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    <description>recent bookmarks from Vaguery</description>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.3235"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://blog.mountaingoatsoftware.com/time-as-a-competitive-advantage"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.3672v2"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://zenpundit.com/?p=3348"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2009/10/creating-sustainable-competitive-advantage.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146415-high-correlation-between-asset-classes-herd-mentality-or-lemming-action?source=feed"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2009/01/do-ads-work.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://rustbeltintellectual.blogspot.com/2008/09/identity-versus-interest.html"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095810#PaperDownload"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://blog.pmarca.com/2008/02/inaugurating-th.html"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://blogs.sun.com/jonathan/entry/sun_enters_the_commodity_silicon"/>
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  </channel><item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.09983">
    <title>[2009.09983] Physical Zero-Knowledge Proof for Ripple Effect</title>
    <dc:date>2022-02-17T11:36:35+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.09983</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Ripple Effect is a logic puzzle where the player has to fill numbers into empty cells in a rectangular grid. The grid is divided into rooms, and each room must contain consecutive integers starting from 1 to its size. Also, if two cells in the same row or column contain the same number x, there must be a space of at least x cells separating the two cells. In this paper, we develop a physical zero-knowledge proof for the Ripple Effect puzzle using a deck of cards, which allows a prover to convince a verifier that he/she knows a solution without revealing it. In particular, given a secret number x and a list of numbers, our protocol can physically verify that x does not appear among the first x numbers in the list without revealing x or any number in the list.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>mathematical-recreations strategy heuristics rather-interesting algorithms constraint-satisfaction to-write-about to-simulate consider:information-spread</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:99b19d1e1d67/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:mathematical-recreations"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:constraint-satisfaction"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.06626">
    <title>[1501.06626] Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule</title>
    <dc:date>2019-03-29T12:14:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.06626</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the agents. We initiate the study of the computational complexity of an agent manipulating the PS rule. We show that computing an expected utility better response is NP- hard. On the other hand, we present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a lexicographic best response. For the case of two agents, we show that even an expected utility best response can be computed in polynomial time. Our result for the case of two agents relies on an interesting connection with sequential allocation of discrete objects.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>assignment-problems voting rostering operations-research game-theory collective-behavior to-simulate strategy rather-interesting to-understand computational-complexity</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:a34470653466/</dc:identifier>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:voting"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:rostering"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:operations-research"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:collective-behavior"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:to-understand"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:computational-complexity"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.07062">
    <title>[1509.07062] Boolean Hedonic Games</title>
    <dc:date>2019-03-29T11:47:46+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.07062</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the makeup of other coalitions. The assumption of dichotomous preferences means that, additionally, each player's preference relation partitions the set of coalitions of which that player is a member into just two equivalence classes: satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A player is indifferent between satisfactory coalitions, and is indifferent between unsatisfactory coalitions, but strictly prefers any satisfactory coalition over any unsatisfactory coalition. We develop a succinct representation for such games, in which each player's preference relation is represented by a propositional formula. We show how solution concepts for hedonic games with dichotomous preferences are characterised by propositional formulas.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>game-theory planning collective-behavior strategy multiagent-systems formalization to-simulate looking-to-see to-understand</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:3f760619ec95/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:collective-behavior"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:multiagent-systems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:formalization"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:to-simulate"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:looking-to-see"/>
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<item rdf:about="https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.2493">
    <title>[1401.2493] Guessing games</title>
    <dc:date>2017-05-07T14:39:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.2493</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[In a guessing game, players guess the value of a random real number selected using some probability density function. The winner may be determined in various ways; for example, a winner can be a player whose guess is closest in magnitude to the target or a winner can be a player coming closest without guessing higher than the target. We study optimal strategies for players in these games and determine some of them for two, three, and four players.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>probability-theory game-theory games mathematical-recreations strategy nudge-targets consider:looking-to-see</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:cb5538112bdb/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:probability-theory"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:games"/>
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<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.5030">
    <title>[1407.5030] To Reach or not to Reach? Efficient Algorithms for Total-Payoff Games</title>
    <dc:date>2015-09-13T12:53:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.5030</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Quantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games (that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games) are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the sum of the weights. Our aim is to describe the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games in the presence of arbitrary weights. It consists of a non-trivial application of the value iteration paradigm. Indeed, it requires to study, as a milestone, a refinement of these games, called min-cost reachability games, where we add a reachability objective to one of the players. For these games, we give an efficient value iteration algorithm to compute the values and optimal strategies (when they exist), that runs in pseudo-polynomial time. We also propose heuristics allowing one to possibly speed up the computations in both cases.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>game-theory mechanism-design strategy agent-based nudge-targets consider:rediscovery</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:6412dae91855/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:mechanism-design"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:agent-based"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:rediscovery"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3865">
    <title>[1405.3865] Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation Problems in Voting</title>
    <dc:date>2015-07-27T11:36:12+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3865</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[In the Possible Winner problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending the partial preferences to linear preferences. Previous work has provided, for many common voting rules, fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the Possible Winner problem, with number of candidates as the parameter. However, the corresponding kernelization question is still open and in fact, has been mentioned as a key research challenge. In this paper, we settle this open question for many common voting rules. 
