightly woven core of Hannah Arendt’s unfinished work on a tenacious modern problem: how to judge critically in the wake of the collapse of inherited criteria of judgment. Engaging a remarkable breadth of thinkers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, Leo Strauss, Immanuel Kant, Frederick Douglass, John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, and many others, Zerilli clears a hopeful path between an untenable universalism and a cultural relativism that forever defers the possibility of judging at all.
"Zerilli deftly outlines the limitations of existing debates, both those that concern themselves with the impossibility of judging across cultures and those that try to find transcendental, rational values to anchor judgement. Looking at Kant through the lens of Arendt, Zerilli develops the notion of a public conception of truth, and from there she explores relativism, historicism, and universalism as they shape feminist approaches to judgment. Following Arendt even further, Zerilli arrives at a hopeful new pathway—seeing the collapse of philosophical criteria for judgment not as a problem but a way to practice judgment anew as a world-building activity of democratic citizens. The result is an astonishing theoretical argument that travels through—and goes beyond—some of the most important political thought of the modern period."

--- Last tag is for Arendt and Kant...]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted democracy philosophy epistemology arendt.hannah political_philosophy social_life_of_the_mind re:democratic_cognition barely-comprehensible_metaphysics feminism in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8e241976955b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:democracy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:arendt.hannah"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:political_philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:barely-comprehensible_metaphysics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:feminism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/01/in-defense-of-facts/508748/">
    <title>In Defense of Facts - The Atlantic</title>
    <dc:date>2016-12-13T14:41:56+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/01/in-defense-of-facts/508748/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>essays literary_criticism book_reviews evisceration epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:26f055fed49a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:essays"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:literary_criticism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:book_reviews"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:evisceration"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="https://meaningness.com/metablog/meta-rationality-curriculum">
    <title>What they don’t teach you at STEM school | Meaningness</title>
    <dc:date>2016-12-06T18:08:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://meaningness.com/metablog/meta-rationality-curriculum</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Interesting, but a comprehensive (and valid!) refutation of nihilism as an intermediate step does bring to mind "I think you should be a bit more specific here in step 2".  (Also: ethnomethodology as the key to everything, _really_?  Even if you accept its findings on their own terms [and Gellner had a great essay back in the day on why you shouldn't], it's just question-begging about how people have the capacity for those sorts of social interactions, so we're off to the races again.  But I'd probably enjoy having these arguments with the author.)]]></description>
<dc:subject>rationality limits_of_rationality systems philosophy epistemology via:vaguery have_read cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:ee228f89a4ab/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:limits_of_rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:systems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:vaguery"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0919-6?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals">
    <title>Indoctrination anxiety and the etiology of belief | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2016-11-07T22:03:26+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0919-6?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["People sometimes try to call others’ beliefs into question by pointing out the contingent causal origins of those beliefs. The significance of such ‘Etiological Challenges’ is a topic that has started attracting attention in epistemology. Current work on this topic aims to show that Etiological Challenges are, at most, only indirectly epistemically significant, insofar as they bring other generic epistemic considerations to the agent’s attention (e.g. disagreement, consistency with one’s own epistemic standards, evidence of one’s fallibility). Against this approach, we argue that Etiological Challenges are epistemically significant in a more direct and more distinctive way. An Etiological Challenge prompts the agent to assess whether her beliefs result from practices of indoctrination, and whether she should reduce confidence in those beliefs, given the anti-reliability of indoctrination as a method of belief-acquisition. Our analysis also draws attention to some of the ways in which epistemic concerns interact with political issues—e.g. relating to epistemic injustice, identity-based discrimination, and segregation—when we’re thinking about the contingent causal origins of our beliefs."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology epidemiology_of_representations re:democratic_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:eb76c28fe4af/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epidemiology_of_representations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals">
    <title>Belief without credence | SpringerLink</title>
    <dc:date>2016-09-08T20:49:36+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. A prominent consideration in favor of credence-based epistemology is the ease with which it appears to account for rational action. In contrast, cases with risky payoff structures threaten to break the link between rational belief and rational action. This threat poses a challenge to traditional epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief. The core problem, we suggest, is that belief may not be enough to register all aspects of a subject’s epistemic position with respect to any given proposition. We claim this problem can be solved by introducing other doxastic attitudes—genuine representations—that differ in strength from belief. The resulting alternative picture, a kind of doxastic states pluralism, retains the central features of traditional epistemology—most saliently, an emphasis on truth as a kind of objective accuracy—while adequately accounting for rational action."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology decision_theory rationality</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:3b0ea103ed79/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0800-7">
    <title>A dilemma for the imprecise bayesian - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2016-05-14T18:05:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0800-7</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Many philosophers regard the imprecise credence framework as a more realistic model of probabilistic inferences with imperfect empirical information than the traditional precise credence framework. Hence, it is surprising that the literature lacks any discussion on how to update one’s imprecise credences when the given evidence itself is imprecise. To fill this gap, I consider two updating principles. Unfortunately, each of them faces a serious problem. The first updating principle, which I call “generalized conditionalization,” sometimes forces an agent to change her imprecise degrees of belief even though she does not have new evidence. The second updating principle, which I call “the generalized dynamic Keynesian model,” may result in a very precise credal state although the agent does not have sufficiently strong evidence to justify such an informative doxastic state. This means that it is much more difficult to come up with an acceptable updating principle for the imprecise credence framework than one might have thought it would be."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB statistics bayesianism epistemology probability philosophy_of_science</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1214f6165de7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bayesianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:probability"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10636.html">
    <title>Pritchard, D.: Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. (eBook and Hardcover)</title>
    <dc:date>2016-01-04T15:56:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10636.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us.
"Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein’s account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. Pritchard also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal that he developed in previous work and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, he argues that these two antiskeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting."

--- I realize there is an irony to being skeptical about this largely on the grounds that all attempts to solve the problem for the last 2000+ years have failed.  (Uncle Davey would've understood.)]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:bceda825705c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo21263435">
    <title>Articulating the World: Conceptual Understanding and the Scientific Image, Rouse</title>
    <dc:date>2015-12-28T01:40:38+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/A/bo21263435</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Naturalism as a guiding philosophy for modern science both disavows any appeal to the supernatural or anything else transcendent to nature, and repudiates any philosophical or religious authority over the workings and conclusions of the sciences. A longstanding paradox within naturalism, however, has been the status of scientific knowledge itself, which seems, at first glance, to be something that transcends and is therefore impossible to conceptualize within scientific naturalism itself.
"In Articulating the World, Joseph Rouse argues that the most pressing challenge for advocates of naturalism today is precisely this: to understand how to make sense of a scientific conception of nature as itself part of nature, scientifically understood. Drawing upon recent developments in evolutionary biology and the philosophy of science, Rouse defends naturalism in response to this challenge by revising both how we understand our scientific conception of the world and how we situate ourselves within it."]]></description>
<dc:subject>in_NB books:noted philosophy_of_science epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:e5e1c897239b/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0719-z">
    <title>What ‘Extended Me’ knows - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2015-12-14T23:21:32+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-015-0719-z</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Arguments for the ‘extended mind’ seem to suggest the possibility of ‘extended knowers’—agents whose specifically epistemic virtues may depend on systems whose boundaries are not those of the brain or the biological organism. Recent discussions of this possibility invoke insights from virtue epistemology, according to which knowledge is the result of the application of some kind of cognitive skill or ability on the part of the agent. In this paper, I argue that there is a fundamental tension in these appeals to cognitive virtue. The tension centers on the presence of a tool or technology as an object of awareness, hence something apt for epistemically virtuous engagement on the part of the agent. I highlight a dilemma: the better something looks as a non-biological element of the machinery of mind, the worse it looks as a potential object of any specifically epistemic skill or ability on the part of the agent. The tension is resolved, I argue, by thinking about sub-personal forms of epistemic hygiene. I examine one such form (rooted in the vision of the ‘predictive brain’), and show how it sits neatly with the vision of the extended mind. I end by asking what we can still reasonably expect, given this more complex sub-personal story, by way of agent-level cognitive hygiene."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB philosophy_of_mind epistemology natural_born_cyborgs social_life_of_the_mind</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d0de0efd4092/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:natural_born_cyborgs"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.davidhume.org/texts/fd.html">
    <title>David Hume - Four Dissertations (1757, 1777)</title>
    <dc:date>2015-03-06T03:09:05+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.davidhume.org/texts/fd.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>have_read philosophy epistemology aesthetics psychology hume.david via:unfogged</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:135eaea5fdd2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:have_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:aesthetics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:psychology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:hume.david"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:unfogged"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11245-013-9174-y">