We show that the Possible Winner problem for maximin, Copeland, Bucklin, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that include the Borda voting rule do not admit a polynomial kernel with the number of candidates as the parameter. We show however that the Coalitional Manipulation problem which is an important special case of the Possible Winner problem does admit a polynomial kernel for maximin, Copeland, ranked pairs, and a class of scoring rules that includes the Borda voting rule, when the number of manipulators is polynomial in the number of candidates. A significant conclusion of our work is that the Possible Winner problem is harder than the Coalitional Manipulation problem since the Coalitional Manipulation problem admits a polynomial kernel whereas the Possible Winner problem does not admit a polynomial kernel.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>voting game-theory mechanism-design strategy nudge-targets inference</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:5b006e0e2529/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:voting"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:mechanism-design"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.07713">
    <title>[1502.07713] Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticultural Perspective</title>
    <dc:date>2015-04-09T11:43:49+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.07713</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We examine cooperative games where the viability of a coalition is determined by whether or not its members have the ability to communicate amongst themselves independently of non-members. This necessary condition for viability was proposed by Myerson (1977) and is modeled via an interaction graph G=(V,E); a coalition S⊆V is then viable if and only if the induced graph G[S] is connected. The non-emptiness of the core of a coalition game can be tested by a well-known covering LP. Moreover, the integrality gap of its dual packing LP defines exactly the multiplicative least-core and the relative cost of stability of the coalition game. This gap is upper bounded by the packing-covering ratio which, for graphical coalition games, is known to be at most the treewidth of the interaction graph plus one (Meir et al. 2013). 
We examine the packing-covering ratio and integrality gaps of graphical coalition games in more detail. We introduce the thicket parameter of a graph, and prove it precisely measures the packing-covering ratio. It also approximately measures the primal and dual integrality gaps. The thicket number provides an upper bound of both integrality gaps. Moreover we show that for any interaction graph, the primal integrality gap is, in the worst case, linear in terms of the thicket number while the dual integrality gap is polynomial in terms of it. At the heart of our results, is a graph theoretic minmax theorem showing the thicket number is equal to the minimum width of a vine decomposition of the coalition graph (a vine decomposition is a generalization of a tree decomposition). We also explain how the thicket number relates to the VC-dimension of the set system produced by the game.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>game-theory strategy stretched-metaphors-that-probably-need-pictures nudge-targets consider:making-the-pictures</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:b2b10485f6ce/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:stretched-metaphors-that-probably-need-pictures"/>
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	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:making-the-pictures"/>
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</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1503.03745">
    <title>[1503.03745] Weiqi games as a loop-free tree</title>
    <dc:date>2015-03-15T12:20:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1503.03745</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Weiqi is one of the most complex board games played by two persons. The placement strategies adopted by Weiqi players are often used to analog the philosophy of human wars. Contrary to the western chess, Weiqi games are less studied by academics partially because Weiqi is popular only in East Asia, especially in China, Japan and Korea. Here, we propose to construct a directed tree using a database of extensive Weiqi games and perform a quantitative analysis of the Weiqi tree. We find that the popularity distribution of Weiqi openings with a same number of moves is distributed according to a power law and the tail exponent increases with the number of moves. Intriguingly, the superposition of the popularity distributions of Weiqi openings with the number of moves no more than a given number also has a power-law tail in which the tail exponent increases with the number of moves, and the superposed distribution approaches to the Zipf law. These findings are the same as for chess and support the conjecture that the popularity distribution of board game openings follows the Zipf law with a universal exponent. We also find that the distribution of out-degrees has a power-law form, the distribution of branching ratios has a very complicated pattern, and the distribution of uniqueness scores defined by the path lengths from the root vertex to the leaf vertices exhibits a unimodal shape. Our work provides a promising direction for the study of the decision making process of Weiqi playing from the angle of directed branching tree.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>games board-games planning hard-problems strategy learning-from-data rather-interesting nudge-targets Go consider:mining-db-and-coevolving</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:a6016bb2084c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:board-games"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:planning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:hard-problems"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:learning-from-data"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:rather-interesting"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:Go"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:mining-db-and-coevolving"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1410.8349">
    <title>[1410.8349] Graph Guessing Games and non-Shannon Information Inequalities</title>
    <dc:date>2014-11-09T13:21:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1410.8349</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Guessing games for directed graphs were introduced by Riis for studying multiple unicast network coding problems. In a guessing game, the players toss generalised dice and can see some of the other outcomes depending on the structure of an underlying digraph. They later guess simultaneously the outcome of their own die. Their objective is to find a strategy which maximises the probability that they all guess correctly. The performance of the optimal strategy for a graph is measured by the guessing number of the digraph. 
Christofides and Markstr\"om studied guessing numbers of undirected graphs and defined a strategy which they conjectured to be optimal. One of the main results of this paper is a disproof of this conjecture. 
The main tool so far for computing guessing numbers of graphs is information theoretic inequalities. In the paper we show that Shannon's information inequalities, which work particularly well for a wide range of graph classes, are not sufficient for computing the guessing number. 
Finally we pose a few more interesting questions some of which we can answer and some which we leave as open problems.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>collective-intelligence network-theory game-theory information-theory strategy rather-interesting nudge-targets counterexamples conjecture</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:eb13e60ecf06/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:collective-intelligence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:network-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:information-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:rather-interesting"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:counterexamples"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:conjecture"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1202.0862">
    <title>[1202.0862] e-Valuate: A Two-player Game on Arithmetic Expressions -- An Update</title>
    <dc:date>2014-11-03T11:40:38+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1202.0862</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[e-Valuate is a game on arithmetic expressions. The players have contrasting roles of maximizing and minimizing the given expression. The maximizer proposes values and the minimizer substitutes them for variables of his choice. When the expression is fully instantiated, its value is compared with a certain minimax value that would result if the players played to their optimal strategies. The winner is declared based on this comparison. 
We use a game tree to represent the state of the game and show how the minimax value can be computed efficiently using backward induction and alpha-beta pruning. The efficacy of alpha-beta pruning depends on the order in which the nodes are evaluated. Further improvements can be obtained by using transposition tables to prevent reevaluation of the same nodes. We propose a heuristic for node ordering. We show how the use of the heuristic and transposition tables lead to improved performance by comparing the number of nodes pruned by each method. 