    <title>The Virtues of Ingenuity: Reasoning and Arguing without Bias - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2014-10-13T12:53:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11245-013-9174-y</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[This paper describes and defends the “virtues of ingenuity”: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philosophers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in the practice of using reasoning to solve problems and gather information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less important uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent revival of rhetoric and argumentative approaches to reasoning (in psychology, philosophy and science studies) has highlighted the virtues of persuasiveness and cast a new light on some of its apparent vices—bad faith, deluded confidence, confirmation and myside biases. Those traits, it is often argued, will no longer look so detrimental once we grasp their proper function: arguing in order to persuade, rather than thinking in order to solve problems. Some of these biases may even have a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen in this light, the virtues of ingenuity may well seem redundant. Defending them, I argue that the vices of conviction are not innocuous. If generalized, they would destabilize argumentative practices. Argumentation is a common good that is threatened when every arguer pursues conviction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for nor explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a collapse of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect, humility or honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues that specifically attach to the practice of making conscious inferences.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB to_read rhetoric epistemology social_life_of_the_mind re:democratic_cognition via:?</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:b88b99bff9f0/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rhetoric"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:via:?"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-014-0523-1">
    <title>Causal tracking reliabilism and the Gettier problem - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2014-10-06T19:30:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-014-0523-1</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This paper argues that reliabilism can handle Gettier cases once it restricts knowledge producing reliable processes to those that involve a suitable causal link between the subject’s belief and the fact it references. Causal tracking reliabilism (as this version of reliabilism is called) also avoids the problems that refuted the causal theory of knowledge, along with problems besetting more contemporary theories (such as virtue reliabilism and the “safety” account of knowledge). Finally, causal tracking reliabilism allows for a response to Linda Zagzebski’s challenge that no theory of knowledge can both eliminate the possibility of Gettier cases while also allowing fully warranted but false beliefs."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:4b3388006d30/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3166/">
    <title>Peirce in the long run: remarks on knowledge a ulteriori - PhilSci-Archive</title>
    <dc:date>2014-09-03T18:48:04+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3166/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Knowledge a priori has an important role in rationalistic schools: it pre-establishes truth in order to justify a system of correlated ideas. Empiricism usually concerns knowledge a posteriori, for experience itself is what we have actually known. Peirce’s probabilistic approach to science was based on necessity in the long run but it has no clear place in the categorization of knowledge either as a priori or as a posteriori. This deficit should be overcome by introducing a new category — synthetic knowledge a ulteriori, defined as what is known about an indefinite number of cases but not about isolated instances."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology philosophy_of_science pragmatism peirce.c.s.</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:513cd12a84c6/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:pragmatism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:peirce.c.s."/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3165/">
    <title>Ignorance and Indifference - PhilSci-Archive</title>
    <dc:date>2014-09-03T18:47:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3165/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The epistemic state of complete ignorance is not a probability distribution. In it, we assign the same, unique ignorance degree of belief to any contingent outcome and each of its contingent, disjunctive parts. That this is the appropriate way to represent complete ignorance is established by two instruments, each individually strong enough to identify this state. They are the principle of indifference (“PI”) and the notion that ignorance is invariant under certain redescriptions of the outcome space, here developed into the “principle of invariance of ignorance” (“PII”). Both instruments are so innocuous as almost to be platitudes. Yet the literature in probabilistic epistemology has misdiagnosed them as paradoxical or defective since they generate inconsistencies when conjoined with the assumption that an epistemic state must be a probability distribution. To underscore the need to drop this assumption, I express PII in its most defensible form as relating symmetric descriptions and show that paradoxes still arise if we assume the ignorance state to be a probability distribution. By separating out the different properties that characterize a probability measure, I show that the ignorance state is incompatible with each of the additivity and the dynamics of Bayesian conditionalization of the probability calculus."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB philosophy_of_science epistemology bayesianism foundations_of_statistics norton.john_d.</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:452062adf5f7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bayesianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:foundations_of_statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:norton.john_d."/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.versobooks.com/books/1013-the-necessity-of-errors">
    <title>The Necessity of Errors</title>
    <dc:date>2014-08-15T18:13:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.versobooks.com/books/1013-the-necessity-of-errors</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A groundbreaking exploration of the process of error and how we learn from it, in philosophy and history of science, from Plato to Adorno.