We describe some domain-specific variants of this game. The first is a graph theoretic formulation wherein two players share a set of elements of a graph by coloring a related set with each player looking to maximize his share. The set being shared could be either the set of vertices, edges or faces (for a planar graph). An application of this is the sharing of regions enclosed by a planar graph where each player's aim is to maximize the area of his share. Another variant is a tiling game where the players alternately place dominoes on a 8×8 checkerboard to construct a maximal partial tiling. We show that the size of the tiling x satisfies 22≤x≤32 by proving that any maximal partial tiling requires at least 22 dominoes.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>game-theory mathematical-recreations strategy nudge-targets rather-interesting nice-game coevolution combinatorics</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:23a0684c83f9/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:mathematical-recreations"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:rather-interesting"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nice-game"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:coevolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:combinatorics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.7360">
    <title>[1312.7360] A state-constrained differential game arising in optimal portfolio liquidation</title>
    <dc:date>2014-10-10T10:21:15+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.7360</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[ risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren--Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem as terminal boundary conditions for finite and infinite time horizons. We prove existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and give closed-form solutions in some special cases. We also analyze qualitative properties of the equilibrium strategies and provide corresponding financial interpretations.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>economics multiobjective-optimization finance simulation models nudge-targets planning strategy consider:representation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:aa0c71cb102c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:multiobjective-optimization"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:finance"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:simulation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:models"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:planning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:representation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.4912">
    <title>[1408.4912] Specialization and Bet-Hedging in Heterogeneous Populations</title>
    <dc:date>2014-09-06T12:55:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.4912</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Phenotypic heterogeneity is a strategy commonly used by bacteria to rapidly adapt to changing environmental conditions. Here, we study the interplay between phenotypic heterogeneity and genetic diversity in spatially extended populations. By analyzing the spatio-temporal dynamics, we show that the level of mobility and the type of competition qualitatively influence the persistence of phenotypic heterogeneity. While direct competition generally promotes persistence of phenotypic heterogeneity, specialization dominates in models with indirect competition irrespective of the degree of mobility.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>diversity evolutionary-economics agent-based emergence strategy simulation nudge-targets consider:representation</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:8d74ad8f59b5/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:diversity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:evolutionary-economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:agent-based"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:emergence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:simulation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:representation"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1310.2561">
    <title>[1310.2561] Characterizing Strategic Cascades on Networks</title>
    <dc:date>2014-08-09T11:58:10+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1310.2561</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Transmission of disease, spread of information and rumors, adoption of new products, and many other network phenomena can be fruitfully modeled as cascading processes, where actions chosen by nodes influence the subsequent behavior of neighbors in the network graph. Current literature on cascades tends to assume nodes choose myopically based on the state of choices already taken by other nodes. We examine the possibility of strategic choice, where agents representing nodes anticipate the choices of others who have not yet decided, and take into account their own influence on such choices. Our study employs the framework of Chierichetti et al. [2012], who (under assumption of myopic node behavior) investigate the scheduling of node decisions to promote cascades of product adoptions preferred by the scheduler. We show that when nodes behave strategically, outcomes can be extremely different. We exhibit cases where in the strategic setting 100% of agents adopt, but in the myopic setting only an arbitrarily small epsilon % do. Conversely, we present cases where in the strategic setting 0% of agents adopt, but in the myopic setting (100-epsilon)% do, for any constant epsilon > 0. Additionally, we prove some properties of cascade processes with strategic agents, both in general and for particular classes of graphs.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>self-organization collective-intelligence tipping-points strategy agent-based evolutionary-economics simulation parameter-sweeps nudge-targets consider:recognizers consider:warning-systems</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:28bfc14914f7/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:self-organization"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:collective-intelligence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:tipping-points"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:agent-based"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:evolutionary-economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:simulation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:parameter-sweeps"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:recognizers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:warning-systems"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2886">
    <title>[1404.2886] Zero-determinant alliances in multiplayer social dilemmas</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-08T12:16:25+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2886</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. But in large groups these mechanisms may become ineffective, because they require single individuals to have a substantial influence on their peers. However, the recent discovery of the powerful class of zero-determinant strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma suggests that we may have underestimated the degree of control that a single player can exert. Here, we develop a theory for zero-determinant strategies for multiplayer social dilemmas, with any number of involved players. We distinguish several particularly interesting subclasses of strategies: fair strategies ensure that the own payoff matches the average payoff of the group; extortionate strategies allow a player to perform above average; and generous strategies let a player perform below average. We use this theory to explore how individuals can enhance their strategic options by forming alliances. The effects of an alliance depend on the size of the alliance, the type of the social dilemma, and on the strategy of the allies: fair alliances reduce the inequality within their group; extortionate alliances outperform the remaining group members; but generous alliances increase welfare. Our results highlight the critical interplay of individual control and alliance formation to succeed in large groups.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>collective-intelligence game-theory economics interesting strategy nudge-targets</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:4225703f2d24/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:collective-intelligence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:interesting"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2832">
    <title>[1404.2832] Bounding Optimal Revenue in Multiple-Items Auctions</title>
    <dc:date>2014-07-08T11:57:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.2832</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We use a weak-duality technique from the duality-theory framework for optimal auctions developed in [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias, EC 2014] and we derive closed-form upper-bound formulas for the optimal revenue of single-bidder multi-item additive Bayesian auctions, in the case that the items' valuations come i.i.d. from a uniform distribution and in the case where they follow independent (but not necessarily identical) exponential distributions. 