"Truth and error are interdependent; claims to truth can be made only in the light of previous error. In The Necessity of Errors, John Roberts explores how, up to Hegel, emphasis was placed on error as something that dissolves truth and needs to be eradicated. Drawing on the fragmented corpus of writing on error, from Locke to Luxemburg, Adorno to Vaneigem, and covering five key areas from philosophy to political praxis, this wide-ranging account explores how we learn from error, under what conditions, and with what means. Errors, Roberts finds, are productive, but not in any uniform sense or under all circumstances—a theory of errors needs a dialectics of error."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted philosophy epistemology learning_from_error in_library</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2db21f60d4fc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_from_error"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_library"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-014-0486-2?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals">
    <title>Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-31T14:41:36+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-014-0486-2?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this paper, we investigate the problem of truth approximation via belief merging, i.e., we ask whether, and under what conditions, a group of inquirers merging together their beliefs makes progress toward the truth about the underlying domain. We answer this question by proving some formal results on how belief merging operators perform with respect to the task of truth approximation, construed as increasing verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Our results shed new light on the issue of how rational (dis)agreement affects the inquirers’ quest for truth. In particular, they vindicate the intuition that scientific inquiry, and rational discussion in general, benefits from some heterogeneity in opinion and interaction among different viewpoints. The links between our approach and related analyses of truth tracking, judgment aggregation, and opinion dynamics, are also highlighted."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology social_life_of_the_mind collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition science_as_a_social_process to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:915722a6e6f3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:science_as_a_social_process"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://statweb.stanford.edu/~cgates/PERSI/papers/thinking.pdf">
    <title>Thinking Too Much (Diaconis)</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-22T17:31:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://statweb.stanford.edu/~cgates/PERSI/papers/thinking.pdf</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Includes the " 'why not use decision theory, like you teach?' 'Come on, this is serious' " exchange.  But also looks worth reading on broader grounds.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to_read decision_theory bounded_rationality rationality epistemology diaconis.persi foundations_of_statistics to:blog</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1d372229f62e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:decision_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bounded_rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:diaconis.persi"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:foundations_of_statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:blog"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-014-0408-3">
    <title>Model change and reliability in scientific inference - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-07T13:44:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-014-0408-3</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["One persistent challenge in scientific practice is that the structure of the world can be unstable: changes in the broader context can alter which model of a phenomenon is preferred, all without any overt signal. Scientific discovery becomes much harder when we have a moving target, and the resulting incorrect understandings of relationships in the world can have significant real-world and practical consequences. In this paper, we argue that it is common (in certain sciences) to have changes of context that lead to changes in the relationships under study, but that standard normative accounts of scientific inquiry have assumed away this problem. At the same time, we show that inference and discovery methods can “protect” themselves in various ways against this possibility by using methods with the novel methodological virtue of “diligence.” Unfortunately, this desirable virtue provably is incompatible with other desirable methodological virtues that are central to reliable inquiry. No scientific method can provide every virtue that we might want."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB philosophy_of_science epistemology non-stationarity danks.david</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5f37fd9dd1ae/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:non-stationarity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:danks.david"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/45997-errors-of-reasoning-naturalizing-the-logic-of-inferenc/">
    <title>Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame</title>
    <dc:date>2014-06-13T21:37:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/45997-errors-of-reasoning-naturalizing-the-logic-of-inferenc/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>book_reviews fallacies logic rhetoric epistemology judgment</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:1afc3c27c343/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:book_reviews"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:fallacies"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:logic"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rhetoric"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:judgment"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://sup.org/book.cgi?id=16730">
    <title>Epinets: The Epistemic Structure and Dynamics of Social Networks</title>
    <dc:date>2014-03-05T21:49:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://sup.org/book.cgi?id=16730</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Epinets presents a new way to think about social networks, which focuses on the knowledge that underlies our social interactions. Guiding readers through the web of beliefs that networked individuals have about each other and probing into what others think, this book illuminates the deeper character and influence of relationships among social network participants."

Drawing on artificial intelligence, the philosophy of language, and epistemic game theory, Moldoveanu and Baum formulate a lexicon and array of conceptual tools that enable readers to explain, predict, and shape the fabric and behavior of social networks. With an innovative and strategically-minded look at the assumptions that enable and clog our networks, this book lays the groundwork for a leap forward in our understanding of human relations.]]></description>
<dc:subject>books:noted social_networks epistemology game_theory social_influence in_NB color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:745c86e3487d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:game_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_influence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-013-0356-3?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals">
    <title>A material dissolution of the problem of induction - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2014-02-24T17:23:15+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-013-0356-3?wt_mc=alerts.TOCjournals</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that the celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved. Attempts to recreate the problem in the material theory of induction fail. They require relations of inductive support to conform to an unsustainable, hierarchical empiricism."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB philosophy_of_science epistemology induction norton.john_d.</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:45662a55c8b2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:induction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:norton.john_d."/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-013-0305-1">
    <title>Evaluating distributed cognition - Springer</title>
    <dc:date>2014-02-03T20:41:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-013-0305-1</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Human beings are promiscuously social creatures, and contemporary epistemologists are increasingly becoming aware that this shapes the ways in which humans process information. This awareness has tended to restrict itself, however, to testimony amongst isolated dyads. As scientific practice ably illustrates, information-processing can be spread over a vast social network. In this essay, a credit theory of knowledge is adapted to account for the normative features of strongly distributed cognition. A typical credit theory analyzes knowledge as an instance of obtaining success because of or through the ability of the individual knower. The extended credit theory developed here broadens this framework so as to accommodate team-like epistemic achievements. The extended credit theory is then contrasted with some similar proposals given from within a process reliabilist framework. Once one isolates pairs of cases of distributed cognition in which there is a difference between sheer reliability and reliability grounded in ability, one can see that the extended credit theory maps the normative terrain better than the alternatives."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB epistemology philosophy_of_science collective_cognition</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:76116196e3fc/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/40972-bounded-thinking-intellectual-virtues-for-limited-agents/">
    <title>Bounded Thinking: Intellectual virtues for limited agents // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame</title>
    <dc:date>2014-01-31T00:19:47+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/40972-bounded-thinking-intellectual-virtues-for-limited-agents/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>book_reviews epistemology bounded_rationality</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:8edefac59e0f/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:book_reviews"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bounded_rationality"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-luxury-of-the-understanding-9780199674800?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;tab=description">
    <title>A Luxury of the Understanding - Hardcover - Allan Hazlett - Oxford University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2013-12-16T06:30:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://global.oup.com/academic/product/a-luxury-of-the-understanding-9780199674800?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;tab=description</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The value of true belief has played a central role in history of philosophy--consider Socrates' slogan that the unexamined life is not worth living, and Aristotle's claim that everyone naturally wants knowledge--as well as in contemporary epistemology, where questions about the value of knowledge have recently taken center stage. It has usually been assumed that accurate representation--true belief--is valuable, either instrumentally or for its own sake. In A Luxury of the Understanding, Allan Hazlett offers a critical study of that assumption, and of the main ways in which it can be defended.
"Hazlett defends the conclusion that true belief is at most sometimes valuable. In the first part of the book, he targets the view that true belief is normally better for us than false belief, and argues that false beliefs about ourselves--for example, unrealistic optimism about our futures and about other people, such as overly positive views of our friends--are often valuable vis-a-vis our wellbeing. In the second part, he targets the view that truth is "the aim of belief," and argues for anti-realism about the epistemic value of true belief. Together, these arguments comprise a challenge to the philosophical assumption of the value of true belief, and suggest an alternative picture, on which the fact that some people love truth is all there is to "the value of true belief.""

- Color me dubious.]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted philosophy epistemology ethics color_me_skeptical</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:769d3cb1d9fd/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ethics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:color_me_skeptical"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://global.oup.com/academic/product/seeing-things-9780199303281?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;tab=description">
    <title>Seeing Things: The Philosophy of Reliable Observation - Hardcover - Robert Hudson - Oxford University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2013-10-11T23:45:27+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://global.oup.com/academic/product/seeing-things-9780199303281?cc=us&amp;lang=en&amp;tab=description</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In Seeing Things, Robert Hudson assesses a common way of arguing about observation reports called "robustness reasoning." Robustness reasoning claims that an observation report is more likely to be true if the report is produced by multiple, independent sources. Seeing Things argues that robustness reasoning lacks the special value it is often claimed to have. Hudson exposes key flaws in various popular philosophical defenses of robustness reasoning. This philosophical critique of robustness is extended by recounting five episodes in the history of science (from experimental microbiology, atomic theory, astrophysics and astronomy) where robustness reasoning is -- or could be claimed to have been -- used. Hudson goes on to show that none of these episodes do in fact exhibit robustness reasoning. In this way, the significance of robustness reasoning is rebutted on both philosophical and historical grounds. 