Using this, we are able to get in both settings specific approximation ratio bounds for the simple deterministic auctions studied by Hart and Nisan [EC 2012], namely the one that sells the items separately and the one that sells them all in a full bundle. These bounds are constant, strictly below 2 for uniform priors and strictly below e for the exponential ones, for arbitrary number of items. We also propose and study the performance of a very simple randomized auction for exponential valuations, called Proportional. As a corollary, for the special case where the exponential distributions are also identical, we can derive that selling deterministically in a full bundle is optimal for any number of items.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>economics game-theory auctions analysis strategy nudge-targets consider:gaming consider:performance-measures somewhat-amusing-claims</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:6da9e66fc5ee/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:auctions"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:analysis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:gaming"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:consider:performance-measures"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:somewhat-amusing-claims"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.4388">
    <title>[1404.4388] Partially Observed, Multi-objective Markov Games</title>
    <dc:date>2014-04-24T10:05:08+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.4388</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[The intent of this research is to generate a set of non-dominated policies from which one of two agents (the leader) can select a most preferred policy to control a dynamic system that is also affected by the control decisions of the other agent (the follower). The problem is described by an infinite horizon, partially observed Markov game (POMG). At each decision epoch, each agent knows: its past and present states, its past actions, and noise corrupted observations of the other agent's past and present states. The actions of each agent are determined at each decision epoch based on these data. The leader considers multiple objectives in selecting its policy. The follower considers a single objective in selecting its policy with complete knowledge of and in response to the policy selected by the leader. This leader-follower assumption allows the POMG to be transformed into a specially structured, partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP). This POMDP is used to determine the follower's best response policy. A multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) is used to create the next generation of leader policies based on the fitness measures of each leader policy in the current generation. Computing a fitness measure for a leader policy requires a value determination calculation, given the leader policy and the follower's best response policy. The policies from which the leader can select a most preferred policy are the non-dominated policies of the final generation of leader policies created by the MOGA. An example is presented that illustrates how these results can be used to support a manager of a liquid egg production process (the leader) in selecting a sequence of actions to best control this process over time, given that there is an attacker (the follower) who seeks to contaminate the liquid egg production process with a chemical or biological toxin.
]]></description>
<dc:subject>evolutionary-economics game-theory coevolution nudge-targets strategy noise multiobjective-optimization planning</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:40628f8fd356/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:evolutionary-economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:coevolution"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:noise"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:multiobjective-optimization"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:planning"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.6601">
    <title>[1212.6601] Co-action equilibria and strategy switchings in a stochastic minority game</title>
    <dc:date>2013-04-14T11:52:50+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1212.6601</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We propose a variation of the minority game in which $N$ rational agents use probabilistic strategies. The absence of quenched disorder in the model makes it exactly soluble in terms of simple exact mean-field like self -consistent equations for the optimal probability assignments to actions. We propose an alternative to the standard Nash equilibrium, called co-action equilibrium, which gives higher expected payoff for all agents. Parameters of the optimal strategy depend on the future time-horizon of agents, parameterized by a real variable $\lambda$, and are non-analytic functions of $\lambda$, even for a finite number of agents. The solution for $N \leq 7$ is worked out explicitly.]]></description>
<dc:subject>minority-game agent-based economics complexology strategy nudge-targets notions-of-equilibrium ought-to-be-multiobjective</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:b5f0dcce5f68/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:minority-game"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:agent-based"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:economics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:complexology"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:notions-of-equilibrium"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:ought-to-be-multiobjective"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.3888">
    <title>[1301.3888] Probabilistic State-Dependent Grammars for Plan Recognition</title>
    <dc:date>2013-03-03T20:43:19+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.3888</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[Techniques for plan recognition under uncertainty require a stochastic model of the plan-generation process. We introduce Probabilistic State-Dependent Grammars (PSDGs) to represent an agent's plan-generation process. The PSDG language model extends probabilistic context-free grammars (PCFGs) by allowing production probabilities to depend on an explicit model of the planning agent's internal and external state. Given a PSDG description of the plan-generation process, we can then use inference algorithms that exploit the particular independence properties of the PSDG language to efficiently answer plan-recognition queries. The combination of the PSDG language model and inference algorithms extends the range of plan-recognition domains for which practical probabilistic inference is possible, as illustrated by applications in traffic monitoring and air combat.]]></description>