"But the book does more than critique robustness reasoning. It also develops a better defense of the informative value of observation reports. The book concludes by relating insights into the failure of robustness reasoning to a popular approach to scientific realism called "(theoretical) preservationism." Hudson argues that those who defend this approach to realism commit similar errors to those who advocate robustness reasoning. In turn, a new form of realism is formulated and defended. Called "methodological preservationism," it recognizes the fundamental value of naked eye observation to scientists -- and the rest of us."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted philosophy_of_science epistemology empiricism</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c6f7e2c6d946/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:empiricism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://global.oup.com/academic/product/bounded-thinking-9780199658534?cc=us&amp;lang=en">
    <title>Bounded Thinking: Intellectual Virtues for Limited Agents - Hardcover - Adam Morton - Oxford University Press</title>
    <dc:date>2013-07-20T19:25:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://global.oup.com/academic/product/bounded-thinking-9780199658534?cc=us&amp;lang=en</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Bounded Thinking offers a new account of the virtues of limitation management: intellectual virtues of adapting to the fact that we cannot solve many problems that we can easily describe. Adam Morton argues that we do give one another guidance on managing our limitations, but that this has to be in terms of virtues and not of rules, and in terms of success--knowledge and accomplishment--rather than rationality. He establishes a taxonomy of intellectual virtues, which includes 'paradoxical virtues' that sound like vices, such as the virtue of ignoring evidence and the virtue of not thinking too hard. There are also virtues of not planning ahead, in that some forms of such planning require present knowledge of one's future knowledge that is arguably impossible. A person's best response to many problems depends not on the most rationally promising solution to solving them but on the most likely route to success given the profile of intellectual virtues that the person has and lacks. Morton illustrates his argument with discussions of several paradoxes and conundra. He closes the book with a discussion of intelligence and rationality, and argues that both have very limited usefulness in the evaluation of who will make progress on which problems."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology bounded_rationality social_life_of_the_mind rationality collective_cognition re:democratic_cognition intelligence_(psychology)</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6caebedc03d2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bounded_rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:rationality"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:collective_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:re:democratic_cognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:intelligence_(psychology)"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100866190">
    <title>The Ambiguities of Experience</title>
    <dc:date>2013-07-08T21:15:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100866190</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In The Ambiguities of Experience, James G. March asks a deceptively simple question: What is, or should be, the role of experience in creating intelligence, particularly in organizations? Folk wisdom both trumpets the significance of experience and warns of its inadequacies. On one hand, experience is described as the best teacher. On the other hand, experience is described as the teacher of fools, of those unable or unwilling to learn from accumulated knowledge or the teaching of experts. The disagreement between those folk aphorisms reflects profound questions about the human pursuit of intelligence through learning from experience that have long confronted philosophers and social scientists. This book considers the unexpected problems organizations (and the individuals in them) face when they rely on experience to adapt, improve, and survive.
"While acknowledging the power of learning from experience and the extensive use of experience as a basis for adaptation and for constructing stories and models of history, this book examines the problems with such learning. March argues that although individuals and organizations are eager to derive intelligence from experience, the inferences stemming from that eagerness are often misguided. The problems lie partly in errors in how people think, but even more so in properties of experience that confound learning from it. "Experience," March concludes, "may possibly be the best teacher, but it is not a particularly good teacher."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted organizations social_life_of_the_mind empiricism epistemology march.james_g. social_science_methodology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:9f150e094cd1/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:organizations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:empiricism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:march.james_g."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670298">
    <title>Kelly on Ockham’s Razor and Truth-Finding Efficiency</title>
    <dc:date>2013-05-17T02:04:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670298</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This article discusses Kevin Kelly’s recent attempt to justify Ockham’s Razor in terms of truth-finding efficiency. It is argued that Kelly’s justification fails to warrant confidence in the empirical content of theories recommended by Ockham’s Razor. This is a significant problem if, as Kelly and many others believe, considerations of simplicity play a pervasive role in scientific reasoning, underlying even our best tested theories, for the proposal will fail to warrant the use of these theories in practical prediction."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB occams_razor epistemology philosophy_of_science kelly.kevin_t. to_read</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:f09495c1b33d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:occams_razor"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kelly.kevin_t."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to_read"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670299">