<dc:subject>planning plan-recognition inference strategy artificial-intelligence nudge-targets</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:a3f47d21383a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:planning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:plan-recognition"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:inference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:artificial-intelligence"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.5711">
    <title>[1302.5711] On a game on graphs</title>
    <dc:date>2013-03-03T20:36:17+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1302.5711</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[We start with the well-known game below: Two players hold a sheet of paper to their forehead on which a positive integer is written. The numbers are consecutive and each player can only see the number of the other one. In each time step, they either say nothing or tell what number they have. Both of them will eventually figure out their number after a certain amount of time. The game is rather cooperative than competitive, and employs the notions of common knowledge and mutual knowledge. We generalize this game to arbitrary (directed and non-directed) simple graphs and try to establish for which graphs one or both of them will figure out the solution, and how long they do need to find it. We give a complete answer for the case of two players, even if they are both allowed to discuss before the start of the game.]]></description>
<dc:subject>game-theory network-theory agent-based nudge-targets strategy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:ac44863d7407/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:network-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:agent-based"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.3235">
    <title>[1206.3235] Identifying reasoning patterns in games</title>
    <dc:date>2012-06-19T22:16:34+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.3235</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["We present an algorithm that identifies the reasoning patterns of agents in a game, by iteratively examining the graph structure of its Multi-Agent Influence Diagram (MAID) representation. If the decision of an agent participates in no reasoning patterns, then we can effectively ignore that decision for the purpose of calculating a Nash equilibrium for the game. In some cases, this can lead to exponential time savings in the process of equilibrium calculation. Moreover, our algorithm can be used to enumerate the reasoning patterns in a game, which can be useful for constructing more effective computerized agents interacting with humans."]]></description>
<dc:subject>game-theory inference strategy nudge-targets learning-by-watching</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:5a280753e24e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:inference"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nudge-targets"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:learning-by-watching"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://blog.mountaingoatsoftware.com/time-as-a-competitive-advantage">
    <title>Time as a Competitive Advantage | Mike Cohn's Blog - Succeeding With Agile®</title>
    <dc:date>2011-06-10T14:04:13+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://blog.mountaingoatsoftware.com/time-as-a-competitive-advantage</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Innovation has become a fertile area in which companies seek competitive advantage today. This has served Apple well over the past decade. I don’t think innovativeness will be going away soon as a source of competitive advantage. But I do wonder whether time is running out on time as a competitive advantage. If agile and other innovations lead us to a world where all companies can deliver new products and services equally quickly, companies will need to find newer ways to differentiate themselves."]]></description>
<dc:subject>innovation competitiveness agility strategy</dc:subject>
<dc:source>https://pinboard.in/</dc:source>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:1632f557cb5a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:innovation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:competitiveness"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:agility"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.3672v2">
    <title>http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.3672v2</title>
    <dc:date>2010-07-28T23:53:44+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.3672v2</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["…For cyclic games with two players and three strategies, we show that the resulting deterministic dynamics crucially depends on the initial condition in a non–trivial way."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>roshambo rock-paper-scissors game-theory strategy complexology</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:e8da15d4f277/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:roshambo"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:rock-paper-scissors"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:game-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:complexology"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://zenpundit.com/?p=3348">
    <title>zenpundit.com » Blog Archive » Arquilla on the New Rules of War</title>
    <dc:date>2010-02-25T23:20:11+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://zenpundit.com/?p=3348</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA['These developments suggest that the United States is spending huge amounts of money in ways that are actually making Americans less secure, not only against irregular insurgents, but also against smart countries building different sorts of militaries. And the problem goes well beyond weapons and other high-tech items. What’s missing most of all from the U.S. military’s arsenal is a deep understanding of networking, the loose but lively interconnection between people that creates and brings a new kind of collective intelligence, power, and purpose to bear — for good and ill…..”'