    <title>Probability, Regularity, and Cardinality</title>
    <dc:date>2013-05-17T02:00:59+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/670299</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Regularity is the thesis that all contingent propositions should be assigned probabilities strictly between zero and one. I will prove on cardinality grounds that if the domain is large enough, a regular probability assignment is impossible, even if we expand the range of values that probabilities can take, including, for instance, hyperreal values, and significantly weaken the axioms of probability."]]></description>
<dc:subject>philosophy_of_science probability bayesianism epistemology in_NB</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:40e511ee6066/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:probability"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:bayesianism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:in_NB"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://crookedtimber.org/2012/12/21/the-christmas-sermon-2012-on-not-believing-in-canada/#comment-440426">
    <title>The Christmas Sermon 2012 – “On Not Believing In Canada” — Crooked Timber</title>
    <dc:date>2012-12-22T02:47:54+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://crookedtimber.org/2012/12/21/the-christmas-sermon-2012-on-not-believing-in-canada/#comment-440426</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[D^2's post, and Slee's comment, are both things of beauty.]]></description>
<dc:subject>canada epistemology theology dsquared slee.tom</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:60582d4ac202/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:canada"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:theology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:dsquared"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:slee.tom"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.waggish.org/2012/truth-and-muddlement/">
    <title>Truth and Muddlement - Waggish</title>
    <dc:date>2012-12-21T23:14:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.waggish.org/2012/truth-and-muddlement/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We are tearing our way through thick layers of the gauze of preconceived notions and biases instilled in us by seemingly every single damn thing in the universe. We won’t pass the final layer (probably not ever, though hope springs eternal I suppose), so the myriad disguised claims of truth that constantly shriek and harangue us would do better to come clean and be exposed for the false promises they are. Our tub is full of ghosts."]]></description>
<dc:subject>epistemology science science_as_a_vocation moral_philosophy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:6dbc046b15a2/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:science_as_a_vocation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:moral_philosophy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2012/11/david-hume-vs-thomas-nagel-knowing-a-hawk-from-a-handsaw-but-mad-south-southwest-weblogging.html">
    <title>Brad DeLong: David Hume vs. Thomas Nagel: Knowing a Hawk from a Handsaw But Mad South-Southwest Weblogging</title>
    <dc:date>2012-11-25T13:43:02+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2012/11/david-hume-vs-thomas-nagel-knowing-a-hawk-from-a-handsaw-but-mad-south-southwest-weblogging.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Nagel's argument, to the extent that I understand it and that it is coherent, goes roughly like this:
"Suppose we think we are going south-southwest and see the sun rising before us. We don't think: "the heuristics of reasoning that have evolved because they tend to boost reproductive fitness make it likely that I am not in fact going south southwest". We think, instead: "I know the sun rises in the east! I must be going roughly east! I deduce this by my reason, and my reason is a mechanism that can see that the algorithm it follows is truth-preserving! My mind is in immediate contact with the rational order of the world! I don't just think I am going east! I know I am going east! And my certainty that I know is correct! And I know that my certainty is correct--and that triumph of reason cannot be given a purely physical explanation! I abandon the belief the I am going south-southwest because I recognize that it could not be true! My consciousness is an instrument of transcendence that grasps objective reality!"
"The problem is that it happened to me: I thought I was going south-southwest, saw the sun rising at 11:00, believed that I was in fact going east--and I was wrong: I was in fact going south-southwest."]]></description>
<dc:subject>epistemology philosophy_of_mind nagel.thomas delong.brad ouch</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:fb2bec131016/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:nagel.thomas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:delong.brad"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ouch"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://markcoddington.com/2012/10/31/nate-silver-journalism-politics-knowledge-epistemology/">
    <title>Why political journalists can’t stand Nate Silver: The limits of journalistic knowledge | Mark Coddington</title>
    <dc:date>2012-11-07T19:29:16+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://markcoddington.com/2012/10/31/nate-silver-journalism-politics-knowledge-epistemology/</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["When journalistic objectivity is confronted with scientific objectivity, its circuits are fried."