]]></description>
<dc:subject>war social-dynamics military tactics planning strategy it's-more-complicated-than-you-think network-culture network-thinking American-cultural-assumptions</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:599aa972df7a/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:war"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:social-dynamics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:military"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:tactics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:planning"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:it's-more-complicated-than-you-think"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:network-culture"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:network-thinking"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:American-cultural-assumptions"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://nvie.com/archives/323">
    <title>nvie.com » Blog Archive » A successful Git branching model</title>
    <dc:date>2010-01-21T14:54:45+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://nvie.com/archives/323</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["In this post I present the development model that I’ve introduced for all of my projects (both at work and private) about a year ago, and which has turned out to be very successful. I’ve been meaning to write about it for a while now, but I’ve never really found the time to do so thoroughly, until now. I won’t talk about any of the projects’ details, merely about the branching strategy and release management."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>git version-control project-management programming software-development tutorial control strategy workflow branching dvcs</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:ede29257bf8c/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:git"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:version-control"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:project-management"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:programming"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:software-development"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:tutorial"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:control"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:workflow"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:branching"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:dvcs"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2009/10/creating-sustainable-competitive-advantage.html">
    <title>Seth's Blog: Creating sustainable competitive advantage</title>
    <dc:date>2009-10-28T11:53:17+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2009/10/creating-sustainable-competitive-advantage.html</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The reason the internet is such a home to wow business models is that it's easier to create a network here than any other time in history."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>business-culture business-model-failure branding networks social-networks entrepreneurship strategy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:68c2fe040fe3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:business-culture"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:business-model-failure"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:branding"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:social-networks"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:entrepreneurship"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146415-high-correlation-between-asset-classes-herd-mentality-or-lemming-action?source=feed">
    <title>High Correlation Between Asset Classes: Herd Mentality or Lemming Action? -- Seeking Alpha</title>
    <dc:date>2009-07-02T14:02:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146415-high-correlation-between-asset-classes-herd-mentality-or-lemming-action?source=feed</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Harry Markowitz, 81, who won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1990 for his work on portfolio theory, says that last year’s collapse reinforces his view that even the most unlikely outcomes are possible in any year. “The thundering herd is still with us,” said Markowitz, a professor of finance at the Rady School of Management at the University of California, San Diego. “Nature draws into a bushel basket full of returns and finds a next return every year, and I believe there’s another 1929 somewhere in that bushel basket. 2008 was not a refutation, it was a confirmation.""
]]></description>
<dc:subject>portfolio-theory portfolio investment trading financial-crisis financial-engineering strategy tactics</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:6f43ecfc977d/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:portfolio-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:portfolio"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:investment"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:trading"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:financial-crisis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:financial-engineering"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:tactics"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://seekingalpha.com/article/144578-a-portfolio-for-you-not-for-your-financial-planner?source=feed">
    <title>A Portfolio for You, Not for Your Financial Planner -- Seeking Alpha</title>
    <dc:date>2009-06-24T23:35:31+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/144578-a-portfolio-for-you-not-for-your-financial-planner?source=feed</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["Overlooked in tax strategy is the huge tax advantages owning and self-managing real estate. I prefer residential real estate. You have write-offs and phantom depreciation galore (which can be deferred until death via 1031 and similar property exchange programs, or simple refinancing)."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>investment portfolio-theory portfolio diversity money financial-crisis strategy</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:57ed95455bce/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:investment"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:portfolio-theory"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:portfolio"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:diversity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:money"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:financial-crisis"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20090102-contemplating-the-consumerist-sale-and-the-adpocalypse.html">
    <title>Contemplating the Consumerist sale and the adpocalypse</title>
    <dc:date>2009-01-05T12:15:55+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20090102-contemplating-the-consumerist-sale-and-the-adpocalypse.html</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["This being the case, it's entirely possible that cash-strapped advertisers will have exactly the same kind of "moment of clarity" that shopaholic consumers are reportedly having now that they've seen entire store inventories marked down 50 percent or more in pre-Christmas sales—that is, they may say to themselves, "We knew all along that this stuff was made in China for a tiny fraction of what it sells for here; we were nuts to pay so much in markup for it.""