(Cf. Gellner's _Legitimation of Belief_, the importance of science "locating the wells of truth outside the gates of the city".)]]></description>
<dc:subject>us_politics why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_press_corps journalism social_life_of_the_mind objectivity social_science_methodology statistics prediction silver.nate coddington.mark epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c61222473af7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:us_politics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_press_corps"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:journalism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_life_of_the_mind"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:objectivity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:social_science_methodology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:prediction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:silver.nate"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:coddington.mark"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2012/11/todays-war-on-nate-silver-quiet-flows-the-don-edition.html#more">
    <title>Brad DeLong: Today's War on Nate SIlver: Quiet Flows the Don Edition</title>
    <dc:date>2012-11-03T17:46:37+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2012/11/todays-war-on-nate-silver-quiet-flows-the-don-edition.html#more</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Perhaps the most appalling quote:  "If it’s possible to recreate Silver’s model using just Microsoft Excel, a cheap Monte Carlo plug-in, and poll results that are widely available, then what real predictive value does Silver’s model have?"
]]></description>
<dc:subject>prediction utter_stupidity us_politics statistics running_dogs_of_reaction why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_press_corps why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_intelligentsia epistemology reproducibility no_really_utter_stupidity</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:2548727b0a08/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:prediction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:utter_stupidity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:us_politics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:running_dogs_of_reaction"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_press_corps"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:why_oh_why_cant_we_have_a_better_intelligentsia"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:reproducibility"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:no_really_utter_stupidity"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9726.html">
    <title>Foley, R.: When Is True Belief Knowledge?</title>
    <dc:date>2012-08-07T01:52:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9726.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
"In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information."]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB books:noted epistemology</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:c4ed7b646600/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/org/cfe/ockam-foundations.html">
    <title>Ockham's Razor: Foundations - Carnegie Mellon Center for Formal Epistemology</title>
    <dc:date>2012-04-17T12:14:22+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/org/cfe/ockam-foundations.html</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Despite my presence on the program, this should actually be really good.

"Scientific theory choice is guided by judgments of simplicity, a bias frequently referred to as "Ockham's Razor". But what is simplicity and how, if at all, does it help science find the truth?  Should we view simple theories as means for obtaining accurate predictions, as classical statisticians recommend?  Or should we believe the theories themselves, as Bayesian methods seem to justify?  The aim of this workshop is to re-examine the foundations of Ockham's razor, with a firm focus on the connections, if any, between simplicity and truth. "

--- ETA: Conference reports, of a kind:
http://bactra.org/weblog/921.html
http://bactra.org/weblog/922.html
http://bactra.org/weblog/923.html]]></description>
<dc:subject>self-promotion occams_razor philosophy_of_science epistemology kelly.kevin_t. kith_and_kin mayo.deborah vapnik.v.n. sober.elliott leeb.hannes wasserman.larry model_selection statistics complexity machine_learning learning_theory grunwald.peter</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:5d233b1231a4/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:self-promotion"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:occams_razor"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kelly.kevin_t."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:kith_and_kin"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:mayo.deborah"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:vapnik.v.n."/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:sober.elliott"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:leeb.hannes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:wasserman.larry"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:model_selection"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:statistics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:complexity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:machine_learning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:learning_theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:grunwald.peter"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/detail.html?bookId=bo12120802">
    <title>Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, Locke, and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition, Corneanu</title>
    <dc:date>2012-02-04T16:49:11+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/detail.html?bookId=bo12120802</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["a new approach to the epistemological and methodological doctrines of the leading experimental philosophers of seventeenth-century England, an approach that considers their often overlooked moral, psychological, and theological elements. Corneanu focuses on the views about the pursuit of knowledge in the writings of Robert Boyle and John Locke, as well as in those of several of their influences, including Francis Bacon and the early Royal Society virtuosi. She argues that their experimental programs of inquiry fulfill the role of regimens for curing, ordering, and educating the mind toward an ethical purpose, an idea she tracks back to the ancient tradition of cultura animi. "]]></description>
<dc:subject>to:NB scientific_revolution history_of_ideas history_of_science epistemology ethics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:722656c36d2c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:to:NB"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:scientific_revolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_ideas"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:ethics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/detail.html?bookId=bo10303424">
    <title>Histories of Scientific Observation, Daston, Lunbeck</title>
    <dc:date>2011-03-04T03:16:29+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://www.press.uchicago.edu/books/detail.html?bookId=bo10303424</link>
    <dc:creator>cshalizi</dc:creator><dc:subject>books:noted history_of_science epistemology philosophy_of_science empiricism</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/b:d79d3ef14ca7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:books:noted"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:history_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:epistemology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:philosophy_of_science"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:cshalizi/t:empiricism"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>