]]></description>
<dc:subject>via:vielmetti advertising economic-downturn marketing strategy woops</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:61733e6cc18e/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:via:vielmetti"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:economic-downturn"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:marketing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:woops"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2009/01/do-ads-work.html">
    <title>Seth's Blog: Do ads work?</title>
    <dc:date>2009-01-03T23:17:28+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2009/01/do-ads-work.html</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The time-tested response is that you're not sure, that ads are risky, that you can't tell. And for some sorts of products and some sorts of ads, you'll get no argument from me.

Digital ads are different (or they should be). You should know cost per click and revenue per click and be able to make a smart guess about lifetime value of a click. And if that's positive, buy, buy, buy.

And if you don't know those things, why are you buying digital ads?"
]]></description>
<dc:subject>advertising online marketing management strategy conservatism received-wisdom web2.0</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:42784e592972/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:advertising"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:online"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:marketing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:management"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:conservatism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:received-wisdom"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:web2.0"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://rustbeltintellectual.blogspot.com/2008/09/identity-versus-interest.html">
    <title>Rustbelt Intellectual: IDENTITY VERSUS INTEREST</title>
    <dc:date>2008-09-21T12:59:48+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://rustbeltintellectual.blogspot.com/2008/09/identity-versus-interest.html</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["The Republicans are playing to voters' identity. The Democrats are campaigning on their economic interests. The outcome of this year's election will ride on whether or not a segment of the working and middle-class electorate in economically-devastated states will support a ticket whose candidates pretend to be the cultural allies of the people or a ticket whose candidates are challenging (at least in part) the failed economic policies that should be the real source of bitterness at the grassroots. "
]]></description>
<dc:subject>politics election Bushism Republicans strategy campaign marketing identity interesting-times</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:8b7331c87870/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:politics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:election"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:Bushism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:Republicans"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:campaign"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:marketing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:identity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:interesting-times"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://malvasiabianca.org/archives/2008/03/refactoring-and-proofs/">
    <title>malvasia bianca » Blog Archive » refactoring and proofs</title>
    <dc:date>2008-03-05T13:21:30+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://malvasiabianca.org/archives/2008/03/refactoring-and-proofs/</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA["But I’m actually thinking that there are some lessons here that the mathematics community could learn from..."
]]></description>
<dc:subject>refactoring learning-by-doing mathematics strategy proof development research</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:83bc1ba594e3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:refactoring"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:learning-by-doing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:mathematics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:proof"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:development"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:research"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095810#PaperDownload">
    <title>SSRN-The Rising Size and Complexity of the Patent Document by Dennis Crouch</title>
    <dc:date>2008-02-26T11:50:58+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095810#PaperDownload</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><dc:subject>patents obfuscation strategy writing intellectual-property communication editing broken</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:289496e91df3/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:patents"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:obfuscation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:writing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:intellectual-property"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:communication"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:editing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:broken"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://blog.pmarca.com/2008/02/inaugurating-th.html">
    <title>blog.pmarca.com: Inaugurating the New York Times Deathwatch</title>
    <dc:date>2008-02-07T12:27:33+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://blog.pmarca.com/2008/02/inaugurating-th.html</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><description><![CDATA[seeing this as the tail-end of a much longer discussion....
]]></description>
<dc:subject>disintermediation publishing newspapers nytimes journalism news strategy prediction</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:58b086f1c503/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:disintermediation"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:publishing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:newspapers"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:nytimes"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:journalism"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:news"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:prediction"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
<item rdf:about="http://blogs.sun.com/jonathan/entry/sun_enters_the_commodity_silicon">
    <title>Jonathan Schwartz's Weblog: Sun Enters the Commodity Silicon Business</title>
    <dc:date>2007-08-30T12:00:53+00:00</dc:date>
    <link>http://blogs.sun.com/jonathan/entry/sun_enters_the_commodity_silicon</link>
    <dc:creator>Vaguery</dc:creator><dc:subject>commodity chip electronics design intellectual-property Sun strategy branding marketing openness open-source patents control</dc:subject>
<dc:identifier>https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/b:a4f300332e92/</dc:identifier>
<taxo:topics><rdf:Bag>	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:commodity"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:chip"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:electronics"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:design"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:intellectual-property"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:Sun"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:strategy"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:branding"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:marketing"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:openness"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:open-source"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:patents"/>
	<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://pinboard.in/u:Vaguery/t:control"/>
</rdf:Bag></taxo:topics>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>